JESSICA LEECH (SHEFFIELD)
The Mereology of Representation
THE MERELOGY OF REPRESENTATION

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BIOGRAPHY

Jessica Leech is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. Her research interests, contemporary and historical, centre around the topic of modality. She has written on topics in the metaphysics of modality such as relative necessity, and on the nature of logical laws. In her writing she has also explored what Kant had to say about modality, and issues arising from that. She is in the final stages of writing a book that attempts to draw out Kant’s views on modality, and apply them to contemporary issues in the metaphysics of modality.

EDITIORIAL NOTE

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Mental representations – like many other things – seem to have parts. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. This is all very well, but it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation in the first place. In this paper I attempt to make some progress on this issue. I explore how to make sense of the parts and wholes of intuitions and concepts.

I. PART AND WHOLE
WALLS ARE MADE OF BRICKS. We cut cakes into slices. We analyse sentences into their words. And so on. It is natural to think of the world around us as containing whole things made up of, or decomposable into, their parts.

At least on the face of it, there are lots of different kinds of things, and so lots of different ways in which things can have parts. For example, the way in which a brick is part of a wall seems to be different to the way in which Hamlet’s ‘To be or not to be’ soliloquy is a part of the play Hamlet. There are a host of questions one might then ask about different kinds of wholes and parts, and the different relationships that they bear to one another. The study of such questions is called ‘mereology’. To sum up some important mereological relations: (1) There are different directions of dependence. Parts can be prior to wholes (wholes depend upon their parts), or wholes can be prior to parts (parts depend upon the whole). (2) There are different senses of dependence. To give two examples: There might be existential dependence. For example, arguably, a wall couldn’t exist without some bricks, but the bricks could exist without being built into a wall. Or the dependence might concern the nature of the whole or part, such that the properties of one determine the properties of the other. For example, the wall’s being solid and rough seems to depend upon its being made of bricks that are solid and rough (compare: a wall made of marshmallows).

In this paper my aim is to focus on the mereology of representation: in what senses can mental representations have parts? By ‘mental representation’, I mean to include a range of mental states, events and activities such as thoughts, perceptions, concepts and so on. Certain claims have been made about the part-whole (mereological) structure of such representa-
tions. My aim here, broadly speaking, is to try to make sense of those kinds of claims. I seek an answer that doesn’t rely on metaphor. For example, we might say that the concept unmarried is a part of the concept bachelor, but in what sense of part? To say, for example, that the former is ‘contained in’ the latter is not immediately helpful: concepts are not straightforwardly like Russian dolls. What we need is a substantive way to understand what certain representations are and then, in terms appropriate to this, how they have parts.

This is a broad question, so I shall narrow it by considering it from a particular perspective, that of Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representation: intuitions and concepts. There are myriad issues concerning our understanding of this distinction, which I will not have space to consider here, or will only be able to examine briefly. My aim is to focus on the mereological aspect of this distinction: an intuition as a whole is prior to its parts, whilst a concept as a whole is posterior to its parts. The mereological nature of this distinction has been widely recognized (as, for example, by Aquila (1994), Bell (2001), Golob (2011), McLear (2015) and Wilson (1975)), but the question remains how exactly we should understand it. Hence, my question is: in what sense can we understand a mental representation as having parts, so that these Kantian claims make sense, and are plausible? It will be a further question how my conclusions cohere with other interpretative and philosophical issues concerning concepts and intuitions.

We might be interested in these questions simply because we want to know more about the mereological aspects of our world, but I also have an ulterior motive. If something like Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts is true of our representations, then, potentially, many interesting consequences follow. This paper is thus the beginnings of a wider exploration into the consequences of mereological distinctions amongst our representations.

I proceed as follows. First, I outline the Kantian background and the target distinction. Second, I outline where my paper touches on, and diverges from, debates concerning non-conceptual content. Third, I consider several ways in which we might take representations to have parts, and explain why they are not appropriate for understanding the mereological structure of intuitions. Finally, I introduce and motivate my preferred way to think of the nature of intuitions, which allows us to honour their mereological structure. My proposal depends upon thinking of intuitions

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1 For example, elsewhere I argue that the purpose of modal judgments may be understood as arising from our having both intuitions and concepts as distinct kinds of representation. See Leech (2014).
as relations.

II. INTUITIONS AND CONCEPTS
Kant famously distinguished between two kinds of representation: intuitions and concepts. Intuitions are singular and immediate, concepts general and mediate:

[An intuition] is immediately related to the object and is singular; [a concept] is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. (A320/B377)

The role of intuitions is to present objects to the mind.

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. (A19/B33)

The role of concepts is to enable conceptual thoughts about objects: for example, to describe, characterize and compare objects. Together, these two kinds of representations combine into what Kant calls a cognition. For Kant, both kinds of representation are required for cognition.

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (A51/B75)

We need intuitions to form a link between our thoughts and the world, but we also need concepts to be able to represent things as things, and not merely present them.

Is such a distinction defensible? The natural option would be to develop the definition of intuitions as singular and immediate representations. There is a sizable literature on such accounts, and their problems. Rather than rehearse these discussions, in this paper I want to develop a third option. Whilst Kant appears to define intuitions and concepts in terms of singularity/generality and immediacy/mediacy, when he argues that certain of our representations (that is, those of space and time) are intuitions rather than concepts, he appeals to mereological features. That is, one can construe at least one key argument as running along the following broad lines.

1. Representation R has mereological feature M.

2. Concepts do not have feature M / Intuitions have feature M.

3. Therefore, R is an intuition and not a concept.

Kant writes:

Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of them. (A24-26/B39)

Here is my reconstruction of the argument. First, Kant describes some features of how we represent space. We can represent to ourselves only one space. So-called ‘diverse spaces’ are parts of one and the same unique space. And, as we represent space, these parts of space are not prior to the whole. Space is essentially just one, single thing: it is not a complex made up of parts. So the notion of a part of space is that of a limitation of the whole, not of a component out of which the whole is composed. It is from these mereological claims—that we represent space as having parts only as limitations, and not as prior components that compose to make the whole space—that Kant moves to his conclusion, that space (by which I read, our representation of space) is an intuition.3 (By this point, Kant has already argued that our representation of space is pure—not derived from sense experience—and not empirical, hence his conclusion that our representation of space is an a priori or pure intuition.) Kant does allow, in this argument, that we can have a concept of space, or at least of spaces: ‘… the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations’. But this is only because it is grounded in a more fundamental representation of space, an intuition.

This passage raises some interesting questions, not least how the presumed mereological features of intuitions relate to their other advertised features of singularity and immediacy. I will have more to say about this below, but first we need to understand the claim that representations have parts. Representations are not like walls and cakes, where it is relatively easy to look at them and read off their more obvious mereological features. We must do some more work. Before proceeding, we can note some constraints on an answer. The conception of part for intuitions must allow that an intuition’s parts can be posterior to the whole. And, assuming that concepts have the opposite structure, the conception of part for concepts

3 Kant does move on to the conclusion that space itself is nothing more than a form of intuition, but at this point it is clearer to keep the distinction between space and our representation of space intact.
must allow that a concept’s parts can be prior to the whole.

III. MEREOLOGY AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
My topic here is closely related to contemporary debates about non-conceptual content, namely, what is it like, and whether there is any. However, my interest is slightly to one side of this debate.

A significant aspect of the conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate focuses on representations of what we might call ‘propositional size’—thoughts and perceptions. For example: Can there be non-conceptual content in our thoughts? In our perceptions? Do we need any concepts at all for perception? One argumentative strategy exploits mereological differences between conceptual and non-conceptual content. For example, Fodor (2006) distinguishes between iconic and discursive representations in mereological terms. Discursive (roughly, conceptual) representations have logical form, and so have a canonical decomposition into their constituents, whereas iconic representations have no canonical decomposition—you can slice them as you like into arbitrary parts.

Appeal is often made to the Generality Constraint. Evans writes,

\[ \text{If a subject can be credited with the thought that } a \text{ is } F, \text{ then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that } a \text{ is } G, \text{ for every property of being } G \text{ of which he has a conception. This is the condition that I call ‘The Generality Constraint’.} \] (Evans, 1982, 104)

The key thought is that conceptual representations—representations that have conceptual content—can be broken down into parts that are re-combinable in a particular way.

In these cases the question of structure is posed for something ‘bigger than’ a concept or an intuition. A thought is decomposable and re-combinable in certain ways. A discursive representation has logical form, and so must be something of propositional shape, not one of the elements put together in that form. (By ‘propositional shape’ I mean to cover sentences, statements, propositions, thoughts etc.—anything that is, or could be expressed using, a grammatical declarative sentence.) It is clear that a distinction between representations of this ‘size’ that do and do not include conceptual content is related to the question of which ‘smaller’ representations are concepts and which, if any, are intuitions. But I wish to focus on the latter question. As such, I leave aside discussion of conceptualism versus non-conceptualism.

Relatedly, a debate amongst readers of Kant is whether intuitions are able to play their role of presenting objects to the mind with or without
the aid of concepts. Is the activity of the understanding—the faculty of concepts and judgments—already at work in sensibility, our faculty for having intuitions? This is more closely related to my concerns here. In looking for a mereological distinction between intuitions and concepts, I am assuming that there is a genuine difference, and that intuitions are not partly constituted by some conceptual content. However, there may still be room for compatibility with both sides of the debate. For example, one might agree with the conceptualist that without the activity of the understanding intuitions don’t give us very much, for example they might present us with minimal content, but nothing as rich as perception of particulars. Nevertheless, there is still a minimal purely intuitive representation, and therefore still a distinction to be explored.

IV. DIFFERENT PARTS
Returning to the core question: How can we make sense of a mental representation having parts?

First, can we think in terms of material, physical, or spatial parts? No. It may be that representations have a physical realization, for example, a particular pattern of brain activity. But this isn’t the sense in which I’m interested in the parts of a representation. I’m interested in the level at which it makes sense to say, for example, that the concept unmarried is a part of the concept bachelor. It seems at least possible that the same mental representation could be physically realized in different ways, in different kinds of mind, or upon different occasions. However, this possibility does not seem to affect the structure in which I am interested – that of the concept, say, regardless of how it is realized. Hence, it may be that there is a physical realization of these representations—with accompanying physical parts—but that is beside the point.

We could simply say: representations are abstract entities, so they have abstract parts. But this, on its own, is not illuminating. In what sense do abstract entities have parts? We might imagine them on a model with physical parts. For example, I can imagine the proposition that grass is green written out like a sentence, and see that the concept green is a part of it, insofar as I imagine the word ‘green’ to be part of the ghostly sentence. But this is just metaphorical. Or I can imagine an intuition as a snapshot of the world, and the parts of the intuition as being like the parts of a photograph. But again, as there isn’t really a photograph, this is just metaphorical. We need to say something more substantive about what an abstract object is like, and how it might have parts.

4 For example, see Allais (2015), Golob (forthcoming), Land (2015a, 2015b) and McLear (forthcoming).
An example of an abstract object of which we seem to have a relatively good understanding is a set.\(^5\) We might then think of the members of a set as parts of the set. Indeed, Fine writes

> There is a strong prima facie case in favour of taking the members of a set to be parts. For we do indeed talk of a set containing its members and of its being composed or built up out of its members; and, as I have suggested, such talk is not to be dismissed simply on the grounds that sets are not material things. (Fine 2010, 563)\(^6\)

According to the standard definition, the existence and identity of a set depend upon its members, so we can make sense of the whole set being existentially dependent upon its parts, its members. Could such an explanation be carried over to other abstract objects? One option would be to reduce other kinds of abstract objects to sets. For example, one might argue that a number is a set of all sets of that cardinality (for example, 3 is the set of all sets with 3 members). Could such an explanation be extended to representations? Perhaps there is scope to give an account of concepts as sets: as extensions, or as functions from objects to truth-values (taking a function to be a set of ordered tuples). I will not assess this proposal as applied to concepts, beyond noting that it would give us the correct mereological structure: the parts (members) being prior to the whole (the set, the concept).

Could a set-theoretic explanation help us to understand the nature and structure of intuitions? I do not think so. Primarily, because, given the point just made, it would yield the wrong direction of dependence between the whole and parts of an intuition. Moreover, it is not clear how an intuition could be a set. In the case of concepts, we can recognise that a concept is at least associated with a set of things falling under it—its extension. And we can recognise that functions can be thought of as complex sets, and concepts as functions. But an intuition’s role is to present us with an object: it gives us the things which might be collected in the exten-

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5 Wilson (1975) gives an account of the differing part-whole structures of concepts and intuitions in terms of the former structure being akin to the set-theoretic notion of membership, and the latter having a mereological structure. Here I am taking ‘mereological structure’ to range more widely, and take different forms, whereas Wilson takes the notion more narrowly. However we take it, simply attributing mereological structure to intuitions does not help us answer the present question of how to understand the nature of a representation so that it has that structure.

6 There is a complication. Strictly speaking, the membership relation is not a parthood relation, because membership is not transitive, whereas it is generally understood that parthood is. Fine suggests that the ancestral of the membership relation – ‘where this is the relation that holds between \(x\) and \(y\) when \(x\) is a member of \(y\) or a member of a member of \(y\) or a member of a member of a member of \(y\), and so on’ (Fine 2010, 53) – is the parthood relation for sets. The members of a set are still parts, albeit its most direct parts.
sion of a concept, or which might be arguments for the function.

Another way to take representations to have parts is in terms of them representing things as having a particular part-whole structure. So, for example, we represent space as having parts only as limitations of the whole, and so therefore we take the representation of space itself to have this mereological structure. The representation itself does not literally have parts, but we ascribe to it the mereological structure that it represents things as having.

We may be able to argue that intuitions represent things as having a whole-prior-to-parts structure. However, our ambition is that mereology could be used to distinguish between intuitions and concepts, but this sense of part does not allow us to do so. Whilst it is plausible that the representations we expect to be intuitions have the ‘right’ structure on this account, some representations that we would want to class as concepts also have this structure, in virtue of representing things as having a whole-prior-to-parts structure. For example, our concept of a cake represents a whole in terms of which we can understand its parts, its slices. We do not think of a cake as being composed of its slices, rather, we think of the slices as being cut out of the whole cake. Perhaps more strikingly, even if Kant is right that our primary representation of space is intuitive, it is plausible to think that we still have a concept of space. That concept, if it represents space correctly, represents it as having parts only as a limitation of the whole. But that does not mean that our concept of space is an intuition.

Rather than taking a representation to be a thing, it may help to think in terms of an ability. Note that Evan’s Generality Constraint concerned what a subject can do (recombine parts of thoughts). As Heck puts it,

The ability to think that a is F must decompose into the abilities to think of a and to think of a thing as F, abilities that are sufficiently distinct that one’s being able to think that a is F may be explained by one’s being able to think of a and one’s being able to think of a thing as F. (Heck, 2007, p.9)

Heck thus presents the view that the grasping of a concept, say, the concept horse, is an ability, say, the ability to think of a thing as a horse. Moreover, that ability partially explains other abilities, such as being able to think that Dobbin is a horse, or that horses are mammals.

The proposal is thus to think of representations as abilities, and the parts of representations as abilities that partially (note: part-ially) explain the whole ability. For example, one might take some parts of the concept bachelor to be the concepts unmarried and man. We can think of our ability to think of a thing as a man as partially explaining our ability to think
of a thing as a bachelor. This looks like a promising account of the mereological structure of concepts. It is plausible that our more complex abilities depend for their existence and nature on simpler, constituent abilities. For example, just as my ability to think of a thing as a bachelor depends upon my abilities to think of things as men and as unmarried, so one might take my ability to drive a car to be a complex made up of, and dependent upon, a range of other abilities, such as abilities to observe, press pedals, react quickly, and so on. This dependence relation is further suggested by the fact that we can diminish a more complex ability by removing one of its ‘parts’. For example, if my reaction times slow down significantly, my driving will suffer. Likewise, if my competency with the concept *man* is diminished, so one would expect my ability to think of things as bachelors to be similarly diminished.

Can we apply the proposal to intuitions? What ability or capacity could an intuition be? The role of intuitions is to present the mind with objects, without which the mind could not get in touch with objects, so we might take an example intuition of an object \(x\) to be the capacity to have thoughts about \(x\). However, this would be to assume that any subject capable of having intuitions is also capable of thought. But it is plausible that something like sensible intuition is a capacity shared by humans and other animals, whereas only humans have the ability to also apply concepts to particulars and engage in conceptual thought (see Allais and Callanan, forthcoming). If we do not want to rule out the possibility of subjects that can have intuition but not have conceptual thoughts, then we cannot define intuition in terms of a capacity to have thoughts.

An intuition of \(x\) will come along with a range of other potential abilities, such as the ability to move around \(x\), track it, sniff it, but none of these look like necessary conditions. It might be that an intuition of \(x\) always comes along with some such abilities, but it seems plausible there is no privileged ability or set of abilities that necessarily accompanies intuition. At least, this is probably an empirical question that would rely on a prior understanding of what an intuition is, in order to test what abilities accompany it.\(^7\) Hence, I conclude that partial abilities might be a helpful way to think about the kinds of parts that concepts have, but not intuitions.

\(^7\) One might choose some abilities and just define an intuition as that set of abilities. But to do so would rule out the possibility of finding creatures that can have the same broad kind of representation—something with the role to present the creature with objects—realized in a very different way. For example, Kant compares our variety of sensible intuition with intellectual intuition (B143; B308; A256/B311-2). Intellectual intuition would arguably come along with some different abilities, but still essentially involve the direct presentation of things.
Another approach which is amenable to concepts is to understand their parts in terms of inferential properties. Theories that associate concepts with some or other inferential abilities or relations are common. A such a view is otherwise defensible, we can think of the parts of a concept C as those concepts the satisfaction of which is implied by C’s satisfaction, and/or as those concepts the joint satisfaction of which is sufficient to imply the satisfaction of C. (For example, the satisfaction of a thing by man and unmarried is implied by its satisfying the concept bachelor, and if something satisfies both man and unmarried, then we can infer that it satisfies bachelor.)

Again, we have a conception of a representation and the way it can have parts that is amenable to thinking about concepts, but not intuitions. An intuition of a particular x does not, just on its own, license any inference. It may enable us to make inferences about x, for example, that if x is a bachelor, x is male. But the intuition does not involve inferential connections between just itself and something else, unlike, say, the connection between the concepts bachelor and man. As above, we also shouldn’t take an intuition of x to be an ability to make inferences about x, because we want to leave it open that beings without the capacity for logical reasoning could still have intuitions.

In summary, I have considered several ways to understand a representation as having parts: material or spatial parts; abstract parts; set-membership; representing something else as having parts; partial abilities; and inferential properties. Several seem promising as accounts of the way that concepts have parts. But I have argued that none so far is able to capture the sense in which an intuition has parts. In the next section, then, I propose one further way to think of intuitions that does better.

V. INTUITION AND PRESENTATION
When we ask how a representation has parts, it is natural to imagine something like a picture or a sentence and then to consider how it might be carved up, or from what it might have been composed. But this is not a helpful way to think about the kind of sub-propositional-sized representations at issue. We have already seen that promising accounts of the parts of concepts are not to be thought of on this model, but as something less picture-like, such as an ability.

Similarly, in the case of intuitions we should think again. The role of intuition is not to present anything as being a certain way. Intuitions

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8 A representative example is the view of Brandom. See his (1994; 2000; 2008; 2009). See also Landy (2015) for an inferentialist reading of Kant.
simply present us, immediately, with objects. Indeed, some interpretations of intuitions in the literature characterize them as presenting, rather than representing, objects. This can be understood as the view that intuitions relate us directly to objects, rather than having an intentional content that represents objects. There is scope for a great deal of subtlety and detail in developing different such accounts of intuition, and what, if any, role might be played by intentional content. My aim here is to focus solely on the mereological question: how can thinking of intuitions as presentation relations help us to understand their mereological structure, and thereby to distinguish them from concepts? There are myriad other considerations that I will be unable to address here. My aim is not, therefore, to present a well-rounded interpretation, but only to contribute to the mereological aspect of one.

I propose, then, to see where we get if we think of an intuition as an instance of a relation between an object and the mind: the presentation relation.

This interpretation offers us a way to understand the singularity and immediacy of intuition. First, if an intuition is a relation between an object and a mind, then its singularity can consist in the fact that it relates us to a single object: ‘The idea that intuitions are singular means that there is a particular thing the intuition presents’ (Allais, 2015, 154). Second, if an intuition is a direct relation between an object and a mind, then we can understand the claim that they are immediately related. This is in contrast to a case where a mind is related to an object via an intermediary, for example, a mental image that is of the object.

Allais interprets the immediacy claim in terms of dependence: ‘As I read Kant’s immediacy claim, he thinks that intuitions are object-dependent in the sense that we have an intuition of an object only when that object is in fact present to us’ (p.156). This dependence can be accounted for in terms of the relation: if there is only one relatum, then there can be no instance of a two-place relation. Indeed, one might take the object-dependence of intuitions to be a consequence of the view that an intuition is a relation between an object and a mind. If there is a relatum missing, there is no relation. Just as there is no intuition if there is an object but no subject present, so there is no intuition if there is a subject but no object. Whether or not it is correct to interpret Kant as claiming that intuitions are object dependent is a matter of some controversy.10 This is also com-

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10 See for example Gomes and Stephenson (forthcoming) and Stephenson (2015).
licated by the fact that there are different strengths of dependence. Must an object be present at the same time as one intuits it (strong dependence), or just either at the same time or prior to the time of the intuition of it (weak dependence), or something even weaker?

It seems to me that as long as we can make sense of there being *something* presented, *some* relatum, whether it be concurrent or not, or recombined or whatever, then there is scope to think of intuitions as relations. A serious problem is therefore presented if we want to be able to make sense of misleading intuitions, that is, hallucination and illusion. If it seems to me as if I am presented with some object \(x\), but it turns out that I’m wrong, how can we explain that? If I have an intuition of \(x\), then \(x\) must exist, so how can we account for hallucinatory intuitions?

Again, this is a matter of controversy.\(^{11}\) I thus offer a sketch of a way that intuitions, conceived of as relations, can meet this challenge, and leave the details for elsewhere. It is an important feature of Kant’s account that there are *inner* intuitions as well as outer intuitions. Outer intuitions are of objects outside us in space. Inner intuitions are of our own mental states. One way to account for hallucinations is in terms of our mistaking an inner intuition for an outer intuition. How exactly this would work, and the details of why they can be indistinguishable, requires more work. But one should note that, for Kant, whilst the forms of sensibility are space and time, there is no one sense with both space and time as its forms. Rather, outer sense has the form of space, so that outer intuitions are spatial in form, and inner sense has the form of time, so that inner intuitions are temporal in form. Our intuitions of the outer world present it as being in space and time because outer intuitions—in spatial form—pass through the mind and thereby are presented in inner intuition, as with any other mental state, and thereby also given temporal form (see A34/B50-1). As at least some outer intuitions become objects of inner intuition, it seems thereby plausible that we might take an inner intuition to be presenting a genuine outer intuition when in fact it is presenting some other inner state. Ultimately, the important point for present purposes is that *all* intuitions have an object, only in some cases this inner object is not an outer intuition, but some other kind of inner state. Hence, there is no bar from hallucination to taking intuitions to be relations, and thereby object dependent.

I now turn to how thinking of an intuition as a presentation relation helps with the mereological question. The core idea is: relations aren’t the kinds of things that are composed out of parts, so if an intuition is a relation, we can explain why it is prior to its parts in a non-metaphorical

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\(^{11}\) See Stephenson (2015).
way that does justice to the role of an intuition. More precisely, perhaps it
does make sense in some cases to think of a relation as having component
parts, for example, perhaps the cousin relation is in fact a complex of rela-
tions of parenthood and siblinghood, and perhaps siblinghood in turn is
composed out of parenthood relations. The thought, though, is that the
presentation relation is simple, and as such does not have parts. There are
no obvious candidates, as in the case of cousinhood, for component parts
upon which the whole relation depends.

The following is our target view: An intuition is an instance of the
presentation relation. The presentation relation is simple: it has no prior
parts upon which it depends. However, intuitions must be presented to
us in a particular form – in space and time. This means that intuitions do
have some further structure that we can discern, and thereby in terms of
which we can take an intuition to have parts. But in such a case, the parts
are posterior to and therefore somewhat dependent on the intuition as
a whole. Parts existentially depend upon the whole. The nature of those
parts may depend to some extent on the nature of the whole, but it may
also depend upon the mechanisms by which we decompose the whole into
parts.

If intuitions are presentation relations, then in what sense could they
have parts? An answer to this question will require a diversion through
the metaphysics of properties and relations. In other words, what is a rela-
tion and in what sense does it have parts?

Let us begin with a traditional option: properties and relations are
universals. It is distinctive of a universal that the very same – numerically
identical – universal is present in all its instances. So, for example, the
very same relation is present in Serena’s being Venus’s sister, and Mary’s
being Elizabeth’s sister. For present purposes, we want to allow that there
are distinct intuitions, for example, an intuition of Serena is distinct from
an intuition of Venus. If we take the intuition to be just the universal pre-
sentation relation in each instance, then given that the relation is one and
the same universal, the intuitions will turn out to be identical, not distinct
after all. In order to ensure the distinctness of different intuitions, then, we
need to consider an intuition to be, not a universal alone, but a relational
complex in which the universal and its relata are combined. For example,
the state of affairs combining presentation, the subject, and Venus, is dis-
tinct from the state of affairs combining presentation, the subject, and
Serena, in virtue of containing different constituents.

The problem with this relational complex view, however, is that it
gets the mereology wrong. The relational complex is best understood as a
whole dependent on its parts, that is, dependent on and composed from
presentation, the subject, and the object. One might respond with an account according to which states of affairs are fundamental and prior to their parts, where the parts are abstractions from the whole. For example, Armstrong (1978) presents such a view. I will not rehearse all of the criticisms of this view. But consider: is it plausible to think that the object, Serena say, is an abstraction from an intuitive state of affairs, dependent in some way on states of affairs in which she is presented? Prima facie, we would, on the contrary, expect Serena to exist independently of states of affairs in which she is perceived.

Nominalist alternatives to universals give an account of properties and relations in terms of some other kind of entity, for example, sets or classes. It is standard to take the semantic value of a monadic predicate to be a class – for example, the semantic value of ‘is blue’ is the class of blue things – and similarly, to take the semantic value of a relational predicate to be a class of ordered tuples – for example, the semantic value of ‘is a sister of’ is the class of pairs of sisters. Can we take the presentation relation to be the class of ordered pairs of subject and presented object, and an instance of the relation – an intuition – to be a member of the class? No. If an intuition is a class, then its mereological structure will be that of a class. But I have already discussed above that this has the structure of the parts (members) being prior to the whole (class, set). So this account would yield the wrong mereological result.

The best prospect for giving metaphysical support to the target view is to think of an intuition as a presentation-relation trope. Tropes are qualitative and particular. One can think of a trope as being like an instance of a property or relation, but where it is a genuinely particular thing (this redness, that presenting). Importantly, different instances of ‘the same’ relation are understood as numerically distinct tropes. Such tropes do not have their bearers or relata as parts, rather, if anything, they are understood to themselves be parts of those bearers. For example, sometimes tropes are introduced as abstract parts: just as we can think of a rose as having concrete parts—its stem, petals and thorns—we can think of it as having abstract parts—its colour and scent. One might plausibly take the existence and/or the identity of a trope to be dependent on its bearer(s): for example, the rose’s redness may depend for its existence upon the rose – if there was no rose, there would not be its redness – and this trope is the individual it is, rather than the redness of Rudolph’s nose, in virtue of being a part of the rose rather than Rudolph. This may suggest, although I will not explore this further here, that at least some tropes are dependent parts of a whole, but it does not suggest that they themselves have parts,

12 See, for example, Devitt (1980), Lewis (1983), and Van Cleve (1994).
let alone parts upon which they depend.\footnote{Whether the identity of a trope depends upon its bearer is also disputed. See, for example, Beebee and Dodd (2005). Also, one might think that the redness of the rose depends upon some parts of the rose, e.g., the petals. But importantly, this is not understood as the redness as a whole depending upon \textit{its own} parts, which is what we are concerned with here.}

These features mean that appeal to a presentation \textit{trope} ensures the distinctness of different intuitions, without requiring the relata to be parts of the intuition (unlike the relational complex view). There are presentations (of objects to minds), just as there are rednesses (of roses, for instance). Such things are simple, and so have no prior parts, although one may carve up the presentation into parts after the fact (of which more below). Even if we take an intuition to be individuated by, or have its identity determined by, its relata (a particular intuition is the presentation of \textit{Serena to Venus}, say, rather than the presentation of \textit{Mary to Elizabeth}), this would not mean that its relata are thereby its \textit{parts}. (Compare: we might identify Mary as the first daughter of Henry, but this does not mean that Henry is a part of Mary.) Hence, presentation tropes yield the right mereology.

If we take intuitions to be particularized presentation relations between subjects and objects, we can explain why the parts of intuitions are not prior to the whole: tropes are simple. The next question is to consider how such a thing could have parts at all. To properly capture the mereological claims made by Kant, we need to understand how an intuition can have parts that are posterior to it.

What allows us to discern parts in an otherwise simple intuition? I suggest: temporal and spatial form. Kant argues that our representations of space and time are intuitions. But he also argues that they are pure, that is, not derived from sense experience. However, if they are not presented to us via the senses, how can they be intuited? Kant answers: they are \textit{forms} of intuition, the forms in which things are presented to us. Kant writes in the \textit{Prolegomena},

\begin{quote}
How is it possible to intuit \textit{something} a priori? An intuition is a representation \textit{[eine Vorstellung]} of the sort which would depend immediately on the presence of an object. It therefore seems impossible \textit{originally} to intuit \textit{a priori}, since then the intuition would have to occur without an object being present, either previously or now, to which it could refer, and so it could not be an intuition. (4:281-2)
\end{quote}

There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an \textit{a priori} cognition, \textit{namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility...} (4:282)
The result is that particulars are presented to us (intuited) as being in space and time. Once we recognize that intuitions must take this form, we have the resources from which to carve out the parts of intuitions. If outer intuition presents us with an object extended in space, then we have the potential to discern, for example, the right hand portion and the left hand portion. Kant himself suggests that, on its own, an intuition is an absolute unity with no parts, and only once the form of intuition (time) is introduced can we represent ‘the manifold’ of parts within it.

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. (A99)

My suggestion depends heavily on the Kantian claim that the forms of intuition are space and time, and so also depends on the success or not of the arguments for those claims. I do not have room to assess these claims and arguments here. Rather, I will comment on one potential objection, which is internal to the issues discussed in this paper. Above, I considered an argument for the conclusion that our representation of space is an intuition that rested on mereological premises. It was the similarity of the mereological structure of intuitions in general, and that of our representation of space, that was supposed to show that the latter is an intuition. If that argument is to avoid begging the question, it cannot already be assumed that the mereological structure of intuitions is spatial. But now I have suggested that we should understand the mereological structure of intuitions in terms of spatiotemporal structure.

In response: although I am making appeal to the structure of space and time here, this is not what explains that the whole of an intuition is prior to its parts – the crucial mereological feature exploited by the argument. The explanation of the priority of the whole intuition did not make any appeal to spatiotemporal structure: that relied on the simple nature of the presentation relation. The arguments for space and time can then proceed: they are essentially one, and so intuitions and not concepts. But they are a priori, and so forms of intuition, not objects presented to us in intuition. We can then draw on this result to go back and see how parts of those simple intuitions could be discerned, exploiting this spatiotemporal structure.

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14 This may or may not involve the use of concepts. To decide this would involve delving deeper into the Kantian conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate than I can do here.
VI. CONCLUSION

In what sense can a representation have parts? More particularly, how can we make sense of sub-propositional-sized mental representations having a part-whole structure? I have attempted to provide an answer that is compatible with, and could be used to support, Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts. My focus has been on intuition, although I have indicated some promising ways to make sense of the part-whole structure of concepts. I propose that if we take an intuition to be a (presentation) relation, then we can not only make sense of the more familiar aspects of Kant’s account of intuitions—that they are singular and immediate—but we can also make sense of the mereological features attributed to intuitions without resorting to metaphor. A presentation relation is simple, and so has no prior parts from which it is composed, although the forms of intuition—space and time—provide us with resources to carve up intuitions into parts that depend upon the whole.15

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