Intrinsically Desiring the Vague
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I/ Introduction

1. *p* is vague just if *p* is not precise.
2. *p* is consequential just if either *p* or ~*p* is rational to intrinsically desire.
3. *Inconsequentialism*: Some proposition is vague, and every vague proposition is inconsequential.
4. *My thesis*: Some vague proposition is consequential if some proposition is vague.

II/ Boolean Ground Rules

5. Propositions are sets of indices.
6. One index is actual.
7. Precise propositions are sets of precise indices.

III/ An Argument for Vague Propositions

8. *Probabilism*: Every rational credence function is a probability function.
9. *Middling Credence*: For some precise index *y*, some proposition *p*, and some rational credence function C, $0 < C(p \mid y) < 1$.
10. Let *y* be a precise index throughout which Harry has exactly 30,000 hairs.

(III.1) Harry is borderline bald if he has exactly 30,000 hairs.
(III.2) If Harry is borderline bald if he has exactly 30,000 hairs, then it is rational to be uncertain whether Harry is bald conditional on *y*.
(III.3) If it is rational to be uncertain whether Harry is bald conditional on *y*, then for some proposition *p* and some rational credence function C, $0 < C(p \mid y) < 1$.

IV/ Intraprecision and Rational Utility Functions

11. A utility function maps every index to a real number.
12. Propositions *p* and *q* are intraprecise just if each is a nonempty subset of some precise index.
13. *Inconsequentialism* (v.2): Some distinct indices are intraprecise, and every rational utility function maps every pair of intraprecise indices to the same value.
14. *Indifference*: If *p* and *q* are intraprecise, then it is not rational to prefer *p* to *q*.
15. Inconsequentialism implies Indifference.

V/ Pain

16. Pain may be inconsequential if vague.
17. *Bouletic Permissivism*: Every proposition is consequential; every utility function is rational.

VI/ Kosher, Permissibility, and Goodness

18. Kosher is consequential even if vague.
19. Permissibility is consequential even if vague.

> DIVERSION SERIES. Darryl is watching his two-year-old daughter play in the city park. It is permissible to divert his attention for one second. It is not permissible to divert his attention for five minutes. Is it permissible to divert his attention for 30 seconds? 31? 32? Plausibly, we can create a Sorites series, admitting of borderline cases of permissibility, out of a series of diversions whose lengths differ only by a second. [Schoenfield 2016: 262]

20. Comparative goodness is consequential even if vague.
21. $p > q$ just if it being the case that p is better than it being the case that q.

CREATION SERIES. We have x, a precise index at which there are 99 happy people. We also have precise indices, $y_1, \ldots, y_{1,000,000}$. Each y has 99 happy people and one additional person. The additional person in y_1 is very happy indeed: $y_1 > x$. The additional person in y_2 is slightly less happy: $y_2 > x$. The additional person in $y_{1,000,000}$ is miserable: $x > y_{1,000,000}$.

22. For some precise indices x and y, each of x and y are consistent with each of $x > y$ and $y > x$.

(VI.1) It is rational both to prefer x & $x > y$ to y & $x > y$ and to prefer y & $y > x$ to x & $y > x$.

(VI.2) If it is rational both to prefer a to b and to prefer c to d, then either it is rational to prefer a to d or it is rational to prefer c to b.

VII/ Truth

23. Consistent belief may be inconsequential if vague.
24. Truth is consequential even if vague.

VIII/ Are Inconsequentialism and Probabilism Consistent?

25. A binary epistemic utility function maps a credence function and an index to a real number.
26. A unary epistemic utility function maps an index to a real number.
27. Credence function C is ideal at index z just if, for every credence function D, $e(C, z) \geq e(D, z)$.
28. Credence function C indicates index z just if C maps every proposition true at z to one and every proposition false at z to zero.
29. *Ideal Indication*: A credence function is ideal at index z just if it indicates z.
30. *Convex Combination*: Every rational credence function is a convex combination of ideal credence functions.
31. Ideal Indication and Convex Combination together imply Probabilism.
32. If C is a probability function and $C(- \mid z)$ is defined, then $C(- \mid z)$ indicates z.
33. Index z is rationally defined just if for some rational credence function C, $C(- \mid z)$ is defined.
34. *Weak Regularity*: Every index is rationally defined.
35. *Ideal Reflection*: If index z is rationally defined, then credence function C is ideal at index z just if for some rational credence function C_1, $C_1(- \mid z)$ is defined and identical to C.
36. Probabilism, Weak Regularity, and Ideal Reflection together imply Ideal Indication.
37. *Binary Variance*: For some credence function C and some pair intraprecise indices z_1 and z_2, $e(C, z_1)$ exceeds $e(C, z_2)$.
38. *Unary Variance*: For some pair intraprecise indices z_1 and z_2, $e(z_1)$ exceeds $e(z_2)$.

(VIII.1) Binary Variance is inconsistent with Inconsequentialism.

39. *Weakened Regularity*: Each of some pair of intraprecise indices are rationally defined.
40. Probabilism, Weakened Regularity, and Ideal Reflection together imply Binary Variance.

(VIII.2) Probabilism is inconsistent with Inconsequentialism.

41. *Ideal Determinate Indication:* A credence function is ideal at index z just if it determinately indicates z.