PART 1.

PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY

DURING THE SESSION 1887-88.

SYMPOSIUM—IS MIND SYNONYMOUS WITH CONSCIOUSNESS?

I.—By Shadworth H. Hodgson, M.A., LL.D., Honorary Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; President.

This question being one of nomenclature and definition, and definitions being ultimately dependent on the convenience of those who make and use them, it seems prima facie as if the question should run, not whether mind is synonymous with consciousness, but whether it ought to be so, and consequently whether it shall with us, for purposes of discussion, be agreed to use it in that sense.

We must remember, however, that convenience of usage for the future is greatly, if not mainly, determined by the prevalent usage in the past and present. If any usage is deeply rooted in habitual and general practice, it may be better to continue it than attempt to change it. Accuracy of definition, which per se is the greatest convenience, would in that case have to yield to long continued custom.

But in the present case it seems to me that both usage and accuracy of definition alike concur in deciding the question whether mind is synonymous with consciousness, and to decide it in the negative.

In the first place we want a nomenclature suitable for discussion, in which no particular philosophical or psychological theory has been adopted, and consequently one which does not involve or
favour one theory in preference to another. We also want a nomenclature which shall be capable of common use; common, I mean, not merely to different philosophical and psychological schools, but also to men in general, or, if I may use the expression, to pre-philosophic man.

Standing on this general ground of common sense, and reviewing the phenomena as a whole, we may reduce them to the following general and diagrammatic expression:

(1) Some one's — (2) consciousness of — (3) something or, in partly Cartesian phrase, to the three corresponding heads:

(1) Res cogitans — (2) Cogitatio — (3) Cogitata.

And the question is, whether Mind is to be brought under the first or under the second head; whether it is to be identified with "some one" or with his "consciousness" — with res cogitans or with cogitatio.

If we identify it with the first we make Mind an agent, the Subject of consciousness, but leave entirely open the question whether this agent is of a physical or of an immaterial nature. If we identify it with the second, we either dissociate it from the Subject, and thus obtain a merely verbal synonym of consciousness, which, to say the least, is a luxury rather than a necessary, or else we adopt the theory that consciousness has agency in itself, or is Subject and consciousness in one.

Now custom and usage have certainly linked together, by habitual association, the term mind with the thought of agency — mind always suggests itself as an agent, a res cogitans. As, for instance, in the well-known line—

νόος ὅρη καὶ νόος ἀκούει· τὰ λα ὑψά ὑψα καὶ τυφλά.

What sees, what hears, is mind;
All else is deaf and blind.

(Epicharmus, l. 253. In Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach, vol. i., p. 144; Didot, Paris.) And perhaps more plainly still in Virgil's—Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. Consequently, if we adopt the nomenclature which identifies mind with consciousness, we practically favour the adoption of the hypothesis—that consciousness has agency in itself, or is Subject and consciousness in one. And, therefore, until this hypothesis has been legitimately established, and even in order to examine and discuss it fairly, it is better to abstain from a nomenclature which identifies mind with consciousness.
But this is not all. There are certain theoretical considerations which militate strongly against the identification.

1. If we identify mind with consciousness, what are we to do with those states and operations, commonly called mental, which are either partially or entirely below the threshold of consciousness, and some kinds of which never rise above it, including, in the opinion of many psychologists, the whole motor and efferent action of brain and nerve—states and operations which, though unconscious, yet form parts of one connected system with those which are attended with consciousness, and the existence of which, as matter of inference, is undoubted? Are these to be excluded from mind, as they must be, if mind and consciousness are to be made synonymous? In view of these states and operations mind is the larger term of the two.

2. There is another sense in which consciousness is a larger term than mind. It has two quite distinct but inseparable characters: (1) as content, in which character it includes all objects, all cogitata, as being the knowledge, but not in any sense the producer, of them; and (2) as process, in which character its states and operations are products one of another, antecedent states and operations producing and determining subsequent ones, as parts of knowledge, the former being the cause cognoscendi of the latter, but not in any way producing the real objects thought of by them. Consciousness in this sense is τα πράγματα, being the knowledge, or subjective aspect, of all things whatever. Mind, on the other hand, is the name of one kind, and one kind only, of the objects known. A mind is an individual real existent, one among τα ὀντα.

Thus, while in one direction the term mind overlaps the term consciousness, in another consciousness overlaps mind. The two cannot be co-extensive, and therefore making synonyms of them can lead only to perpetuate the confusion of thought from which it seems to spring.

3. The very form of the word consciousness shows that it means an attribute, not a subject of attributes. The word mind on the other hand indicates a subject and not an attribute. Mind must be generalised in meaning, so as to signify mentality, or else consciousness must be particularised so as to mean a consciousness, before the two terms can be treated as synonyms. And this alone would, in my opinion, be a fatal objection to doing so, namely, that it leaves undetermined and unmarked which of the two ways it is intended to take, I mean, whether it is intended to generalise mind, or to particularise consciousness.

The word mind has, no doubt, a meaning of its own, just as much as the word consciousness, though its precise meaning is by no means
equally evident. It is a name for Subjects, and characterises them by picking out one of their functions, or group of functions. In my own opinion it is best employed to mean the Subject considered as a reasoning being, that is, in its intellectual or thinking functions; just as the Will is a name for the Subject considered in its volitional or immanently active functions; the Soul, a name for it considered either in its vital, living functions, or else in its emotional and imaginative functions; and the Person or Ego, a name for it in its character of having the idea of Self, remembering its own states and actions, and referring them to itself. So it is also with the term mind, which thus receives a meaning in perfect harmony with the term consciousness, for the very reason that it is not attempted to identify them.

II.—By DAVID G. RITCHIE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford.

By “Consciousness” I understand the fact of my being aware that I feel, think, act, or am acted on in any way. “Consciousness of an event” is the reference of an event to myself as knowing it. Consciousness is the most certain fact in the universe. It is the only absolutely certain, it is the ultimate fact. Attempt to think away everything else—the thinking (cogitatio) remains. “Cogito, ergo sum,” may be so interpreted as to contain a fallacy (if we read more into “sum” than is contained “in cogito”); but “Dubito, ergo cogito,” is absolutely valid. Now Consciousness, from the very meaning of it, includes in it an “Ego,” an I. [In “cogito” the termination expresses the “I.”] Of course, the term “Self-consciousness” may be used in a fuller sense to express a recognition only arrived at by a process of reflection at an advanced stage in knowledge. We talk of simple and straightforward persons “showing an absence of self-consciousness,” meaning that they are not in the habit of reflecting about self, of making self an object of thought: we cannot possibly mean that their conscious life does not contain a reference of all that happens to the self, as knowing subject. A self, or Ego (the Latin word is perhaps preferable, because we can keep it more free from irrelevant connotation), as the subject thinking, is there in the very fact of consciousness. Sensation implies it, as soon as sensation can possibly give rise to any knowledge, as soon as feeling becomes “I feel this.”

On the other hand, “the human Mind” is a hypothetical substance to which we can ascribe qualities. We do not know it in
any strict sense. We assume it for convenience. We talk of it as something parallel with the body, existing alongside of (or in) the body; and then we proceed to enquire into the relations between mind and body, not noticing that one of the pair is a merely conjectural entity. The body we know as a thing, or complex of things, existing in space and time; we have no such knowledge of the Mind as a *res cogitans*. The "I" is what *knows*, and for that reason can never be fully *known*. The attempt to make it into an object, a thing existing among other things, involves the attempt to jump outside oneself, which is impossible. For convenience we may regard ourselves as mere objects, as existent *things*; but that is only a convenient psychological fiction—convenient, or worse, as soon as we forget that it is a fiction. We can only properly and fairly study the human Mind by studying what man has *done* in the world (language, institutions, religions, art, &c.).

Thus, though I should follow the President, by answering our question in the negative, my reasons for doing so are very different.

And I must venture in particular to disagree with several phrases in his paper. As already said, "*res cogitans*" (see p. 6) seems to me a fiction. "*Cogitatio*" is a fact. "*Ego cogitans*" represents all that we can know about the subject that thinks. What the *Ego* is we cannot say from direct knowledge of it, because we cannot get outside ourselves to look at it. Nor can we know any other self except as a series of events, which we ascribe as acts to a conjectural unity on the analogy of our own self.

Further, is there not an ambiguity in the word "subject"? (see p. 6). In the sense in which we distinguish "subject thinking" from "object thought," the conscious self (which we might call "consciousness")—though with some awkwardness, because the word has the abstract termination "ness"—to distinguish it from the more fully grown "self-consciousness"), the conscious self is the subject. But it does not, therefore, follow that it is a subject in the sense of a substance, a thing, underlying qualities, though, of course, like any other noun, it may be made the logical subject of predicates or attributes.

It will be apparent that I have used the term "Ego" in a very different sense from the President (see p. 8). It seems convenient to keep the word for the mere "I" which "know," "think," &c., imply, whereas the word "person" is only applicable to human beings in a complicated social organisation, which bestows on them a status with legal and moral rights and duties, i.e., "Ego" I keep as a logical and metaphysical term (a term in that *Erkenntniss-theorie* of which the President, like Lotze and others, has become impatient); whereas "person" is a term only applicable in Ethics or Jurisprudence.
If it be asked, What is this "Ego"? Is it you, or I, or he, or anyone in particular, or is it no one in particular, but some absolute "Ego"?—to this question I must answer, though aware that I shall seem to be quibbling, Of course "Ego" is always "I," and not "you," or "he," or "it;" but how the absolute presupposition of all knowledge and existence which because it makes Time possible cannot be in Time, how this eternal Ego manifests itself in each of us, who calls himself "I," that question I must leave to speculative metaphysics. That our many finite individual selves (as we consider them) imply a self, one and eternal (i.e., time-less), I believe to be an inevitable logical conclusion from the fact of knowledge. But how it is so is the one great mystery to which every philosophical problem drives us back, and the solution of which is the perpetual endeavour of all the great metaphysical systems and of all religions, so far as religion implies a theory of the universe. These problems, moreover, are not merely theoretical as is obvious enough in the case of evil. But why call this unity of the Cosmos a "self"? Why not be content, like the ancients, with calling it ιό άυ or ιό άυ? The answer to this is, that, apart from the unity of self-consciousness, any unity of the Cosmos is a mere conjecture. Through the senses we learn not unity but multiplicity. Yet it is true that science implies an ultimate unity. This unity we know as a fact in the "ego" which we cannot escape, do what we will. Therefore it is "truest" to call the unity "ego." This is the advantage in terminology which modern philosophy has over ancient. We have found a higher category, that is all.

Certainly we may call Consciousness an attribute, but I cannot think that much is gained by calling it an attribute of the mind except for the special purpose of marking off unconscious or subconscious mental activities from those which are conscious. Consciousness may be considered as an attribute of certain highly organised matter, or, if the word be used to express, not a more or less permanent quality, but an occasional phenomenon, it may signify an event, or set of events, which takes place when certain material conditions are fulfilled. Consciousness, then, is a phenomenon whose material conditions may be examined by a natural science, just as are the conditions of light, electricity or life. But I do not see that this is inconsistent with regarding consciousness as also the ultimate fact. Though, as a matter of history, it is the result of a process of development, yet logically it is prior to the whole universe, because implied in all our knowledge of it.

This question presents two aspects, according as it is considered from a psychological or from a metaphysical point of view. Psychology investigates the steps by which knowledge grows. Metaphysics investigates the ultimate nature of what is known. Thus for the Psychologist the problem before us takes shape as follows:—Is it legitimate in explaining the way in which knowledge arises to posit unconscious mental processes as taking place within the mind whose development we are tracing? The metaphysician, on the contrary, has a very different question to discuss. He must inquire whether unconscious mental processes can have being, apart from any consciousness whatever, including that of the psychologist, who assumes them. To the former of these two questions I answer, Yes; to the latter I answer, No.

I. From the psychological standpoint the phrase, mental but unconscious, may have a definite and useful meaning. The word "mental" may, I think, be applied with propriety to an extra conscious process, of which the course and working may be traced by representing it as analogous to conscious psychological processes, and as forming part of the same total dynamical system with them. In assuming such a process we should only be pursuing a course similar to that on which all our knowledge of physical nature depends. In order to trace and account for the changes undergone by physical things, we must of necessity picture them as invested with a sensible appearance, even when they are unperceived. This we do even in the case of ultimate atoms, which we have good reason to believe could not appear as we represent them. In like manner, the psychologist may, if need be, establish continuity between events in consciousness by interpolating between them as connecting links, trains of events not given in consciousness, but regarded as more or less analogous to those which are so given. The analogy of these hypothetical processes to conscious processes, and their continuity with them as forming parts of the same dynamical system, could only be expressed by applying the term mental to both. Thus it appears that from the psychological standpoint, something may conceivably exist which is mental and at the same time extra conscious. It is, therefore, illegitimate to give a definition of mind which excludes this possibility. Mind for the psychologist is not synonymous with consciousness.

Before leaving this part of the subject I must notice the question which the President raises, whether mind is res cogitans or cogitatio. As to the correctness of Mr. Hodgson's distinctions I have nothing
to say. But I am strongly of opinion that mind cannot be identified either with res cogitans or with cogitatio, or with cogitata. So far as mind implies consciousness it implies all that is logically pre-supposed in consciousness, just as the word triangle implies figure and sides and angles and threeness. By giving it this meaning we do not pre-judge any question. All that is implied in the word consciousness enter into the connotation of the word mind. In affirming this we in no way anticipate the result which logical analysis of the import of the word consciousness may yield.

With the statement that mind is a subject and consciousness an attribute I agree. I fail, however, to see that a subject in the grammatical sense is anything distinct from its attributes in a perfectly determinate form.

II.—Turning to the metaphysical aspect of our problem, I ask whether the unconscious processes posited in psychology may exist apart from any consciousness whatever. To this question there can be but one answer if my explanation of what is meant by unconscious mental process be accepted. It is something which exists only for a very conscious person indeed, i.e., the psychologist. I do not mean to say that what the psychologist thinks and speaks of as unconscious mental process is in itself nothing. But I do affirm that, taken per se, it cannot in any intelligible sense be called an unconscious mental process.

From this point of view the question, Is it mind? is identical with the question, Is it some mode of consciousness? I may add that I can attach no other meaning than this to the apparently more general question, Does it exist?

For metaphysics, consciousness is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, through and for which all things are.

IV.—By Bernard Bosanquet, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford.

I begin by naming two problems, which I consider myself discharged from discussing, as they have not been discussed in the previous papers. 1. Can mind exist without consciousness, in the particular sense that design or purpose is to be found operative in unconscious nature? 2. Can consciousness exist without mind, in the particular sense that units of inorganic matter are to be regarded as charged with or consisting in elements of consciousness, not concentrated into individual minds?

Dismissing these two questions, I find the problem as stated by
both the President and Mr. Ritchie to turn on the fact that mind as
a concrete name is taken to mean a thing or subject, while conscious-
ness as an abstract name is taken to mean an attribute or general
characteristic. Both writers, however, recognise that this lexico-
graphical rule is not absolute, and what Mr. Ritchie says of conscious-
ness as — the conscious self appears to me to apply precisely to mind
when taken as a concrete name.

Starting from this point I shall on the whole dispute the conclu-
sion at which in common they have arrived. I shall admit a
difference in meaning between mind and consciousness; but I shall
not consent to treat this as a difference in strictly philosophical usage.
I shall maintain that mind and consciousness are co-extensive though
not synonymous terms.

I think that English usage leaves no doubt that “my mind” and
“mind” are capable of precisely analogous significations to those of
“my consciousness” and “consciousness,” respectively. In modern
language, at all events, there is no real hindrance to using abstract
terms as concretes. The practical distinction seems to me to be that
mind is a popular and prima facie unreflective term, while con-
sciousness is an analytic term of comparatively recent growth (Skeat
does not mention it), and bears its analytic meaning on its face. It
is the same relation as between feeling and sensation, or will and
volition.

The views both of the President and Mr. Ritchie have the peculiarity
that they rather tend to impeach, at all events the natural usage of the
older and less reflective term. Mr. Ritchie regards mind as something
not knowable, although habitually treated as a thing or hypothetical
substance. The President regards it as including a false or disputable
idea—that of agency, and as therefore neither identifiable with con-
sciousness, nor to be assumed as real apart from consciousness. He
proposes a use for the word, of which I cannot approve—“The
subject—in its intellectual functions,” apparently excluding the Will.

I have to examine these two ideas; that mind in the ordinary
sense implies a thing or substance which is not knowable, but which
is only assumed for convenience sake; and that mind in the ordinary
sense implies agency, which is something disputable, and not attri-
butable to consciousness. My purpose in doing so is on the whole
to defend the ordinary usage.

My mind I take to be the totality of ideas and feelings attached
to my sentient experience, which of course is not definable qua
sentient, by identity of quality. This totality is coloured throughout
by a self-identical character and set of purposes.

As Mr. Ritchie contends, it is not a thing among things in space.
Space for me is in it. It is, therefore, not knowable as a thing in
space. The same may be said of a musical chord, of a colour system, or of a toothache. And, moreover, no thing could be in space if it were only in space. It must have a continuous quality, or identity throughout its extended parts, or else it would not present its parts as parts of a thing. Therefore the mind has only, in a stronger sense, a character which attaches to everything in space. And although not in space, it is unquestionably qua sentient, in time, though this relation also is only made possible by its being more than in time.

The only difference between my mind and a thing for knowledge, seems to me to be that my mind is a totality, and every thing is an abstraction within that totality. But I cannot see that my mind is a hypothetical substance in any sense in which a thing admitted to be knowable is not. A thing is a universal, a synthesis of differences, and my mind as a totality is the most concrete of all syntheses, and is not merely a unity in general, but a particular unity coloured throughout by a recognisable quality. I do not see how we can think of mind as not so coloured. To divorce mind from sense may be, perhaps, like divorcing the concave from the convex. A mind not at all in time, and viewing things purely sub specie aeternitatis, may be, I suspect, a creation of a false abstraction. But however this may be, my immediate point is that my mind is to its attributes precisely as the town of London to its attributes, and if the one is a hypothetical substance and knowable only by a fiction, then so is the other.

And secondly, I cannot see that my mind thus regarded becomes an agent or entity in any disputable sense. Nothing that we thus say about it tends to make it anything beyond its actual content. We imply no noumenon, except as a totality is a noumenon, because thought is needed to bind its differences together. The conception of agency would repay examination. I take agency to be the form assumed by imperfect explanation, when the matter to be explained consists of events in time. Therefore, in as far as my mind is a series in time, it would present, when being imperfectly explained, an aspect of agency. This carries no connotation of anything behind consciousness, but is simply the ordinary expression of a connected series in time in which we refer the latter part to the former, because we cannot refer the former to the latter, which we do not yet possess.

I cannot, therefore, admit that my mind is a fiction or hypothesis in a sense in which my consciousness is not, or that my mind implies agency in a sense in which my consciousness does not. When we speak of the mind of Christ, we mean the totality of a certain consciousness as consciousness, with a certain purpose and a certain
colour and mood. When we say, "My mind leans to that course of action," we are judging a predicate of a subject which includes it, and bringing order into a total complex of relations and events. If such a judgment is a predication of agency, then I think agency is a very harmless conception, and quite inevitable in judgment, whether about consciousness or about mind.

One further difficulty is, I think, simply solved by keeping to the analogy of a thing. Does my mind include unconscious states, and therefore include something which is not consciousness? Does poison, I should ask, include arsenic when no one is eating it, and therefore include something which is not acting in any way as poison? You may say, "Yes, because the conditions of the poisoning are permanent, although the poisoning is intermittent." This is plausible with the arsenic, because the thing persists in its other properties; but, of course, all these other properties can theoretically have their manifestation suspended, and in the case of mind this is so. If you say that the conditions must persist or the effect could not be apparent, I may reply, "Perhaps; but how do you know that the conditions of mind which persist in the breaks of consciousness are such as should be called Mind?" In ordinary life we cannot venture on this inference, or we do it very irregularly. You may call the pipe from which a fountain plays "the fountain" or not. The fact is, I do not think that in our usage we mean to apply mind to unconscious states. I think we characterise the subject by a feature which has continued identity, and leave this feature to take care of its own application. Intermittent identity is no hindrance to unity if the characters of the intermittent content are recognisable. Out of sight, out of mind; to call to mind; to mind in the sense of attending or remembering—all go to show that mind involves consciousness. To say that the conditions are there, that an activity is dormant, that an attribute is not being manifested—all simply mean that something is not happening, but we know, more or less specifically, under what circumstances it would be likely to happen again.

Therefore, apart from the two problems mentioned at first, I take mind to be convertible with consciousness: only while consciousness is a negative superficial term meaning the characteristic of being not asleep, mind rather means the totality of a consciousness in all its grades and with all its organised relations. Mind in the abstract, as Mr. Ritchie has said, no doubt should be looked for in its works; but what is the philosophy of mind if it is not the revelation by the analysis of these works of the conscious world or concrete consciousness of the artist, the citizen, or the saint?

What I have said determines my position towards Mr. Stout's contentions. I agree that in psychology as a working science we
may conveniently speak of unconscious mental states. But I see no use in shirking the paradox and pretending that we are not speaking of unconscious states of consciousness. If instead of unconscious mental states we spoke of unconscious states of mind, then I think our paradox would be unavoidable. It is, as Mr. Stout says, exactly parallel to talking of things as having sensuous qualities when not objects of sense. But I cannot sympathise with his perfect indulgence towards this supposed habit, which I believe that I have accounted for rightly above. We characterise things by their qualities without noting that the qualities are intermittent, but we do not mean seriously to ascribe to things out of reach of sense qualities analogous to, or identical with, those which they have for sense. If we speak of a thing which we do not see, as red, we mean that seen in a white light it would be red, we do not mean that it is something like red now. If we know the other properties which are relatively permanent, and are real conditions of red, we may, or may not, use red to = them, according as they seem remote or not. But apart from this, "red" for a red thing in the dark is merely a name of a problem, and that is what unconscious mental states are. We do not mean to pledge ourselves that they are at once mental and unconscious.

Therefore, in Metaphysics, I must, with Mr. Stout, reject even this shadow of a difference between Mind and Consciousness, because Metaphysics admits of no fictions. But I cannot accept Mr. Stout's reason for the identification of unconscious states with consciousness in Metaphysic, viz., because in reality they, like everything else, are relative to a knowing consciousness. This argument would prove equally well that an inkstand is consciousness. But an inkstand though in consciousness, is in consciousness as unconscious; a mind is in consciousness as conscious. It is not a question of the form of existence, but of the content. We assume in metaphysics that everything is in consciousness, but for that reason we go on to ask how in consciousness?

V.—By S. ALEXANDER, M.A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford; Vice-President.

Though the question is put before us as one of nomenclature, it is evident from the remarks of the previous speakers that their decision of the question of language rests upon fundamental differences as to the nature of the mind and consciousness itself. I shall, therefore, make no apology for beginning with this, the more important aspect
of the problem. I can only regret that the debate is graced by no representative of the strictly empirical psychology, and the more so because though I shall not come to quite the same result I believe myself to be in essential agreement with Mr. Bosanquet, and shall seem sometimes to be merely repeating "the song which floats last about the hearer's ears."

Waiving the ultimate question, I shall first try to show that, supposing we believe in the identity of mind and consciousness, our belief need not be disturbed by the arguments alleged against the identity. The President's fear is that to identify them would be to attribute to consciousness agency. The objection is hardly answered by saying with Mr. Ritchie, that the mind has been, and is, held to be passive, for the distinction is one of degree. When the part played by the mind itself in any mental state is more important or striking or more decisive than the contribution of the foreign cause, we regard the mind as active; in the contrary case we regard it as passive. But it is surely impossible to reproach consciousness with being an agent until it is explained in what sense we attribute agency to anything whatever. And it is the more unreasonable because our idea of agency is largely derived from the knowledge of the operations of our mind and will. A thing is, I think, called an agent, or said to be active when one or more events in the thing or states of it lead up to or are transformed into some other event or state, either in some other thing or in the thing itself. The brickbat that killed Pyrrhus was an agent, because such poor qualities and states as mass and fall were sufficient to crack the skull of a king. And if mind were nothing else but a complex of conscious states it would be an agent in exactly the same sense.

The grounds of Mr. Ritchie's view are very different; he denies that consciousness can, except by a psychological fiction, be regarded as a thing like other things; it is something unique, which is the condition of knowledge and of reality, is itself not in time, and is the reproduction of that consciousness which is the unity of the world. But this view seems to me partly to contradict facts, and partly to rest on an assumption. So far as it denies consciousness to be the object of knowledge, it contradicts a fact of which we have experience in every description which we give of our own mental condition or may read in the pages of a novelist. The difficulty of observing our minds does not prove that we cannot observe them. The assumption I allude to is the inference from the peculiar and unique character of certain mental states to the existence of a unique and peculiar subject, which is altogether out of line with what we call natural objects. The course of reasoning proves too much. If an electrical machine could think and speak (and
we may imagine its words would be more sparkling than I can represent them), it might say, "Electricity is unique and the source of all reality; and is thus entirely incomparable with any other thing; my electricity does not exist in a succession of flashes, but is the condition of such succession, and it postulates as the unity of the whole world an electricity of which mine is the reproduction." With this view all electrical thinkers would agree who held the truth of things to be what they are when seen sub specie electricitatis. We know they would be wrong, but they would be making an inference of precisely the same kind as the inference in question.

My own view is that the mind is a thing in precisely the same sense as all other things, and that it is a peculiar and unique thing in the same way as other things are peculiar and unique. The mind is a name which we give to the complex or unity of what we call mental states, just as the stone is the complex or unity of the states of the stone. These states are modes of behaviour towards all other things, but the thing itself is not different from its modes of behaviour but identical with them. They constitute it a thing because of their character, or quality, or content. But different things behave differently, and what constitutes their peculiarity is the difference in their modes of behaviour. The mind then is the unity of its states, a unity effected by what Mr. Hodgson calls their contents, and it owes its peculiarity not to being something entirely disparate with other things but to the peculiar nature of its states, in the same way as an animal differs from a stone, or an elephant from a tiger. Some mental states are entirely identical in man and the animals, but the most important and characteristic of them have the property that they imply a distinction between the actual feeling or impression and the idea. But this so-called distinction of the mind from its object I regard similarly as only one of the peculiar modes in which the mind behaves. Knowledge, again, is on this view merely a property or quality of the thing called mind, and to argue immediately from knowledge to reality I regard, therefore, as unwarrantable. My difference from Mr. Bosanquet is, I think, only one of expression; to speak of the mind as a "totality coloured by a particular quality" may give the idea of concealing the fact which Mr. Ritchie expresses by his doctrine of consciousness. There is, I think, no quality to colour the totality except the qualities of the states, which are combined into the totality.

If I go a step further it is not with a desire to raise fresh matters of debate, but with a direct reference to the ultimate question. So far from the mind being out of line with other things, I believe there is a perfect continuity between its peculiar states and theirs.
Hence I am unable to accept the proposition that consciousness is only an attribute of the brain. Any kind of consciousness, e.g., thinking, is really an attribute only of that totality of consciousness unified under the name of mind. The notion of a mere parallelism of brain and mind seems to me fictitious. The brain as brain is the mass of matter which we can dissect, and in which certain physical actions take place. When it becomes, as we say, conscious, it is no longer brain, but is consciousness itself. At a certain stage in the development of things, we arrive at that complex mode of behaviour we call consciousness; but that consciousness is brain only when considered in its merely physical behaviour, just as light may be considered physically as waves of ether but is itself light. True, consciousness depends on physical conditions, but, equally, everything else (e.g., electricity depends on conditions simpler than itself). At a certain stage you have the amoeba, at a higher stage you have the lion; so, at a higher stage still, you have the thing called mind, or consciousness, dependent on the things that precede it, and continuous with them, yet peculiar and distinct from them.

I come now to the question at issue; I have spoken of the states of the mind by the general term mental states in order to postpone the ultimate question. For in determining whether mind and consciousness are synonymous there is a twofold difficulty. One is the difficulty of language, what things the word consciousness covers. The other difficulty is of facts, viz.: to determine where mind itself begins. The preceding remarks were made in order to point out that this second difficulty is the same as meets us whenever we try to define where a peculiar species begins. Between it and its predecessors there is a series of intermediate links which render the determination of the species more or less arbitrary. It is natural that if mind is really a thing continuous with organic and inorganic things, we should be perplexed by states which seem neither physical nor mental. This is the case with the so-called unconscious states. How shall we determine whether these are states of mind, or merely of body? It is certain that the word mind has tended to limit itself to the higher states beginning with feeling. But the reverse was the case in Greek, where ψυχή included any state from thought down to nutrition and growth. We have differentiated the soul into life and mind, but the difficulty of determining where animal leaves off and man begins is not greater than that of determining where life leaves off and mind begins.

There is the further difficulty as to the use of "conscious" and "consciousness." I have to notice first that the words are used in a narrower and a wider sense. In the strict sense we mean by
consciousness, to quote Mr. Ritchie, "the fact that I am aware that I feel, think etc." In other words, consciousness involves the element of attention. The limited meaning, is, I believe, the source of the metaphysical theories of consciousness. Ordinary language (as in the phrase—I have no consciousness of guilt) uses the word chiefly in this sense. But these states are quite highly developed states of mind. At other times, however, we include under the word consciousness (e.g., we say of a paralytic, he is without consciousness), and certainly under the adjective conscious (e.g., conscious life as equivalent to waking life or again the animals would be described as conscious), the whole of our feelings and ideas even where attention is not implied. I agree with Mr. Bosanquet that "consciousness" is for the most part a scientific term, while I think "conscious" is more popular. The phrase "states of consciousness" would hardly be intelligible to ordinary usage, and has been extended by science downwards over a wider area than is proper to it. And it may be noted how this process has reacted upon the word "mind;" for as the unconscious states have been shown to be intimately connected with the conscious the word "mind" has tended to move downwards, and we begin to feel less repugnance to the unnatural idea of unconscious action of the mind, though it is very doubtful whether such action is not merely an action of the brain.

We have, then, both to face the ambiguity of "consciousness" and to fix the limits of the mind itself. If we regard mind and consciousness as identical, as both applying to the waking life, we have the further difficulty of dreams, which are certainly operations of the mind, but are not so naturally described as states of consciousness. Yet we do speak of ourselves as conscious in dreams: in nightmares, for example, we are "conscious" of great weights upon us, and we have begun already to speak of the dream-consciousness, and from the expression waking-consciousness it is but a step to sleeping-consciousness. It seems to me then that there is no absolute answer to the question, that the terms are in a state of fluidity, and I believe the cause is the attention directed by psychology to subconscious and unconscious states, which has at once extended the meaning of the narrow word "consciousness" and shaken the stability of the word "mind." But the case may be truly stated by saying that, in their present use, mind and consciousness tend to coincide, but that consciousness moves more slowly, and leaves a margin below itself to which mind may be more naturally, but not exclusively, applied. "Mind" and "conscious" coincide more accurately still. On the other hand, the future use of the words is, I think, partly arbitrary, for, in the first place, we have more freedom with the word "consciousness," and, in the second place, we must leave it to the
physiologists and psychologists to determine definitely whether unconscious states are really more like mind or more like body. It would, I think, be a great convenience, no matter how we fix the limits of mind, if we could reserve consciousness for the more strictly conscious perceptive or apperceptive acts, leaving mind to embrace all mental states. But such a distinction would have to be recognised as arbitrary, and is sure to conflict with the popular use of, at any rate, the adjective "conscious."

VI.—By David G. Ritchie, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford.

(A Reply.)

As my position has been most severely attacked by Mr. Alexander, it seems best, for the sake of brevity, that I should confine myself to his criticisms, and chiefly to those made in the last paragraph on p. 17 of his paper.

1. If by "our minds" be meant the series of mental states of which we are conscious (with the addition of certain other sub-conscious or even unconscious states which it may, or may not, be convenient to call "mental"), I certainly do not deny that we can know and study these states as we study any other natural events. But I do not see how we can know the consciousness of these states in the same way that we know other objects. We cannot know the knower as we know the known. The attempt to do so involves a regressio ad infinitum. I must be conscious of being conscious, etc., etc., of feeling something. We cannot, except metaphorically, get outside ourselves. I think Comte went too far in denying the possibility of psychology: but the psychologist has to be warned that his science involves more fictions and metaphors than other sciences. Mr. Alexander refers to the practice of novelists—Well, I consider that a good novelist makes more valuable contributions to the knowledge of mental phenomena than the professed votaries of psychology, just because he lets us see his characters talking (to themselves or others) and acting, instead of giving us imaginary mechanics about vivid and faint "aggregates" or imaginary chemistry about indissoluble association. This mythology of the ordinary psychologist is only excusable as Plato's myths are, because the subject is so very difficult, without having Plato's justification that the myths in themselves are beautiful.

2. As to Mr. Alexander's ingenious and meditative electrical machine, if its electricity is its thinking, and if this thinking be
really thinking, so that it can philosophize, then—on this quite impossible supposition—I should say that the electrical machine is perfectly right in its conclusions; for “electricity” would, in such a case, be just another word for “consciousness.” But if the electrical machine is supposed to have thinking as a quality superadded to its electricity—the supposition which alone gives plausibility to the illustration—the machine has committed a fallacy, such as I should be committing, were I to make the statement Mr. Alexander attributes to it, because, with the help of a gutta-percha comb, in frosty weather I can get sparks from my hair.

3. As to what is said on page 18, “peculiarity and uniqueness” seem to me to lose all meaning, if everything is peculiar and unique. There is, of course, a sense in which mind is a thing, i.e., a subject of qualities, like any other thing; but to treat mind as a thing like other things which exist in space seems to me purely metaphorical. The difference between the subject of mental qualities and the subject of physical qualities is more important than the likeness. Mr. Alexander disclaims the parallelism between brain and mind (p. 19), but what he says on that very page seems to imply it. In the sense in which we can call stones, or animals, or brains “things,” I do not think that we can call motion, or life, or consciousness, “things,” unless, of course, we mean “moving things,” “living things,” “conscious things,” awkwardly using abstract for concrete terms.

Finally, when Reality is brought in as something in comparison with which “Knowledge” may be somewhat despised (see p. 18), I should like to ask our new “Realists” to explain what they mean by it. I have never yet heard any explanation of Reality which did not either explain it in terms of knowledge or tend to identify it with the Unknowable: and surely, after all the current commonplaces about experience and the relativity of knowledge, we are not going to have a return to Ontology or Metaphysics, in the worst sense of these terms—a science of things-in-themselves, apart from all relation to a knowing subject.

VII.—By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, M.A., LL.D.; President.

(A Reply.)

I begin by remarking that the only good of settling the present question of nomenclature is to arrive at a use of the words mind and consciousness which may be adopted in common by metaphysicians, by
psychologists, and by men in general. It is not an exclusive definition for one class only that is needed. The words are words in common use, and we want meanings for them which shall be common also.

But—here we come to a singular circumstance—all the papers read this evening, except my own, define the words for particular classes only. Mr. Stout, for instance, maintains that the term mind has quite contrary meanings in psychology and in metaphysic; and the other three contributors arrive at their conclusions only by first establishing each his own theory of Idealism—like the Cambridge undergraduate who could not approach a single question in his examination papers without first giving a full-length proof of the Binomial Theorem, which was, in fact, the only subject he had got up. Consequently, unless we accept Idealism, the proposed definitions fall to the ground. The three papers read by Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Bosanquet, and Mr. Alexander, are in reality proofs of three several forms of Idealism—like three heads of a Cerberus—from which the only conclusion to be drawn is that it is essential to Idealism to confuse consciousness with the subject of it. This confusion is among its arcana imperii, the secret of which it is dangerous to divulge.

Idealism resembles some cruel despotism, which maintains itself by fostering the vices of its miserable subjects; for Idealism prospers by fostering the confusions and the obscurities of popular thinking, and by employing every available ambiguity of language to make the confusion plausible.

I have to contend this evening singly against three Idealists and an ally, for Mr. Stout is an Idealist in metaphysic, though he seems to keep his metaphysic quite apart from his psychology—no doubt, greatly to the advantage of the latter; and my charge against Idealism is that it confuses and identifies knowing with the knower, whereas I maintain that consciousness is a knowing, but not a knower, and the subject (whether called Ego or whether called Mind) is a knower, but not a knowing.

Mr. Ritchie's paper agrees with my conclusion, that mind and consciousness are not synonymous, but for reasons, as he truly says, very different from mine. It is in these reasons that the main interest of his paper consists. Mind, he says, is not synonymous with consciousness, because mind is merely "a hypothetical substance to which we can ascribe qualities," which "we do not know in any strict sense," but "assume for convenience." The Ego is very different, and the relation of the Ego to consciousness is the main theme of his paper.
This being so, it is remarkable that he never explicitly draws the conclusion to which his argument seems to point, that the Ego is synonymous with consciousness, although Mind is not. It would have been interesting to see how Mr. Ritchie's answer would have run had the question been—Is the Ego synonymous with consciousness?

Now, the reasons given in my paper for mind not being synonymous with consciousness cover the case of the Ego also. They cover the case of any term applicable to the thinking subject as the subject of consciousness. But of this Mr. Ritchie takes no note whatever. He objects to my calling the Ego a res cogitans, a thinking thing, but he omits to notice my alternative expression, "some one's" consciousness. He confines himself, in answering the question proposed, to the ground of the special definition which he gives of the term Mind. But at the same time he seizes the occasion to give us his theory, or part of his theory, of consciousness, and there he leaves us.

But inasmuch as Mr. Ritchie maintains that the Ego holds a very different relation to consciousness from that held by Mind, it is requisite to show that against its being made synonymous with consciousness the very same reasons hold good as hold good against Mind. This I will show from Mr. Ritchie's own words. In his first page he says: "Consciousness of an event is the reference of an event to myself as knowing it;" and again: "Consciousness, from the very meaning of it, includes in it an 'Ego' or an 'I';" and again: "A Self or Ego as the Subject thinking is there in the very fact of consciousness."

Now if, as Mr. Ritchie says, in consciousness I refer an event to myself as knowing it, I clearly have some knowledge or awareness of myself as knowing, as well as of the event which I refer to myself. My Ego is both knowing and known. I not only am, but I am known as, the Subject thinking. I am an object to myself in consciousness. This special object is called usually, and by Mr. Ritchie, the thinking Subject. The Ego, therefore, is both an object in consciousness and the pre-supposition or Subject of consciousness.

Now, my contention is that the Ego, as that particular object which is the Subject and pre-supposition of consciousness, cannot, without logical contradiction and absurdity, be made synonymous with the consciousness which is its function or its possession. And this contention, which was contained in my paper, Mr. Ritchie makes no attempt to meet.

But I wish now to go farther. Granting to Mr. Ritchie, for the sake of argument, that the Ego is conscious of itself as the Subject of and in all its consciousness, it does not follow that the Ego itself is included in consciousness; it is only the awareness or knowledge
of the Ego which is so included. It is as object, not as Subject, that it is part of consciousness. Mr. Ritchie's first sentence runs: "By consciousness I understand the fact of my being aware that I feel, think, act, or am acted on in any way." Just so. The Ego sustains two characters in consciousness; it is conscious, and it is known to be conscious; and it is only in the latter that it is included in consciousness. In the former it is contra-distinguished from consciousness as its Subject and pre-supposition. But this distinction Mr. Ritchie never draws. And when, without drawing it, he identifies cogito with cogitatio, as he does at p. 9, we naturally suppose him to hold that the Ego in both characters is included in cogitatio. This is a patent ambiguity.

But this is not the only ambiguity which that sentence contains—"By consciousness," he says, "I understand the fact of my being aware that I feel, think, act, or am acted on in any way." This, if literally taken, is an absurdity which cannot be admitted for a moment. If he had said, "By my consciousness I understand," &c., that would have been unobjectionable. But as the words stand they identify consciousness in general, wherever found, with Mr. Ritchie's consciousness, which is inadmissible, and causes ambiguity. For we naturally read the words at first as if he had said "my consciousness," and only afterwards find that consciousness in general is held to have been intended. The difference is great.

If Mr. Ritchie stands to the assertion that his Ego has an immediate knowledge of itself as the thinking Subject of its own consciousness, well and good. No one can contradict him there, on the ground of his own immediate experience; but then the certainty of that knowledge depends on its individuality and immediateness to Mr. Ritchie. It cannot be extended to the consciousness of any other individual, if any such there be, or to the nature of consciousness in general. For my part I doubt the fact that any Ego has an immediate knowledge of itself as the Subject of its own consciousness. I think that an Ego (supposing it to exist) may be mistaken even about itself. To discriminate what is immediate from what is mediate in knowledge is always difficult, and the more familiar the knowledge the greater the difficulty. The bearing of these remarks upon Mr. Ritchie's doctrine of the "Eternal Ego," will be sufficiently obvious.

In conclusion, I would say that what Mr. Ritchie appears to me to do in this paper is, first, to take an unanalysed fact of pre-philosophic common sense, namely, cogito, the "I think" (a fact which, as a fact of common sense, is familiar and indubitable), and refuse to analyse it, even though his own description supplies the means and shows the necessity of doing so; and then, secondly, to make this
fact, unanalysed, serve as the foundation-stone of philosophy. He mistakes the statement of it for a philosophical truth, when it is only a pre-philosophical one.

It will be well to proceed next to Mr. Bosanquet's paper, since the view which it develops stands in such close connection with Mr. Ritchie's on one side and my own on another.

I note in the first place that he understands Mr. Ritchie's meaning to be, that consciousness is equivalent to the conscious self, though I think this is not explicitly stated by Mr. Ritchie, who does not go farther than saying that I plus thought is equivalent to thought, cogito as a whole is equivalent to cogitatio. And then he goes on to maintain that what he understands Mr. Ritchie to say of consciousness as equivalent to self applies to mind when taken as a concrete name, just as much as it does to self. Thus, Mr. Ritchie holds that consciousness is equivalent to the conscious self, and Mr. Bosanquet that consciousness is equivalent to the conscious mind. What Mr. Ritchie calls Self or Ego, Mr. Bosanquet calls Mind. Both views are alike opposed to mine, which is that neither the Ego nor Mind is equivalent to consciousness; I hold that to be consciousness and to have consciousness are two things and not one.

Mr. Bosanquet next states his own answer to the question proposed. Mind and consciousness, he says, are not synonymous, but co-extensive terms. That is to say, they have different meanings, different connotations, but the same application, the same denotation, applying to one and the same existent or set of existents. Mind is the popular, unreflective term for that existent, and consciousness the analytical term for it. The philosopher uses consciousness to name the same thing for which the non-philosopher uses mind.

Observe, if these terms had the same meaning or connotation as well as the same application, they would be synonyms; and this Mr. Bosanquet says they are not. They have, then, different meanings, but being co-extensive, they must be terms for the same thing, that is to say, this same thing must have at once all the properties expressed by the one, and all the properties expressed by the other. The analytic term is not to be a substitute for the popular term, but an addition to it. Each term has a meaning of its own, and both meanings are applicable to the same thing. In other words, the philosophical usage is to make an amalgam of the meanings of the popular and the analytic terms, so that when we say consciousness, subauditur mind, and when we say mind subauditur consciousness. I repeat, the philosophical usage, according to Mr. Bosanquet, is this; he is not describing merely what the ordinary usage is, but defending
it; and that he is defending it is proved by his subsequent use of it in the sequel of his paper.

Now, I ask, can any proceeding be conceived more confusing than this, more certain to wrap the whole subject in hopeless obscurity? The advantage of having an analytic term in place of a popular one is not only thrown away, but it is actually made the means of further complication, by adopting the popular term as equally applicable with the analytic term, thus giving it a philosophic rank and value which it had not before.

These points premised, I come to particular arguments. Mr. Bosanquet says that there is no real hindrance in modern language to using abstract terms as concretes. Exactly so; that is the very source of the confusion. Language leads us, prompts us, helps us, to confuse the distinctions of thought. This prompting is not to be welcomed, but accepted as a necessity, the effects of which must be carefully guarded against. Mr. Bosanquet says that "my mind" and "mind" can be taken analogously to "my consciousness" and "consciousness." This, of course, is true, but entirely misses the point of the objection against confusing the general with the particular meaning of general terms. The general terms in both pairs, mind in one pair, and consciousness in the other, are confusing because they may be taken either as general or as collective terms. My mind, versus mind (general) is not the same thing as my mind, versus all minds (collective). My consciousness versus consciousness (general) is not the same thing as my consciousness versus all consciousness (collective). The particular and the collective terms alike include a subject and an attribute, a mind and its mentality, together. The general term includes only the attribute. Hence the confusion in the use of general terms so warmly welcomed by Mr. Bosanquet.

At p. 13, we come to the definite statement "My mind I take to be the totality of ideas and feelings attached to my sentient experience." This leads him to agree with Mr. Ritchie, that this totality (which is his mind) is not a thing among things in space. "Space for me is in it." I suppose, in the same sense as, for the map, England is in the map and not the map in England. I pass over paradoxes of this sort. But I must make one remark on Mr. Bosanquet's restriction "for me." This restriction must be either nugatory or explanatory. But, if explanatory, it is falling back upon Mr. Ritchie's position, that Self is more closely bound up with consciousness than mind is, since to explain how space can be in the mind, it has to be limited to space for me, as something which is better known than space simply. The mind theory of consciousness thus falls back at a pinch upon the self theory.

There is a well-known line in poetry "My mind to me a king-
dom is;" but Mr. Bosanquet goes much farther than this when he says that his "mind is a totality, and everything is an abstraction within that totality." By this he must mean that this table, for instance, round which we are seated, is an abstraction, and Mr. Bosanquet's mind the totality from which it is abstracted by Mr. Bosanquet's thought. I only ask on this whether Mr. Bosanquet considers that he is here "defending the ordinary usage" of the term mind?—which he says is, on the whole, his purpose.

Again, when he says "a thing is an universal synthesis of differences"—is this put forward as conformable to ordinary usage? I should say it was quite the reverse. We invariably treat a "thing" as an individual or singular, a creature of Nature, and opposed to an universal or general, which is a creature of Logic. It is in its conceptual analysis only that a "thing" is "a synthesis of differences." Take a pebble on the beach. It is not built up by Nature as we build up its Begriff, so much hardness, so much weight, so much roundness, so much smoothness, so much whiteness, &c., &c. These are only our way of understanding the pebble. In nature it is the product of natural forces, the result of its history.

But I must hasten to Mr. Bosanquet's reply to my own remarks about Mind involving agency. In the first place, there is nothing in my paper which implies that agency is a "false or disputable idea," or which tends to discredit the reality of that which involves it, namely, Mind, as Mr. Bosanquet seems to think. On the contrary, if Mind is a real thing or substance, whether material or immaterial, it must be conceived as having and exerting what we call agency; just as we conceive material things as having energy and exerting it. Agency is only a more general term including energy, which latter usually carries with it the suggestion of material substance. That we do not fully comprehend the nature of either energy or agency per se, is no argument against something really operative being intended by the names. It is not I, but Mr. Bosanquet, who wishes to get rid of agency out of the conception of mind; I wish to retain it in that conception, but in the character of an explicandum, not of an explication.

To get rid of it somehow, is part of Mr. Bosanquet's general drift, as I understand it, which is to obliterate the distinction between consciousness and the conscious being between being consciousness and having it. His mind, he tells us, is "the totality of ideas and feelings attached to his sentient experience," which I suppose is another expression for the totality of his consciousness. This I can understand in no other way than as an adoption of the second of my two alternatives, that is, identifying mind with consciousness or cogitatio, and not with "some one" or "res cogitans." The question
is, in what sense can consciousness, or the totality of consciousness, apart from any supposed subject of it which is not itself, be said to possess and exert agency, to do anything, so as to deserve the name of a Mind?

To me, I confess, this is impossible. Here is the difficulty. The agency, the possession of which by consciousness is to turn consciousness into a concrete mind, has to be found in consciousness qua consciousness, and not in a subject having (but not being) consciousness. But the consciousness is intermittent, has intervals in which it is non-existent. How comes it to revive after an interval of non-existence, if the agency belongs to it, and not it to the agency?

Mr. Bosanquet's answer is, that the question is solved by "keeping to the analogy of a thing" dropping, I suppose, the inconvenient consideration of consciousness being "a series in time." Now we know what is meant by consciousness being a "thing." It means that "totality of ideas and feelings, which is the most concrete of all syntheses," and which "is to its attributes precisely as the Tower of London is to its attributes." The revival of consciousness after an interval of non-existence is accounted for by forgetting its character of intermittence in time, and assuming its analogy to things in space, on the ground of its being a totality. But the question shelved for the moment must recur again, with regard to the totality. How does the totality of ideas and feelings hold together so as to be a totality? This question is not answered at all.

Let us look at the totality of feelings and ideas a little more closely. It is a totality, by far the larger part of which consists of feelings or ideas which, at any given moment, have ceased to exist as experienced originally, and which are known only as reproductions in memory or imagination. This fact clearly points to some permanent agency which reproduces them in memory, some agency which is not fleeting as all states of consciousness are, some agency, therefore, which is not itself consciousness.

Mr. Bosanquet, on the contrary, finds this agency in consciousness itself, not indeed in what he calls abstract consciousness, but in the totality of its states. But then the fact that they form in a certain sense a totality is the very fact to be explained. The question here is—How it comes to be so? How does consciousness cohere as a totality, on the analogy of a thing? The question is just as difficult as the other,—how it comes to revive after intervals of extinction?

Moreover, what is included in the totality? Is future consciousness included in it? If so, it does not now exist as a totality. And if its power of holding together resides in it because it is a totality,
it resides in what does not exist. Or is past consciousness included in it? But this has ceased to exist. If this is included in it, its totality has ceased to exist. If neither past nor future consciousness is included, then the totality of consciousness is reduced to the moment actually present, which is no totality at all. So far from resembling the Tower of London and its attributes, it is rather to be compared to a spark from a sky-rocket.

One more remark in conclusion, relating both to Mr. Ritchie's and to Mr. Bosanquet's theories. Mr. Ritchie refuses to conceive consciousness apart from the Ego, Mr. Bosanquet apart from Mind. The Ego with one, and Mind with the other, is not conceived as a separable condition, but as an inseparable part of consciousness. This being so, it is difficult to imagine what can possibly be excluded from consciousness. Consciousness-ego and consciousness-mind must equally be conceived as being πάντα τὰ πράγματα. Or, as Mr. Bosanquet puts it, what we commonly call "things" are abstractions from the concrete synthesis of feelings and ideas which is his mind. If this is a correct account, then I ask, what basis or what room is there for any of the positive sciences, which profess to deal with a world external to the mind, and governed by physical, not psychical, laws?

The most remarkable fact about Mr. Alexander's paper is, that while he believes himself to be "in essential agreement with Mr. Bosanquet" he entirely surrenders. Mr. Bosanquet's form of idealism, which, as we have seen, consists in holding that "things" are abstractions from the great concrete synthesis, or totality, of his feelings and ideas. Mr. Alexander, on the contrary, holds "that the mind is a thing in precisely the same sense as all other things," that is, not the whole from which things are abstractions, but one thing among other things.

He rejects the idea that consciousness is an attribute of the brain, and holds that the various kinds of consciousness are attributes of the "totality of consciousness unified under the name of mind." Thus it seems that the brain with its attributes is one thing, and the totality of consciousness of which the various kinds of consciousness are attributes is another thing.

He says farther, that "a mere parallelism of brain and mind seems to him fictitious." One of them changes into the other. "When the brain becomes as we say conscious, it is brain no longer, but is consciousness itself." The brain is thus changed into consciousness. We naturally ask whether consciousness is ever changed back into brain? Here Mr. Alexander flinches. He does not say that consciousness becomes brain, but merely that consciousness is brain
"when considered in its merely physical behaviour." This is a very different thing. Mr. Alexander has the courage of his opinions up to the point of making the astounding assertion that brain, when conscious, ceases to be brain, and is changed into consciousness, but that courage fails him when he comes to the further point of saying that consciousness ever ceases to be consciousness and is changed into brain. At this point he takes refuge in saying that consciousness is brain, but only when considered in its merely physical behaviour. *By whom* considered—is not specified. And which of the two is it, when no one happens to be considering it?

To say it is brain instead of it *becomes* brain is to shift the question to quite different ground—from brain as condition and conditionate of consciousness to brain as the object of consciousness, i.e., of the idea of brain. The idea of brain is the only state of consciousness of which it is in the least plausible to say that it is brain in any sense at all. But it was not the idea of brain which Mr. Alexander was speaking of when he said that brain, when conscious, was no longer brain consciousness. The theory breaks down in spite of all the aid derived from its ambiguity.

The instance which Mr. Alexander gives to illustrate this singular one-sided transformation is instructive for us, though unfortunate for himself. "Light," he says, "may be considered physically as waves of ether, but is itself light." Now it is true that the same word light is sometimes used for the waves of ether and sometimes for the sensation produced by them; but the sameness of the word does not show that the waves of ether and the sensation produced by them are one and the same thing. The sensation of light cannot produce waves of ether, neither can we produce waves of ether by considering light in its merely physical behaviour. Light, the sensation, has no physical behaviour. The waves of ether have. Mr. Alexander identifies the sensation, light, with its condition, waves of ether.

When Mr. Alexander admits "that consciousness depends on physical conditions," we must understand him to make a mental reservation, namely, provided those conditions are identical with itself, or are itself in another form, a form produced by its considering itself physical. When consciousness can consider itself physical, we may entertain Mr. Alexander's theory. But this is an impossibility; consciousness can consider its conditions to be physical, but not itself.

I must now briefly notice Mr. Alexander's reply to myself on the subject of agency. He takes a falling brickbat as his instance of an agent, which I quite agree to. But then he says that "if mind were
nothing but a complex of conscious states, it would be an agent in exactly the same sense." This I entirely deny. Let us take the idea of a falling brickbat as our instance of a complex of conscious states. The falling brickbat has certain physical consequences. What consequences of any kind has the idea of a falling brickbat? None whatever. First, it has no physical consequences; it does not break what it is supposed to fall upon. Secondly, it has no consequences in consciousness, for the ideas or states of consciousness which follow it are due to the continuance of that action of the mind or brain, to which it is due itself; and this action and its continuance are now, by the words, "nothing but a complex of conscious states," excluded from the action, if any, of the idea as such a complex. I affirm, then, that there is no evidence to show that the idea alone, i.e., as distinguished from the mind or brain which has it, has any consequences corresponding to those which the brickbat has, and in virtue of which it is called an agent. If we attribute consequences to the idea of the brickbat, it can only be by tacitly taking back the distinction which we have drawn between the idea and its conditions in the mind or brain.

I am quite ready to yield to proof, if any can be given, that an idea as such has consequences of its own; but then it must be proof relating strictly to the idea as such, and not as identified with its own conditions. No such proof is given by Mr. Alexander. That this distinction, between an idea and its conditions or generally between consciousness and its conditions, should be observed in discussing questions like the present, is the sum and substance of my contention. All the idealistic theories which have been broached this evening seem to me to rest upon ignoring the distinction and confusing its terms.

Mr. Stout contrasts psychology with metaphysics, and gives an account of the latter which harmonises entirely with what is held in common by Mr. Ritchie and Mr. Bosanquet with regard to consciousness.

His paper proves that, on this view of metaphysics, no metaphysician can be a psychologist, and no psychologist a metaphysician.

The psychologist, being a conscious person, may legitimately assume that unconscious mental processes really exist; but the metaphysician (who is also presumably a conscious person) is not allowed to assume the existence of anything unconscious. "For Metaphysics, consciousness is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, through which and for which all things are." This is Mr. Stout's concluding sentence.

Mr. Stout thus carries to the mark the conclusion which I drew
from Mr. Ritchie's and Mr. Bosanquet's views, and shows that, on those views, which are identical with his own, psychology and metaphysics are hopelessly at variance.

But Mr. Stout's paper, by thus putting the two incompatibles in presence and confronting them with one another, supplies the means of restoring the harmony between them. I mean, that we can trace in his paper the precise confusion which causes them to appear incompatible.

Not for the psychologist alone, and not for the metaphysician alone, but for every man, everywhere and always, Existence to be thought of at all must be thought of in consciousness, for thinking is having consciousness. He who thinks has consciousness. But this does not imply that the existence of which a man thinks has consciousness also. He must have a consciousness in him in order to think of it (and in this sense consciousness is all-embracing, the Alpha and Omega, &c.)—but existence need not have consciousness in it, in order to be thought of.

Now Mr. Stout sees this and admits it in the case of the psychologist, but denies it in the case of the metaphysician. In order to deny it in the case of the metaphysician, some theory like those of Mr. Ritchie and Mr. Bosanquet—that is, some Idealistic theory—would be requisite. Then, indeed, if Idealism were to be held true, we might have psychologist and metaphysician hopelessly and for ever at variance.

THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.

By G. F. Stout, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.

The sciences may be divided into two classes, according as they lay down canons of criticism or investigate matter of fact. Under the former head are to be placed certain of the moral sciences, e.g., ethics, aesthetics, and logic. Ethics lays down canons of conduct, aesthetics aims at establishing canons of taste, and logic prescribes canons of reasoning. Among the sciences which inquire into matter of fact are to be ranked mathematics and all the physical sciences, together with two moral sciences—theory of knowledge and psychology. Psychology, like chemistry or physics, is directly concerned with what is; it does not, like ethics or logic, treat of what ought to be. It is within its province to investigate certain questions of fact; it is totally outside its province to pass sentence of approval or disapproval.