What is Social Philosophy? Or, Order, Practice, Subject

MARTIN SAAR
WHAT IS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY?
OR,
ORDER, PRACTICE, SUBJECT

MARTIN SAAR
GOETHE UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM MAIN

MONDAY, 19 MARCH 2018
17.30 - 19.15

THE WOBURN SUITE
SENATE HOUSE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
MALET STREET
LONDON WC1E 7HU
UNITED KINGDOM

This event is catered, free of charge &
open to the general public

CONTACT
mail@aristoteliansociety.org.uk
www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk

© 2018 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
BIOGRAPHY

Martin Saar is professor of social philosophy at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main (since fall 2017). He has taught in Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin and Leipzig. His areas of specialization and teaching are contemporary political and social philosophy and the history of early modern and modern political thought (with focus on Spinoza, Nietzsche, Marx, Foucault, Critical Theory, Post-structuralism, and interdisciplinary research on collective memory, affect, ideology, and power).

EDITORIAL NOTE

The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author’s permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Issue No. 2, Volume CXVIII (2018). Please visit the Society’s website for subscription information: aristotelsociety.org.uk.
WHAT IS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY? OR,
ORDER, PRACTICE, SUBJECT

MARTIN SAAR

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY?

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY is a young, not every well-defined sub-field of contemporary philosophy. If it is a specific and meaningful field or sub-discipline at all, this means that it is a specific philosophical practice that starts from a specific starting-point, namely society, or the social. To do social philosophy, therefore, is not necessarily to not talk about knowledge, action, logics, metaphysics or morality, but to start thinking from the social and maybe then even proceed to these other objects. It means to place philosophical questions under the perspective of the social, or sociality, to treat its objects as social. So it is less a specific field of objects that defines social philosophy, but the priority it attributes to a certain way of looking at them. And it is from this perspective that a certain specificity arises, that specific questions, and maybe even specific solutions and systematic proposals emerge.¹

Let me propose one way of describing or elaborating such a style of philosophical thinking (one form of social philosophy, as it were). I will do this, following the remarks just given, not by way of naming specific systematic achievements or results of social-philosophical thinking, but by sketching its conceptual grid, a constellation of concepts (as in my subtitle) that constitute the set of tools enabling philosophical reflection on and research into the social. This is a methodological or conceptual exercise not meant to exhaust the whole range of possibilities. Rather, it is a way of accounting for one specific practice within contemporary social philosophy (let’s just say: mine, or one that I find congenial).

This proposal proceeds in three steps. First, I propose to treat ‘society’ less as an object (more or less well-defined), less as a distinctive zone or separate sphere, but as a constellation, a coherent set of relations (a Zusammenhang) that can appear in different forms, and appears rather differently on three different levels.

¹ For related discussions on which I am drawing here, see particularly Honneth (1996) and Celikates and Jaeggi (2017), but also works by Theunissen (1984), Joas and Knöbl (2004), Fischbach (2009) and Bedorf (2011).
Second, I hold that on these three levels there appear three form or figures of the social as phenomena or fields of power. This turns social philosophy as a whole – on a rather abstract level – into the practice of an analysis and critique of power.

Third, in all of these three fields these phenomena of power lead to processes of self-reflection within society and reflections on the possibility to transform, alter and modify given social relations, it leads, that means, to a reflection on the possibility of individual and collective action changing the very social itself, that is to questions of politics (in the widest sense).

In all of these steps, social philosophy comes close to other forms of reasoning (sociology in the first, general social theory in the second, political theory in the third step), but it is the coherence and constellation of these different concepts and the questions connected to them that – for me at least – mark the specific approach or practice of social philosophy that is not particular in its objects but in its perspective.

I. THREE LEVELS OF THE SOCIAL

1. Order. Asking ‘what is society?’ means posing an ontological question, asking about the defining features of an entity, maybe even its place within a larger picture of other entities. The intellectual history around the concepts of polis and kosmos, ecclesisa or respublica or what since Machiavelli has been called ‘the state’, later sharply separated from civil society or société (see Keane 1988, Neuhouser 2008) – all of these are elements of a conceptual prehistory of the modern question of society and its specificity and its separation from nature or divine will but also its separation from political institutions in the narrow sense.

Since the middle of the 18th century, around the time of Rousseau, the term ‘society’ gradually acquired its modern meaning and contour, as a concept of totality; and it will never lose this trait. Even the many laments that social theory has lost its proper object of reference in late modernity (a claim Lyotard or Baudrillard have leveled against the Marxist tradition, or Luhmann against the Weber tradition, or Ernesto Laclau or Oliver Marchart against the whole of classical social theory) are part of a history that thinks society as a figure of the whole or of totality. And social philosophy will probably forever remains in this horizon.

I propose to take the question of society as a totality seriously but not literally. Already for classical social theory from Rousseau to Durkheim to Weber, society is not a container, not a box separable from its content, with a clear locality, clear borders or identity, but a type of relation, a
form of the human in the form of collectivity, a social form of the human, namely being-socialized (vergesellschaftet, in Weber’s term).²

On the most fundamental level, therefore, ‘society’ refers to nothing less than this fact of social determination, social ordering or regularity of all that happens ‘in’ society or with and by members of a society. It shapes, structures and determines what members of a society can do and what they do and how they learn to do to it. It structures and determines their agency, their possible range of actions. For this reason, society is or appears – to us, theorist, and of course also to the subjects and members of a society – as the very fact that things happen a certain way and not differently (that there are specific forms of education, professions, consumption, relations to nature, to history, and so on). All of this appears to the one describing and observing and even to the one entering into a society, as a set of facts, the fact of an order that exists, or a structure that determines. And this is, we might say, where social philosophy begins to ask and to answer, with society-as-order.

2. Practice. This first level of analysis and description of society as order (or being-ordered and being-ordering) might be fully adequate and certainly irreducible to other facts about the social, but of course it runs exactly the risk of reifying and substantializing society that advanced theories of the social have always tried to circumvent.³ For this reason a second perspective imposes itself, a description on another level. With only a slight change of perspective, we can shift from the fact of order to the process of creating, maintaining and sustaining this very order. Behind every order, we might say, lies a universe of acts of regularization and institutionalization that create social order. But they are themselves social acts, social interactions and communications, that refer to, for example, education, the formation of habits, social exchange, cooperation, division of labor, forms of conflict and conflict-regulation. We might say with Talcott Parsons that all of these elements are ‘media’ of the social, in any case they are the very forms that socially create the social. They are actions in the strict sense, things that are done, and in this sense, practices (see Bourdieu 1977).

On this second level, therefore, society appears as nothing else than a set of related practices (a Praxiszusammenhang, as we can say in German), and this of course amounts to a commonplace which in our post-

² There is a variety of ways to translate Vergesellschaftung, the standard edition of Economy and Society from Roth and Wittich has ‘association’ (Weber 1978, p. 1375, cf. Swedberg 2016, p. 12).

³ Since the mid-19th century, the emergence of sociology as a rival discourse and discipline to philosophy that was less speculative and more empirical was a crucial factor. One could day that the diverse instances of a philosophical critique of the positivism in the social sciences were an almost unavoidable result of this rivalry (see Dahms 1994).
pragmatist era that takes so many cues from Wittgenstein, Heidegger or Dewey nobody would dare to deny. But I want to insist that it constitutes an essential, and necessary step for any ambitious social philosophy: to talk about society means to talk about its being practically instituted, brought into being. To talk about society means to talk about the scenes, forms and contradictions of not only being, but doing society.

To extend the perspective from order to practice does not revise but reinterpret the first step where society appears as order, as a fact placed before the members of a society. In this second step, the members themselves appear as participants, producers and maintainers and sometimes transformers of this order. Their actions are themselves constitutive of what they can then again experience as fait accompli, as an external fixed order of practices: this is the dialectics of structuring and structured, institution and instituted, constitution and constituted (crucial for many social theorists from Giddens (1984) to Castoriadis (1987) to Balibar (2014)).

3. Subject. On a third level, moving downward, arises the question of the elements of this complex of practices in the form of which society appears on the second level. After the macro-level of order, the meso-level of practices and interaction, there are now questions on the micro-level about who or what acts and interacts. It seems important (to me at least) to say that society does not stop, as it were, on the level of the intersubjective or interindividual, since the practices instituting or maintaining or changing order are essentially practices of individual or subjects.

In this sense, we might say, even it fit sounds strange, society on this third level appears in or on the level of subjects, in the form of subjects or socialized selves. It is the most crucial ‘society effect’ to create members of societies that are and do exactly this, namely maintain a social order through their very practices, by being what they are and doing what they do, as subjects of this very society, and understanding themselves as these very subjects, be it positively (by upholding a specific order) or negatively (by contesting it).

For this reason any self understanding itself and relating to itself as a member of a society is the smallest unit of the social, but not its basis or foundation (since it is also its effect or product). The individual self is part of the social but the social not reducible to it). The individual does not ‘explain’ the collective. Rather, explaining or articulating the social means reflecting on the relation between the individual and the collective, but as a relation between interrelated poles. Society embodies itself, we might say, in subjects and their self-understanding, but this turns back
on the meso-practices and macro-orders that are enacted, interpreted and transformed by subjects.

Social philosophy will therefore need to talk about the autonomy, the *Eigensinn* of self and subject without hypostasizing this in any individualist or subjectivist way. A social philosophy without a conceptual place for the self is not social philosophy at all (but only systems theory), but its interest in the self is directed toward the self’s sociality and its place in society and its effects on society. It is addressed as a situated self or self in context (see Benhabib 1992), not only in its existential, reflexive or moral dimension, but in its entanglement with the social frames in which it projects itself in relation to others, but in which it is also regulated and governed as much as it also regulates and governs others (see Habermas 1992).

The self or subject in social philosophy therefore is conceptualized relationally all the way down, as a part of a relation in which it is also constitutive for the other parts or the other selves or subjects. This holds true on this level but also on the two others: practice and order. Order, practice and subject all describe relations and interrelations. ‘The social’ is nothing autonomous, no sphere or entity, but a product of interactions and relations. It realizes itself and emerges in and through orders, practices, and subjects. Research in social philosophy will have to reckon with all of these levels and all of these objects. It will never be pure theory of social order, neither pure theory of social practice nor pure philosophy of the subject, but it will comprehend society as a structured as well as structuring complex of orders, practices and subjects.

II. THREE FIELDS OF POWER

My remarks so far were ontological or conceptual, the three levels mentioned mark the point where social philosophy begins to ask and inquire, the three terms mark specific relations that define or specify the social. But what is seen and described on these respective levels? It seems obvious to me that on all levels, modern social philosophy tries to account for the very fact that there is simultaneously social determination and social under-determination, that it is not for nothing that it has taken the shapes and forms a given society has acquired, that this shape of form is neither natural nor necessary, but contingent on certain factors. To account for this contingency means to account for the powers and forces that have instituted this social universe and made it so (without it being necessarily so).

All the classical narratives about social alienation or exploitation, cultural illusions or *anomie* (from Rousseau to Marx, and Nietzsche and
Durkheim) in this sense are variants of an analysis of power or forces trying to make sense of the fact that (modern) society took this course, that certain self-understandings, practices and institutions have emerged and what this means for modern society and its subjects. Social philosophy therefore describes, on a rather general level, three fields of power located on the three fields respectively.

1. **Domination.** The classical term domination (or *Herrschaft*) places power on the first level, referring to the very power of the (social) order, of its overall structure and its institutional form, and here it is irreplaceable. It refers to the hard fact of order in its petrified form. When we talk of domination in this structural sense, we speak of a social form that has acquired a stability and autonomy that structures and regulates the whole of the social body. As relation of domination, a society distributes agency and the possibilities and authorities to act to its members differentially and systematically (it institutes the power of classes, groups, identities; this power can be personal but must not be necessarily so). Social philosophy on this level is interested in these petrifications and institutionalizations of the social in its entirety, and it will try to account for the power effects regulating it. In this sense it will be an analysis and critique of domination, a reflection on the entire social order as a figure or phenomena of power.

2. **Normalization.** But of course we also encounter power on the second level, of specific practices, referring less to the overall structure and its petrification but to some of their elements. Practice can appear as power when it becomes dominant, when certain forms of interaction represses others or certain patterns of practices emerge as hegemonic. These processes close the potentially open character of the social into a more coherent, more normative form, but not on the level of the whole structure, but on the level of some of the actions possible within it.

I propose to refer to these processes as ‘normalization’, the powerful regularizing of what can be done. It is a figure of power because it makes a specific narrow form out of a potentially richer, polyvalent one, because it also distributes agency and the possibility to act. Society appears as power on the level of practice when it narrows down the range of actions and interactions, attaches norms and worth to some of them (and takes them from others). These are looser, more flexible cases of power than on the first

---

4 I hope this to be a minimal and uncontroversial usage of the term power in its most general self, following the discussion after Dahl (1986), Wartenberg (1990) and Lukes (2005).

5 This rather broad understanding of domination that follows Weber but also Foucault should also be tenable even despite of the criticism against a too narrow focus on domination as just one case of power among many. See Lovett (2010) for the most important recent discussion.
level, for sure. But they are no less innocent, harmless or ineffective, they might even constitute the most effective mechanisms of power regulating modern societies.

3. **Subjectivation.** But even on the lower, third level we will find scenes and occurrences of power. If it is true that the self or subject is a constitutive element of society, if it is also instituted and constituted as a necessary instance of being-social, it must be possible to describe this level and its coming into being as a sphere of power, in a specific sense. In English and French, the terms for becoming-subject (or subjectivation) and subjection lie close to each other, and philosophers from Hobbes to Althusser, Foucault and Butler have exploited this semantic proximity (see Foucault 2000[1982], Butler 1997). Already Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud, arguably the most important modern theorists of the subject, were proposing this essential social-philosophical line of thinking: The self or subject only emerges in the context of unequal, powerful interactions, it is a product or an effect of power in the sense that it is born out of submission and subjection. Or, put otherwise: becoming a subject takes place in the context of powerful, power-laden or power-ridden interactions. Power inscribes itself into selfhood, the subject is a site of power. This is what Hegel’s philosophical image of the emergence of self-consciousness out of serfdom points at; this is what Nietzsche is proposing in his genealogical reflection of the origins of reflexivity in pain and sanction; this is what Freud is trying to get at when he explains the emergence of conscience out of the interiorization of paternal authority.

The self, then, emergences in the context of power, and it will become, what it is, out of power. Power marks the subject who will never lose these marks. In the works of Nietzsche, W.E.B. Du Bois und Frantz Fanon, this thought leads to a radical critique of the social orders that have led to exactly these forms of subjectivity. For the context of my argument it is enough to maintain: for social philosophy, the subject is nothing prior to society (and of course no basis of society), but also nothing completely subjected to power, helplessly, as it were. It is a product and an effect of power in what it has become to be. And this means that power over selves, or, the power in selves or subjects is a major theme for social philosophy. This is what the rather technical term ‘subjectivation’ in this conceptual matrix should convey: the social problem of power and self, which is the problem of the power of the social in or within the self (see Warren 1988 and Patton 1998).

To sum up this section: The three terms domination, normalization, and subjectivation refer to – on the three respective levels of the social – three respective zones, or fields, or problems of power inherent to the three
levels. These three powerful effects of the social on order, on practice, and on the self are to be analyzed and laid bare. To do this, on the three levels, with a diagnostic sensibility for the rather different power-effects, is part of the mission of a social philosophy that is based on an ‘analytics’ of power, as Foucault (1978[1976], p. 82) puts it.

III. THREE POSSIBILITIES OF POLITICS

If the thinking of society, as has been proposed here, encounters three figures or forms of power, namely the dominating power of/in order, the normalizing power in/of practice and the subjectivating power in/of the self, it is, quite generally, a reflection, an analysis or, we might even say, a critique of power (as in Honneth 1991). This term refers to an analysis that describes and assesses the effects of power while at the same time thinking about the costs, the price, and even the victims of a given constellation of power. In the terms proposed here, these costs or this price will be accounted for in terms of the possibility to act (or of agency) that are weakened or strengthened, narrowed or extended, both on the individual and the collective level.6

The reflections offered by social philosophy are critical in the sense that it is interested in the possibility or impossibility to act in an order, within a practice, of subjects. In an older language one might speak of a practical-critical epistemic interest (Erkenntnisinteresse) that guides this form of reflecting on society as problem or phenomenon of power, and this seems just right (see Habermas 1971 and Stahl 2017). Every analysis of social structures, of forms of influence and determination aims at the possibility-to-act, at the possibility to cope with forces and powers, to use the space and freedom available and to evade non-necessary limitations.

In this sense, the analysis of the power of/in society contains – on the three respective levels – a thematization, a reflection of three possible forms of counter-power or counter-action, or, we might also say, of moments of collective determination. And this is where the perspective of social philosophy changes again, now from society as a site of being-determined to society as a site of determining, of acting, and of being conscious of society’s own powers. And the traditional name for this, of course, is: politics, collective action. Social philosophy therefore, from the logic of its very object, is logically led to its political dimension, present differently

6 The idea that society makes possible and distributes individual agency, is a traditional thought, but it has been made productive in its negativistic form in more recent Critical Theory. See the helpful discussion of Celikates (2009) on the idea of blockages to agency, implicit in Habermas and Honneth.
on the three respective levels. To three problems of power correspond and correlate three forms of acting-otherwise and acting collectively.

1. (Radical) Democracy. On the first level, order as a whole is now not understood as a terrain of being determined, structured and petrified, but as a terrain that is itself flexible, malleable, because it contains forces that make it transformable, by itself. The effect of society is then taken to create the capability, of a social entity, to give itself a certain form, an order; it is taken as the power of self-constitution or self-institution. Reflecting on society as a whole (this is what ‘society-as-order’ stands for) that is capable of transforming itself means thinking of it not as an agent of domination (over something else, its members, and so on) but as an agent of self-transformation and self-determination. It is here where social philosophy overlaps with, or articulates, the project of collective autonomy that traditionally is called democracy (in the wider sense; see the seminal texts by Castoriadis (1987) and Lefort (1989)).

This doesn’t mean that social philosophy turns into democratic theory or into a theory of democratic government. But it turns into a reflection of society’s ability of self-determination and self-government. The term democracy here refers to the collective form of life or mode of existence of an entity that creates spaces for collective self-determination of self-programming. (In the current debate, the term ‘radical democracy’ has come to refer more to this non-institutional, non-regime side of government. This is democracy out of bounds, we might say (see Tonder and Thomassen 2005 and Saar 2014).

So there is an internal relationship of social philosophy as an enterprise to collective freedom or self-determination, and this derives from its object of analysis and critique. Social philosophy does not desire or recommend democracy, as a political choice, but it is led to think collective self-determination from its very object and perspective on it that reveals the internal self-transformability of society. And this might be social philosophy’s optimistic bid (even in the face to more somber diagnostic suggestions from Marcuse to Agamben): that social self-determination might be possible, malgré tout.

2. Resistance. On the second level, the level of practice, it is possible to describe the petrification or hardening of forms of action. Practice turns into (normalizing) power where it relentlessly imposes a specific style or way of acting. But also this power is countered by another counter-conduct, counter-practice that reopens this impasse. Max Horkheimer in his famous essay from 1937 on ‘Tradition and Critical Theory’ has spoken of a ‘critical activity [Verhalten] which has society itself for its object’ (Horkheimer 1986[1937], p. 206) and that is the precondition for any
emancipatory reflection on social conditions. For him, the direction of this ‘activity’ is clear and straightforward: a sense of social injustice and an endorsement of class struggle.

Looking at practice as a problem or phenomenon of power therefore connects to those struggles that counter and contest powerful instrumentalizations or manipulations of social practices (see Jaeggi 2005 and Celikates 2016). A power-critical social philosophy will look for instances of such counter-conduct and acting-differently, they might be local, contextual and dispersed. Again: these acts of resistance are not located on the upper level of the social whole (this would be ‘(radical) democracy’ or even ‘revolution’), but on the meso-level of practices and collective action. These are now being described not in their power to normalize but in their being altered, modified, and subverted.

Such acts of non-conforming or non-normalized action are social practices in the form of counter-power, they can be called ‘resistance’ to refer to their performative or practice-aspect. And the social philosophy sketched here will necessarily have an interest in and a sensibility for such resistant desires and possibilities. They show and reveal the potential for counter-power that lies in social practice itself. Social practice realizes itself not only in the reproduction of existing orders and norms but can – potentially – also realizes itself in their subversion and transformation which might, in turn, have effects on the whole social structure and its order (see Brown 1995).

3. Self-transformation. But also on the third (or lowest) level, there is a political element, because, also here, there is a social entity (namely the self or the subject) that can be analyzed in terms of power, here called ‘subjectivation’, the powerful subjection of subjects under social norms and the invasion or penetration of subjectivity with social power. Also this problem of power has a significant counterpart in a counter-power, now at the site of the subject, being the smallest social unit, society embodied in a person, as it were.

What I have in mind here are moments of individual critical acts, that are critical of the social but that take place or are located in subjects and that alter their shape. What happens in these acts is a wrenching from, a twisting from norms and models of selfhood, a stylization of the self against the social (in acts of ‘subjective’ resistance, one might say) that does not add up to a complete exit or exodus from the social. (Which, in the strict sense, is impossible anyway. There is always too much society in

\[7\] For discussion of resistance as a concept, see Hoy (2004) and Caygill (2013), for the idea that resistance can act as a ‘chemical catalyst’ to ‘bring to light power relations’, Foucault (2000, p. 329).
the subject). But it is on this level, at this site, of the subject, that these acts take place and are irreplaceable, because they involve subjective experience and decisions. These utterly individual, existential acts can of course have explosive social and political potential.8

What I am thinking of are acts of non-conformity and individual rule-breaking, existential 'experiments in living' (Mill) that involve aesthetic, utopian, spiritual or other risky forms and styles of life in which the refusal of conformity with the current order and the current set of practices let appear a possible being-different of society. These acts, however individual and subjective, can gain political and social traction in that they create, however fleetingly, a vision of a different society as a whole.

I want to call this counter-power to the social in the self ‘self-transformation’ and refer to the acts in which the subject itself is transformed by itself. These acts testify to the fact that in the individual, existential, subjective case society can be changed, and that maybe even the great ruptures and refusal need a million of micro-transformations.9 Even a seemingly asocial scene of individual dissidence is social through and through because its locus or site, the self, is social through and through. In such a scene, the social in the self, the sociality of the self, can appear as a reality in transformation, in process.

Social philosophy, as I imagine it and as I have sketched it here in its conceptual grid, finds its object on three levels, in three relational structures: in order, in practice, in the subject. Social philosophy takes its object to be entangled with social struggles and power and conceptualizes it as a threefold figure or phenomenon of power. This is why it reflects on cases of domination, normalization, and subjectivation. But it also finds, or rather, requires the thematization of actual counter-power, cases of social self-determination against the demands of the social. These cases are political in a wide sense, because they have themselves effects on the social, they actively shape and transform it. This happens in radical-democratic acts on the level of society as a whole, as order, it happens in acts of radical resistance on the level of practice, it happens in moments of radical self-transformation on the subjective level.

The power of order, the power of practice and the power of self runs up against counter-powers, against the democratic politicization of order, against the resistant politicization of practice and against the self-

8 I follow Ian Hacking’s (2002) argument that any account about the being constituted or constructed or being ‘made up’ of a self or a subject poses an existential challenge to that very self and therefore invites, as it were, the changing of one’s attitude to oneself or (at least) considering self-transformation.
9 For more elaboration along these lines see Allen (2008), Menke (2015) and Saar (2016).
transformative micro-politics of the subject. In describing, analyzing and understanding these oppositions, social philosophy itself is not neutral, but solidary with its object, namely society, its practices and its individuals.

Doing social philosophy in this way therefore means to work on all three levels, in all three registers. Some methodological implications of this are rather straightforward: there is no sound social philosophy that does not contain some form of a philosophy of the social subject or socialized self. There can be no theory of social structures that is not mediated by an account of the practice-character of these structure. But it also means to move from social facts to power to politics and to accept that the questions of critique and normativity arise inescapably, because they are in-built, as it were, inherent in the very perspective on society (see Tully 2002).

Is this the only way to understand social philosophy? Definitely not. Is it possible and coherent to understand it in this way, conceptually and methodologically? I hope so. Where does it lead? We will see.
REFERENCES


amerikanischen Pragmatismus und dem kritischen Rationalismus.


PRESIDENT: Helen Beebee (Manchester)

PRESIDENT-ELECT: Jo Wolff (Oxford)

HONORARY DIRECTOR: Rory Madden (UCL)

EDITOR: Guy Longworth (Warwick)

LINES OF THOUGHT SERIES EDITOR: Scott Sturgeon (Oxford)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: Clare Chambers (Cambridge) / Tim Crane (CEU)
James Harris (St Andrews) / Ulrike Heuer (Leeds) / Sacha Golob (KCL)
Elinor Mason (Edinburgh) / David Owens (KCL) / Jo Wolff (Oxford)

MANAGING EDITOR: Josephine Salverda (UCL)

ASSISTANT EDITOR: David Harris

DESIGNER: Mark Cortes Favis

ADMINISTRATOR: Nikhil Venkatesh (UCL)