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*The Wonder of Signs*  
ADRIAN HADDOCK

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## B I O G R A P H Y

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## E D I T O R I A L   N O T E

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THE WONDER OF SIGNS

ADRIAN HADDOCK

For speculation turns not to itself  
Till it hath travelled and is mirrored there  
Where it may see itself. This is not strange at all.<sup>1</sup>  
*Troilus and Cressida* (3. 3. 110-113)

1. In 1956, the following problem was set as a competition in the journal *Analysis*.

It is impossible to be told anyone's name. For if I am told "That man's name is 'Smith'", his name is mentioned, not used, and I hear the name of his name but not his name. (Anscombe 1956 & 1957, p. 220)

We owe this problem to G.E.M. Anscombe.<sup>2</sup> And it raises a very general difficulty.

2. The difficulty is this. Understanding a sentence in which a linguistic expression is quoted involves identifying the expression, in that it involves knowing what expression it is. And this identification is afforded by perceiving the sentence, and in so doing perceiving the expression. But because an expression that is quoted in a sentence is mentioned but not used in the sentence, it is not perceived, in perceiving the sentence. So, there is no such thing as understanding a sentence in which an expression is quoted. This means that it is impossible to be told anyone's name through a sentence in which the name is quoted.<sup>3</sup> But more fundamentally,

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1 The speaker is Achilles, and he is seeking to expound an idea propounded by the 'strange fellow' in the book that his interlocutor, Ulysses, is reading. The critical consensus is that this book is the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (See, for example, Elton (1997).)

2 According to Anscombe (1971, p. 68), a problem raised by Reach (1938) 'suggests the formulation' of her problem. But whereas Reach's problem is fundamentally concerned with the apparent impossibility of explaining the meaning of a name of a name in an informative manner, the difficulty that Anscombe's problem raises is not — as we shall see.

3 This is not quite the consequence that it is impossible to be told anyone's name; but

it means that language cannot take itself as its topic through quotation, at all.

3. This difficulty rests on the following principle: what is mentioned but not used in a sentence is not perceived, in perceiving the sentence.

4. We might elaborate this principle as follows. What is used in a sentence is what is spoken in speaking it, and as such what is heard in hearing it; or — equally — it is what is written in writing it, and as such what is read in reading it. The sense of ‘perceiving’ that figures in the principle just is that of hearing what is spoken, or reading what is written. Let us group these activities — speaking, and hearing what is spoken; writing, and reading what is written — under the head of ‘articulating’, and say that what is used in a sentence is what is articulated, in articulating it. The principle is that what is mentioned but not used in a sentence is not articulated, in articulating it — and as such, not perceived, in perceiving it, in this sense of ‘perceiving’.

5. We can see the truth of the principle by considering the sentence:

(1) That man’s name is ‘Smith’.

Anscombe’s problem assumes that what is used in (1) is not the man’s name, but the name of his name. And when she speaks of ‘a name’, she means simply a singular referring expression, of some kind. We might think that the expression that refers to the man’s name in (1) has the following features: it refers to a linguistic expression; it opens and closes with a pair of inverted commas; and it is otherwise composed of a series of letters. And we might call such an expression ‘a quotation’. So understood, the quotation in (1) is distinct from the name that it refers to. And a moment in Lewis Carroll makes this distinctness vivid. In chapter VIII of *Through the Looking-Glass*, The White Knight sings Alice a song, and tells her, first, that the song is called ‘The Aged, Aged Man’, and second, that the name of the song is called ‘Haddocks’ Eyes’ (Carroll 2009 [1893], p. 218). In (1), the man’s name is called “‘Smith’”. And because this name is distinct from the man’s name, the man’s name is no more articulated in articulating (1) than the song’s name is articulated in articulating:

(2) That song’s name is Haddocks’ Eyes.

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Anscombe came to see that the problem should be qualified in this way; see Anscombe 1956 & 1957, p. 220).

6. The quotation in (1) might be a name in the more specific sense of a referring expression whose composition plays no role in fixing its reference, and which refers to its object in a manner that does not depend on the context of its historical occurrence (its occurrence on someone's lips, at some time). 'Haddocks' Eyes' would be a name in this sense, and insofar as such a name is distinct from its object, to articulate it is not to articulate its object. Alternatively, it might be an abbreviation of a definite description that comprises quotations that refer to letters, where these quotations are themselves names in this more specific sense: such an expression equally refers to its object in a manner that does not depend on the context of its historical occurrence, but unlike such a name its reference is fixed by the meanings of its elements, and how these are combined. But the conclusion is not substantially affected. For example, (1) might be rendered as:

(3) That man's name is the result of articulating 'S', followed by 'm', followed by 'i', followed by 't', followed by 'h'.

And in articulating (3), neither the object of the definite description, nor the objects of the names that compose the description are themselves articulated.

7. Suppose, however, that the expression in (1) that refers to the man's name is not (what we have called) 'a quotation', but merely that which plays the role of the quotation marks — namely, the pair of inverted commas. That would be the view of Donald Davidson, who holds that what plays this role in a quoting sentence refers to the quoted expression in the manner of a demonstrative, through pointing either to its inscription, or — if the sentence is spoken — to its utterance (Davidson 1979).<sup>4</sup> Davidson's account would invite us to render (1) as follows:

(4) That man's name is this. Smith

This points up two salient features of the account: first, the quoted expression is not used in the quoting sentence — the office of the dot after the demonstrative in (4) is to mark the exclusion of the man's name from this sentence; and, second, the quoted expression is nonetheless articulated in articulating the sentence — for the man's name is articulated in articulating (4). This second feature reflects the fact that understanding a demonstrative, as it occurs historically, involves perceiving its object; and because the object of the demonstrative before the dot in an historical occurrence of (4) is a linguistic expression, the operative sense of 'perceiving' is that of reading what is written, or hearing what is spoken. The articulation of the quoted expression is internal to the capacity of

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4 Compare the discussion of Davidson's account in McDowell (1980).

the quoting sentence to perform its semantic function: only through articulating the man's name after the dot is it possible to understand the demonstrative before the dot as referring to his name at all. As such, it is not true in general that what is mentioned but not used in a sentence is not articulated, in articulating it. The principle, upon which the difficulty rests, is false.

8. We can think of the difficulty as seeking to bring out the incompatibility of two functions that are often thought to characterize quotation: first, *the picturing function* — that of ensuring that the quoted expression is articulated, in articulating the quoting sentence, and as such perceived, in perceiving the sentence (in the operative sense of 'perceiving'); and, second, *the referential function* — that of referring to the quoted expression. It has been said that quotation performs the second function by performing the first: W.V.O. Quine remarked that a quotation 'designates its object ... by picturing it' (Quine 1940, p. 26). But the difficulty is that the second function usurps the first. Or so it seems. By understanding the office of quotation as performed by a demonstrative, Davidson's account promises to dissolve this appearance, and with it the difficulty, by understanding quotation as performing its referential function in a manner that involves articulating the quoted expression.

9. But Davidson's account is a con.<sup>5</sup> And we can bring this out by reflecting on the very idea of demonstrative reference.

10. Articulating, and in so doing understanding a demonstrative identifies its object in a manner that is original, in that it is not mediated by any other manner of identifying its object. If it consists in saying (or perhaps in writing) the demonstrative, then it identifies its object in that it constitutes a potential answer to a potential what-question that concerns its object; whereas, if it consists in hearing (or perhaps in reading) the demonstrative, then it identifies its object in that it constitutes hearing or reading such an answer to such a question. We find this kind of question and answer in a dialogue of the following form.

'Something is F.'

'What is F?'

'This G.'

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<sup>5</sup> I am not suggesting that Davidson is trying to deceive anyone. When a philosopher cons, he cons himself.

Here the answer identifies the object, in that it distinguishes it from everything else of its kind, and as such from everything else. And it does so in a manner that is original, in that it is not mediated by any other manner of identifying the object. Contrast a name, in the specific sense introduced earlier, whose reference is fixed by a demonstrative. Articulating, and in so doing understanding such a name equally identifies its object, in that it equally either constitutes a potential answer, or constitutes hearing or reading such an answer to a potential what-question that concerns its object. We find this kind of question and answer in a dialogue of the following form.

‘Something is F.’

‘What is F?’

‘A, a G.’

This answer equally identifies the object, in that it equally distinguishes it from everything else of its kind, and as such from everything else. But it does not do so in a manner that is original, because its manner of identifying the object is mediated by the different manner of identifying it that is afforded by the demonstrative that fixes the reference of the name. In general, the reference of a name is fixed by something whose comprehending articulation originally identifies its object; and this provides for the possibility of explaining the reference of the name in a manner that is informative, in that it identifies its object, not by articulating, and in so doing understanding the name, but by articulating, and in so doing understanding, that which fixes its reference — a demonstrative, for example. It is only because this possibility is provided for that articulating, and in so doing understanding a name can be said to identify its object at all. (On the face of it, the office of (1) is to explain the reference of the name that it concerns in just this informative manner.) As we might put it: a demonstrative identifies its object in a manner that is original, whereas a name identifies its object in manner that is not original. That is to represent the referring expression as achieving what, in a fuller description, is achieved not merely by the expression but by articulating, and in so doing understanding it.

11. But articulating a referring expression does not merely help to identify its object. It equally identifies the expression. And it equally does so in a manner that is original, in that it is not mediated by any other manner of identifying the expression. If the articulation consists in saying or writing the expression, then it identifies the expression in that it constitutes a potential answer to a potential what-question that concerns the expression; whereas, if it consists in hearing or reading the expression, then it identifies

the expression in that it constitutes hearing or reading such an answer to such a question. This kind of question and answer is different from the kinds of question and answer considered above. But it is familiar in life, and in literature. For example:

Perhaps it was chiefly with a diplomatic design to linger and ingratiate himself that Deronda patted the boy's head, saying—

‘What is your name, sirrah?’

‘Jacob Alexander Cohen,’ said the small man, with much ease and distinctness. (Eliot 2014 [1876], p. 327)

Here the boy answers the question, not by demonstrating his name, but by saying his name. In general, this kind of question and answer consists in a what-question that concerns an expression, which is to be answered not by saying or writing an expression that refers to the expression, but by saying or writing the expression. Such an answer identifies the expression, in that it distinguishes it from every other expression — but not by referring to the expression, and rather by articulating it. As we might put it: an expression identifies itself, in a manner that is original. That is to represent the expression as achieving what, in a fuller description, is achieved not merely by the expression, but by its articulation.

12. It is tempting to think that understanding the rendering of (1) that Davidson's account invites us to give — namely, (4) — depends on articulating, and in so doing identifying, the name after the dot. In reading (4), we read, *inter alia*, this name. In reading the name, we identify it. And, because we have identified it, in this manner, we are able to understand the demonstrative before the dot as referring to it. To understand the demonstrative before the dot as referring to the name is to identify the name by articulating it, and on the basis of this articulatory identification to understand the demonstrative as referring to the name. Or so we might think. But then the (so called) demonstrative is not a demonstrative at all — because the manner of identification that it affords is not original, but mediated by an articulatory identification of its object. Only insofar as understanding the demonstrative does not rest on articulating its object can its *bona fides* as a demonstrative be sustained.

13. But then Davidson's account faces a dilemma. If understanding the (putative) demonstrative before the dot in (4) rests on articulating its object, then it is not a demonstrative — because its manner of identifying its object is not original, but mediated by an articulatory identification of the name. But if understanding the (putative) demonstrative does not rest

on articulating its object, then Davidson's account does not live up to its promise of understanding quotation as performing its referential function in a manner that involves articulating the quoted expression. The con in Davidson's account comes in its inviting us to render (1) as (4) — because (4) is naturally understood in a manner that the account precludes.

14. On the first horn of this dilemma, Davidson's account falls apart. And on the second horn, even though it remains intact, it is powerless to dissolve the difficulty. It promised to dissolve the difficulty by exposing the falsity of the principle on which the difficulty rests, through making the articulation of the quoted expression internal to the quotation marks' capacity to refer demonstratively to the expression. But it transpires, on reflection, that the articulation of the quoted expression cannot be internal to this, if the marks are to refer demonstratively to the expression at all. On this horn of the dilemma, although the demonstrative character of the quotation marks in (1) fixes it that understanding them, in a historical occurrence of (1), involves perceiving their (putative) object, the sense of 'perceiving' that figures in this last formulation cannot be that of articulating a linguistic expression. As we might put it: it must be merely that of being given an object in some way — a kind of perception that is not a matter of reading what is written, or hearing what is spoken, at all.<sup>6</sup>

15. The idea that Davidson's account exposes the falsity of the principle is, I think, an illusion. And for this reason, it is not clear that the principle can be denied. But if it cannot be, and if the identification of the expression quoted in a sentence is to be afforded by articulating the sentence, and in so doing articulating the expression, it seems that the expression quoted in a sentence must be used in the sentence. And that seems to generate absurd results — for example, it seems that, if the man's name were used in (1), then (1) would say that a certain man's name is a certain man. If it belongs to quotation to perform a picturing function, then it is hard to see how language can take itself as its topic through quotation, at all.

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16. We seem to have reached a dead-end. And that might motivate a change of tack. Each of the accounts that we have considered assumes that quotation performs its office through an expression that refers in the manner of a referring expression of a recognized kind: either in the manner of a name (in the specific sense), or a definite description, or a

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<sup>6</sup> I shall say more about this kind of perception in §§32-37 below.

demonstrative. And just for this reason, it might seem that an alternative is possible: namely, to understand quotation as performing its office through a referring expression of a *sui generis* kind; specifically, through one that is constituted as the referring expression it is simply on account of its falling under an elementary rule — the rule that ‘the denotation of the result of enclosing any [expression] in quotes is the [expression] itself’ (Wallace 1970, p. 135).

17. But this does not address the concern of the difficulty. The difficulty is concerned with what is understood in understanding a quoting sentence, and *a fortiori* with the identification of the quoted expression that understanding such a sentence affords. Each of the accounts of quotation that we considered addressed this concern, by understanding the identification as afforded by a referring expression that refers to its object in a certain manner. And, because they each addressed the concern in this way, they each failed to make sense of the identification as afforded by articulating the quoted expression. The problem with the present ‘alternative’ is not merely that it does nothing to show that the identification is afforded in this manner; because it elevates its disregard of the question of how the referring expression refers to its object into a point of principle, it bypasses the concern with what is understood in understanding a quoting sentence. An influential version of the ‘alternative’ makes this vivid. It casts the rule into the following ‘self-explanatory notation’ (Wallace 1970, p. 135):

(5) den (quot (x)) = x.

And it goes on to suggest, as an instance of (5):

(6) den (quot (before)) = before.

It would be a mistake to think that, in articulating (6), we articulate the familiar English word ‘before’: as the variable in (5) ranges over expressions, its replacements are terms that refer to expressions; so, what we articulate, in articulating (6), is not the quoted expression, or even the quotation, but an expression comprising a term (namely, ‘quot’) that refers to the quotation marks, and a term (namely, ‘before’) that refers to the quoted expression.<sup>7</sup> This version of the ‘alternative’ might seem to speak to the concern of the difficulty, because it claims that the rule belongs to a theory of meaning for a language of the sort advanced by Davidson: knowing the truth expressed by the rule, and being able to derive from this truth, in the context of knowledge of the rest of the theory, the truths expressed by instances such as (6), is to suffice for understanding sentences of the language involving quotation, and so

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<sup>7</sup> Wallace brings this out by putting a line over ‘before’. (Wallace himself thinks of the referring term used in (6) as a definite description of some kind.)

for identifying the expressions quoted in these sentences; and it might seem that, insofar as it does suffice for this, the rule sheds some light on what is understood in understanding these sentences. But knowing the truth expressed by an instance of the rule, such as (6), does not suffice for understanding any sentence involving quotation; on the contrary: it suffices for understanding a distinct sentence, not involving quotation, which is *about* a quoting sentence (and, specifically, about the quotation in such a sentence). What is understood, in understanding a quoting sentence, is not expressed by any instance of the rule. Contrast Davidson's account, for example: although it ultimately fails to dissolve the difficulty, it does at least speak to its concern — for it would hold that what is understood, in understanding (1), is expressed by the rendering that it invites us to give (namely, by (4)). We should not, I think, allow this 'alternative' to detain us any longer.

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18. The picturing function of quotation usurps its (supposed) referential function. That is the lesson of the difficulty. Davidson's account tried to have it both ways, through the idea that quotation consists in the demonstration, and as such in the articulation, of the quoted expression. But because articulating an expression itself serves to identify it, this idea comes to nothing. As we put it earlier: an expression identifies itself. We brought this out through the idea of a what-question that concerns the expression, which is to be answered by articulating the expression. In answering such a question, the expression is articulated in a context that is equally articulated. And this idea — of articulating an expression in an equally articulated context — is the key to understanding quotation in a way that sustains its picturing function.

19. When the context is a sentence, the key is as follows: identifying an expression that is quoted in a sentence consists simply in articulating a sentence in which the expression is both used, and associated with something playing the role of quotation marks, and in so doing articulating the expression.

20. Although this key does not explain how the expression quoted in (1) can be used in (1), it might seem to make room for the following explanation: the expression does not perform the semantic function that it performs in sentences in which is not so associated — in the case of the

expression quoted in (1), that of referring to a certain man — but the distinct function of referring to itself. Anscombe herself advances this explanation (Anscombe 1957).<sup>8</sup> And it might seem not merely to acknowledge the key, but to turn it, by making sense of how the expression quoted in a quoting sentence can equally be used.

21. But this is a chimera. Articulating the quoting sentence identifies the sentence, and in so doing identifies the expression associated with the quotation marks. But the ‘explanation’ fixes it that it does not identify the quoted expression. That is achieved, not merely by articulating, and in so doing identifying the expression associated with the marks, but by understanding this expression, and in so doing identifying its object. The articulatory identification of this expression no more serves to identify its object than the articulatory identification of any referring expression serves to identify its object. Far from turning the key, the explanation discards it.<sup>9</sup> And in so doing, it reinforces the lesson of the difficulty: if quotation is a matter of picturing, then it is not a matter of referring, *at all*.

22. Short of this ‘explanation’, however, it might seem that, because the expression quoted in (1) is used in (1), it must refer to a certain man — and as such, (1) must say something absurd. But an assumption holds this appearance in place: namely, that if the expression quoted in a sentence is used in the sentence, then it is what Irad Kimhi (2018, p. 81) calls a ‘categorematic unit’ — an element in a sentence with the form of reference and predication. Each of the accounts of quotation that we have rejected assumes that a quoting sentence is a sentence of this form, in which a categorematic unit performs the office of quotation: the unit refers to an expression, and the rest of the sentence says something of the object of this unit. But the lesson of our reflections is that, if quoting is picturing, then the quoted expression is neither a categorematic unit, nor the object of such a unit, but rather what Kimhi calls a ‘syncategorematic unit’ — an element in a sentence that is not of this form.

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<sup>8</sup> She advances this position for consideration, but not (I think) for acceptance: she describes it as ‘not perfectly clear’ (1957, p. 18), and as such not acceptable as it stands.

<sup>9</sup> And this is not the only problem with the ‘explanation’: as it does not say how the expression performs its referential function — whether in the manner of a name, a definite description, a demonstrative, or a referring expression of some other kind (if such there be) — it bypasses the concern of the difficulty in just the same manner as the ‘alternative’ that we considered above.

23. Let us say that a sentence of this form is ‘an expression of consciousness’, and a quoting sentence, which *ex hypothesi* is not of this form, is ‘an expression of self-consciousness’.<sup>10</sup> A quoting sentence, so understood, identifies the quoted expression in just the manner that the key prescribes. And I think that we can better understand the idea of such a sentence — and with it the idea of self-consciousness that I have just invoked — by reflecting on how this idea addresses the following question: how can a sentence be, at once, quoted in a sentence, and preserved in its directedness to the world?

24. Consider a sentence of the following form:

(7) ‘p’ is true.

It is natural to think that a sentence of this form preserves the quoted sentence in its world-directedness, in that an assertion of such a sentence is, *inter alia*, an assertion of the quoted sentence. The problem is that, if the quoted sentence is either mentioned but not used in such a sentence, or used not as a sentence but as a term that refers to itself, then an assertion of such a sentence is an assertion, not of the quoted sentence, but of a distinct sentence in which the quoted sentence figures only as the object of a referring term. This comes out in the difference between sentences of the following forms:

(8) p, and not-p.

And:

(9) ‘p’ is true, and not-p.

We might think that, just as a sentence of the form of (8) is formally a contradiction, so is a sentence of the form of (9). But if quotation is a matter of reference, then this cannot be right. The sentence negated in the second conjunct of a sentence of the form of (9) might be the very sentence that is quoted in the first; but this sameness cannot be recognized without understanding a catgeorematic unit in the first conjunct that refers to a sentence. Recognizing the sameness of the sentence negated in the second conjunct of a sentence of the form of (8) and the sentence used in the first does not require understanding any such catgeorematic unit. And for this reason, there is an obstacle to acknowledging a sentence of the form of (9) as formally a contradiction that does not stand in the way of acknowledging this of a sentence of the form of (8). But if a sentence of the form of (9) were an expression of self-consciousness, then this obstacle would lapse — because the recognition of the sameness of the quoted sentence and the negated sentence would

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<sup>10</sup> Compare Kimhi (2018, p. 31).

no longer require understanding a categorematic unit in the first conjunct that refers to a sentence.

25. Consider, by contrast, a sentence of the following form:

(10) A said ‘p’.

It is natural to think that, unlike an assertion of a sentence of the form of (7), an assertion of a sentence of the form of (10) is not an assertion of the quoted sentence. And this comes out in the fact that a sentence of the following form is not a contradiction:

(11) A said ‘p’, but not-p.

We might think, however, that the sentence negated in the second conjunct of a sentence of this form is the very sentence that is quoted in its first. And as such, we might think that a sentence of this form is, formally, not a contradiction, but a falsification of the quoted sentence.<sup>11</sup> This would allow us to say that the sentence quoted in a sentence of the form of (10) is equally preserved in its directedness to the world: that the quoted sentence in a sentence of the form of (7) is so preserved comes out in the fact that a sentence of the form of (9) is formally a contradiction; and that the sentence quoted in a sentence of the form of (10) is equally so preserved comes out in the fact that a sentence of the form of (11) is formally a falsification of the quoted sentence. In each case, the world-directedness of the quoted sentence is reflected in the formally significant logical nexus between the sentence in which it is quoted, and its negation.

26. As before, however, if quotation is a matter of reference, then a sentence of the form of (11) cannot be formally a falsification — because recognizing the sameness of the negated and the quoted sentence would require understanding a categorematic unit in the first conjunct that refers to a sentence. And then we should, I think, really speak of a sentence of the *apparent* form of (11) — for the real form of such a sentence would have to be given differently. To bring this out, suppose that what follows ‘said’ in a sentence of the apparent form of (11) is a quotation, in the sense introduced in §5, and suppose that this quotation is a name (in the specific sense introduced there). Then the real form of such a sentence would be given by:

(12) A said B, but not-p.

The point would not be substantially affected if the quotation in such a sentence were a definite description; for then the real form would be given by:

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<sup>11</sup> For an extended treatment of sentences of this, and related forms see Rödl (2020).

(13) A said the G, but not-p.

And a similar consequence would follow if Davidson's account of quotation were assumed — for then the real form would be given by:

(14) A said that, but not-p.

Davidson himself would no doubt insist on placing a dot in that which gives the real form, in parataxis with 'p' — perhaps by giving the real form as:

(15) p. A said that, but not-p.

But this is why his account is a con; (14) removes the con, by refusing to give the real form in a manner that is apt to trick us into thinking that the articulation of the (supposedly) quoted sentence is internal to the capacity of the demonstrative to perform its semantic function. In contrast to each of the above accounts, the 'explanation' of §20 does not specify whether reference to the sentence is achieved in the manner of a name, a definite description, a demonstrative, or a referring expression of some other kind (if such there be). But effectively the same point applies. If we let the sign for a singular referring expression be 'a', then the real form would be given by:

(16) A said a, but not-p.

And no sentence of the form of (12), (13), (14), or (16) is formally a falsification, just because, if the sentence negated in the second conjunct is the very sentence that is said to be quoted the first, then recognizing this sameness requires understanding a categorematic unit in the first conjunct that refers to a sentence. I say 'said to be quoted', because each of these renderings makes vivid that, if it gives the real form of a sentence of the apparent form of (11), then the supposedly quoted sentence is not articulated, in articulating a sentence of this apparent form, and as such — given the picturing function of quotation — a sentence of this apparent form is not really a quoting sentence at all. To acknowledge that a sentence of this apparent form is really of this form is to acknowledge that it is really a quoting sentence. And that removes the present obstacle to acknowledging that it is formally a contradiction.

27. The repetition of a sentence is an aspect of what is articulated, in articulating not merely a sentence of the form of (8), but sentences that are really of the form of (9) and (11). And the recognition of the sameness of the sentence that is quoted in the first conjunct of a sentence of the form of (9) or (11), and the sentence that is negated in the second conjunct, is a moment in the articulation of such a sentence — and as such a moment in perceiving it, in the sense of 'perceiving' that we have taken for granted

in this essay. This sense of ‘perceiving’ is not merely of great interest — it is fully intelligible only in the light of the conception of quotation (and so of self-consciousness) that we have developed, and vice versa. Quotation (and so self-consciousness), and this sense of ‘perceiving’ are intelligible only together.

28. But before turning to bring out this unity, two further points are worth registering.

29. First, even if sentences of the form of (7) and (10) do not have the form of reference and predication, to acknowledge that a sentence of the form of (9) is formally a contradiction, and a sentence of the form of (11) formally a falsification, is to acknowledge that sentences that are not of the reference-and-predication form can still be true, or false. This is clear in the case of a sentence of the form of (7): its truth-value is fixed by the truth-value of its quoted sentence. The same does not hold of a sentence of the form of (10): it can be true even if its quoted sentence is false, and vice versa. And to acknowledge that a sentence of the form of (11) is formally a falsification just is to acknowledge this last point. That might seem wrong, for it might seem that it is to acknowledge that a sentence of the form of (10) can be true, even though the quoted sentence is false, but perhaps not vice versa. But once it is acknowledged, there can be no obstacle to acknowledging the possibility of iterated *oratio recta*, of the following form:

(17) B said “A said ‘p’” but it is not the case that A said ‘p’.

If a sentence of the form of (11) is formally a falsification, so is such a sentence.

30. Second, insofar as quoting sentences, in general, are expressions of self-consciousness, the expression quoted in the sentence with which we began must equally be a syncategorematic unit. A suitable historical occurrence of (1) excogitates an aspect of the significance of a name, and as such an aspect of the speaker’s knowledge of what the name refers to. And for this reason, (1) introduces a difference between its speaker, and its hearer: the office of (1) as spoken is to excogitate this aspect of the speaker’s knowledge; whereas the office of (1) as heard is to equip the hearer with it. But this difference does not bear on what it is to identify the expression quoted in (1), for in the case of both the speaker and the hearer, it is afforded by articulating the quoting sentence, and so articulating the expression.

31. From this understanding of quotation, many consequences follow, for many of the fundamental ideas of philosophy — for the ideas of truth, language, meaning, and judgment, for example. Thinking through these consequences is a project that the present essay seeks to engender.<sup>12</sup> But executing this project must be for another occasion (or another series of occasions). The outstanding task, for now, is to shed some light on the sense of ‘perceiving’ that we have presupposed throughout.

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32. Suppose that someone sees someone who satisfies a certain definite description—let it be ‘the editor of *Soul*’. Then the following is a true sentence:

(18) A sees the editor of *Soul*.

It does not follow, however, that (18), and specifically what follows the verb, expresses how the editor of *Soul* is given to the perceiver, in the case of perception that it reports. Contrast the following sentence, as it occurs on the perceiver’s lips at the time he sees the editor:

(19) I see this person.

Suppose that this sentence, in this historical occurrence, and specifically the demonstrative after its verb, not merely refers to the person seen, but expresses how he is given to the perceiver. Then it expresses sensory consciousness—specifically, it expresses a sensory way of being given an object: the very way in which it is given to the perceiver. By contrast, suppose that (18), and specifically the definite description after its verb, does not. Then whereas (18) is a report from outside the sensory consciousness in which the object is perceived, the occurrence of (19) is a report from within. And of these two kinds of report, the report from within is fundamental, insofar as the idea of perception that both reports employ just is that advanced by Anscombe (1965)—the idea of being given an object in a certain sensory way.

33. But this idea cannot exhaust the idea of perception. The idea of perception is the idea of a certain kind of original manner of identification. And we have seen that there is an original manner of identifying a linguistic expression that is not a matter of referring to it, and as such not a matter of being given it in any way, but a matter of articulating it. We have taken for granted that this manner of identification is a

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<sup>12</sup> In this, it follows Kimhi (2019).

kind of perception. And we can shed further light on it by reflecting on how cases of perception of these two different kinds are to be reported. Although the idea of perception advanced by Anscombe (1965) conceives of sensory consciousness, specifically, as a sensory way of being given an object, it equally conceives of it, generically, as that which is expressed, in some manner, by a certain kind of report of a case of perception. If what follows the verb in such a report is a demonstrative that refers to what is perceived, then what follows the verb expresses sensory consciousness in that it expresses the sensory way in which what is perceived is given to the subject. But if what follows the verb articulates what is perceived, then what follows the verb does not express a way of being given what is perceived at all — rather, it *is* what is perceived. And this constrains the form of the report accordingly. If the name ‘Smith’ were perceived, for example, then this very name would follow the verb in the sentence that constitutes the report. It could not be constituted by the following sentence:

(20) I see Smith.

An historical occurrence of (20) reports a case of perceiving, not the name of a man, but a man, just because the name ‘Smith’ figures in (20) as referring to its object.<sup>13</sup> The name would rather need to be associated with quotation marks, as in:

(21) I see ‘Smith’.

And given the understanding of quotation at which we have arrived, this is just to say that the name would need to figure in (21) as a syncategorematic unit.

34. It follows that the report constituted by (21) is itself an expression, not of consciousness, but of self-consciousness. But this does not mean that it is not an expression of sensory consciousness. On the contrary: as it involves quotation, it expresses self-consciousness; but as a report of a case of perception, it equally expresses sensory consciousness. It expresses *sensory self-consciousness*. Only through the idea of this kind of perception is the idea of quotation intelligible; and only through the idea that cases of this kind of perception are reportable by sentences that involve quotation is the idea of this kind of perception intelligible in turn. These sentences may be said to be report these cases ‘from within’, in that they express the sensory consciousness in which what is perceived is perceived, in these cases. But as they are not cases of being given an object

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<sup>13</sup> It could not be a report from within, because — unlike the ways of being given objects that are expressed by historical occurrences of demonstratives — the ways of being given objects expressed by names are not sensory in character.

in any way, the contrast between reports from within and reports from outside — which holds when perception is conceived as the givenness of an object in a certain sensory way — has lapsed.

35. But it is not only the idea of quoting sentences that depends for its intelligibility on the idea of this kind of perception. The ‘I perceive’ must be able to accompany all my linguistic expressions. That echoes Kant’s way of formulating the idea of self-consciousness: ‘the *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations’ (Kant 1998 [1787], B131). And in both of these formulations, the use of the first person — in the phrases ‘my expressions’, and ‘my representations’ — is utterly non-restrictive. To focus on the first formulation: its point is that it is internal to the very idea of language that its expressions are capable of being perceived in sensory self-consciousness, and as such capable of figuring as syncategorematic units inside the quotation marks in “I perceive ‘...’”. The distinctive office of quotation — an office that this context itself performs — is to enable language to exploit its capacity to be so perceived, in order to take itself as its topic in a non-objectifying way. But it is not merely explicit reports of cases of the perception of language that express sensory self-consciousness: if an expression is quoted in a sentence, then it is perceived in the sensory self-consciousness that the sentence expresses. Unlike an historical occurrence of (19), which expresses sensory consciousness through an element of its content — specifically, through the demonstrative — a sentence involving quotation expresses sensory consciousness as the expression of self-consciousness that it is.

36. The idea of sensory self-consciousness is evidently Kantian in resonance. But I think it goes beyond Kant in an important respect. As an idea of sensory consciousness, it is an idea of the presence of a sensible manifold — the manifold of linguistic expressions. But as an idea of self-consciousness, this manifold is not a manifold of *objects* — in that its elements are not given in any way at all.

37. I do not think that Kant can acknowledge this idea of sensory self-consciousness. And I would like to end by tracing this idea — somewhat ironically, given its post-Kantian character, but also, I think, significantly — to a pair of pre-Kantian sources: first, to Ancient Greece; and then, finally, to Merrie England.<sup>14</sup>

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14 For the idea that to go beyond Kant is to return to the Greeks, see (amongst many other post-Kantian texts), Mure (1940).

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38. At one point in the *Sophist* (244c-d), Plato argues against the Parmenidian idea that being is not a manifold of beings, on the ground that insofar as being has a name — such as ‘being’, or ‘the one’ — then there is such a manifold, for there is both being, and its names. But when Parmenides said that being is not a manifold of beings, and ‘all else is mere names’, he did not think that he was contradicting himself (Anscombe 1966, p. 25). And in a late essay, Anscombe argues that he was not, on the ground that the difference of names is a “difference in ways of thinking of [an] object [and] not a difference in what is thought of” (Anscombe 1981a, p. ix):<sup>15</sup> only if the difference of names were a difference in what is thought of would it make sense to say that there *is* a manifold of names. Names are not things that there are — they are not beings — in that they are not objects of reference; and, as such, their manifoldness is no threat to the oneness of being.

39. There is an insight here that is detachable from Parmenidian monism. Let it be granted that being is a manifold of beings. There remains something right in the idea that the manifold of names is not *such* a manifold. Considered as present to consciousness in the manner that has concerned us in this essay, names are not objects, but aspects of subjectivity, in that they are not given objects, but the ways in which objects are given. And yet, even though, considered as present to consciousness in this manner, they are aspects of subjectivity, or consciousness itself, and so are not given, nonetheless: *we see them* (or, more generally, we perceive them, in the sense of ‘perceiving’ that has been operative in this essay). That is the wonder of signs. And it is what the phrase ‘sensory self-consciousness’ is intended to capture.

40. But we might prefer the more sublime formulation that figures in the epigraph. Speculation turning to itself, or self-consciousness, rests on an element of the visible that not merely is present to consciousness, but is consciousness. And there is nothing strange about this element. We traffic in it everyday, and we are doing so right now. It is nothing other than language. And in its mirror, consciousness sees itself. Philosophical reflection, as this essay has sought to practice it, just is an expression of sensory self-consciousness. And for this reason, the parts of the essay that comment on its own quoted expressions — such as the numbered expressions (1) to (21) — do not objectify these expressions, but take them

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<sup>15</sup> We might equally say, of course: a difference in ways of being given an object, and not a difference in what is given.

as their topic by exploiting their capacity to be articulated. As the essay is a philosophical reflection, it perforce employs the very non-objectifying discourse that it seeks to bring into focus.

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