Truth
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Truth and God
Peter Geach
TRUTH

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In celebration of the 125th year of the *Proceedings* we are proud to announce our first ever *Online Conference of the Aristotelian Society*: a week-long event featuring a classic paper a day from our back catalogue, each accompanied by a commentary by a contemporary philosopher and an online forum open to all. The commentary will stimulate discussion by highlighting the paper’s major themes and their continuing importance to current debates; signaling challenges to specific claims and arguments; and indicating thematic connections between the various papers.

Continuing in the Society’s long tradition of publishing the proceedings of its live events, both the classic papers and commentaries will be published in our first ever *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue*, which will be free and available online following the conference.

The first Online Conference and Virtual Issue will focus on the theme of Truth. What is it for the things we say or believe to be true? Does truth depend on a relation between what we say or believe and the world? What are the natures of the things we say or believe, the bearers of truth? To what are the truth-bearers related when they are true: are they related to facts, ordinary objects, or something else? What is the required relation? We’ll want an account of the nature of truth that addresses those questions also to fit with an account of truth’s importance: why should it matter to us that what we say or believe is true rather than false? Our views about truth are liable to impact widely on our views about other things. Are moral claims or views apt to be true or false, or are they to be evaluated along different dimensions? Does truth figure in an account of the nature of belief or the nature of assertion? Is the acquisition of beliefs that are true amongst the fundamental aims of inquiry?

Each of the papers selected for the Online Conference were chosen for the distinctive answers that they advance to these questions. In some cases papers were chosen because they have had a decisive impact on later discussions, in others they were chosen because they present views and arguments that deserve more careful consideration than they have thus far received. In all cases, there is much to be gained from becoming acquainted, or reacquainted, with these important texts.

The Online Conference and Virtual Issue will be moderated and edited by Guy Longworth (Warwick).
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BIOGRAPHY

Peter Thomas Geach, MA, FBA (born 29 March 1916) is a British philosopher with areas of interest in the history of philosophy, philosophical logic, and the theory of identity. Geach was educated at Balliol College, Oxford. He taught at the University of Birmingham from 1951 until 1966 when he was appointed Professor of Logic in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Leeds. Geach was given the title of Emeritus Professor of Logic on his retirement from Leeds in 1981. He has been awarded the papal cross “Pro Ecclesia et Pontifice” by the Holy See for his philosophical work.

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WHEN we consider truth in a quite particular example, there seems to be no problem about truth as such. Suppose someone gravely asks me: 'Is it true that our sovereign liege lady is deceased?' If I once understand that his last six words just mean 'the Queen is dead', then his question amounts to no more and no less than 'Is the Queen dead?'; and to answer that we need advert to no problem about truth. Death raises serious problems, both philosophically and otherwise, but not specially about truth.

However, we cannot confine our use of 'true' and 'truth' to such examples. Counsel assures the jury in a trial for motor manslaughter that what P.C.49 says on oath will be true, since he is a man of great integrity and a reliable observer. (We may here notice a difficulty for the inductivist theory of testimony, so often light-mindedly accepted since Hume's day: how can we reliably establish by induction a correlation between being what P.C.49 says on oath and being true? Being true is not, surely, on a level with being blue or Goodman's being grue.) From 'What P.C.49 says is true' we cannot extract something to the same effect and no longer involving mention of truth. It is because of such apparently uneliminable uses of 'true' that philosophers have come to construct theories of truth.

Some theories of truth turn out to be blunderings or blind alleys: the difficulty of showing this varies from case to case. By the speech-act theory of truth, 'What P.C.49 says is true' (e.g.) would be assimilated to a sentence with a verb used performatively, like 'I corroborate what P.C.49 says': this theory hardly gets airborne; it ignores all uses of 'is true' except as the single main predicate of an assertoric sentence, although like other grammatical predicates 'is true' can occur in dozens of other sorts of context. The predicative 'is a scandalous revelation if true', for example, cannot be twisted into any form employing a performative verb in place of its constituent '(is) true'.

Another theory that may be quickly dismissed is the theory that truth is a kind of correspondence relation to a fact. The identity of facts as entities raises many problems: I am inclined myself to think that the problems are intractable, and facts consequently *entia non grata*, in Quine's phrase. Luckily we need not go into that: even if facts there are, the view that the truth of a judgment is its correspondence with some fact or other is still untenable. For suppose A judges that Jupiter is
round: call this judgment J₁. If A reflects minimally, A will also be able
to judge: My judgment that Jupiter is round is true; call this judgment J₂.
J₁ and J₂ clearly stand or fall, and indeed both stand, together: they are
not made true on two different accounts. Given that J₂ is a first-person
judgment simultaneous with J₁, A who judges J₁ needs no further
justification, no additional data, to go on to J₂. But on the theory of
truth as correspondence to facts, J₁'s truth would be its correspondence
to the roundness of Jupiter, and J₂'s truth would be its correspondence to
quite a different fact, namely, J₁'s correspondence to the roundness of
Jupiter. This is good enough reason to reject the theory; all the same,
unlike the first theory, it has taught us something: an adequate theory of
truth must pass the test that this theory failed, namely that J₁ and J₂ are
made true in the same way and not on different accounts.

I turn then to a much better effort: the so-called redundancy theory
of truth, put forward by Ramsey, Ayer, and Arthur Prior. By this theory
e.g. 'A truly believes that the Earth is round' would come out as 'A
believes that the Earth is round, and the Earth is round'; and 'What
P.C.49 will tell the Court on oath is true' would come out as 'For any p,
if P.C.49 is going to tell the Court on oath that p, then p'. The
redundancy theory, as is easily seen, escapes the difficulty that was fatal
to the correspondence theory. For 'My judgment that Jupiter is round is
true' now comes out as a mere conjunction:

I believe that Jupiter is round, and Jupiter is round. No relation of
correspondence comes into the structure of this. If the conjunction
expresses something A judges, then so does the second conjunct; the first
conjunct, we may say, professes the judgment stated in the second
conjunct; we have no puzzle about two true judgments answering to two
facts.

All the same, the redundancy theory too apparently breaks down. I
shall not discuss the intricate questions that could be raised over the
quantification 'for any p' that comes in my second illustration of the
theory; whether this quantification is 'substitutional' or 'objectual', and
what this difference amounts to. Such identification of variables as we
have here is doubtfully legitimate if there would have to be a shift of
meaning in any substitution instance of the formula in which the
propositional variable is repeated. Frege, as is well known, powerfully
argued that there is indeed a shift of meaning (Bedeutung) in such cases.
If Frege is right, the redundancy theory too must be rejected, or at least
is hard to defend.

Why would the identification of variables across such a shift of
meaning not be clearly legitimate? An example in which nobody would
sensibly dispute the shift of meaning may serve to show this. 'Giorgione
was called Giorgione because of Giorgione's size' and 'Little John [the
companion of Robin Hood] was called Little John because of Little
John's size' are clearly not to be conceived as got by substitution in 'x was called x because of x's size'; it would be absurd to use this last formula for specifying a class \( \{ x : x \text{ was called } x \text{ because of } x \text{'s size} \} \) to which Giorgione and Little John alike belong. Even without aid of quotes, it is obvious that in these examples the first and the second occurrences of an equiform name have different meanings: what is meant the first time is a man, what is meant the second time is a nickname of his; and this is what makes the formula 'x was called x because of x's size' manifestly illegitimate.

Now Frege argues that there is likewise a shift of meaning when e.g. a proper name occurs now in straightforward discourse and now in an oblique context like 'P.C.49 is going to tell the Court on oath that...' – of course not the same shift as we have just considered. The proposition that would occur twice over in a substitution instance of 'If P.C.49 is going to tell the Court on oath that \( p \), then \( p' \) may well contain a proper name; but if so then there is a shift of meaning between the two occurrences of the proper name, and so we have after all only an apparent repetition of the proposition it occurs in. Frege's theory of indirect discourse would therefore make the redundancy theory of truth illegitimate in the most important cases: cases like 'What P.C.49 is going to tell the Court on oath is true.'

But is Frege right? I do not wish to say he is entirely right; there is something wrong, to my mind, about his positive account of what things proper names come to mean in indirect discourse; but his negative thesis, that there the names do not simply name the objects that they ordinarily name, seems to me solidly established. Let us take an example in every sense more down to earth than his example of the Evening Star and the Morning Star. The Derby winner Running Rein turned out to be a horse Maccabeus disqualified by reason of age for running. In a context like 'Lord George Bentinck discovered that—was four years old' the truth-value might alter according as we inserted the name 'Running Rein' or the name 'Maccabeus': the age of Maccabeus was already well known to the racing fraternity, the age of Running Rein was not. We cannot then read this as a context 'F( )' into whose empty place a name for a horse taken straightforwardly is inserted; for then we could not get 'F (Running Rein)' false while 'F (Maccabeus)' would be true. Whatever else we say, we must say that 'Maccabeus' and 'Running Rein' have not here their straightforward meaning. The meaning they would have, as each naming a certain horse and both of them the same horse, in a context like '— was four years old when he won the Derby'.

I think these considerations rob the redundancy theory of truth of its intuitive simplicity and persuasiveness. Possibly a context in which an inserted proper name would occur straightforwardly at one place and obliquely at another could still be regarded as determining a definite sense for the resulting sentence, a function of the sense of the name: this
was the conception of 'non-Shakespearean' predicables that I suggested in *Reference and Generality*. But the logic of such predicables has not been thoroughly worked out; and the ostensible dissolution of the problem about 'is true' that the redundancy theory offers is paid for at a dear rate if nasty problems of intentionality are left on our hands. The advocates of the redundancy theory, such as Ramsey and Prior, seem to me not to take seriously enough the Fregean case for a shift of a name's use in intentional contexts, so that what it means is no longer the same object as when it is used straightforwardly.

It is worth remarking that Frege himself held what might be called a partial redundancy theory, for 'is true' in certain contexts. He held that the thought expressed by a sentence $S$ was the same as the thought expressed by the longer sentence [The thought that $S$ is true], where [the thought that $S$] is of course for him a complex designation of a thought. On this view 'is true' would be *predicable* of thoughts. As we may see at the beginning of the essay 'Thoughts' (*Der Gedanke*), Frege had some discomfort about this account of 'true' in his old age, though he held on to this redundancy theory *faute de mieux*.

Even this limited redundancy theory is open to doubt; in fact Frege's other doctrines, combined with this one, generate an actual antinomy. Frege holds that if a proper name $N$ answers to an unsuccessful identification, then a sentence $[F(N)]$ in which $N$ is meant to be straightforwardly used is neither true nor false, though it still has sense. I accept this doctrine and am ready to defend it. (One class of case that to my mind speaks for it occurs when $N$ is misconferrered on two individuals of a kind, e.g. two men, who have been muddled together by the speaker; in this case the speaker literally does not know what, i.e. which one, he is talking about, and his statements are, as lawyers say, void for uncertainty.) But it still holds, even if $N$ fails to name, that the sentence $[F(N)]$ can get over an impression of how things are and others may come to share this impression. Frege would then say that [the thought that $F(N)$] designates a definite thought; $N$'s vacuousness does not prevent this, because in such oblique contexts $N$ has not its straightforward use e.g. to designate a man. (The thought that Santa Claus descends chimneys is shared by many children, and to recognize which thought it is we need not take 'Santa Claus' to name a man.) But then if 'is true' is predicabile of thoughts, the sentences $[F(N)]$ and [The thought that $F(N)$ is true] will not express the same thought; the first will express a *truth-valueless* thought when $N$ fails to be a name, the second will say of this truth-valueless thought that it is true, and will thus express a *false* thought. Frege's various insights thus turn out to be partly deceptive.

Dummett resolves this antinomy by proposing to reject the view that in the contexts 'It is true that...' or 'It is false that...' the embedded sentence has its indirect meaning: the sentence would on the contrary
stand for a truth-value, just as if the sentence or its negation were free-standing. This proposal would need modification for sentences with empty proper names in them; but we could now say that just as 'Santa Claus is lazy' has sense but no truth-value, so also the results of embedding this in 'It is true that – ' and 'It is false that – ' have no truth-value; for then 'Santa Claus' does not by such embedding get carried over to its indirect meaning, and in non-oblique use it is an empty name. But we need not consider these empty-name cases to find Dummett's proposal unacceptable. As grammatical subject of 'is true' or 'is false', 'that for no non-zero numbers x, y, z, n do we have \( x^{n+2} + y^{n+2} = z^{n+2} \), is replaceable *salva veritate* by the nickname 'Fermat's last theorem'; just as this replacement can be made in other contexts, where Dummett would take both expressions to stand for thoughts. But on Dummett's proposal there would be no indirect meaning of words in the *that* clause when it stood as grammatical subject of 'is true' or 'is false'; we have rather a clause standing for a truth-value. So what is meant by the nickname 'Fermat's last theorem' when it is standing before 'is true' or 'is false' will likewise be a truth-value! Dummett says 'this is a consequence which it is possible to swallow if one is resolute'. (Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 382). When the Duke of Wellington, no coward assuredly, had ingested an over-hot potato, he did not show the resolution Dummett commends: he promptly spat it out on his plate, and remarked to his hostess the unwisdom of swallowing it.

To my mind, Dummett and Frege both go wrong about the semantic role of sentences. Both hold that a sentence stands to *something* in the same kind of relation as a name does to what it names: not always to the same thing – to a truth-value in straightforward use, to a thought (*Gedanke*) in oblique contexts. The term 'truth-value' may have caused misunderstanding; it does not here mean the circumstance of a given sentence S's being true or, as the case may be, false (who could doubt that 'there are' the two truth-values *true* and *false* in this sense?); rather it is held that all true sentences straightforwardly taken stand in a namelike relation to one entity, the True, and all false sentences, to another entity, the False.

Dummett modifies Frege's theory just to the extent of saying that the True and the False are *not objects*. This modification is quite ineffectual. It is surprising that he should think it effectual: for in criticism of what I once wrote he justly objected that whether numerals are names cannot be made to depend on whether numbers are objects; if numerals logically behave like non-vacuous names, then they *are* such, and then numbers must be recognized as what numerals name. Fine; but equally the primary question is whether sentences play a kind of naming role; if so, then it is futile to try to discriminate this from the role of names properly so called by saying that what are here named are not *objects*. 
What we should say is that sentences simply are not names, do not stand to \textit{anything} in a namelike relation; neither in their straightforward use (freestanding, or as truth-functional components) nor in their oblique use. We have to take into account the \textit{logic} of duality. To grasp this difficult notion intuitively, we need to recognize that (if we consider just statement-making sentences) a language alternative to ours is possible in which a sentence equiform to an English sentence says the contradictory opposite of what the English sentence says. Let us call the alternative language in which this is done 'Unglish'. The Unglish sentences 'It is not raining' and 'It is raining' will then respectively render the English sentences 'It is raining' and 'It is not raining'; so 'not', as in English, can serve to form a contradictory for a sentence; the Unglish for 'not' is 'not'.

This way of explaining duality originates with \textit{Tractatus} 4.062-.0621. Max Black in his commentary misunderstands the matter: he in effect supposes that in English 'It is raining', Unglish 'It is not raining', we have Unglish 'not' translating the \textit{absence} of 'not' in English! This is a peculiarly piquant example of what I have called the \textit{cancelling-out fallacy}: the error of supposing that if equiform expressions are cut out from two sentences which \textit{as wholes} have the same sense, then what is left must have the same sense; here, what is left on one side is what linguists call the zero morpheme, \textit{i.e.} \textit{nothing}. Naturally if this first step were right, the idea of a dual language Unglish would dissolve into incoherence; but the step is wrong, and as I said, the Unglish for 'not' is 'not'.

In working out which pair of expressions are mutually dual, we are so to say constructing an English-Unglish (or Unglish-English) dictionary; we want to find a set of pairs of expressions such that if we replace each expression in the set by its mate we get a negation of the original sentence. The theory of duality has been extensively worked out. Any propositional part within a sentence is dual to its negation, as the whole sentence is. The connective 'either... or...' is dual not to 'neither... nor...' but to 'both... and...'; 'some' and 'every' are dual to one another. Names are self-dual, for in the contradictory we shall still be mentioning the same things by saying the opposite about them; and by the simplest key of translation, common nouns like 'horse' in quasi-subject positions (e.g. in a phrase 'every horse' or 'some horse') will also be self-dual; this speaks in favour of the old doctrine that in such places these words too are names. Predicables, on the other hand, are dual to their negations. Take the sentence 'Every horse galloped'. The quantifier 'every' is dual to 'some'; 'horse' is self-dual; 'did not gallop' is dual to 'galloped'; so putting the bits together we get 'Some horse did not gallop', contradictory, as it ought to be, to our initial sentence.

For our purpose, two special cases of duality are important. First, what is dual to a definite description or other complex singular
designation? Frege treated such expressions as complex names; by that reckoning they would be self-dual. I do not believe there are any complex names; a name needs no internal structure in order to be a name, so any structure it happens to have physically is irrelevant to its sense. But we nearly get self-duality for complex singular designations. We may distinguish two workable definitions of \([F \text{ the one and only } A \text{ that is } G]\), which may be given the following semi-English explanations:

(i) \([\text{Just one } A \text{ is } G, \text{ and } F \text{ (that } A)]\)
(ii) \([\text{If just one } A \text{ is } G, \text{ then } F \text{ (that } A)]\)

Let us write \([F(\text{the } A \text{ that is } G)]\) for the first, and \([F(\text{the } A \text{ that is } G)]\) for the second. Then if \([F()]\) and \([F()]\) are contradictory (and thus mutually dual) predicables, which yield contradictory propositions when one name is inserted in their argument-places, \([F(\text{the } A \text{ that is } G)]\) and \([F'(\text{the } A \text{ that is } G)]\) work out as dual to each other; and the difference between the two mutually dual readings of \([\text{the one and only } A \text{ that is } G]\) becomes unimportant when the truth of \([\text{Just one } A \text{ is } G]\) is guaranteed.

The other important case of duality is the dual to a proposition-forming functor with a proposition as argument. Let \(\varphi\) be such a functor: the dual to \(\varphi\) is \([\neg \varphi\neg]\) – the successive application of negation, \(\varphi\), and negation again. At any rate, this will be so if we assume, like Frege, that double negation of a proposition does not alter its sense. For by our rule \([(\neg \varphi\neg)(\neg P)]\) will be dual to \([\varphi P]\); now \([(\neg \varphi\neg)(\neg P)]\) is the same as \([(\neg \varphi)(\neg \neg P)]\), which has the same sense as \([(\neg \varphi)P]\); and this last is just another way of writing \([\neg (\varphi P)]\), which is dual to \([\varphi P]\) as it should be.

The law of double negation is already disputed in some quarters, let alone the Fregean principle that double negation does not change sense. Obviously I cannot here argue the question. Following Elizabeth Anscombe, I want to say that two propositions’ being one another’s negations is like two correlative terms’ being one another’s converses; that double negation no more alters the sense than 'Cnv' iterated does; that the idea of inherently negative propositions, whose contradictories are inherently positive, is as empty as the idea of a class of inherently converse relative terms, which are converses of (shall we say) basic relative terms. I think too that what Intuitionists are after could be better secured by restricting the use of the dilemma pattern of argument (the vel-elimination rule) rather than by rejecting the laws of double negation and excluded middle. It must for now suffice to have said this; henceforth I take for granted Frege's principle that double negation does not alter the sense.
Let us now consider how duality works with oblique occurrences of propositions. There are two rival theories: one conformable to Frege's or Dummett's views, the other to Arthur Prior's. Take the following sentence:

Jones is informed that Smith has been in prison.

By the Frege-Dummett account, 'that Smith has been in prison' is a complex designation of a certain thought; since thoughts, for Frege, are individual pieces of information (two sentences conveying the same bit of information convey the same thought), we may use the paraphrase:

Jones is apprised of the piece of information that Smith has been in prison.

Now let us consider how duality will work. The string of words following 'of', as in the simpler case of ordinary definite descriptions, will admit of two mutually dual readings, which as before we may distinguish by using Roman and italic type for the definite article. The name 'Jones' will be self-dual; 'is apprised of' will be dual to 'is not apprised of'; so, piece by piece, the dual of the whole sentence works out as:

Jones is not apprised of the piece of information that Smith has been in prison.

Since for argument's sake we may suppose there is no question of our words' relating to no piece of information, or to more than one, we need not bother about the difference between the 'the' designation and the 'the' designation; the duality thus far seems to work out satisfactorily – but it only seems to. For let us now consider the duals of the expressions within the that clause. The predicatable 'has been in prison' is dual to its negation 'has not been in prison'; and even if we agree with Frege (as I say we should) that 'Smith' here has not a straightforward meaning, standing for a man, that is no reason for not treating it as still a self-dual name. (Frege of course would take it to name the relevant ordinary sense of the name 'Smith'.) If we take these dualities into account, we get:

Jones is not apprised of the piece of information that Smith has not been in prison.

Something has gone badly wrong. Of course some further complications of the theory could be devised to avoid a crack, but they would to my mind be just adhocus-pocus.

Let us now look at Prior's rival analysis. Prior treats 'Smith has been in prison' as still being a proposition even in oblique constructions, and correspondingly treats 'Jones is informed that – ' as a proposition-
forming functor with a single propositional argument. By our general rule, the dual of the functor will be the product of negation, this functor, and negation again:

It is not the case that Jones is informed that it is not the case that

Now let us turn to 'Smith has been in prison'. The dual of this, as before, will be 'Smith has not been in prison'. Putting the pieces together, we get:

It is not the case that Jones is informed that it is not the case that Smith has not been in prison.

But this, by the Fregean principle that double negation makes no difference to the sense, will reduce to:

It is not the case that Jones is informed that Smith has been in prison,

which is, as it ought to be, the contradictory of the proposition we first thought of. This result comes out without any new apparatus or adhocus-pocus: as Frege might have said, bei der richtigen Auffassung kommt Alles in Ordnung.

I believe, then, that a theory on Prior's lines could be coherently worked out and would be manifestly superior to one on Frege-Dummett lines. I do not think Prior's own theories, historically speaking, were quite satisfactory. He did not accept the need for distinguishing as Frege did the straightforward and the oblique meaning of names; and this pushed him step by step, as Russell had been pushed, towards a very restrictive view of real proper names, proper names for which Frege's problem would not arise. But as I said before, allowing that the name 'Smith' in an oblique context does not straightforwardly mean the man Smith, we are not then estopped from still treating it as self-dual. I must leave to others the exploration of the possible escape-routes whereby the dual of 'Smith' in oblique contexts would be some other expression, or 'Smith' would have two different oblique uses to make dualities work out right.

My view is, then, that sentences are not names and are nothing like names. Whether a sentence occurs straightforwardly or obliquely within another, it neither names nor has any namelike relation to anything whatsoever, whether a truth-value or a thought or a state of affairs or what you will. Names admit of no duality of significance: a name either names something, or simply fails to name and thereby becomes semantically futile. Sentences are essentially dual in significance: what a true sentence points towards is what its contradictory points away from; there are two opposite semantic relations involved. A false sentence is
not like an empty name; for it, unlike an empty name meant to be taken straightforwardly, can be an integral part of a sentence with truth-value. 'Pointing towards' and 'pointing away from' are of course metaphors, but what they are metaphors for cannot be informatively explained; an inchoate understanding of these relations is involved in all informative discourse, and this understanding can be clarified, or sharpened, by logical and philosophical training, but there can be no question of analysis or explicit definition.

Here I had better quickly clear up the puzzle we had about such apparent names as 'Fermat's Last Theorem'. What we get here, I hold, are not names but mere abbreviations for that clauses: the apparent name 'Fermat's Last Theorem' is not related to the clause 'that for no non-zero integers \(x, y, z, n\) do we get \(x^{n+2} + y^{n+2} = z^{n+2}\)' as a proper name is to a definite description. A proper name is not an abbreviation for a definite description (I have argued this elsewhere, and shall not do so here); but expressions like 'Fermat's Last Theorem' are mere abbreviations. What a sentence signifies (or better: how a sentence signifies things to be) can be signified only by a complex sign; thus medievals rightly spoke here of complexe significabilia; an abbreviation is a mere proxy for such a complex sign. Were it otherwise, 'I believe Pop and he believes Pip' could be a plainer way of conveying the different belief-relations in which I and he stand; it would be a pis aller to describe the entity Pop by the rigmarole 'that the Earth is round' and the entity Pip by the rigmarole 'that the Earth is flat'. (A reduction, I hope, of latent nonsense to patent nonsense.) And so we may forget about Dummett's puzzle which thing is meant by 'Fermat's Last Theorem' in 'Fermat's Last Theorem is true' and his heroic solution that here it stands for a truth-value, though elsewhere for a thought.

To what, then, do a pair of contradictories alike relate – one pointing towards it, and the other away from it? There are many reasons for rejecting the answer: A fact. Facts, as I said, are entia non grata because of their uncertain individuation; and moreover I think the appearance of the construction 'the fact that...' always points to a need to split up the sentence, so as to exhibit the content of the that clause in a separate assertion (see my Logic Matters, pp. 21-23 and 259-261). But moreover it is easy to wield Ockham's razor drastically here. Frege, with only one semantic relation for sentences used straightforwardly to bear, could cut down what sentences relate with to just two objects, the True and the False. If we recognize a duality of semantic relations for sentences, we can account for their semantics in terms of just the True: all true propositions point towards this, all false ones away from it.

Here, as I said, no informative analysis is possible: similes may help. In a world where all roads lead to one place, to Rome, let us say, travellers who face Rome will all meet there if they follow the road, travellers whose backs are towards Rome will be scattered to all
quarters. The different roads to Rome and from Rome correspond to the
different senses of true propositions or again of false propositions;
contradictory opposition is represented by travellers going opposite ways
along the same road. On a round Earth indeed travellers all going
straight away from Rome would meet at Rome’s antipodes; but it is not
a logical truth that the Earth is not flat, and there are no logical
antipodes.

Another simile brings out a little more. A parallel beam is turned by a
convex lens into a convergent pencil of rays passing through a real focus;
a concave lens would turn the beam into a divergent pencil of rays which
when projected backwards meet in a virtual focus. At the real focus there
is an actual concentration of energy, physically related to the beams that
meet there; there is nothing at the virtual focus physically relevant to the
divergent rays. The difference between the relations of the convergent
and the divergent pencil to the focus here represents the difference
between true and false propositions; the difference between two rays in
the same convergent or divergent pencil represents the difference in sense
between two true or two false propositions. And as we shall see, I wish
to say that the True is causally related to true saying and thinking, as it
is not to false saying and thinking; in the model this is represented by the
different physical relation of a real and a virtual focus to a pencil of rays
geometrically passing through the focus. Obviously any such simile must
limp somewhere; it would be idle to seek for analogues of the originally
parallel beam or of the two lenses.

At this point someone may be reminded of the doctrine taught by
Augustine and Anselm, that all true saying and thinking relates to one
Truth, which is God. This is no accident; I do myself believe that the
True, the goal and focus of all true saying and thinking, is indeed the
living, the only God. But I shall not here try to prove this; I shall indicate
what steps would have to be climbed and how arduous the climb would
be.

Augustine had an all too easy argument for the eternity of truth: if
we tried to deny this, we should get 'It was once true, or will eventually
be true, that there is no truth', which is absurd. It is providential that
Augustine did not devise this argument in his Manichean days, or he
might have found his logic forcing him to remain a Manichee, as
follows: ‘Falsehood must be eternal, for otherwise we should get:

It was once false, or it will be false, that falsehood exists

and this is absurd’. Something we might indeed characterize as logical
Manicheaism is Frege’s position: his setting up of the True and the False
as two objects of reference implicitly recognized in all thinking, even that
of the sceptic.
We are delivered from logical Manichaeism by the recognition of duality. But to show that the True is a living God we must show that the True can be credited with understanding and will; and moreover causes true thinking and saying in this world, besides being positively signified by them. This would be a long story.

As regards understanding, my first step (and I believe this is possible on somewhat similar lines to those in my Three Philosophers) would be to expound and defend Aquinas's doctrine of esse naturale and esse intentionale: the doctrine that a set-up in the world and its mental representation differ not by a descriptively capturable difference between two existent things, but by the different manner of existence ('existence' here being used in a sense not expressible by the quantifier 'for some x'). This could be used, I think, to explain our earlier result about the relation between a man's judging that Jupiter is round and his judging that he himself so judges. By Aquinas's account (Summa Theologica Iaq.16 art.2) A in judging that Jupiter is round brings into actuality in himself an intentional instance of the same form round as exists naturally in Jupiter if A judges truly; in bringing it into actuality, A is aware of so doing, and eo ipso judges its agreement in form (conformitas) with the roundness existing in Jupiter, and this constitutes a simultaneous judgment that his judgment about Jupiter is true. Aquinas considers only very simple cases, and we need to supplement his account by some recursive procedure to cover the truth-conditions of more complicated judgments; but I think this is at least the first step towards a correct account.

From this I would go on to Aquinas's notion of entia actu intelligibilia, entities whose very life is a thought by each one of himself; such are not we, although we too do think, but such, Aquinas holds, are the immortal spirits, good and evil; and such, I would argue, is the True. If understanding can be ascribed to the True, so can will; for 'will' does not mean a faculty of eliciting mental states called volitions, but a mode of causality, voluntary causality, that is proper to beings who have discourse of reason. And it is by that will, I should argue, that the True brings about all true thinking and saying, like an artist creating multitudinous self-portraits. This would be terrible egotism on the part of a human artist; but then there is nothing better than the True to be represented, and no representations can exhaust its riches.

All this is only a sketch of an argument I have partly expounded elsewhere. But I think I have shown in the present paper that there is solid reason to believe that all our true saying and thinking points to one object, the True. To do just that is all we are here for. Christ said that he was born and came into the world to bear witness to the Truth; unless in our small measure we too do that, we are worthless; our life has failed like a seed that never germinates. In comparison with this goal, how paltry it seems to devote oneself to the godling of some modern thinkers:
a godling changeable, and ignorant, and liable just as we are to passions like anger and grief and access of joy! I have not proved that the True is God, but I will worship nothing else: if the True is not God, there is no God.

\footnote{p. 6 of the Blackwell translation of \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}.}
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