The 99ᵗʰ Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association

General Information

Contact Details

Emergency services: The national phone number in an emergency is 999.

Medical issues: If you need non-emergency medical treatment, you should call phone 111.

Dental emergency: We cannot recommend a dental service providing emergency treatment, but you may wish to try Night & Day Emergency Dentist (07541 911 123). Please note that we cannot attest to the quality of this service.

Conference Organisers: In an emergency that cannot be solved with any of the above contact details, you can phone the conference organisers on 07506 948703. They will be available 24 hours a day throughout the conference period.

Internet Access

Eduroam: If your home institution participates in eduroam, you can use your home institution's credentials to connect to the eduroam network at the University of Glasgow.

UofGvisitor Wi-Fi: This is the public Wi-Fi network for visitors. Simply select "UofGvisitor" from your device's Wi-Fi options and follow the instructions on the landing page to connect.

WhatsApp Groups

Announcement WhatsApp Group: There is a WhatsApp Group for important announcements about the conference e.g. room changes or cancellations. Join it here: https://tinyurl.com/jointsession25news

Social WhatsApp Group: Delegates wishing to talk to other delegates via WhatsApp, e.g. to arrange dining plans, can make use of this group. https://tinyurl.com/jointsession2025social

Social Media

Twitter/X/Bluesky: The hashtag for posts is #jointsession25

Getting to the Conference

Directions to the University of Glasgow (including rail, bus, taxi, air, and car) are available on [here](#).

Conference Location

The key locations for the 2025 Joint Session are:

- **James McCune Smith Learning Hub**, *University Avenue, G12 8QW*: This is the main venue for the conference. It is where the majority of the sessions will take place.
- **Philosophy Department**, *65-69 Oakfield Ave, G12 8LP*: This is the conference's secondary venue where some of the Open Sessions will be held.
- **Queen Margaret Residences**, *Bellshaugh Court, G12 0PR*: This is where delegates who booked University accommodation will be based.
- **City Chambers**, *82 George Square, G2 1DU*: The wine reception and conference dinner will take place here.
- **Curler's Rest**, *256-60 Byres Road, G12 8SH*: The venue for drinks on Saturday and Sunday evening.

The 2025 Joint Session Essential Map with these locations can be accessed at https://tinyurl.com/jointsession2025essentialmap

Registration

The Registration Desk for the Conference will be located in the atrium of the James McCune Smith Learning Hub and will be open the following hours:

- **Friday 12th of July:** 12.30 – 16.30
- **Saturday 13th of July:** 09.00 – 13.00
- **Sunday 14th of July:** 09.00 – 11.00

Accommodation

Delegates who have booked University of Glasgow accommodation with be staying in the Queen Margaret Residences, which is 1 mile northwest of the main conference venue.

Getting to Queen Margaret Residences

Public Transport: Buses 6 and 6a go from the city centre to Horselethill Road. From there it is an approximately 10min walk to the residences.

If you arrive by **train** (either at Queen Street Station or Central Station), the closest stop is St. Vincent Palace.

If you arrive by **bus** (Buchanan Street Bus Station), the closest stop is Theatre Royal.

If you arrive by **plane** (Glasgow Airport), you will first have to take a bus to Buchanan Street Bus Station.

Taxi: Black cabs are available outside of the airport, the train stations and the bus station. You can also call a black cab via: +44 (0) 141 429 7070.

Uber: Uber is an efficient means of transport in Glasgow. You can book an Uber via the app.

Check-in Information

Registration: Delegates check in at the main reception of the Queen Margaret Residences, Bellshaugh Court, Kirklee, Glasgow, G12 0PR.

The reception office is open from 8am to 6pm. Outside these hours, security staff are on-site and will be able to issue keys. Guests can call the office number +44 (0)141 339 3273 for assistance.

Check-in/Check-out Times:

- Check-in: 2pm
- Check-out: 10am.

Requirements: Guests should present either photo ID or their booking confirmation email when they arrive.

Contact Information

Phone: +44 (0)141 339 3273

Childcare

For weekend childcare options, please visit the following link:
https://www.childcare.co.uk/search/Childminders/Glasgow/Weekend

Facilities

A map with an overview of facilities can via found at
https://tinyurl.com/jointsession2025extendedmap

Printing

- **The Copy and Print Shop**, 13 Eton Ln, Glasgow G12 8NB, United Kingdom
- **The Corner Print**, 87 Great Western Rd, Glasgow G4 9AH, United Kingdom

Banking

Branches of many popular banks as well as cash machines can be found on Byres Road. Please check the [extended map](#) for more information.

Local Shops

Byres Road and Great Western Road feature a range of supermarkets and convenience shops. Please check the [extended map](#) for more information.

Food and Drink

The conference's Wine Reception is sponsored by the **Lord Provost and City Council of Glasgow** and will be held in the **City Chambers** on Friday, 11.7.25, followed by the conference dinner.

We have reserved space in the **Curler's Rest** (256-60 Byres Road, G12 8SH) on Saturday and Sunday Evening.

There are plenty of cafes, bars, and restaurants on Byres Road and Great Western Road. For some suggestions, please check the [extended map](#).

Tourist Attractions

Tourist attractions in the West End of Glasgow:

- [The Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum](#) (Argyle St, Glasgow G3 8AG), which offers impressive sights of diverse Scottish & international art with natural history displays.
- [The Hunterian](#) (University Ave, Glasgow G12 8QQ), which is the oldest public museum in Scotland, with collections spanning arts, sciences and humanities, The Hunterian is at the forefront of university museums around the world.
- [Riverside Museum](#) (100 Pointhouse Rd, Glasgow G3 8RS), which is a hyper-modern museum with collections of historic vehicles and state-of-the-art interactive displays.

Open Sessions: Organisational Matters

Charing

By default, speakers in an Open Session also chair one talk in the same session. The first talk is to be chaired by the speaker of the second talk, the second talk by the speaker of the third talk, the third talk by the speaker of the fourth talk, and the fourth talk by the speaker of the first talk.

If you cannot chair a talk in your session, please make provisions for a replacement (e.g. by asking another speaker in your session to chair the talk assigned to you).

The Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association are committed to running conferences in line with the SWIP/BPA Good Practice Scheme. Chairpersons are asked to follow the SWIP/BPA seminar chairing policy suggestions, which are available here: http://bpa.ac.uk/uploads/Good%20Practice%20Scheme/Seminar%20chairing.pdf

Rules for Open Sessions and the Chairing thereof

1. Each half-hour slot in the open sessions starts at its allotted time whether or not anyone has started speaking and lasts for precisely 29 minutes
2. Experience shows that the 29 minutes is exhausted entirely by 20 minutes speaking and 5 minutes questions.
3. Previous chairs have observed that it doesn't matter if speakers start speaking late; if they want any questions they stop by the 23rd minute.
4. There are no follow-up (or 'finger') questions.
5. There is never time for just one more question.
6. Chairs are instructed to interrupt speakers at the 28th minute.

Slides/Handouts

If you have slides, please save your file on a USB stick or bring your own laptop with HDMI access.

If you have handouts, please make sure that you have them printed in advance of your session. We cannot print handouts for Open Sessions

Conference Programme

Friday, 11.7.

12:30 – 16:30:   Registration

14.15 – 14:30:   **Aristotelian Society AGM**, JMS 429

14.30 – 14.45:   **Mind AGM**, JMS 408

15.00 – 16.00:   **BPA Pre-Conference Session**, *The State of the Profession*, JMS 438

15.00 – 16.30:   Refreshments

16.30 – 18.00:   **Inaugural Address**, *Oiling the Wheels of the Philosophy Machine,* Helen Beebee (Leeds), JMS 438

19.00 – 20.00:   **Wine Reception**, City Chambers, 82 George Square, Glasgow
Sponsor: Lord Provost and City Council Glasgow

From 20.00:   **Conference Dinner**, City Chambers, 82 George Square, Glasgow

Saturday, 12.7.

09.00 – 13.00:   Registration

09.00 – 10.30:   **Symposium I**, *Nicknames*, Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers) and Eliot Michaelson (KCL)/Ethan Nowak (Stanford), JMS 438
Symposium II, *Love: Learning from Husserl and Beauvoir*, Sara Heinämaa (Helsinki) and Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford), JMS 641

10.30 – 11.00:   Refreshments

11.00 – 13.00:   **The Open Sessions**, Block 1, see Open Sessions Programme
SWIP Session, JMS 438

13.00 – 14.00:   Lunch

13.00 – 14.00:   Joint Meeting II, JMS 641
SWIP Open Meeting, JMS 745

14.00 – 15.00:   **Mind Fellow Lecture**, JMS 438

15.00 – 17.00:   **The Postgraduate Session**
Theoretical Philosophy, JMS 438

Will Moorfoot (Southampton)
Daniel Garcia Saavedra (York)
Roope Ryymin (KCL)
Viviane Fairbank (St Andrews)

Practical Philosophy, JMS 641
Malte Hendrickx (Michigan)
Puneh Nejati-Nehr (LSE)
Damiano Ranzenigo (Konstanz)
Leo Eisenbach (Humboldt University Berlin)

17.00 – 17.30:	Refreshments
17.30 – 19.00:	**Symposium III**, *What is Social Science?,* Anna Alexandrova (Cambridge) and Kareem Khalifa, JMS 438 **Symposium IV**, *National Humiliation*, Raamy Majeed (Manchester) and Maeve McKeown (Groningen), JMS 641
18.30 – 01.00:	Bar, Curler's Rest, 256-260 Byres Road

Sunday, 13.7.

9:00 – 11:00:	Registration
09.00 – 10.30:	**Symposium V**, *Information and Questioning*, Christoph Kelp (Glasgow) / Mona Simion (Glasgow) and Anne Meylan (Zurich), JMS 438 **Symposium VI**, Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy, Therese Cory (Notre Dame) and Hamid Taieb (HU Berlin), JMS 641
10.30 – 11.00:	Refreshments
11.00 – 13.00:	**The Open Sessions**, Block 2, see Open Sessions Programme
13.00 – 14.00:	Lunch
14.00 – 16.00:	**The Open Sessions**, Block 3, see Open Sessions Programme
16.00 – 16.30:	Refreshments
18.30 – 01.00:	Bar, *Curler's Rest*, 256-260 Byres Road

JMS = James McCune Smith Learning Hub (main conference venue), University Avenue

Open Session Overview

Room	Open Sessions Block 1 Saturday 11:00-13:00	Open Sessions Block 2 Sunday 11:00-13:00	Open Sessions Block 3 Sunday 14:00-16:00
JMS 407	Session 1: Virtues and Vices	Session 18: Philosophy of Mind and Psychiatry	Session 39: Business and Politics
JMS 408	Session 2: Philosophy of Language	Session 19: Higher-Order Evidence	Session 40: Practical Ethics
JMS 429	Session 3: Feminist Philosophy 1	Session 20: Contractualism and Social Ethics	Session 41: Artificial Intelligence
JMS 430	Session 4: Testimony and Trust	Session 21: Reference and Meaning	Session 42: Feminist Philosophy 2
JMS 507	Session 5: Inquiry and Progress	Session 22: Paradoxes and Philosophical Problems	Session 43: Social Epistemology
JMS 508	Session 6: Philosophy of Science 1	Session 23: Philosophy of Literature and Fiction	Session 44: Mind and Action
JMS 629	Session 7: Political Philosophy 1	Session 24: Oppression and Injustice	Session 45: Decision Theory
JMS 630	Session 8: Logic, Reasons, and Normativity	Session 25: Metaphysics 2	Session 46: History of Analytic Philosophy
JMS 639	Session 9: Philosophy of Mind 1	Session 26: Meta-Ethics	Session 47: Metaphysics and Language
JMS 641	Session 10: Moral Responsibility and Blame	Session 27: Epistemology 1	Session 48: Ethics 4
JMS 707	Session 11: Music and Imagination	Session 28: AI Ethics and Responsibility	Session 49: Attention and Experience
JMS 733		Session 29: Epistemology of Inquiry	Session 50: Harmful Thought and Talk
JMS 734		Session 30: Philosophy of Science 2	Session 51: Social Philosophy
JMS 743		Session 31: Language and Philosophy	Session 52: Ethics 3
JMS 745		Session 32: Reasons and Normativity	Session 53: Aesthetics and Games
Oakfield 414	Session 12: Healthcare & Population Ethics	Session 33: Emotions	Session 54: History of Philosophy
Oakfield 312	Session 13: Freedom and Religion	Session 34: Perception	Session 55: Ethics 2
Oakfield 201	Session 14: Metaphysics 1	Session 35: Kant	Session 56: Philosophy of Mind 2
Oakfield 203	Session 15: Evidence and Belief	Session 36: Axiology and Value	Session 57: Causation
Oakfield 316	Session 16: Ethics 1	Session 37: Feminist Philosophy of Language	Session 58: Understanding
Oakfield 410	Session 17: Collectives and Groups	Session 38: Aristotle	Session 59: Epistemology 2

Open Sessions Programme

OPEN SESSIONS BLOCK 1, SATURDAY, 11:00 – 13:00

Session 1: Virtues and Vices, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 407

1. **Calum Sims** - The Vices and Virtues of Metacognition
2. **Piotr Szalek** - Berkeley, Virtue Ethics, and Expressivism
3. **Taylor Matthews** - The Normativity of Vice
4. **Thomas Giourgas** - Aristotelian ideas in modern education: Empirical insights into virtue cultivation

Session 2: Philosophy of Language, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 408

1. **Krisztian Kos** - Restricted Hearer Attitudes: An Uptake-Based Approach to Illocutionary Force
2. **Madeleine Léger** - Linguistic "Holding": Speaking Each Other Into Linguistic Futures
3. **Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska** - Lie as a Prototype Concept
4. **Veronica Cibotaru** - Which epistemological evidence for the idea of universal grammar?

Session 3: Feminist Philosophy 1, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 429

1. **Arjun Devanesan** - The mereology of pregnancy, according to the immune system
2. **Lara Scheibli** - Why Professors Should Not Sleep With Their Students
3. **Naomi Sutton** - Gender Orientalism and Cultural Harms
4. **Arlene Lo** - Defiance amid Despair: Reporting Sexual Assault Despite Its Futility

Session 4: Testimony and Trust, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 430

1. **Emilia Wilson** - Testimonial Distortion and Perspectival Clash
2. **William Gopal** - Large Language Models and Testimonial Injustice
3. **Yinmei Wu** - Survivors' Testimony and Epistemic Agency Revisited

Session 5: Inquiry and Progress, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 507

1. **Benoit Guilielmo & Miloud Belkoniene** - Inquiry and Question Comprehension
2. **Guido Melchior** - Knowledge and Inquiry
3. **Javier González de Prado** - Inquiry Aims at Usable Knowledge
4. **Tina Firing** - Philosophical progress and inductive reasoning

Session 6: Philosophy of Science 1, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 508

1. **Frederik J. Andersen** - Addressing the Replication Crisis in Psychology: On the Importance of Base Rates
2. **Deborah Marber** - Humble Science: Collective Intellectual Humility through the Lens of SAGE and Independent SAGE's Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic
3. **Mert Atessal** - Reconsidering the Grounds for Public Trust in Science
4. **Oscar Westerblad** - Pluralism about scientific progress in a social framework

Session 7: Political Philosophy, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 629

1. **Bastian Steuwer** - Three Myths of Meritocracy
2. **Frodo Podschwadek** - Playing Politics: On the Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy in Virtual Game Worlds

3. **Leia Hopf** - Should We Compensate Economic Disadvantage Through Education?
4. **Michael Da Silva** - On Lexical Priority

Session 8: Logic, Reasons, and Normativity, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 630

1. **Pinelopi Stylianopoulou** – Obligations, omissions, and logical consequence
2. **Stephan Kraemer** - Reasons and the Logic of Obligation
3. **Thomas Schmidt** - Reasons First, Deontic Logic Second

Session 9: Philosophy of Mind 1, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 639

1. **Arata Matsuda** - The Meta-Meta-Problem of Consciousness
2. **Adriana Alcaraz Sánchez** - Dreaming While Awake: The Case of Maladaptive Daydreaming
3. **Noddy Lam** - Extracting McDowell's Insight on Colour from his Dispositionalism
4. **Karol Polcyn** - The Intuition of Dualism and an Epistemic Gap

Session 10: Moral Responsibility and Blame, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 641

1. **Ahmet Gönüllü** - Moral Responsibility as Answerability for Group Wrongdoing
2. **Gabriel De Marco, Kyle Fritz, and Daniel Miller** - Mitigated Standing to Blame
3. **Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette** - Fully Excused but Responsible
4. **Gunnar Björnsson** - The Lessons of Accountability Understanding Individual Responsibility, Shared Responsibility, and Complicity

Session 11: Aesthetics, Decision-Making, and Applied Ethics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 707

1. **Alper Yavuz** - Metaphorical Expression in Music
2. **Giulia Lorenzi** - On the distinctiveness of listening to music
3. **Tom Beevers** - How to evaluate decisions in hindsight
4. **Lesley Jamieson** - Why Fun Aunties Matter: A Modest Account

Session 12: Healthcare and Population Ethics, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 414 (Reid Room)

1. **Ben Davies** - Responsibility and Healthcare Allocation: Beyond The Moralisation Objection
2. **Joseph Millum** - Fair allocation to rare disease research
3. **Robert C Robinson** - Reflective Equilibrium 2.0: AI's Role in Balancing Healthcare Ethic.
4. **Paul Heller** - Non-Human Animals and the Goal of Population Axiology

Session 13: Freedom and Religion, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 312 (Schaper Room)

1. **Patrick Todd** - Innocent Incompatibilism
2. **Jonathon Hawkins** - Rethinking Compatibilist Agent-Causation: Motivations and Misgivings
3. **Tien-Chun Lo; Hong Soong** - Perfect Being Theology and the Triviality Objection
4. **Slater Simek** - Against Divine Moral Perfection

Session 14: Metaphysics 2, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 201 (Hutcheson Room)

1. **Bartosz Kaluziński** - (Natural) kind pluralism
2. **Sergi Oms** - The Property-Inheritance Problem
3. **James Ravi Kirkpatrick** - Higher-Order Counterpart Theory
4. **Giorgia Malone** - What's Nonideal About Nonideal Social Ontology?

Session 15: Evidence and Belief, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 203 (Walsh Room)

1. **Roger Clarke** - Context-Relative Belief, by Analogy
2. **Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi** - Bias and Noise as Sensitivity Failures
3. **Chih-Yun Yin** - Rethinking Evidentialism: Trade-offs and Epistemic Reasons for Actions
4. **William A Sharp** - Block's new argument for the nonconceptuality of perception

Session 16: Ethics 1, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 316 (Jebb Room)

1. **Maximilian Kiener** - Vagueness and Responsibility
2. **Euan Metz** - Assessing Normative Neutrality
3. **Jonas Haeg** - What's Wrong With Victim-Blaming?
4. **Riccardo Baratella** - The Moral Status of Personites

Session 17: Collectives and Groups, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 410 (Murray Room)

1. **Evrensel Sebep** - The Citizenry as a Responsible Agent: Collective Blame and Forward-Looking Duties
2. **Yoshiki Yoshimura** - A non-consequentialist thought on collective impact cases
3. **Thomas Brouwer** - Groups and Group Agents
4. **David Storrs-Fox** - Could a Mixed Human-Artificial Group Agent be Blameworthy?

OPEN SESSIONS BLOCK 2, SUNDAY, 11:00 – 13:00

Session 18: Philosophy of Mind and Psychiatry, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 407

1. **Chenwei Nie** - Delusions as Seeming-Based Beliefs
2. **Kathleen Murphy-Hollies** - Giving Uptake to the Metaphorical Meaning of Delusions
3. **Rebecca Dreier** - Must False Memories be Malfunctions?
4. **Richard Hassall** - Ontic injustice and psychiatric diagnosis: the example of schizophrenia

Session 19: Higher-Order Evidence, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 408

1. **Tyler Porter** - Higher-Order Evidence Against (Many) Conspiracy Theories
2. **Zhongwei Xu** - Higher-Order Evidence as Unspecific Evidence
3. **Giorgia Foti** - The Pragmatics and the Normativity of Ignorance Attributions
4. **Lou Thomine** - Why ignorance is not lack of true beliefs

Session 20: Contractualism and Social Ethics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 429

1. **Jessica Fischer** - Mutual Recognition: Bipolar or One-on-all?
2. **Russell McIntosh** - Doing What Another Would Want
3. **Bennett Eckert-Kuang** - Can Constitutivists Explain What We Owe to Each Other?
4. **Daniele Bruno** - Expanding Interest in Contractualism

Session 21: Reference and Meaning, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 420

1. **Alexandru Radulescu** - Reference with and without Intention
2. **Artur Kosecki** - Meaning Eliminativism, Nominalism, and Conceptual Engineering: Quine's Model of Scientific Language and Austin's Pragmatic Analysis of Ordinary Language
3. **Demet Tugce Dumanoglu Cosgrave** - The Use of Donnellan's Referential/Attributive Distinction in Political Discourse
4. **Maciej Witek** - Conventions without Meanings, Assertions without Forces: An Austinian Perspective on Metasemantics

Session 22: Paradoxes and Philosophical Problems, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 507

1. **Aristotelis Ioannis Paschalidis** - The Paradox of Paradox Resolution
2. **Simon Langford** - Kripke's Dogmatism Paradox
3. **Giulia Schirripa** - On Why Vagueness is not Ambiguity under any Scale
4. **David Chandler** - The Non-Identity Problem for Transformative Acts

Session 23: Fiction, Literature, and Aesthetics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 508

1. **Elisa Paganini** - An intrinsic characterisation of fiction
2. **Jonny Blamey** - Fiction and I
3. **Michael Quinn** - Philosophy and Literature: Companions in Guilt
4. **Emily Lawson** - Three Neo-Rasa Theorists on Aesthetic Emotion

Session 24: Oppression and Injustice, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 629

1. **Michael Garnett** - Freedom and Ideological Oppression
2. **Stephanie Collins** - Freedom, Resentment, and Structural Injustice
3. **Maya von Ziegesar** - The Black-White Binary as an Epistemology of Ignorance
4. **Han Edgoose** - Challenging the 'Debate' Framing of the Trans Panic: On Cissexist Ideology and Epistemic Injustice

Session 25: Metaphysics 2, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 630

1. **Alice van't Hoff** - Parsimony and Complexity
2. **Fathima Afra Mohamed Akram** - On the Metaphysical Status of Minimum Principles
3. **Simone Salzano** - Effective Physics and Effective Metaphysics: A Perfect Match?

Session 26: Meta-Ethics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 639

1. **Mikhail Volkov** - A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model
2. **Thomas Lockhart** - Constitutivism and the Goodness-fixing Kind Objection
3. **Isaac Shur** - Organizational Functions as a Source of Ethical Normativity
4. **Pyro Suarez** - Normativity in Substantive Metaphysics

Session 27: Epistemology 1, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 641

1. **Abida Malik** - Do We Live in an Epistemically Hostile World? How to Evaluate Epistemic Environments
2. **Bernhard Salow** - Knowledge Can Go Bad
3. **Julien Dutant and Sven Rosenkranz** - Reliability and Truth Ratio Drops
4. **Ross Patrizio** - Gricean Maxims as Epistemic Norms

Session 28: AI Ethics and Responsibility, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 707

1. **Matthew Jope** - AI Testimony, Responsibility Gaps, and Epistemic Blame
2. **Sandra Catalina Branzaru** - Empathy in Virtual Reality and Large Language Models
3. **Christos Kyriacou** - Can Artificial Moral Intelligence Learn to be Good?

Session 29: Inquiry and Scepticism, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 733

1. **Amiya Hashkes** - Inquiry, Responsibility, and Understanding
2. **Freya von Kirchbach** - Inquiry and the Coordination Problem
3. **Nastja Tomat** - Norms of inquiry for bounded epistemic agents
4. **Andre LeBrun** - Margaret Cavendish on Skepticism and Probable Opinion

Session 30: Philosophy of Science 2, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 734

1. **Chun Yu Kwok** - Inter-Programme Theories and Lakatos's 'Empirical Content'
2. **Philipp Berghofer** - What Price Fiber Bundle Substantivalism? On How to Avoid Holes in Fibers
3. **Fabian Pregel** - The New Age of Enumerative Induction
4. **Aidan Ryall -** The Historical Premise

Session 31: Language and Philosophy, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 743

1. **Bart Smith-Johnson** - Weak Normative Reference Magnets
2. **Thomas Engeland** - What do thick concepts refer to?
3. **Julian Lee-Sursin** - The Special Questions Dispute: A Simple Case of Normative Metalinguistic Dispute in Mereology
4. **Atticus Carnell** - Perspective, Opacity, and Voice

Session 32: Reasons and Normativity, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 745

1. **Dannish Kashmiri** - Acceptance and the Status of Moral Reasons
2. **Eleanna Tzeraki** - A New Defense for Pragatism About Reasons For Belief
3. **Sophie Keeling** - Reasons Deliberation
4. **Emily McTernan** - Levers, not rules: On freedom and social norms

Session 33: Emotions, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 414 (Reid Room)

1. **Dong An** - Agent-Regret as a Non-Moral Emotion
2. **Hichem Naar** - Ways of Being: The Metaphysics of Emotions
3. **Niccolo Nanni** - Feelings Touched: On Tactually Perceiving the Emotions of Others
4. **Sean Maroney** - Perceptual versus Empathic Knowledge of Others' Emotions: re-reading Edith Stein's empathy (Einfühlung)

Session 34: Perception, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 312 (Schaper Room)

1. **Yinzhu Yang** - Rethinking the Perception-Cognition Border: Olfaction as a Challenge to Format-Based Approaches
2. **Mario Sergio Sheing Temoche** - The Division of Perception
3. **Thomas Koster** - A Challenge for Self-Aware Perceptual Knowledge from Gaṅgeśa

Session 35: Kant, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 201 (Hutcheson Room)

1. **Fridolin Neumann** - Heidegger's realism and his appropriation of Kant
2. **Myriam Stihl** - Dissolving 'Henrich's Challenge': On the Proof-Structure of Kant's B-Deduction
3. **Ying Xue** - The Challenges to "the Banality of Evil" and Kant's Religion
4. **Juuso Rantanen** - On the Duality of the Schemata

Session 36: Axiology and Value, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 203 (Walsh Room)

1. **Andrés G. Garcia** - Neutral and Absent Value
2. **Luca Stroppa** - On Cake, Death, and Restricted Transitivity
3. **Ronan Ó Maonaile** - Epistemic Perspectivism about Ought, Fit, and Value
4. **Guillaume Andrieux** - Suspending for practical reasons

Session 37: Feminist Philosophy of Language, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 316 (Jebb Room)

1. **Anna Klieber** - Grammatical gender and (non-binary) linguistic representation
2. **Dan Zeman** - Gender Terms as Assessment-Relative
3. **Annalisa Muscolo** - Invariantism and contextualism about gender kinds

Session 38: Ancient Philosophy and Philosophy of Mind, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 410 (Murray Room)

1. **Eleni Kontogianni** - Sense Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle: A relation of proportions
2. **Yijing Yang** - From Endoxa to Systematization: The Role of Nutritive Soul
3. **Uku Tooming** - Imagination and Two Contents of Desire
4. **Tom McClelland** - Agnosticism About Artificial Consciousness

OPEN SESSIONS BLOCK 3, SUNDAY, 14:00 – 16:00

Session 39: Business and Politics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 407

5. **Karl Landström** - The Nonworseness Claim and Oppressive Double Binds
6. **Callum MacRae** - Against Non-Tuism
7. **Bill Wringe** - When Is Deportation Punishment (And Why Does It Matter)?
8. **Tarek Yusari** - State Entrapment, Private Entrapment, and their Implications

Session 40: Practical Ethics, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 408

1. **Ilya Shemmer** - How To Persevere
2. **Katie Prosser** - On Species Revival and the Badness of Extinction
3. **Christina Fritz** - When Words Slip: The Moral Weight of Unintentional Speech

Session 41: Artificial Intelligence, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 429

1. **Chris Cousens** - Large Language Models in Large Language Games
2. **Gabe Dupre** - LLMs vs HLF
3. **Jonas Bozenhard** - Large Language Models and the Question of Rule-Following
4. **Zeev Goldschmidt** - Debugging the Turing test: Towards a Resource-Relative Conception of Intelligence

Session 42: Feminist Philosophy 2, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 430

1. **Filipa Melo Lopes** - Feminist Witches? Beauvoir on Women, Magic, and Otherness
2. **Lara Schadde** - Rethinking the Sex/Gender Distinction
3. **Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler** - Deflationism: Feminist Epistemology and Theory of Truth
4. **Emily Thomas** - Victorian Concepts of Time and Sexism

Session 43: Social Epistemology, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 507

1. **Frances Darling** - Epistemic Reparations and Disability
2. **Sam Kang** - Social Encroachment
3. **Glenn Anderau** - The Epistemic Importance of Narratives

Session 44: Mind and Action, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 508

1. **Cansu Irem Meric** - Reconciling Descartes's Mind-Body Distinction with Embodied Cognition
2. **Chengying Guan** - Actions as Movements of Bodies Coupled with Tools: A Case for Instrumentalism about Basic Action
3. **Will Hornett** - The Form of Agency
4. **Kael McCormack** - The Problem of Passive Self-Movement

Session 45: Decision Theory, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 629

1. **Lea Clara Hugo** - Options as known abilities
2. **Sven Neth** - Against Optimization
3. **Nicholas Makins** - Carroll's Tortoise Against Meta-Decision Theory
4. **Vita Kudryavtseva** - Calling Imagination to Arms: how a decision-maker imagines

Session 46: History of Analytic Philosophy, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 630

1. **Mahdi Ranaee** - Wilfrid Sellars' Inverted Antinomy: How His Kantianism Overcomes the Clash of the Images
2. **Tom Williams** - Why does Russell hold his Principle of Acquaintance?
3. **Luca Alberto Rappuoli** - Russell's Meta-philosophy: Moorean Relics and Unfounded Expectations
4. **Jonathan Lucas** - Are Moorean Arguments any Good?

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1. **Christopher James Masterman** - Can We Repudiate Ontology Altogether?
2. **Nika Skala** - Thompson's non-empirical conception of life
3. **Karen Green** - Some 'objects of thought' are not objects
4. **Hugo Heagren** - On baptisms

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1. **Gerald Lang** - Sexual Prejudice
2. **Matthew Bradley** - Authenticity: A Dilemma for Moralism
3. **Wouter Cohen** - James Baldwin's Critique of Redirectional Forgiveness
4. **Paul Forrester** - Collective Incoherence

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2. **Jonathan Mitchell** - Attending to things past as reliving the past
3. **Petronella Randell** - Evaluating the Unexperienced
4. **Heather Annan** - Explaining increased rates of synaesthesia in autism populations: the monotropic-compensatory account

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1. **Kaj André Zeller** - Just Say It! Harmful Thoughts and Vague Behaviour
2. **Somayeh Tohidi** - Mind Your Probability Language
3. **Rory Aird** - Hedging, bullshitting, and hedged bullshitting
4. **Katherine Caldwell** - Feminist Pornography as Slur-Appropriation

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1. **James Laing** - Belonging
2. **Nick Clanchy** - On Love and Categorisation
3. **Elisabetta Angela Rizzo** - The Dynamic Interplay of Virtual and Actual in Williams' Process Signs
4. **Stephanie Kapusta** - The 'Settled Mind' and Breakdowns of Habitus

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1. **Christopher Joseph An** - The Evolution of the Social Contract: Cooperation or Social Play?

2. **Anh-Quân Nguyen** - Pessimism and Solidarity
3. **Joseph Bernardoni** - Giving Caring Gratuitousness Its Due
4. **Kangyu Wang** - When not to pick casually

Session 53: Aesthetics, Games, and Achievement, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 745

1. **Artur Harris** - Aesthetic properties are not shades of aesthetic value
2. **Karl Egerton** - Authorial play as a form of gameplay
3. **Lisa Forsberg** - Difficulty, Achievement, and Perfectionist Value

Session 54: History of Philosophy, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 414 (Reid Room)

1. **Ke Xia** - A reading of Rousseau's theory of property rights
2. **Ludovica Medaglia** - The argument of Dion and Theon: the Stoic refutation of the Academic argument against growth and diminution
3. **Eli Lichtenstein** - Nietzsche on Mastery of Nature
4. **Farhad Alavi** - Intuitive Contradictions: Hume on the Possibility of Thought with Negative Contents

Session 55: Ethics 2, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 312 (Schaper Room)

1. **James Brown** - On the Division of Well-Being Across Time
2. **Martin Sticker** and **Felix Pinkert** - The Dilemma of Demandingness
3. **Laura Fearnley** - Role Ethics and Action Guidance
4. **Joe Slater** - What's Wrong with "Ugging-Up"?

Session 56: Philosophy of Mind 2, 65-69 Oakfield Ave 201 (Hutcheson Room)

1. **Evie Moss** - Dynamic Desire: Explaining Our Privileged Access to Dispositional States
2. **Qiantong Wu** - The Threat of Over-Conceptualization
3. **Romanos Koutedakis** - Lines of Contradiction: The Müller-Lyer Illusion's Challenge to Representational Theories
4. **Milena Bartholain** - Externalism Does Have an Access Problem

Session 57: Causation, Oakfield 203 (Walsh Room)

1. **Gary Jones** - Anscombe on Causality
2. **James Ross** - The Aristotelian Unity of Causation
3. **John Donaldson** - Does the causal exclusion problem require a theory of causation?
4. **Anna Ortin Nadal** - Cordemoy on secondary causation as prejudice

Session 58: Understanding, Oakfield 316 (Jebb Room)

1. **James Shearer** - Understanding for Believers: A Belief-First Account of Understanding Why
2. **Wang Qinyi** - A Kantian Approach to Scientific Understanding
3. **Dominik Jarczewski** - On Levels of Understanding
4. **Marasoiu Andrei-Ionut** - Understanding Counterfactuals in Historical Narratives

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1. **Annette Song** - The Authority of Self-Knowledge: A Wittgensteinian Expressivist Approach
2. **James Hutton** - On Being Left Cold: Emotional Blanks & Ethical Knowledge
3. **Lars Neth** - Higher-Order Evidence in Philosophical and Biomedical Ethics
4. **Hadeel Naeem** - Learning with AI

Abstracts

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Abstracts Symposia

SYMPOSIUM I – NICKNAMES

Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers)

Nicknames as Tools for Managing Face

Contemporary orthodoxy analyzes names as universally accessible tags that track referents across space, time, and possibility. I argue that paradigmatic nicknames, like 'Crooked Hilary,' 'Shrimpy', and 'Bubblegum', also perform this tracking function, but are marked by contrast with proper names in enforcing restrictions on who they can be used by, with, and when; and in framing their referents by projecting affective valences and social identities for them. While proper names also typically carry social information, it is part of nicknames' characteristic communicative function to manage social identity, in ways that an adequate overall theory of meaning needs to explain.

Eliot Michaelson (King's College London) and Ethan Nowak (Stanford)

Fregean Socialism

Philosophers of language have tended to treat names merely as tools for talking about individuals, either directly or as part of a denoting phrase. We argue that names are every bit as much tools for tracking, maintaining, and performatively updating our positions in social space, as well as projecting a linguistic persona. This pushes us towards a revised picture of the meanings of names, one which incorporates what we shall call a 'social sense'.

SYMPOSIUM II – LOVE: LEARNING FROM HUSSERL AND BEAUVOIR

Sara Heinämaa (Helsinki)

Varieties of Love: Intentionality, Temporality and Agency

This paper presents a new phenomenology of love with a fresh analysis of its intentional and temporal structures and a clarification of its affective, axiological and conative bases. The paper begins by questioning the habitual manner of classifying emotions into oppositional pairs of positive and negative ones. The second part focuses on the intentional and temporal structures of love. It demonstrates that love is a personal emotion in the specific sense that it draws from the very core of the intentional subject and is conatively anchored in this core. On the basis of this analysis, the paper argues that the obligation to care for the loved one is transitive: love demands that the lover cares not just for her beloved but also for the loves of her beloved. Utilizing these results, the third part proceeds to study the role of love in ethics. In this interest it develops a novel interpretation of the 'commandment of love'.

Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford)

The Opium of the Lasses: Beauvoir's Revaluation of Love in The Second Sex

This paper argues that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex offers a genealogy of the morality of sexual hierarchy in which love plays a central role. In dialogue with Sara Heinämaa's reading of Beauvoir as a projection theorist, I argue that the economic and moral dimensions of Beauvoir's revaluation of love are illuminated by reading her in a particular tradition of "French Marx". According to Beauvoir, both religious and secular mystifications of love, like Marx's 'opium of the masses', veil the real relations between human beings. However, rather than merely unmasking individualistic mystifications of love, The Second Sex situates what I call 'the opium of the lasses' in an axiological critique of Marx's projection theory of religion and post-Nietzschean discussions of 'love' and its capitalist co-options. Reading Beauvoir as a 'Mistress of Suspicion', I contend that her revaluation of love concerns not only the

weight of patriarchal myths of what makes women 'loveable', but an enquiry into the possibility of co-responsible solidarity—of what it means to become love-able, able to love.

SYMPOSIUM III – WHAT IS SOCIAL SCIENCE

Anna Alexandrova (Cambridge)

Social Science: A Constructivist Account

What sort of inquiry is social science? This question used to preoccupy philosophers but fell off their agenda due to a stalemate between so-called naturalists, who took the ideal to be natural science, and exceptionalists, who allied social sciences with humanities. I show that both positions commit the error of contrastivism, namely defining social science in contrast to these two traditions, which inevitably ends up caricaturing and essentialising them. Using recent advances in social epistemology and political theory, I formulate constructivism about social sciences, a view that denies an essence to this inquiry and grounds it in the needs of communities to understand and improve themselves.

Kareem Khalifa (UCLA)

Getting the Methodenstreit Right

Should the social sciences should emulate the natural sciences or humanities? While once a lively topic in the philosophy of social science, interest in this question has waned in recent decades, in no small part because attempts to answer it have appeared futile. I argue that this futility stems largely from insufficient appreciation of the empirical questions that any defensible position in this debate must confront. By bringing these empirical considerations into sharper relief, the debate can be fruitfully reframed. I contrast my empirical approach with Alexandrova's constructivist alternative.

SYMPOSIUM IV: NATIONAL HUMILIATION

Raamy Majeed (Manchester)

National humiliation is the humiliation felt by individuals who identify with the state (or nation) in response to an international event. Humiliation of this variety is often used, by both politicians and scholars in international relations, to explain a range of international conflicts (e.g., Chinese antagonism towards the West, the U.S response to 9/11, the Russian invasion of Ukraine etc.). In this paper, I explore the epistemic harms that result from national humiliation. First, I argue what is most relevant within the epistemic domain is not humiliation, the emotion, but humiliation narratives, which are used as discursive mechanisms to justify conflict. Second, I argue such narratives impact in-groups mobilised by populist rhetoric, as well out-groups marginalised by them. I conclude by suggesting some possible ways to mitigate these harms and foster epistemic resilience across societal divides.

Maeve McKeown (Groningen)

Tba.

SYMPOSIUM V: INFORMATION AND QUESTIONING

Christoph Kelp (Glasgow) and Mona Simion (Glasgow)

What is Information?

This paper develops an account of information as possible knowledge. What it is for a signal T to carry the information that p is for T to have a disposition to generate knowledge that p in some agent S: upon reception of the signal T by S, S in a position to know that p based on it. We argue the account is strongly superior to probabilistic competitors on both extensional adequacy and prior plausibility.

Anne Meylan (Zurich)

Tba.

SYMPOSIUM VI – INTENTIONALITY IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Therese Scarpelli Cory (Notre Dame)

Rethinking 'Thinking About' in Medieval Philosophy: Aquinas's Theory of Intentionality as Active Imitating

The standard gloss of 'intentionality' as "aboutness" may be insufficiently fine-grained to capture the complexity of medieval theories of intentionality. Using Thomas Aquinas as a case study, I show that he provides distinct accounts of two aspects of the phenomenon which could be called "intentional presence" and "intentional directing." These distinct accounts are joined together through his theory of imitation into what I call a "theory of intentionality as active imitating," but without giving relations of likeness any work to do in the account. In each part of the account, Aquinas draws on a general metaphysical schema that applies to both mental and non-mental being, contra interpretations that view intentionality as a sui generis feature of mental states.

Hamid Taieb (HU Berlin)

Presences and Directednesses: Intentionality beyond Aquinas

My paper explores Latin medieval accounts of intentionality developed after Thomas Aquinas, focusing in particular on the theories of mental presence and mental directedness defended by Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Auriol. As the paper aims to show, these two authors distinguish between the intentional and the real presence of objects to the mind, and consequently, between intentional directedness and real directedness towards objects. The paper argues that their theory, which combines detailed phenomenological insights with careful considerations about the way our mind relates to objects and reality, constitutes a valuable alternative to Aquinas's views on presence and directedness as reconstructed by Therese Cory.

Abstracts Mind Fellowship

Sophia Dandelet (Cambridge)

Metaepistemology and the Value Problem

What makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? This is the so-called *value problem*. Some epistemologists think that providing a solution to this problem is a key desideratum for theories of knowledge. One simple argument for this position starts with the claim that knowledge is intuitively more valuable than true belief. A more subtle and ambitious argument is rooted in the idea that theorists about knowledge must explain why knowledge is distinctively valuable, on pain of embarrassment; for without such an explanation, the thinking seems to go, epistemologists must confront the awkward possibility that they are spending time and energy on an unworthy subject. In what follows, I flesh out each of the arguments sketched above in a number of ways, and I argue that none of these versions succeed. The moral is that the value problem does not have the metaepistemological significance that is sometimes attributed to it.

Abstracts Postgraduate Sessions *(in alphabetical order, by first name)*

SATURDAY, 15:00 – 17:00, JMS 438 and 641

Damiano Ranzenigo | damiano.ranzenigo@uni-konstanz.de | Konstanz

Existential self-identification: practical necessity meets meaning in life

I aim to offer an account of the psychological phenomenon of existential self-identification (ESI), according to which some people cannot fathom living a meaningful life without some X they strongly and intrinsically value. ESI is best exemplified by people who overcome phases of existential distress by committing to a specific evaluative self-conception, like Martin Luther expressing his moral and theological commitments with the famous words 'here I stand, I can do no other', and many other people consciously holding that life makes no sense without caring for some X, be it about politics, religion, profession, familial and romantic relationships, etc.

I first consider two influential notions of practical necessity as candidates to specifically account for ESI, namely Harry Frankfurt's notion of volitional necessity and Christine Korsgaard's notion of self-legislative commitment and conclude that both fail to do justice to the nature of ESI.

My alternative account of ESI treats it as a hybrid phenomenon, which combines a belief held with conviction that something, which or whom one strongly and intrinsically values, is constitutive of meaning in living one's life, with a desire for living meaningfully. Contrarily to the alternatives, my account captures both the reflective dimension of ESI as well as its connection to meaning in living, but is exposed to other challenges, such as the possibility of beliefs about oneself being wrong, the controversial postulation of 'reasons of meaning,' and the seemingly idiosyncratic nature of the phenomenon. Addressing these challenges highlights further interesting aspects of ESI.

Daniel Garcia Saavedra | daniel.garciasaavedra@york.ac.uk | York

Seeing the whole without its parts

I argue that in backlit conditions we see objects without seeing any of their parts. To do this, I show that the assumption that to see an object one must see some part of it does not hold for backlit perception. I claim that abandoning this constrain allows for the simplest answer to the puzzle of which part of a backlit object we see: None, but still, we see a whole object. I argue that this answer is preferable to the alternatives because it respects the notion of simple seeing while not falling into an unrevised constraint on object perception.

Leo Eisenbach | eisenbal@hu-berlin.de | HU Berlin

Moral and epistemic praiseworthiness

Some deeds are such that we are praiseworthy for them. A benevolent agent who made some sacrifice to help someone in need is morally praiseworthy. And someone who managed to solve an important scientific problem is epistemically praiseworthy. The question that arises is whether there is a unified explanation of what makes agents praiseworthy – one that holds for both the moral and the epistemic domain?

I argue that there is: in both the moral and the epistemic domain, what makes an agent praiseworthy for her response is that it manifests a degree of sensitivity that exceeds the degree of sensitivity one can fittingly expect of her.

This view does not require any revisionism in moral philosophy. It is consistent with the most widespread view of what makes agents morally praiseworthy: the "Quality of Will View". All we need to do is to see that the manifestation of morally good will is the manifestation of moral sensitivity, and that there is a

structurally analogous notion of epistemic sensitivity in terms of which the correct view about epistemic praiseworthiness shall be formulated.

Malte Hendrickx| hmalte@umich.edu | Michigan

Moral burnout

A nurse in an understaffed hospital; an activist fighting insurmountable systemic injustice; an aid worker desperately triaging resources between victims of violence: individuals in morally demanding circumstances run a significant risk of burning out. Unnoticed by philosophers, an empirical literature on this phenomenon has explored a chronic stress condition called 'Moral Burnout.' Individuals with Moral Burnout become so preoccupied with their moral shortcomings that they lose the motivation to act on their moral judgments.

This article introduces the phenomenon of Moral Burnout. It then showcases its philosophical significance by introducing it to a debate about Moral Motivation. Specifically, a popular view in metaethics called Internalism about Moral Judgments holds there to be a necessary connection between judging an action to be morally right and being motivated to act on said judgment. This precludes the existence of amoralists, i.e., individuals who are not motivated by their moral judgments.

I argue that individuals with Moral Burnout are amoralists. This makes them walking counterexamples to Internalism about Moral Judgments. I further argue that the most common internalist strategies of dealing with amoralists fail to apply to the case of Moral Burnout, thereby making the study of Moral Burnout a pressing matter of metaethical significance.

Puneh Nejati-Mehr | p.nejati-mehr@lse.ac.uk | LSE

Be confident! Rethinking the ontology of confidence in light of difficult action

This paper has two aims. Firstly, to introduce the paradox of difficult action for the orthodox view that rational confidence is an exclusively epistemic attitude (e.g., degree of belief). Secondly, to propose a novel view, Confidence Dualism, that can solve the paradox. It broadens the notion of rational confidence to include two fundamentally distinct types of attitudes—epistemic confidence and practical confidence—and shows why this view is explanatory superior to the orthodox monistic view.

First, I argue that an agent can in the context of difficult action, e.g., quitting smoking, simultaneously have practical reasons to be confident in success (e.g., to persevere) and have epistemic reasons to not be confident in success. I show why standard monistic-epistemic approaches to rational confidence struggle to resolve the paradox. I argue that the argument that epistemic rationality is a form of instrumental rationality leads to two meta-normative problems: the incommensurability problem and a failure to explain how an agent can simultaneously have epistemic reasons for low confidence and practical reasons for high confidence.

Finally, by extending Bratman's model of the agent's cognitive background of deliberation to include degrees of acceptance, I argue that practical confidence is grounded in degrees of acceptance and propose a way to model rational confidence for temporally extended action. I explain how on this view rational agents can pursue difficult actions and be continuously practically confident without giving up an epistemic conception of confidence, thereby resolving the paradox of difficult action.

Roope Ryymin | roope.ryymin@gmail.com | Kings

What is it like to hear silence?

The objectual perceptualist about silence experiences claims that silences are among the objects of our veridical phenomenally conscious auditory experiences — that our auditory experiences veridically represent or present absences of sound. Despite its arguable intuitive appeal, objectual perceptualism faces a phenomenological challenge.

On the one hand, it is plausible to suppose that one can hear something only if it determines some phenomenal property of one's auditory experience — makes a difference to what one's auditory experience is like. On the other, in total silence it is difficult to introspectively discover auditory phenomenal properties that would correspond to silence.

In this paper, I defend objectual perceptualism by arguing that silence can determine the phenomenal properties of auditory experience over time. Absences of sound make a difference to the gappy phenomenology of hearing events like the beeping of an alarm over time. I close by arguing that if silences do determine auditory phenomenal properties, then the representationalist has a reason to reject a notable principle regarding the epistemology of phenomenal properties: the thesis of revelation.

Viviane Fairbank | vf45@st-andrews.ac.uk | St. Andrews

Against inferential pollution: a critique of the adoption problem in logic

In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that the logic one uses is always under one's rational control. According to its proponents, some fundamental logical principles, such as Modus Ponens, cannot begin to be used by a reasoner who does not already use them (Birman 2023; Kripke 2023). The standard explanation is that these principles are "self-governing," and hence unadoptable; this serves as an argument for the exceptional epistemic status of fundamental logical principles (Finn 2019).

I argue, however, that this interpretation is flawed. The account of adoption proposed by Birman (2023) relies on an incorrect assumption about the relationship between logical adoption and logical inference, and this assumption makes the adoption of all logical principles impossible, even if they are not self-governing. The Adoption Problem is therefore not convincing, at least not in its original form.

Will Moorfoot | wam1n21@soton.ac.uk | Southampton

The grandfather paradox and physical probabilities

I go back in time and try to kill my grandfather. If I succeed, then I undermine the very sequence of causal events that enabled me to make the attempt. But, if time travel is possible, the assassination seems within my power – what could ensure that I fail on every attempt? This is the grandfather paradox.

David Lewis argued that a time traveller will always fail in his assassination attempt, and always due to some coincidental event (such as the gun misfiring or slipping on the infamous banana peel). Lewis' solution is attractive because it attempts to solve the grandfather paradox by appealing to coincidences and a proper analysis of the relevant counterfactuals. While the worlds at which I attempt to kill my grandfather are quite strange (insofar as they involve time travel) there is nothing metaphysically suspect about the events themselves.

In this paper, I will argue that attention to the modal consequences of physical probabilities reveals a tension in Lewis' claim that some coincidental event will always stop me from killing my grandfather. On the one hand, every physically close world at which the attempt is made is a world at which a coincidence must intervene. On the other hand, the physical probability of any coincidental event intervening is very low. The problem is that physical probabilities shape the surrounding modal space in a way that the Lewisian cannot accommodate merely by appealing to coincidences and a proper assessment of the relevant counterfactuals.

Abstracts SWIP Sessions *(in alphabetical order, by first name)*

SATURDAY, 11:00 – 13:00, James McCune Smith Learning Hub 438

Ellie Jerome | ejerome@gradcenter.cuny.edu | CUNY

Whose Duties to Resist?

Oppression harms the oppressed, and there is an urgent need to end—or at least mitigate—these harms. A burgeoning literature in political philosophy asks whether victims of oppression themselves have obligations to contribute to this goal in the form of duties to resist their own oppression. My aim in this paper is to argue that this literature has not paid enough attention to the heterogeneity of victims and how this affects their duties.

First, drawing on intersectionality theory—particularly work by Alison Bailey (1998), Jennifer Nash (2008), Chandra Talpede Mohanty (1988, 1995), and Ann Garry (2011)—I insist that any account of how to determine duties to resist must pay close attention to the ways in which a given victim can be simultaneously oppressed *and privileged*. I go on to argue that arguments against duties to resist—particularly those that rely on the claim that such duties unfairly and unduly burden the already oppressed—derive much of their force from insufficiently careful theorising around these nuances, and should be rejected.

Further, I argue that even proponents of duties to resist often overlook the morally relevant differences between differently situated victims of oppression, and that this tends to result in an overcautiousness when it comes to assigning duties: an overcautiousness that is ultimately of most detriment to the most marginalised.

Turning finally to the substantive question of *when* victims have duties to resist, I concur with Rosa Terlazzo that we need "a unified set of principled guidelines that can be applied to the cases of particular victims" (2020, 393). I finish by evaluating Terlazzo's four suggested guidelines in light of my own analysis, bringing out various considerations and complications that must be taken into account when determining when victims have duties to resist in particular cases.

Louis Doulas | louis.doulas@mcgill.ca | McGill

Of Tables and the Atomic Theory: Lessons from Susan Stebbing's Philosophy of Science

What is the relationship between the world of science and the everyday world? In the early twentieth century, several influential philosophers and scientists declared war upon the everyday. The discoveries of modern science—particularly physics—had, they argued, upended much of what we take for granted. Modern atomic theory was one such revelation: matter is mostly empty space, so nothing is really solid. The world of physical science seems to have emerged victorious. Today, the everyday world is regarded by many philosophers and scientists as illusory in some way.

In several works from the late 1920s and 1930s, Susan Stebbing challenged this view. Stebbing did not dispute the findings of modern physics; instead, she was critical of how these findings were often interpreted in relation to our everyday beliefs—beliefs like the one that this table I'm typing on is solid. Stebbing argued that such perceptual beliefs are not only true but that "unless perceptual science is true theoretical physics cannot be true" (1929: 149).

In this paper, I examine these claims in detail, arguing that they form the basis for Stebbing's philosophy of science. That is, rather than conceive of these two "worlds" as rivals competing for the truth, the world of physics and the world of common sense, for Stebbing, as I argue, form a unity. I explore the relevance of this claim for contemporary philosophical discussions that appear to have overlooked Stebbing's lessons. Overall, my paper constitutes a lesson in philosophical history. On the one hand, its goals are to develop Stebbing's philosophy of science from a historical point of a view. On the other hand, its aims are

to show how the familiar becomes strange, by using our philosophical past to understand our philosophical present. What Stebbing offers us is an alternative picture: the world of science and the everyday world were never distinct worlds in the first place.

Matthew Cull | mcull117@gmail.com | Trinity College Dublin

Claire Fontaine, The Genders of Collective Agents, and The Methods of Social Ontology

This paper investigates what has gone awry when we ask the question, 'Can corporations have genders?' In so doing, a position on the methodology of social ontology is developed. I begin with Burman's split between ideal and nonideal social ontology, and a question that seems to straddle the divide: whether corporations can have genders. Noting that something seems to be awry in that question, I undertake a methodologically ideal investigation into whether collective agents could be said to have genders, appealing to the collective artist Claire Fontaine. Thinking through a variety of accounts in the metaphysics of gender, I will argue that (at least in principle) there is no obstacle to a collective agent such as Fontaine having a gender if we simply apply various conceptions of gender, at least when those conceptions are abstracted from the contexts where they were put forward. I will then argue that such an investigation shows what was dissatisfying in that initial question: that the ideal social ontologist had become unmoored from the feminist values and projects that guide much work in the metaphysics of gender. The paper then appeals to resources from Wittgensteinian feminist philosophy to clarify this dissatisfaction, and as a guide to doing nonideal social ontology in ways that better do justice to trans and feminist political projects.

Romy Eskens | r.s.eskens@uu.nl | Utrecht University

Degradation and Mental Wronging

Can one person wrong another through purely mental activity? For example, can Atilla wrong Bibi just by fantasizing about raping her, or thinking misogynist things about her? Many moral philosophers will say 'no'. The possibility of mental wronging seems ruled out by the conjunction of two widespread (but often implicit) assumptions about wronging and interpersonal ethics: (1) that one person's activity wrongs another only if it treats or affects them in some way; and (2) that purely mental activity doesn't treat or affect anyone in any way. In this talk, I'll challenge (2) by arguing that purely mental activity can affect others by treating them in degrading ways. More precisely, I'll suggest that one person can degrade another through purely mental activity and that this suffices for wronging them.

I'll start by developing an account of the nature and grounds of degradation in the 'ordinary' context of degrading physical actions, such as rape, torture, and enslavement. Next, I'll examine the relation between degradation and wronging, arguing that degrading someone is sufficient for wronging them. I then proceed to apply this account to purely mental actions and show that such actions can similarly degrade and, hence, wrong others. This, I argue, explains a range of important cases in which guilt and resentment seem fitting in response to purely mental actions. I'll close by suggesting there is a broader class of wrongings that my view might be fruitfully applied to, namely those inflicted through intuitively wrongful physical actions that, like mental actions, lack impact on victims' subjective or physical states. For example, undiscovered acts of voyeurism, upskirting, stalking, hate speech, or creating and consuming deepfakes of particular others.

Abstracts Open Sessions *(in alphabetical order, by first name)*

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Do We Live in an Epistemically Hostile World? How to Evaluate Epistemic Environments

Our environment plays a crucial role in the achievement of epistemic goods. Some environments are designed to foster this achievement, while others make it especially hard for us to improve our epistemic standing. However, there seems to be no systematic and comprehensive discussion of their epistemic potential and dangers yet.

To start this discussion, we need (1) a clear understanding of the term, and (2) an evaluative framework. In this paper I aim to provide these. I take an epistemic environment (EE) to be constituted by all aspects of our surroundings—such as social, physical, institutional, cultural factors—insofar as they influence the achievement of epistemic goods.

How positively or negatively we view an EE should therefore depend on how well it fosters epistemic progress. I suggest the features of 'friendliness', 'safety', and 'hostility' to evaluate EEs, defining them in the following way:

(a) An EE is friendly iff it fosters epistemic progress.

(b) An EE is hostile iff it hinders epistemic progress.

(c) An EE is safe iff it does not hinder epistemic progress.

While I do not think that all EEs should become friendly, safety is a baseline that we should always expect to be met. This means that:

(c1) the environment does not basically obstruct us in improving our epistemic strengths, and

(c2) the environment does not basically obstruct us in achieving our epistemic goals.

I argue that EEs should be safe and that not meeting this standard of safety leads to disastrous consequences which can, for example, be witnessed in our educational environments today. We should therefore do our utmost to detect hostility and ensure or restore safety in (not only, but especially) our educational environments.

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Dreaming While Awake: The Case of Maladaptive Daydreaming

According to the imagination model of dreaming, dreams do not involve percepts but rather imaginings. Under this view, dreams are not conceived as perceptual-like experiences similar to those in waking life but are instead seen as "vivid daydreams, entered into deliberately and voluntarily" (Ichikawa, 2009:199). Similar views, though formulated on different grounds, can be found in cognitive science. According to some authors, dreams can be placed within a spectrum of spontaneous thoughts occurring across waking and sleep and can be regarded as an "intensified" form of mind-wandering or daydreaming (Domhoff, 2008).

Thus, there is a sense in which dreaming follows the genesis of certain forms of imagination in wakefulness. However, to what extent is dreaming merely a more "vivid" or "intense" form of waking imagination? Should the differences between imagination and dreaming be understood as a matter of degree?

I examine what I consider to be a real-case example of the kind of vivid daydream the imagination theorist has in mind. Extreme forms of fantasy, also referred to as "maladaptive daydreaming" (MD) by some (Somer, 2002), provide the perfect example of what seems to be a dream-like experience while awake—a compelling and immersive form of waking imagination.

After considering how this phenomenon might be situated along a continuum with dreaming and other ordinary forms of waking imagination, I outline a challenge for the imagination theorist: to explain how we transition from an experience that is recognised as imagined to one that is not. I conclude by suggesting that, in some cases, MD might involve a conflation between the imagistic and the real world, akin to dreaming. However, such a scenario would entail a dissociative state—an altered state of consciousness—raising questions about the extent to which dreaming should be modelled on imagination.

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Moral Responsibility as Answerability for Group Wrongdoing

The debate over moral responsibility for group wrongdoing remains contentious. Individualists argue that only individuals bear moral responsibility, whereas collectivists claim that groups qua groups can be morally responsible. However, neither view is entirely satisfactory. In this paper, I aim to offer an alternative by proposing a distinct kind of moral responsibility as answerability that applies to individuals who contribute to foreseeable group wrongdoing.

Drawing on Fischer's and Tognazzini's (2011) moral responsibility framework and Shoemaker's (2011) taxonomy of moral responsibility, I assert that group wrongdoing cannot be aretaically attributable to contributors and that no contributor possesses complete intentional control over group wrongdoing, which entails blameworthiness, due to other contributors' contributions. Thus, both attributability and accountability, which are tied to aretaic appraisal and blameworthiness, respectively, are unfitting in cases of group wrongdoing.

Here is my proposal: Every contributor, as a sensible target of reactive attitudes, is partially excused for group wrongdoing due to others' contributions and partially unexcused due to her own contribution. In such cases, the appropriate reactive attitude in virtue of group wrongdoing is we-compunction, which every contributor directs towards herself as well as towards other contributors. We-compunction leads to moral responsibility for group wrongdoing as a type of answerability in relation to each contributor's evaluative judgments about why she Φ-ed, despite being aware that Φ-ing would contribute to foreseeable group wrongdoing, instead of choosing not-Φ. While each contributor bears answerability for group wrongdoing because of we-compunction, each also holds others answerable for the same reason. This twofold answerability for group wrongdoing is what I call we-responsibility.

Considering that we both contributed to an instance of group wrongdoing, if I am answerable for it, so are you. I am we-responsible for it as much as you are.

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The Historical Premise

One of the most successful arguments against scientific realism is the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI). As standardly constructed, the PMI is an inductive argument that moves from the observation that many empirically successful scientific theories have later been disproven, to the conclusion that it is likely that all our best current scientific theories are false. I argue that this rests on what I call the historical premise: the claim that there are sufficiently many such successful but false scientific theories in history. In this paper I challenge the viability of using the historical premise in debates about the metaphysical status of science. In relying on the historical premise, scientific anti-realists must choose whether to adopt historical realism or historical anti-realism. I argue that if the scientific anti-realist adopts historical realism, then the historical premise and the conclusion of the PMI cannot both be true. In contrast, if the scientific anti-realist adopts historical realism, then the induction has no force. Thus, we cannot use the PMI to conclude that scientific anti-realism is true.

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Reference with and without Intention

The speaker's intentions have been often said to play a role in word tokening, in reference determination, and in meaning determination (some classical examples: Austin 1962; Grice 1969; Kaplan 1989, 1990). These authors disagree about the nature, exact role, and sufficiency of these intentions; but they broadly agree that in their absence, at least one of these linguistic phenomena cannot take place. Opposing views have often provided separate reasons against each of these claims, and have then offered separate, distinct accounts that make the speaker's intentions irrelevant to each of these linguistic phenomena (Romdenh-Romluc 2008; Stojnić 2021, 2022).

In this paper, we have two aims. First, we provide new arguments that function against all these intentionalisms. One example: people with Tourette's syndrome, during a tic, sometimes token words that are meaningful and refer. This is in the absence of, indeed, against, the person's intentions. In this respect, we agree with, and go beyond, the claim in Stojnić (2022) that the neurological story about word production can suffice to settle which word is tokened, what it means, and what it refers to.

Second, we argue that there are cases where a word is tokened, there is reference and meaning, and yet the only plausible account must involve the speaker's intentions. One example: making use of a naturally occurring rock formation that looks like the word "HELP" in order to ask for help.

This account may seem unparsimonious. And yet, this is a familiar type of view in philosophy of mind. Take attention shifting: I can decide to shift my attention to a particular thing, or my attention can be captured by e.g. a loud noise. Just as attention shifting is sometimes top-down, and sometimes bottom-up, so are word tokening, reference, and meaning.

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Parsimony and Complexity

Being parsimonious matters, especially for those interested in ontology. But we have misunderstood it, or so I argue. There is, I suggest, a way in which theories can vary in their complexity that is distinctly ontological in character but is not determined by the number of things that they posit. Philosophers have been misled because they have fixated on what might be called 'mere counting principles', views according to which the parsimoniousness of a theory is directly settled by the number of things in a certain privileged category that exist according to this theory. The argument for these conclusions proceeds in several stages.

First, I defend the proposal put forward by Jonathan Schaffer, Karen Bennett, and Ross Cameron among others, according to which the parsimoniousness of a theory is settled by the number of fundamental entities it posits against some recent objections. But, I go on to claim, views that tie parsimoniousness to the number of fundamentalia do not go far enough. In particular, they yield the wrong verdicts when evaluating monist views: even if there is only one fundamental thing, the cosmos, it should matter that this thing is enormously complex. The internal complexity of its posits matters, I argue, to a theory's ontological simplicity, and principals of parsimony accordingly go wrong when they fail to account for variation along this axis. This suggests that a better view of parsimony would weight the number of entities implied by a theory by a measure of their complexity.

I conclude the paper by sketching three different views about what internal complexity of the kind described might consist in and defending my preferred proposal according to which an entity is internally complex to the extent that it is qualitatively heterogeneous.

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Metaphorical Expression in Music

Can music express an emotion or a thought? An affirmative answer should distinguish three ways of expression in music: symbolic, mimetic and metaphorical. Although the first two only allow the expression of things with a sound symbol or things that have a characteristic sound, in the third way the sound constraint disappears. This is where the expressive power of music comes from.

The question I focus on is this: If there is a metaphor about a piece of music, how is it interpreted? I argue that there is no interpretive difference between metaphors about music and other non-musical metaphors. If the tenor of the metaphor is a piece of music, then some of the relevant features associated with the vehicle are attributed to the tenor. This is Gricean pragmatics at work. Assuming that the composer is rational and cooperative, the interpreter has to determine which features the metaphor attributes to the music through the choices the composer makes and does not make in composing her music.

This approach may be criticised by some theorists, such as Peacocke and Dreyfus. Peacocke focuses only on the listener's experience rather than the composer's intention. He also argues that the experience itself is metaphorical. This view is based on the interactionist approach to metaphor. According to interactionists, the so-called seeing-as effect is a necessary consequence of metaphorical interpretation. I argue that this effect is perlocutionary in nature.

Dreyfus disagrees with the possibility of metaphorical expression in music. In his view, music produces a bidirectional effect, whereas the seeing-as effect that metaphors trigger is unidirectional: seeing the tenor as the vehicle. I argue that the bidirectionality here arises from the purpose of our approach to music and that similar situations are possible for non-musical metaphors.

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Bias and Noise as Sensitivity Failures

Existing literature depicts bias as involving systematic error. The idea here is that people, processes, or outcomes are biased when the errors they commit, involve, or are disposed to are non-random but predictable, systematic, or patterned. Bias is then often juxtaposed to noise, which is depicted as involving random or unsystematic error. In short, bias and noise are standardly depicted as (patterned and random) failures of *accuracy*.

In this paper, I argue that bias and noise are *process faults* that need not result in (or otherwise involve) error. As such, the standard depiction of bias and noise is underinclusive and limited to cases that they happen to result in error. I then argue that accordingly it is better to understood bias and noise as involving (patterned and random) failures of *sensitivity* rather than accuracy.

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Inquiry, Responsibility, and Understanding

My talk defends the value of understanding within inquiry, contending that one may pursue understanding even in cases where doing so is not necessary to gaining justified belief. To do so, I adopt a view similar to Thorstad's account, on which epistemic and zetetic norms are distinct, so that tensions between the two of the kind described by Friedman is unsurprising, and does not necessitate jettisoning one or the other (Friedman, 2020; Thorstad, 2021). Also, I accept the arguments set forth by several authors to the effect that it is rationally permissible to conduct inquiry even when one already holds knowledge or justified beliefs about the subject of the inquiry (Beddor, 2024; Falbo, 2023, 2024; Flores & Woodard, 2023; Woodard, 2021).

While such arguments often list understanding (taken non-factively, and as distinct from knowledge) as one the acceptable epistemic aims besides knowledge, little has been written to explain why understanding is important specifically in the context of inquiry.

Against this backdrop, I defend understanding's importance for inquiry on both deontic and instrumental grounds. From a deontic perspective, I argue that agents ought to possess some minimal level of understanding regarding their commitments—including their beliefs—in order to be properly responsible for them. Instrumentally, following Hazlett, I argue that societies are, on the whole, better off epistemically when agents value and pursue understanding, even if it may at times seem more efficient for them to shortcut their way to true beliefs (Hazlett, 2016).

Ultimately, I contend that embracing understanding's importance for inquiry allows us to adopt to a certain permissiveness concerning debates in social epistemology: we can accept that while agents may

rely on testimony, expertise, and epistemic authority to reach justified beliefs, they are also permitted—perhaps at times even required—to inquire further to better their understanding.

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Margaret Cavendish on Skepticism and Probable Opinion

While Margaret Cavendish has often been read as a skeptic of one kind or another, there is little agreement among the various skeptical readings of her works. She has been variously understood as a "modest skeptic" (Deborah Boyle), a proponent of a domain-specific "extreme" skepticism regarding knowledge of nature's inner workings (Lisa Sarasohn), and a proponent of a broader "extreme" skepticism about knowledge in general (Anna Battigelli). On the other hand, Cavendish never explicitly proclaims herself to be a skeptic of any sort, and some recent attempts at offering a systematic account of Cavendish's epistemology (such as those of Kourken Michaelian and Colin Chamberlain) leave no room for anything which might be plausibly construed as skepticism.

In this short paper, I suggest that the puzzling lack of agreement among scholars regarding skepticism's place in Cavendish's philosophical system may be at least partly attributable to subtle discrepancies between her stated views on knowledge, certainty, and probable opinion. My aim here is to offer an account which bridges the gap between her fallibilistic but apparently non-skeptical epistemology in the Observations upon Experimental Philosophy with decidedly less optimistic remarks about the possibility of knowledge in her other mature works.

This reconstruction of Cavendish's epistemology renders her as a proponent of an unusual form of skepticism which denies the possibility of certain knowledge, affirms that we form probable opinions about the world, affirms that highly probable opinions might indeed sometimes constitute a lesser degree of knowledge, but further denies that we can aspire to even this lesser degree of knowledge in most domains. While this might initially seem to be incompatible with Cavendish's endeavors in natural philosophy, I argue that her system requires only probable opinions which do not amount to knowledge but which we are entitled to provisionally treat as knowledge. While her view thus ends up amounting to a variety of "extreme skepticism," I contend that this does not render the search for mere probable opinion any less important for Cavendish. It is possible to see her as both a staunch advocate for inquiry regarding the true natures of things and an ardent skeptic about the possibility of uncovering genuine knowledge about them.

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Neutral and Absent Value

Philosophers tend to be preoccupied with the good and bad when attempting to elucidate the evaluative domain. These belong to demanding regions in the domain where we are called upon to adopt certain reactions. A flourishing garden might call upon us to admire it, while an act of cruelty calls upon us to condemn it. Far less attention has been given to items that are neither good nor bad. Consider the state of there being a pebble on a distant planet or there being so many grains of sand on a beach. These items belong to the null region of the evaluative domain, and their normative profile remains poorly understood.

This paper explores the null region by addressing an apparent tension between two plausible intuitions about value. The first is that some items are neither good nor bad, meaning the null region is not empty. The second intuition holds that the world is not so demanding that every aspect of it calls upon our reactions. A simplistic view of the null region, where all its items demand neutral reactions, accommodates the first intuition but sacrifices the second. In so doing, it also entails the result that even trivial items, like the state of there being a pebble on a distant planet or there being so many grains of sand on a beach, place demands on us.

Instead, this paper resolves the apparent tension by arguing that the null region is mixed. Within it, some items exert no normative force, while others call for neutral reactions.

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Pessimism and Solidarity

This talk argues that pessimism as a moral stance can be grounds for collective solidarity. Pessimism in philosophy describes a set of views related to (1) value-oriented pessimism, asserting that life for many is not worth living, and (2) future-oriented pessimism, which claims that we should not expect anything from the future in terms of progress and narratives about change (Van der Lugt 2021, Dienstag 2009).

Drawing from Schopenhauer (1851, 1859), I show that both forms of pessimism provide grounds for collective solidarity in two ways: Firstly, being a pessimist helps agents recognise and empathise with the suffering of others, and avoiding the optimistic drive to explain away suffering by appealing to a deeper meaning behind it. Thereby, a pessimist can build a collective „community of fellow sufferers" (Schopenhauer 1859). Secondly, pessimism helps agents avoid resentment against those who suffer. According to Schopenhauer (1851), focusing on moral rules and laws leads us to resent those who do not live up to our moral standards. Similarly, focusing too much on how hopeful or optimistic someone is can make us resent those who suffer but do not show the same hopefulness or optimism. Thereby, pessimism can help us build collective solidarity by avoiding resentment for those who suffer.

This Schopenhauerian argument will be illustrated with examples where pessimism can create solidarity: Afropessimism, which is a version of both pessimisms that hold (1) the reality of Black lives is social death and (2) there is no immediate path towards liberation from Anti-Black racism (Wilderson 2020, Sexton 2016), is a case where a pessimist standpoint can better recognise Black suffering and oppression and thereby create collective solidarity and care. In short, pessimism is not only not an obstacle towards caring for those who suffer, but can be the moral grounds for collective solidarity.

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Grammatical gender and (non-binary) linguistic representation

In "Linguistic Hermeneutical Injustice" Martina Rosola (2024) argues that that grammatical gender languages like Italian or German, which lack third-person gender-neutral pronouns like the singular "they/them" in English, structurally misgender non-binary individuals. Since these languages lack the resources that allow non-binary people adequate representation, this constitutes both hermeneutical (Fricker 2007) and ontic injustice (Jenkins 2020; 2023).

I explore how framing this issue through "hermeneutical injustice" risks obscuring the fact that there are resources in most grammatical gender languages that can (linguistically and socially) represent non-binary individuals. While the implementation of consistent gender-neutral alternatives is not always straightforward in the languages in question, I aim to draw attention to the fact that we ought to not overlook long-standing ameliorative political struggles with respect to liberatory linguistic interventions on the one hand, and how they are actively obstructed on the other. The reason as to why these resources aren't taken up more widely, I argue, cannot be explained by grammatical structures alone or even primarily, but stems from sexist and transphobic oppression that seeks to make invisible trans identities more broadly.

I first highlight a number of linguistically subversive strategies in grammatical gender languages, focussing on German, and highlight the nature of individual and institutional (sometimes state-level) resistance against them. Second, I argue that the issue is better conceptualised as hermeneutical sabotage (following Edgoose 2024): Their account highlights cases where linguistic or epistemic resources are available, but actively obstructed. Finally, I show that this reframing of the issue allows us to grasp why this specific situation encompasses ontic injustice, and where it is different from misgendering as experienced by non-binary individuals in languages that have already more or less broadly established alternatives.

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Cordemoy on secondary causation as prejudice

This paper examines an argument offered by the Cartesian Géraud de Cordemoy in favour of occasionalism with the objective of determining the status of the belief in the efficacy of secondary causes. For a thoroughgoing occasionalist, finite bodies and minds are causally inefficacious and God is the only true cause that realizes causal interactions continuously. Seventeenth-century occasionalism, however, is not a uniform theory and authors respond differently to questions about our experience of secondary causation. I claim that, for Cordemoy, the belief in causal powers in nature is a prejudice in the technical Cartesian sense: it is an illegitimate judgment that has not been informed either by the pure intellect nor by the considered representations of perception. I proceed in three steps. First, Cordemoy argues that experience reveals only successions of events and causal transference of properties is speculated. I call this the "Experience versus Conjecture" argument. Second, I show that Cordemoy operates with Descartes' account of epistemic error and that he broadens it in a distinctive way. For Descartes, prejudice typically applies to beliefs about the senses as revealing the "true nature" of things. Cordemoy goes further: our belief in secondary causation is also conjectured and not experienced by the senses or discerned intellectually. Third, this analysis clarifies a confusion in the literature: the experience of secondary causation should not be classified as a perceptual error nor as an element of a domain of law-like appearances that needs the correction of reason. Rather, the notion of secondary causation is akin to the occult qualities that the Cartesian project aims to vanish from explanation. This paper uncovers Cordemoy's contribution to the pre-Humean debate on the justification of causal beliefs and it identifies a specific variety of causal projectivism. It sets him apart from other Cartesians and provides new nuance to the connection between occasionalism and Humean causal reductivism.

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Invariantism and contextualism about gender kinds

Some feminist philosophers argue that social practices constitutively construct social phenomena like gender, and thus the respective gender kinds (Haslanger, 2018; Jenkins, 2023). However, social practices around gender vary widely. For instance, some contexts adopt practices which respect individuals' preferred pronouns, while others assume gender based on presentation, reinforcing oppressive norms and increasing risks of misgendering.

These differences raise crucial questions for feminist social ontologists: can emancipatory practices shape the construction of gender kinds across contexts? I consider two contrasting positions:

1. Invariantism holds that social practices around gender constitutively construct gender kinds, but differences in the social practices adopted across contexts do not alter the ontological configuration of the gender kinds that exist in each context.

2. Contextualism holds that gender kinds may differ between contexts depending on the practices adopted. For example, resistant practices which respect individuals' pronouns may construct emancipatory gender kinds in one context, while oppressive practices in another context may construct oppressive gender kinds.

Then, I consider whether these positions are genuinely available for feminist social ontologists who theorise about emancipation from gender oppression. I argue that invariantism is not a good option if we want to adequately account for emancipatory social practices. Invariantism struggles to explain the construction of emancipatory gender kinds in resistant contexts and fails to account for material social change produced by changes in social practices.

Moreover, I show that attempts to defend invariantism turn out to either collapse into contextualism or entail a commitment to nominalism. By itself, this does not show that invariantism is untenable, but it shows it carries hidden metaphysical commitments which may not be welcome.

I argue that contextualism better explains the relation between emancipatory practices and the construction of gender kinds, offering feminist social ontologists a more effective framework for theorising resistance to gender oppression.

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The Authority of Self-Knowledge: A Wittgensteinian Expressivist Approach

This paper focuses on the 'authoritative' feature that seems true of one's knowledge of her own mental states but not her knowledge of other people's, namely that what one takes to be true about her own mental states should be considered true by default and to be deferred to. The 'belief-firsters' or 'thought-firsters' (Wright, 2012) who appeal to privilege access could provide a coherent explanation for special characteristics including the authority of our self-knowledge. However, following the belief-first route we can be quickly led to the notorious problem of other minds. Hence, the so-called language-firsters develop a later-Wittgensteinian version of the story, taking the task of accounting for authority of self-knowledge to significantly involve explaining the authority of first-person, present-tense psychological self-ascriptions, or 'avowals'.

Bar-On (2004; Bar-On and Wright, 2023) raises her Neo-Expressivism which is a language-first approach that treats avowals as linguistic expressions of mental states, and argues that avowals are authoritative because they are immune to error through both misidentification and what she calls misascription. In this paper, I suggest that Bar-On overlooks what is key to the Wittgensteinian expressivist picture, namely that when one expresses her mental states through avowing sincerely, the states manifest themselves through expressions in the corresponding external circumstances, as a result of our language learning process. I then argue this feature of avowals explains its authority.

This Wittgensteinian view suggests that language training supplies the necessary control between the states and expressions. I also consider the objection that this is only a contingent link with no guarantee, and examine whether complementing the view with the constitutivist thought that what is true about our mental states is constrained by what we have to say about them could provide a satisfactory response.

This paper would also provide an explanatory basis for the 'dispositional' account of self-knowledge which I shall purpose elsewhere, which suggests a route to self-knowledge via appealing to our awareness of the disposed expressions of our mental lives, as a special case of the awareness of our disposed actions in general.

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The Meta-Meta-Problem of Consciousness

Building on the debate on the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers (2018) goes meta and proposes the meta-problem of consciousness, which asks why we think that consciousness poses the hard problem. In this paper, I repeat this meta-move. That is, I go further meta and propose the meta-meta-problem of consciousness, which problematizes the "we" in the meta-problem and asks why some philosophers of consciousness think that "we" think that consciousness poses the hard problem.

After clarifying what the meta-meta-problem is, particularly in relation to the meta-problem, I consider two possible solutions to this problem: the capturing hypothesis and the projection hypothesis. Finally, I argue for the importance of the meta-meta-problem from three perspectives: philosophy of consciousness, philosophical methodology, and experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy. Through these discussions, I aim to introduce this important problem and set the stage for future research.

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The Paradox of Paradox Resolution

In this paper, I put forward an assumption according to which conceptualization requires both conceiving and evincing. From this, I argue that a world capable of resolving paradoxes necessarily loses the ability to conceptualize them. I then introduce the $\forall \lambda \exists \theta \in i\alpha$ hypothesis, which posits that for every paradox (λ), there exists at least one solution (θ) in an impossible world (i), distinct from the actual world (w), where the solution cannot be replicated without violating w's logical or physical constraints.

By comparing w and i in terms of expressive richness, I establish a fundamental trade-off: while w retains paradoxes but cannot resolve them, i dissolves paradoxes but loses the capacity to conceptualize them altogether. This leads to the conclusion that conceptual richness is inherently tied to irresolvability. As such, w's ability to sustain paradoxes without resolution grants it a broader conceptual scope.

The paper also succinctly addresses two foreseeable objections: one concerning the necessity of i's impossibility, and another regarding the nature of concept possession. Considering eternal irresolvability as the defining feature of paradoxes, I conclude by emphasizing that the pursuit of paradox resolution, in any actual or possible world, is ultimately in vain, as it misconstrues the very nature of paradoxicality.

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The mereology of pregnancy, according to the immune system

In a series of influential papers, Elselijn Kingma (2018, 2019) argues that the foetus is a part of the pregnant organism rather than being merely contained by it on the basis of four physiological criteria - homeostasis, metabolism, topological connectedness and immune tolerance. However, these four criteria are not only consistent with the Kingma's Part View but another option - the Overlap View. Given this ambiguity, Geddes (2023) argues that Kingma cannot have established that the foster is a part of the gravida. It might be the case that they overlap.

In this paper I will argue that the immunology of pregnancy is only consistent with the Overlap View. If Geddes (2023) and Finn (2020) are right that the other accounts are consistent with both the Part View and the Overlap View, my argument establishes that the Overlap View is the only option consistent with all four of Kingma's criteria.

Here I will take it to be the case that an immune system tolerates all and only the parts of the organism to which it belongs and that all parts of an organism must be compatible with at least some parts of its immune system, where something is compatible with a part of the immune system if it would be tolerated by it under normal circumstances.

If so, while part of the foetus is tolerated by the gestator, part of it is immunologically incompatible. This is only consistent with overlap. Moreover, the immune tolerance of the foetus by the pregnant organism cannot entail that the later is part of the former because the foetus also has an immune system which tolerates the pregnant organism. Parthood is a canonically antisymmetrical relationship and overlap is symmetrical. So, the Overlap View is the only coherent option.

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Defiance amid Despair: Reporting Sexual Assault Despite Its Futility

If you were a woman who experienced sexual assault, would you report it to law enforcement? The choice to report faces a strong practical 'defeater': reporting brings significant costs to the victim's wellbeing with an extremely low likelihood of prosecution (<2% in the UK). Under this defeater, reporting seems to be a hopeless, irrational act. How should we understand such political actions despite their futility?

I first survey attempts to rationalise reporting, e.g. suggesting that collective rationality trumps individual rationality or that choices under oppressive double binds are arational, and argue why they fail. This exploration of failed solutions suggests how this defeater inevitably leads the victim to conclude that not reporting is the only rational, sensible way to proceed. What appears suspect, then, is the very mode of deliberation itself.

The mode of deliberation instantiated by this defeater, I argue, is ideological in nature: it presents as if not-reporting is the only viable course of action so that victims self-reinforce their oppression. The defeater rationalises and reifies the futility and high costs of reporting as mere natural state of affairs when they are historically specific products of the patriarchy. This distortion of social reality performs a normalisation function so that victims self-regulate their dissent in securing patriarchal hegemony.

Victims should resist such mode of deliberation, I contend, for it reinforces a self-abnegating instrumental rationality and pre-empts one's will and agency to dissent. One's subjectivity is first denied in assault and again denied in this mode of deliberation. Such a double eradication of the self will never be emancipatory.

In rejecting this mode of deliberation, reporting thus constitutes a wilful act of political defiance amid despair. It is to reclaim, even in miniature, what the oppressive systems hope to strip away through dehumanisation and subjugation – one's will, subjectivity, and humanity.

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Aesthetic properties are not shades of aesthetic value

Aesthetic properties such as elegance, delicacy, melancholy or garishness have been one of the main subjects of aestheticians' attention for decades. One view about their nature which has proven particularly popular is the determination picture, the position that aesthetic properties stand to aesthetic value in the relationship of determination, such as that between shades and colours (Lopes 2018; Zangwill 2013; Sibley 1985 on Lopes's reading).

In this paper, I offer a criticism of the determination picture. The problem, I believe, is that the view is underarticulated. It can be understood either as a claim about overall or pro tanto aesthetic value. Both versions, I argue, face different but equally insurmountable difficulties. The appeal of the determination picture comes from persistent confusion between the two which obscures their respective shortcomings.

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Meaning Eliminativism, Nominalism, and Conceptual Engineering: Quine's Model of Scientific Language and Austin's Pragmatic Analysis of Ordinary Language

In this paper, meaning eliminativism is defined as a position in the philosophy of language that holds that meaning is not a fixed, objective property of linguistic expressions. I analyze this approach in the context of Quine's model of scientific language and Austin's pragmatic analysis of ordinary language.

Quine's semantic holism (1951) and his rejection of analyticity led him to adopt a nominalist ontology, avoiding commitments to abstract entities and treating sets as mere theoretical constructs (Quine, 1960). In his view, what is traditionally called meaning is not an objective property of words but is better understood as behavioral dispositions and the systemic role of terms within an interdependent network of statements in scientific language. Austin (1962), in turn, critiques the notion of meaning as a context-independent entity, arguing within speech act theory that meaning is primarily determined by its use in communicative practice.

I argue that both Quine and Austin question the 'Platonic' view of meaning as a stable entity in different ways, which in turn supports a nominalist stance on meaning.

The aim of this paper is not only to provide a historical reconstruction but also to highlight its significance for the rapidly developing field of conceptual engineering (see Cappelen, 2018; Burgess, Cappelen & Plunkett, 2020; Chalmers, 2020). Instead, I interpret Quinean "conceptual engineering" as a process of revising terms within scientific language, where conceptual changes are guided by their role within an interdependent network of statements and their responsiveness to empirical evidence. In contrast, Austin's analysis of ordinary language demonstrates how meanings evolve through speech acts and communicative interaction. A comparison of these two approaches sheds light on the mechanisms of conceptual revision in both scientific and everyday communication.

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Perspective, Opacity, and Voice

According to an influential understanding of respect, what we're to respect in others is fundamentally their perspective or point of view. This involves considering practical matters from others' perspectives by, e.g., taking their interests or preferences as bearing on our treatment of them (see Benhabib 1988, Benn 1988, Buss 1998, Wood 2010, Lingle forthcoming). Thusly understood, respect is taken by many to entail equal freedom. But beyond freedom, the literature on perspectival respect is rich with invocations—

albeit often vague—of voice. The suggestion is that, beyond considering practical matters from others' perspectives, we should also grant others a genuine voice in our deliberation. Herein lies the potential connection between respect and democracy.

Just how perspectival respect entails a claim to voice with others, and just what it is to have the kind of voice to which we have claim, is rarely well worked out. Sometimes the bridge from perspective-taking to voice is put in epistemic terms: we should take seriously others' voices because they tend to know best about their own lives. I argue here that we should take a different tack. Perspectival respect entails treating others' practical speech—over above their "inner" practical judgments—not just as good evidence about how to treat them, or epistemically authoritative, but as irreducibly practically authoritative.

This, I show, squares with strongly held intuitions, but is also theoretically well supported. Communicatively mediated rather than direct perspectival authority preserves mutual opacity between persons. Carter (2013) treats opacity as an alternative to perspectival respect. I argue that communicative mediation harmonizes perspective-taking and opacity. To conclude I sketch a novel account of the kind of authority at hand—at respect's core. Respect involves more than considering but less than deferring to others' practical speech. Rather, it requires that we heed it.

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Weak Normative Reference Magnets

In Normative Reference Magnets, Williams (2018) argues that we can explain why concepts used with a particular conceptual role stably denote moral wrongness by appealing to an interpretationist metaphysics of mental content. The explanation hinges on the claim that, in ordinary circumstances, an agent who deploys a concept with this role – 'the wrongness-role' – is made most substantively rational by an interpretation on which her concept denotes wrongness.

In this paper I show that the explanation faces a problem; one of the normative premises used to support this claim is false. I then show that though the explanation fails to account for the stability thesis, it can predict and explain a weaker thesis. I finish by exploring ways in which this weaker thesis may be supported or undermined.

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(Natural) kind pluralism

It seems that philosophers of language are largely sympathetic to Putnam's (1973, 1975, 1978) and Kripke's (1980) original arguments that (natural) kind terms such as "gold" or "tiger" are similar to proper names in some important respect, and that their reference is determined by the kinds' micro-structural essences. Philosophers of science mostly despise that picture and its dichotomy between natural kinds, which "carve nature at the joints", and completely arbitrary kinds, say, "animals born on Sunday".

In response, I propose a new account of natural kind terms that is entirely different from causal–historical approach and can be reconciled with our actual classificatory practices in both science and ordinary life. In order to do so I assume inferentialist semantics. Roughly speaking, normative inferentialism holds that the meaning of a linguistic expression is identical with its inferential role, which is determined by inferential rules that are common among relevant members of a linguistic community.

I propose that "natural kind terms" are broad or rich expressions of this sort: they involve three contents that I label (a) "fundamental kinds", (b) "explanatory kinds" and (c) "practical kinds". (a) Fundamental kinds are meant to identify the most basic building blocks of reality, and they are identified by essential properties. (b) Explanatory kinds are meant to be tools for predicting and explaining phenomena. Such kinds clearly participate in the laws of nature and these laws enjoy a high level of stability: they predict and explain phenomena robustly but they lack the sort of inevitability and robustness laws involving fundamental kinds have. (c) Practical kinds are relatively weak in terms of projectability and explaining, and do not participate in the laws of nature, but nevertheless share some real properties and are useful in satisfying our ordinary, everyday needs.

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Three Myths of Meritocracy

Meritocracy is a notoriously elusive ideal. Among both supporters and detractors, there is little agreement on what meritocracy really means. In this article, I construct a meritocratic ideal on the assumption that meritocracy is, indeed, a valuable ideal. In doing so, I show that three commonly, though not universally, held beliefs about meritocracy's relation to other concepts are false, at least insofar as meritocracy is a defensible ideal. These concepts are (i) equality of opportunity, (ii) affirmative action, and (iii) desert.

First, I argue that defenses of meritocracy make appeal to two different principles which are in tension with one another—a principle of equality of opportunity and a principle that positions should be filled by the most qualified candidate.

I proceed by arguing that the merit principle should be understood as the latter principle. Applying this principle in practice requires us to give an account of what we mean by qualification. This turns out to be far from straightforward. I introduce and discuss the problem of reaction qualifications, i.e. the problem that sometimes our ability to perform our job depends on how others react to us, including to traits of ours such as race or gender. My solution points to a restricted instrumentalism about qualifications. I expand on this restricted instrumentalism through a discussion of non-reaction qualifications in the context of public administration and bureaucracies.

The restricted instrumentalism about qualification shows that we need to rethink the relation between meritocracy and affirmative action as well as desert. Restricted instrumentalism implies that quotas or affirmative action measures based on group identity are, contrary to widespread belief, often compatible with meritocracy. Lastly, restricted instrumentalism makes it particularly difficult to justify the idea that the best qualified candidate deserves the position or is entitled to the position.

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Responsibility and Healthcare Allocation: Beyond The Moralisation Objection

The idea of individual responsibility playing a part in healthcare allocation is controversial, and subject to a long list of objections (Sharkey and Gillam 2010). This talk focuses on one objection in particular: holding patients responsible for their health-affecting behaviours is unacceptably moralising. Call this The Moralisation Objection (MO).

The standard version of MO rests on an error about responsibility. MO presumes that to hold someone responsible is necessarily to regard them as blameworthy – examples of such reasoning can be found in several recent publications arguing against the relevance of responsibility in healthcare (Hurst 2024; Kennett 2024; Nath 2024; Shaw 2024). But this is not the conception of responsibility that is typically at play in arguments in favour of responsibility-sensitive health allocation. Rather, what is typically appealed to is a conception of what I call distributive responsibility.

Distributive responsibility is familiar from political philosophy but neglected in medical ethics. It is a form of responsibility: it links one's obligations to bear costs, and rights to enjoy benefits, to one's intentional actions under certain circumstances. However, it is non-moral. Indeed, more broadly, it has no necessary relation to any ideas of praise or blame, including non-moral ones: one's distributive responsibility is not essentially affected by the prudential or epistemic quality of one's choices any more than by their moral quality. An example of this might be my decision to gamble, with my own money, in a casino. To say that it is I—and not you, say—who should shoulder the costs of losing a bet does not imply that I do something morally or prudentially blameworthy when I gamble.

Thus, I suggest that an important strand of applied ethics has neglected a central insight from political philosophy, at significant cost to the coherence of the debate about responsibility-sensitive allocation.

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Can Constitutivists Explain What We Owe to Each Other?

Metaethical constitutivists say that moral norms are grounded in the nature of rational agency. Many have argued that constitutivists cannot make sense of moral obligations' directedness. Directed obligations are owed to a particular person. Intuitively, many moral obligations are directed. If I kick you, I don't just do something wrong; I wrong you. And if I promise you that I'll meet you for lunch, it's not just that I should meet you; it's that I owe it to you to meet you. But if my obligations are ultimately grounded in the nature of my agency, how can we make sense of their directedness? My obligations seem to be grounded ultimately in facts about my nature, not facts about you. Thus, constitutivists can at best show that my obligations are indirectly owed to you, but ultimately owed to me. For constitutivists, other people figure only derivatively in moral obligations. Call this the Directedness Worry. I argue that the Directedness Worry is misguided. Constitutivists can make sense of directed obligation. While general norms (e.g., to respect other persons) are grounded in the nature of my agency, my particular obligation to respect you is grounded in both my agency and your personhood. The nature of my agency grounds the requirement that I respect other persons, and your personhood explains why I ought to respect you. After all, if you weren't a person, then my agency wouldn't ground an obligation to respect you. Your personhood partially explains why the nature of my agency grounds a particular obligation to respect you. Your nature and mine thus both play an important role in explaining my particular obligations to you. For constitutivists as for others, directed obligation takes two. My argument ultimately yields a clearer picture of both the explanatory structure of constitutivism and the nature of directed obligation.

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Inquiry and Question Comprehension

What does it take to inquire into a particular question? According to J. Friedman (2013, 2019, 2020), inquiry involves adopting an inquiring attitude toward a question (paradigmatically "wondering about Q"). Yet, it seems that one can wonder a particular question without necessarily being committed to take steps toward settling it. For, inquiring into a particular question plausibly involves a type of commitment that goes beyond mere wonderings.

This paper builds on this issue to defend a Noetic Account of Inquiry according to which what distinguishes genuine inquirers from mere wonderers is a specific type of cognitive engagement with the questions that constitute the content of one's inquiring attitudes. In particular, we argue that inquiring into a particular question is essentially a matter of gaining an understanding of the question one wonders that is such that it puts one in a position to act on one's inquiring attitude. After elucidating the nature of the understanding we take to be distinctive of inquirers by relying on van Dijk and Kintsch's (1978, 1983) Construction-Integration Model of language comprehension, the Noetic Account of Inquiry is shown to have the resources to show precisely in what sense inquiry consists of an intentional activity that is guided by inquiring attitudes.

On the view we defend in this paper, the key feature of inquirers is the kind of understanding they have of the questions they come to wonder. Inquirers do not inquire into certain questions because they decide, in addition to wondering these questions, to take steps toward settling them. They inquire into these questions because their understanding of the questions they wonder is such that their inquiring attitudes can guide their actions and, as a result, the norms that govern their inquiry are tied to the very nature of the understanding that is distinctive of inquirers.

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Knowledge Can Go Bad

Consider the following example:

You walk past a partially occluded field. The farmer who owns the field tells you that there are definitely sheep somewhere in the field, even if you might not be able to see them. You look more closely, and become sure that you can spot them. Unbeknownst to you, however, the objects you have spotted are merely sheep-shaped rocks, which the sheep are hiding behind.

Later that day a usually trustworthy source tells you that the farmer is not to be trusted; he likes to play pranks, and is no more likely to speak truly than falsely. Uncharacteristically, your source is wrong about this; the farmer was perfectly trustworthy.

I argue that this is a case where, intuitively, your knowledge that there are sheep in the field is defeated, even though your justified belief that there are sheep in the field is not. The existence of such cases reshapes the debate around the reality of knowledge defeat, which has focused on cases where knowledge seems to be lost precisely because justification is lost. For defenders of knowledge defeat, the challenge is to expand the explanation of how knowledge is defeated to cover these cases. While not trivial, I show that this is at least sometimes possible, by developing a version of the 'normality theory' of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023) that vindicates the example. For sceptics about knowledge defeat, the challenge is to expand the error theory for our intuitions that knowledge can be defeated. This looks more difficult, since, I argue, error theories appealing to the objectionability of dogmatism (Lasonen Aarnio 2010, 2021; Baker-Hytch and Benton 2015; Goodman ms) or the cognitive mechanisms underlying reconsideration (Nagel 2021) get no purchase on these examples, in which the subject can undogmatically decline to reconsider their belief.

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When Is Deportation Punishment (And Why Does It Matter)?

Many states - but in particular the US and the UK – have legal orders that allow for (and may in some circumstances require) the deportation of immigrants and other non-citizen residents who have been found guilty of and sentenced to certain kinds of crime whose criminality does not depend in any way on their having been committed by immigrants. In some cases – and this is certainly true of both the UK and the US – the legal order claims explicitly that deportation is not a form of punishment. This claim has practical consequences: those who are subject to these measures are not accorded the same kinds of protections as those the state claims to be punishing. But can the claim that in these cases deportation does not constitute punishment be sustained? Some might appeal to a distinction between punishment and collateral consequences of punishment in order to defend it. Even if this move is successful there will be significant moral constraints on how the state can deploy deportation. However, I shall argue that it is not successful. Although deportation could perhaps in principle be treated in a way that made it a mere collateral consequence of punishment, the expressive role of post-sentencing deportation in both the US and the UK means that is in fact punishment. This is not merely a verbal point: it has significant consequences. The denunciatory role of punishment makes certain kinds of procedural safeguards appropriate to it. Furthermore, legitimate punishment is subject to a norm of proportionality and many actual cases of post-sentencing deportation in the US and UK will fail to meet this norm.

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Against Non-Tuism

A common complaint against markets is that they motivate people in objectionably self-interested ways (e.g., Cohen, 2009). One response to this argument, originally due to Philip Wicksteed, is that market motivation is non-tuistic (e.g. Steiner, 2014). According to the non-tuistic model, market exchange need not involve self-interested motivation. After all, many people who engage in market exchanges are doing so in order to share the proceeds of their exchanges with others—think of someone working to provide for their family, or an effective altruist earning to give. All markets preclude, on this understanding, is being motivated by the interests of one's direct exchange partner. In Wicksteed's words: "The economic relation does not exclude from my mind everyone but me, it potentially includes everyone but you." (1933 [1910], 174) The purpose of this paper is to show that non-tuism is a bad way to understand market motivation. Section 1 sets out the case for non-tuism. Section 2 argues that the non-tuistic model can't be right. First, people can engage in market exchange in order to further the interests of their direct exchange partners, in the very same way Wicksteed argues that they can do so to further the interests of third parties. Secondly, some non-tuistic exchanges can fail to be genuine market exchanges for precisely the same reasons that Wicksteed's own tuistic examples do. Section 3 offers a diagnosis of where the non-tuistic model goes wrong. I argue that the non-tuistic model conflates the reasons why one might decide to engage in market

exchange to begin with, with the way in which one must respond to reasons if one is to count as engaging in market exchange at all. Section 4 concludes with some thoughts about the implications of this argument for broader debates about markets in political philosophy.

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The Vices and Virtues of Metacognition

Virtue theorists have begun to think about the relationship between metacognition and virtue (Lepock 2013, Stichter 2024). Is metacognition a virtue, and can it be taught? I consider this question in light of Socrates' claim, 'all I know is that I know nothing', using metacognition science to precisify our account of what this means and how such knowledge would be realised.

I argue that metacognition is a virtue that can be taught, addressing crucial objections to this position. I argue that metacognition science helps to cultivate the virtues of self-awareness for the simple reason that it leads us to acknowledge the dependence of our self-awareness on social and other factors. I discuss practical applications of cultivating metacognitive virtue.

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Reconciling Descartes's Mind-Body Distinction with Embodied Cognition

Descartes' mind-body distinction has long been a cornerstone of philosophical discourse, traditionally emphasising the separateness of the immaterial mind and the physical body. At first glance, this dualistic framework appears to stand in direct opposition to contemporary theories of embodied mind – a theory of mind that stress the interdependence of mind and body and posit that cognition arises from the body's dynamic interaction with its environment. However, the dominant portrayal of Descartes as a rigid dualist is not solely a product of his own writings but has been shaped significantly by later interpretations. An interpretation that has often been accepted without a thorough re-examination of his original texts.

This presentation seeks to challenge that narrative by reassessing Descartes' writings through the lens of embodied cognition and Carnap's notion of domains. Descartes maintains a conceptual distinction between mind and body in the metaphysical domain. However, when evaluated within the material domain, his account of the "I" presupposes a highly embodied subject. Such claim could be seen in his reliance on faculties—such as sensory perception, imagination—that he explicitly attributes to the body in his definition of the self. This suggests that human beings are not purely minds or bodies but rather a unified whole in which bodily experience plays a crucial role in cognition.

This presentation will examine discussions of the union of mind and body, in the Meditations, Passions of the Soul and his correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia to further reinforce the idea that human cognition is deeply rooted in bodily experiences. By situating Descartes' philosophy within the material domain this analysis aims to demonstrate that Descartes' philosophy could be interpreted as a precursor to some core insights of embodied mind.

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Actions as Movements of Bodies Coupled with Tools: A Case for Instrumentalism about Basic Action

In contemporary philosophy of action, standard event-causal theorists (e.g. Davidson, Smith) grapple with problems such as deviant causation and the seeming absence of a genuine agent within the causal chain, given partially because they assume that basic actions are bodily movements. Proponents of new volitionism (e.g. McCann, Hornsby) address this by positing basic actions are purely mental movements. Recently, Anton Ford (2016) presents a contrasting materialist perspective, contending that our agency extends beyond bodily boundaries to the very objects upon which we act. Ford develops his account through a conductive argument that balances considerations for and against each position. My paper

examines and reconfigures Ford's conductive approach to demonstrate that it actually supports what I term instrumentalism about basic action: the thesis that basic actions encompass both bodily movements and the movements of the tools employed by the agent. I explore how Ford's framework—particularly its dependence on "good cases" of ordinary action—can be expanded to reveal a crucial distinction between tools, which become temporarily incorporated into our bodily schema, and other external objects, which typically remain under merely indirect control. By meticulously tracking the weighing of conflicting considerations central to conductive reasoning, I show that instrumentalism accounts more effectively for our ordinary experience of acting with tools than either strict corporealism or broad materialism. It captures the unique phenomenology of tool use—where tools are experienced "as if" part of one's body— while preserving Ford's insight that agency often extends beyond our skin. In doing so, instrumentalism not only refines Ford's original argument but also provides a richer understanding of how humans, as tool-using animals, integrate the movements of both body and instrument into a single, coherent act.

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Delusions as Seeming-Based Beliefs

It is common practice to take delusions to be beliefs. However, delusions are notorious for being insensitive to evidence, inconsistent with patients' other beliefs, and incongruous with patients' behaviours. These puzzling features give rise to the philosophical debate about whether delusions are beliefs. So far, the debate has centred on whether delusions resemble everyday irrational beliefs, and it appears to have reached an impasse.

In this paper, I will argue that both sides of this debate might have, to various degrees, assumed that if delusions are beliefs, then they must be "evidence-based" beliefs. By contrast, I will propose that we could understand the claim that delusions are beliefs in terms of the idea that they are based on seemings, namely "seeming-based" beliefs. I will put forward a key difference between how evidence holds sway over belief formation and how seemings hold sway over belief formation, and explain how this difference can shed new light on the puzzling features of delusions.

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Rethinking Evidentialism: Trade-offs and Epistemic Reasons for Actions

Singer and Aronowitz (2021) target at a narrow version of *evidentialism*, holding that All epistemic reasons are reasons for a subject S to believe what S's evidence supports (Singer and Aronowitz 2021, 2–3). Traditionally, evidentialists deny that S can have an epistemic reason for actions other than believing.

A contribution of Singer and Aronowitz is they argue, together with some plausible claims about reasons, evidentialism implies (Singer and Aronowitz 2021, 2–3; 8–9):

RFE If S knows that φing would help bring about S believing strictly more of what her evidence supports, then S has an epistemic reason to φ.

Here, φ can be replaced by any actions, such as believing or eating a sandwich. By requiring "strictly more", they impose a trade-off constraint: S is forbidden from abandoning some epistemically good beliefs to gain many other epistemically good beliefs (Singer and Aronowitz 2021, 8, footnote 7).

I argue that the ground for RFE also supports a broader principle allowing trade-offs. Particularly, S can have an epistemic reason to believe a proposition p that is not supported by S's evidence if S knows that believing that p will help bring about S believing more of what her evidence supports. This result challenges evidentialism and Singer and Aronowitz's position.

The broader principle contradicts evidentialism, which states S ought not believe and thereby has no reason to believe what S's evidence does not support. To solve this confliction, we either revise evidentialism or reject the broader principle. The former requires evidentialist to revise their core claim, making it unattractive. The latter requires rejecting the ground for the broader principle, which is the ground of RFE. This follows that we no longer have reason to accept RFE. Since RFE is central to Singer and Aronowitz's argument, this option is unattractive.

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Large Language Models in Large Language Games

When I receive an email making me a promise, giving me an order, or offering me a job, have I in fact been promised, ordered, or offered? Until recently, this would have likely been easily answered in the affirmative. We have become quite accustomed to the performance of online speech acts.

The recent proliferation of large language models might seem to undermine this. We can no longer be (as) confident that an email was created by a human 'speaker'. We are faced with a dilemma. Either we restrict illocutionary force to utterances whose author we *know* to be human (and thus exclude most online speech). Or we accept the risk of treating LLM-generated text as speech acts.

If we adopt the restrictive response, we preserve received views in speech act theory (invoking Austin 1962; Strawson 1964). Speech acts are often taken to require *intention* from the speaker, which LLMs seem to lack. The predominant alternative view takes speech acts to require *uptake* from the audience—but this is often cached out as the recognition of speaker intention (Lance and Kukla 2013; McDonald 2022)! If we no longer give uptake to emailed speech acts, speech act theory remains secure but at the cost of our ability to promise, order, and offer online.

If we adopt the expansive response and allow that LLMs can perform speech acts, we reject a key component of traditional speech act theory. Large language models would be no mere 'stochastic parrots' (Bender et al 2021). We would then need an alternative conception of illocutionary force to explain this. I suggest a possible solution, grounding the illocutionary force of an utterance-token in its contribution to the 'conversational score' (Lewis 1979), rather than the intention of the speaker or uptake of the audience.

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When Words Slip: The Moral Weight of Unintentional Speech

In this contribution, I will explore the moral responsibility of individuals for spontaneous acts of speech, focusing on cases where speech occurs automatically without conscious intent. Using the example of an agent called Paul, who unintentionally makes a sexist remark in a moment of frustration, the discussion examines whether individuals should be held accountable for such speech despite lacking deliberate intent. The analysis considers the nature of automatic actions and speech, the distinction between mere utterances and genuine speech acts, and the moral weight of unintentional harm.

I argue that even acts of speech performed without attending to a decision can carry moral significance, prompting a reassessment of moral responsibility and the validity of excuses in such contexts. My thesis is that determining whether someone is blameworthy depends on the causal history of the respective action. Notably, while actions performed automatically are not driven by present deliberation, their causal history may include past deliberations, actions, and beliefs, which can play a crucial role. Regarding the given example, I want to emphasize that agents like Paul may still be responsible for their words, even if they do not genuinely mean them, depending on the causal history of the act of speech.

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Can We Repudiate Ontology Altogether?

Ontological nihilists claim that, fundamentally, there are no objects whatsoever. This view is radical, but the motivations for nihilism are numerous (O'Leary-Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995; Dasgupta, 2009; Azzouni, 2017; Diehl, 2018; 2025).

Nihilists reject the idea that the world is some undifferentiated stuff (Diehl, 2022: 14). Instead, they accept that the world is complex in some sense, but that theorising about it does not require the introduction of any ontological structure (Turner, Forthcoming: 177). For their view to be viable, the nihilist must then:

1. Develop a nihilist-friendly way to theorise about the world.

2. Provide a precise nihilist metaphysics.

(1) is the *expressive adequacy challenge*. Standard responses are paraphrase schemes that translate ordinary language into nihilist-friendly language. One widely endorsed approach uses feature-placing languages, based on ontologically neutral statements like "It is raining" (Strawson, 1950: 202; O'Leary-Hawthorne & Cortens, 1995; Diehl, 2018).

(2) has received much less attention, but (1) and (2) are interrelated: the language and metaphysics must align. It is commonly assumed that a nihilist paraphrase scheme must preserve the core of our ordinary claims (Turner, 2011: 4-11; Forthcoming), retaining their (purported) truth and inferential behaviour (Turner, 2011; Diehl, 2018). To do this convincingly, nihilists must point to what in the world explains the distinctions drawn in their nihilist-friendly language.

In this paper, I make precise this idea of alignment as a new constraint on nihilist paraphrase schemes. I argue that widely endorsed schemes can only meet this requirement by violating a second, well-motivated but undiscussed constraint: preserving the *explanatory unity* of our ordinary claims. To illustrate, I show how a promising approach to paraphrasing relational claims leads to disunified distinctions, explained only by differences between primitive features or piecemeal connections between them.

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The Evolution of the Social Contract: Cooperation or Social Play?

Evolutionary accounts of the social contract are often framed from an adaptive cooperation-based context, often using game theoretic models to explain the emergence of norm-governed behaviour in humans (Skyrms, 2014; Sterelny, 2021; Thompson, 2022). They tend to highlight the role of rational self-interest or some shared goal that motivates cooperative behaviour structured around shared social rules. The normative force of social rules, on this view, is explained in terms of some prudential or instrumental rationality and as such falls short of explaining the apparent deontic or categorical force that is key to understanding the rationality behind morally responsible action and thought. In other words, cooperation-based accounts reflect what Oakeshott (1975) calls an "enterprise association," oriented towards joint ends and purposes, leaving the apparent categorical force and authority of our most valued social norms unexplained. A theory of social normative order, by contrast, should capture a form of "civil association" — the supposed moral-normative framework underpinning human conduct.

This paper proposes an alternative account that vindicates a thoroughly Rousseauian (or Scanlonian) social contract. This Rousseauian model, in contrast to the instrumentalist models on offer, highlights an agent's distinctive attunement towards and mutual recognition of others, according them symmetric standing that not only informs how they relate with and treat one another but also how rules are determined for the general regulation of action and thought. I suggest that contexts of social play can generate a plausible evolutionary foundation for a Rousseauian contractualist model that can explain our capacity to bind ourselves to rules that is robustly categorical.

A close analysis of the intrinsic participatory dynamics in social play arguably gives us the basic elements of a Rousseauian social contract such as commitment amongst equal participants, mutual agreement and negotiation of behavioural expectations, and even attunement towards relations of fairness and interpersonal trust.

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Can Artificial Moral Intelligence Learn to be Good?

Some have raised concerns that no matter how virtuously designed the algorithms are, Moral AI cannot be robustly virtuous, that is, it cannot be virtuous in the distinctively human way (cf. Wallach and Vallor (2020), Veliz (2021), Kyriacou (2024)). This is primarily because AI is a different kind of cognitive system than Human Intelligence (HI) and because of the difference in cognitive kind it lacks the cognitive prerequisites for human virtue (that humans can inculcate and develop via moral learning from early

childhood). In this paper, I examine the possibility that AI can attain moral intelligence via moral learning that imitates human moral learning (e.g. Railton (2020)). I adopt a broadly Aristotelian perspective on human developmental moral learning and compare how AI moral learning could proceed, given the differences in cognitive kind between AI and HI. As I argue, cognitive differences such as autonomous reason-responsiveness, conceptual understanding, affective experience and virtuous moral intuition hinder moral AI of learning in the distinctive human manner that can lead to the development of phronesis, or practical wisdom.

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Inter-programme Theories and Lakatos's 'Empirical Content'

How science changed and progressed is a thoroughly researched topic by philosophers. According to critical rationalism, science progresses with increasing empirical content and verisimilitude. A hitherto overlooked aspect of the discussions is how two co-existing sciences might interact. Darden and Maull (1977) proposed that two scientific fields are bridged together through interfield theories. In a similar vein, I propose that two co-existing research programmes (Lakatos, 1969) interact through inter-programme theory. Following the tradition of critical rationalism, I defend Lakatos's account of scientific progress through progressive research programmes. I develop the notion of inter-programme theory that helps in meeting some challenges faced by Lakatos's account of scientific progress.

First, I present the two main challenges faced by Lakatos's account: (1) the failure to account for the interaction between research programmes. (2) the tension between the notion of 'empirical content' and his dynamic picture of scientific progress. To meet these challenges, I propose a way to re-conceptualize 'empirical content' that better captures Lakatos's 'empirical content' of a scientific research programme. Based on this new definition, I develop the notion of an 'inter-programme theory' through which two co-existing research programmes interact.

Through a case study in the theory of special relativity and the theory of ether in the 19th and early 20th century, I argue that it is philosophically fruitful to conceive some hypotheses and models in science as inter-programme theories. Finally, I shall discuss the functions of inter-programme theories, such as establishing connections between research programmes, fostering unification of research programmes, and reconciling tensions between co-existing research programmes.

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Gender Terms as Assessment-Sensitive

Gender terms play a crucial role in our lives, in that they allow us to categorize ourselves and others as of a certain gender, which in turn has important social, moral and legal implications. One recent issue in the semantics of gender terms has been to allow trans people (and their allies) to use the gender terms of their choice to refer to themselves (call this "the inclusion problem"). This has been a pressing issue within both ameliorative (e.g., Haslanger 2000) and descriptive (e.g., Diaz-Leon 2016) projects in the philosophy of language. In this talk, I explore the application of a well-known semantic framework (relativism, based on the idea that the denotations of certain expressions depend on features not only of the context of utterance, but of that of assessment, too; e.g., MacFarlane 2014; Lasersohn 2014) to gender terms as a possible way to solve the inclusion problem. The framework is familiar from the literature on perspectival expressions (predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc.), where it has been one of the main contenders. I argue, first, that an orthodox relativist framework is suited from a descriptive point of view, capturing how both trans people and their allies, as well as transphobes, use gender terms. Second, I show that the very same framework won't help the inclusion problem in an ameliorative setting. I propose instead a flexible version of relativism, which has good chances of doing so. The move to such a version of the view is independently motivated by various considerations in the literature on perspectival expressions (e.g., problematic cases of cross-perspective truth-assessment, data about retraction, etc.). I thus put forward a specific form of flexible radical relativism for gender terms based on the notion of importance of the situation of the subject (in a context of assessment), and show how it can

help with the inclusion problem. Finally, I compare the view proposed with other recent views, such as subject-contexualism and self-identificatory invariantism.

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Expanding Interest in Contractualism

One of the main draws of Scanlonian Contractualism is its ability to combine a plausible criterion of moral right- and wrongness with a compelling answer to the question of why we ought to be moral. Contractualism's focus on reasons that concrete, situated individuals may have for rejecting principles allows it to establish a crucial link between action and intersubjective justification and therefore to the value of mutual recognition. However, contractualism's narrow individualist focus also makes many paradigmatically deontological moral reasons surprisingly hard to capture. This is striking, as contractualism was specifically intended by Scanlon as a counterfoil to consequentialism.

In this paper, I pursue two aims: first, I argue that these extensional shortcomings of traditional Scanlonian contractualism stem from an overly narrow view of what kind of interests individuals can have for rejecting principles, which is implicit in much contractualist reasoning. I show this to underlie contractualism's problems in accounting for three phenomena where these interests are unable to ground reasonable objections to principles: bare breaches of promise, harmless trespass against property and body, and deontic restrictions against killing to prevent further killings. While the third problem has been widely discussed, its connection to the underdiscussed first two problems has not, yet it points to a possible joint solution.

Secondly, I claim that to be extensionally and explanatorily adequate, an individualist, interest-based contractualist approach must be supplemented by the idea of genuine *normative interests*. The idea that mere possession of certain rights and obligations matters for our status as beings endowed with autonomy and dignity can solve the discussed extensional problems for contractualism, allowing it to make sense of the various kinds of deontic restrictions in a principled and unified manner, even when non-normative interests remain unaffected. The best version of contractualism thus must take normative interests on board.

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Acceptance and the Status of Moral Reasons

Acceptance can mean different things, such as accepting a fact, a state of being accepted or being in a state of acceptance. Sometimes acceptance comes with positive connotations, such as being accepted by one's peers, but sometimes acceptance comes with negative connotations, such as accepting the loss of a loved one. I propose an account of acceptance that aims to encompass all meanings of acceptance by understanding acceptance as the acceptance of reality. Of course, reality may come in myriad contexts, such as the reality of one's mental state, a sociopolitical reality, or a physical reality. However, I argue that there is correctness within those contexts that ties all contexts of reality together regarding the acceptance of reality. Accepting reality x is correct whenever there is a corresponding state of affairs, y.

I show how my basic and preliminary notion of accepting reality can be found in various traditions, from Buddhism to Existentialism. In the case of Buddhism, for example, there is something that we are required to accept, such as the noble truths. However, the basic notion of accepting reality itself is without content. I argue that on this fundamental notion of accepting reality, there are practical solutions to be found as clinical psychology shows that acceptance is the beginning of rehabilitation and empowerment, whether one suffers from bereavement or disability.

Finally, I discuss what the acceptance of reality means for the status of moral reasons and argue that accepting reality itself cannot give anyone moral reasons unless they somehow had them in the first place. As such, the acceptance of reality can lead an agent to rediscover moral reasons they once had. My conclusion is that the way in which the acceptance of reality can lead to universal moral reasons is if they are mind-independent.

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The Non-Identity Problem for Transformative Acts

Das and Paul have constructed an intrapersonal analogue to the traditional, interpersonal form of the non-identity problem through applying aspects of Paul's work on transformative experience to said problem. I explore the possibility of a solution to this new problem by reflecting on what it means for someone to care about making things better for themselves in a way that is sensitive to the difficulties raised by personally transformative experiences.

In particular, I expand on Caspar Hare's notion of de dicto betterness. Hare has argued that there are situations in which it is appropriate for us to care about making things de dicto better for others, meaning that we care not that the occupant of a certain role is as well off as possible, but that a certain role be filled by someone who is as well off as possible. I contend that the attitude that Hare describes applies not just to the other people for whom we are responsible but also captures one crucial aspect of our responsibility towards future versions of ourselves.

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Could a Mixed Human-Artificial Group Agent be Blameworthy?

Many philosophers hold that some organized groups of human beings are agents in their own right. Such *group agents* plausibly include corporations, states, and universities. To date, the group agency literature has focused on groups composed entirely of humans. But in my view, recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) justifies thinking that many highly consequential group agents will soon be composed of *both* human and artificial agents. That is, they will be *mixed groups*. In place of a human-only Boeing, there will be a mixed Boeing. In place of a human-only British State, a mixed British State. To understand some of the most important agents in our world, we might soon need to understand mixed groups.

However, mixed groups are not of practical interest only. They raise theoretical issues ripe for philosophical treatment. The broad question is: how might differences between human and artificial agents affect group-level properties? This paper focuses on blameworthiness. On the widely-held assumption that human-only group agents are sometimes blameworthy for their actions, I argue that the presence of artificial agents could undermine the blameworthiness of mixed groups for many of *their* actions. I close with suggestions for how a mixed group might yet remain blameworthy.

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Humble Science: Collective Intellectual Humility through the Lens of SAGE and Independent SAGE's Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic

Demonstrating intellectual humility seems key to fostering trust in public-facing and public-serving scientific institutions. It is also pre-theoretically intuitive that an appropriate degree of intellectual humility (hereafter, IH) in a scientific institution—neither too much nor too little confidence—is conducive to the success of the institution's epistemic endeavours. But it is not obvious what is required for an institution to be humble.

In this paper, we explore what intellectual humility, defined as an appropriate level of confidence in one's epistemic products and processes, might look like at the collective, institutional level, if it is to support the production of knowledge by scientific institutions. We tease out what features of scientific institutions foster this kind of intellectual humility and suggest how this informs us about how intellectual humility differs at the collective level from at the individual level. In particular, we argue that though the right kind of dispositions among individual members of the institution likely matters, structural or organizational features of the group itself cannot be ignored when attributing IH at the institutional level.

We refined and developed our theory through examining a real-life case study which we introduce here for concrete illustration: the activities of two scientific advisory groups—one operating within the framework of formal scientific advice provision (SAGE), the other a public-facing alternative scientific voice (Independent SAGE)—during the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK. We show that some structural features are key to such institutions' possessing intellectual humility at the collective level by analysing how dispositions to epistemic failure resulted from the absence or insufficiency of structural features significant of intellectual humility, and how they were sometimes remedied in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We aim for our approach to be applicable to collective virtues more generally.

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The Use of Donnellan's Referential/Attributive Distinction in Political Discourse

Populist leaders often create fictional enemies to consolidate their power and neutralise opposition groups. These fictional enemies are often described as secret organisations seeking to harm the state, in short, the names of these enemies can be regarded as empty words or non-referential terms in philosophy of language. My claim is that populist leaders utilise Donnellan's distinction to create enemies. Populist leaders first presuppose the enemy by using a non-referential expression (i.e. a fictional enemy) attributively, and then select and neutralise the desired opposition group or individuals by using the same description referentially. In short, in political discourse, attributive use takes precedence over referential use.

For example, let us consider a country that is experiencing a deep economic crisis due to corruption and the wrong economic model adopted. Instead of taking responsibility, the populist leader of this country asserts that a secret organisation is behind this economic crisis; let us call this organisation the 'Philosophers' Lodge'. The use of the definite description here corresponds to what Donnellan defines as an attributive use. However, the fact that the presupposition of definite description is not fulfilled here does not make the sentence containing the expression false, because (following Stalnaker's view) the presupposition in question here is the pragmatic presupposition.

Moreover, when a definite description is used referentially, there is not only a presupposition that something or someone fits the description, there is a different presupposition: The speaker presupposes that a certain person or thing fits the description. Thus, through referential use, the populist leader can select groups or individuals who oppose him and claim that these people are members of this dangerous organization (like terrorist groups). In this way, the populist leader consolidates his power.

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On Levels of Understanding

Much has been said about various kinds of understanding and their relationship to propositional knowledge. One way proponents of non-reductionism about objectual understanding differentiated it from knowledge was by asserting that unlike knowledge, understanding is gradable. This has given rise to the concept of degrees of understanding (Baumberger 2019). In particular, this concept proposes to address the question about explanatory condition on understanding by suggesting that even explanation is not necessary for basic understanding, it comes with higher degrees of understanding.

In contrast, this paper proposes an alternative idea and introduces the concept of levels of understanding. Initially, it distinguishes two fundamental levels: practical (nonpropositional) understanding (UP) and explanatory understanding (UE). Unlike the "degree model," it argues that there are discrete changes in understanding as it progresses. Moreover, it allows that the degrees of understanding do not grow continuously, but can vary independently on different levels. For instance, S1 may have higher UP than S2, but S2 can still have a higher UE than S1. This approach accommodates the idea that explanation may not be essential for basic understanding (e.g., animal understanding) and provides a plausible anti-intellectualist outcome: one can achieve higher practical understanding without necessarily providing

better explanations, and better explanatory powers do not necessarily translate in better practical understanding.

To develop this framework, I draw from different versions of Sosa's stratified virtue epistemology (Sosa 2007; 2009; 2021). Next, I present a functionalist argument for the distinctiveness of levels of understanding by connecting them to different practical goals. UP is associated with practical, first-grade goals, while UE is linked to second-grade, formative goals (becoming a better agent). Finally, I explore the possibility of distinguishing further intermediate levels of understanding, such as conscious and reflective understanding.

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Agent-Regret as a Non-Moral Emotion

When one is causally but not morally responsible for one's actions, she can feel "agent-regret". Existent accounts characterize agent-regret as a moral emotion that reflects our expanded agency. They assume that not feeling a moral emotion reflects bad on the agent, and by feeling this moral emotion, the agent expands her agency. However, this approach is flawed because it mistakenly puts the focus on the agent and thus risks self-regardingness. Although we are agents, this does not imply that we are exercising our agency all the time. Besides, by introducing the involuntary aspect of our actions into the concept of agency, what we use the term to explain will be seriously diluted, such as distinguishing actions from mere behaviors or characterizing human agents in contrast with non-human beings. My alternative notes a false dichotomy assumed by commentators. They assume that if in such cases one does not feel a moral emotion, then they must be indifferent, which is a deficiency. However, there are in-between non-moral emotions that people can feel. Although non-moral emotions are not typically those that reflect moral responsibility, they are also obviously different from indifference, because they are expressions of care or valuing. In our context, the driver can feel sorrow, grief, regret, pity, empathy, etc., because he cares about the child's death. But he does not need to feel any moral emotion to show care. Agent-regret is still different from spectator-regret because they involve different psychological distances. Different psychological distances can explain our making different judgments and motivations in taking different actions. In our cases, because the agent plays a causal role and the spectator is not causally involved, agent-regret and spectator-regret are different. Rather than postulating agent-regret as a different kind of regret, it is special because of the degree in intensity.

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A New Defense for Pragatism About Reasons For Belief

A powerful argument against pragmatism about reasons for belief is that the only effective considerations in the deliberative process of belief formation are evidential: the only way to be convinced of the truth of a proposition, e.g. that God exists, is by acknowledging enough evidence in favour of its being true, even in the face of infinite practical gain from belief; practical motivations are simply irrelevant to a process of belief formation through deliberative reasoning. This phenomenon has been referred to as "transparency", a psychological feature of belief that makes it so that the deliberative questions about "whether to believe that p" must give way to the question "whether p is true". Nishi Shah (2005) undertakes an influential defense of evidentialism about reasons for belief by invoking the feature of transparency and positing what he calls the "deliberative constraint on reasons", a normative principle based on which only premises in reasoning aimed at issuing a belief that can dispose someone to believe the proposition in question, as the best explanation for transparency. My position rests on the rejection of transparency, not on the basis that Shah anticipates the staunch pragmatist with no other option would adopt, namely the contingent nature of human psychology that could conceptually allow for some, non-evidential intentional reasons for belief. I would have to reject it as a phenomenon that accurately describes the process of belief formation at all, even if it were true that the only reasons for belief could be related to evidence, for two reasons. Firstly, the reason why I came to believe that p cannot be that I became convinced of the truth of p, simply because the reason for a given state must be something different than that very same state, and the sentences "I believe that "p"" and "I am convinced of the truth of "p"", taking into account disquotationalism about belief, describe the selfsame state. The second reason is related to what

Anscombe (1979) cites as the non-reflexive nature of belief in testimony: To believe N one must believe that N himself believes what he is saying. My defense of pragmatism culminates in a dispositionalist account of pragmatic reasons for belief, whereby, even if evidence is to be considered sufficient and necessary for the formation of a belief, practical considerations can dispose a person to recognise a given set of evidence as sufficient or not for belief, directly influencing the deliberative process of belief formation.

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Sense Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle: A relation of proportions

In this paper I examine the twofold character of imagination as capacity to produce images which is involved both in sense perception and deliberation. More precisely, I examine imagination, on the one hand, in relation to sense perception as efficient cause of the former, on the other, in relation to desire as disposition of the sense perception and as efficient cause of the action toward an end identified as pleasant or good.

In the De Anima II.11, 424a2-7, Aristotle describes sense perception as 'a kind of mean between the opposites' that constitute the object of sense. He ascribes to sense perception the function of discerning sense objects and judging about their qualities in relation to the sense impressions that they produce. Sense perception is understood as mean between opposite affections, that is, as ratio of opposites that implies a normative standard which enables to compare them and determine their difference as more or less excessive.

In III.7, 431a8-12, Aristotle compares sense perception to asserting or thinking for pursuing or avoiding is like affirming or negating. The analogy between sense perception and discursive thought highlights the value judgement entailed by sense perception as mean and leading to the identification of the object, which is the final cause of the action, as good or bad. Imagination brings about the appearance of the end in relation to the present affection and thus gives a direction to the desire. This appearance arises from the comparison between possible ends according to a certain point of view that entails a common scale of valuation by means of which a particular end is identified as superior. The appearance of the end 'as such' reflects the criterion of choice and entails the deliberative activity of imagination.

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Nietzsche on Mastery of Nature

This paper examines Nietzsche's attitude toward human mastery of nature, in dialogue with modern environmental ethics. Nietzsche suggests that moralized dominion over animals reflects hostility to our own animality, echoing his diagnosis of moralized mastery of natural drives as repressed cruelty. Human dominion can thus reflect fear of 'evil' nature. However, I argue, environmentalist critiques may embody the same fear, expressed in higher-order aversion to human mastery as 'evil' exploitation—whereas Nietzsche sees exploitation as biologically ubiquitous and unobjectionable. I conclude that Nietzsche's stance is unconventional: mastery should be neither idealized nor stigmatized, but rather naturalized. Still, Nietzsche distinguishes between pathological and healthy forms of self-mastery, and I argue that parallel distinctions apply to outwardly-directed mastery. This Nietzschean framework undermines traditional projects of human dominion, but also challenges contemporary ideals of environmental nondomination.

The structure of the paper is as follows: First, I examine Nietzsche's views regarding self-mastery or inward dominion over nature, identifying distinct forms of self-control that he judges differently: some as pathological self-denial or repression, but others as expressions of vitality or strength. I then show how similar distinctions also apply to outward dominion or mastery of external nature. Environmental exploitation can be a healthy integration and Apollinian idealization of nature, or alternatively pathological repression and rationalization. Finally, I briefly situate my analysis in relation to prior work on Nietzsche and environmental ethics, before highlighting several important limitations of a Nietzschean approach.

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An intrinsic characterisation of fiction

It was D. Matravers (2014) who made explicit a consensus claim in the literature on fiction: that fiction cannot be characterised in terms of its intrinsic properties, but only in terms of its functional properties, i.e. the kinds of actions it induces. In contrast to this consensus claim, I propose an intrinsic characterisation of fiction, according to which a work is fiction if and only if any commitment to its representational role is socially suspended and the work is offered for interpretation. The aim of this work is to show that my characterisation does not suffer from the limitations that have been denounced for every intrinsic characterisation of fiction proposed so far. So far, intrinsic characterisations have been concerned either with the structural aspects of fiction (for linguistic fictions, these are the syntactic properties) or with the aspects that enable fiction to represent (for linguistic fictions, these are the semantic properties). My aim is to question the way in which the above characterisations have been proposed in terms of representation (or semantic properties). Following D. Davies (2022), it can be said that either fiction has been thought to represent only the world of fiction, or fiction has been thought to represent our world and to be false. The above characterisations assume that the tools used in fiction retain a representational role already performed outside fiction, but it has been argued that the way in which this representational role is accounted for is inadequate. I propose instead that the tools used in fiction have a representational role outside fiction, but that this role is suspended within fiction, leaving room for these tools to be interpreted as either representational or non-representational by the users of fiction.

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The Dynamic Interplay of Virtual and Actual in Williams' Process Signs

James Williams (2016) challenges conventional understandings of signs, arguing that they are not static markers but rather dynamic, ever-evolving processes shaped by context, valuation, and the interplay of various factors. He posits that signs are inherently political, causing debate and effecting change. Consider, for example, the debates surrounding gender-neutral pronouns like 'they/them'. The increasing visibility of these pronouns challenges established grammatical conventions and prompts crucial conversations about gender identity and social inclusion. This linguistic shift is a political event, illustrating Williams' point about the inherent political nature of signs.

This impact is tracked through what Williams terms the 'diagram', a sketch accompanying the sign, mapping the specific changes it effects. While Williams does not explicitly label the diagram as 'virtual', it aligns with Deleuze's concept of the virtual: a realm of full reality distinct from the actual. This virtual sphere is a dynamic field of relations, constantly being re-evaluated, leading to shifts in its patterns that may reconfigure social conventions. The ongoing negotiation and redefinition of 'they/them' as a singular pronoun powerfully illustrates this dynamic, showcasing how meanings evolve and social conventions are reshaped.

This process is not linear. Actual changes (e.g., more inclusive language use in company documents) feed back into this virtual space, further shaping the ongoing debates and influencing future actions. The virtual and the actual are locked in a continuous, dynamic feedback loop, each informing and shaping the other.

By illuminating this dynamic interplay, this research offers valuable insights into the transformative power of signs contributing to a richer understanding of Williams' theory.

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Testimonial Distortion and Perspectival Clash

Often, we attempt to communicate not only information but also our perspective. We do this by various means, deploying framing mechanisms such as metaphor and narrative. In doing so, we structure the information we communicate. In some cases, the hearer may (inadvertently) restructure this information,

for example, by interpreting the narration of a traumatic experience as a humorous anecdote. This paper develops an account of how one may be wronged by this kind of misinterpretation.

I take as my central case study exchanges between disabled legal scholar Harriet McBryde Johnson and ethicist Peter Singer on the nature of disability. I argue that Johnson attempted to challenge Singer's view of disability as tragic, instead framing it as a form of diversity, but was misinterpreted due to perspectival clash. Singer was unable to interpret what Johnson attempted to communicate because doing so would require inhabiting a perspective that clashed with the dominant framing of disability.

I propose that this is a form of imaginative resistance: when certain perspectives are deeply entrenched, agents can find themselves unable to inhabit clashing perspectives. This results in attempts to challenge dominant perspectives being distorted because the communicated perspective is inaccessible to the hearer. Moreover, this can result in the contents of this perspectival testimony being distorted in ways that reconcile its contents with the entrenched perspective.

In cases where the testifier was attempting to reject the dominant perspective, like Johnson, this can result in 'hermeneutical backfire', wherein their testimony is (mis)interpreted as exemplifying the perspective they attempted to reject. Singer's obituary for Johnson in the New York Times, titled 'Happy Nevertheless', exemplifies this. My paper thus presents an account of an overlooked communicative injustice, which, I suggest, is especially likely to occur when individuals attempt to critique dominant interpretive resources which misrepresent their experiences.

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Three Neo-Rasa Theorists on Aesthetic Emotion

What are aesthetic emotions, and why do they matter to us? Aesthetic emotions have been the subject of renewed philosophical attention following a period of neglect (e.g. Robinson 2020; Fingerhut and Prinz 2018; 2020; Menninghaus et al. 2019), but the most useful conceptual resources for analyzing aesthetic emotions may come from South Asian aesthetics, particularly rasa (aesthetic emotion) theory. Mysore Hiriyanna(1871-1950), A. K. Coomaraswamy (1877-1947), and K. C. Bhattacharyya (1875-1949), three South Asian philosophers writing in the Independence-Era, developed a neglected view of aesthetic emotion with contemporary relevance.

"Disinterestedness" has played the largest role in analyzing aesthetic emotions, but it is a notoriously troubled concept. These philosophers interpreted the Classical Sanskrit rasa theory in a way that incorporated and revised, standard accounts of aesthetic emotion as disinterested pleasure then dominant in Europe. Neo-Rasa philosophers recast the disinterest of aesthetic emotions in positive terms: as involving a special form of fellow-feeling that can be analyzed as "expansive empathy."

To reconstruct a Neo-Rasa account of aesthetic emotion, this paper takes up three charges against the traditional concept of disinterested pleasure and argues that Neo-Rasa accounts evades them. The first challenge, which Robinson has recently flagged as the "paradox of aesthetic emotion"(2020, 208), is about an apparent incompatibility between disinterest and emotion. The second charge is that disinterested or distanced "aesthetic attitudes" appear to reduce to mere focused attention (Dickie 1964). The third challenge is about value: "disinterested pleasure" falls short of accounting for "beauty's apparent profundity" (Riggle 2016, 6).

Appealing to positive expansive empathy rather than negative disinterest solves these challenges, and establishes that Neo-Rasa emotions are emotional, that they are aesthetic, and that they are valuable—it also establishes that they improve on standard "disinterest" accounts.

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Levers, not rules: On freedom and social norms

Social norms are often assumed to be freedom restricting, or even oppressive. They are widely regarded as the social equivalent of laws: rules that we have to follow, or else risk social sanctions. As J. S. Mill

observes, such social pressure can be a greater threat to liberty than a law. Hence, a society with a greater number of norms appears to be one less free, or more oppressive, than a society with fewer.

This paper offers two arguments against this popular picture of norms and freedom.

First, I argue that having more norms enables a greater range and nuance in our expressive possibilities, just as a more sophisticated grammar permits greater subtlety in speech. Social norms often imbue acts with shared meanings, say, as rude, respectful, fair, or unfair. Using the example of handshakes, I argue that, as a result, having more norms doesn't simply limit freedom by restricting our option set, in making one of two options costly. Rather, social norms often expand the range of available, socially meaningful options, like shaking hands too firmly, for too long, eagerly, or with reluctance.

Second, the relevant norms, how weighty they seem, and the meaning and consequence of deviating, varies across settings. Some are far better than others at picking up on such details. All else equal, the person with a greater social knack can better shape important and interaction-shaping features of encounters. For instance, it will be easier for her to shape how she is seen by others, and easier for her to guide an interaction successfully, in tone, manner, and even outcome. I suggest that social norms are thus sometimes better understood as providing a set of levers to pull, rather than as simply rules that restrict.

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Victorian Concepts of Time and Sexism

It's difficult to imagine how a metaphysic of time can be sexist. Yet I'll be arguing that the "default" Victorian concept about of time was just that: the concept didn't just concern the nature of reality; it was also deeply political, with sexist (and racist) undertones. As the Mad Hatter of Wonderland tells Alice, 'Time' is male. Further, around the turn of the twentieth century, I argue that one reason Henri Bergson's alternative philosophy of time proved so attractive to women is that it upended the particularly problematic elements of Victorian time - rendering it anti-patriarchal. I'll make this case through the work of two early twentieth century philosophers of time: London-based British idealist Hilda Oakeley (1867-1950); and Cambridge-based Bergsonian Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1889-1953). As we'll see, both thinkers took up precisely the elements of Bergsonian time that were compatible with their feminist politics.

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Assessing Normative Neutrality

Work in normativity distinguishes between first-order normative theory, such as ethical theories (act consequentialism, Rossian pluralism), and structural normative theory, such as "X-first" theories (the buck passing account of value, ought-first theory). Discussion in these two domains often proceed independently, based on the assumption that their explanatory aims differ. This paper examines the validity of that assumption, focusing on a principle of neutrality: Neutrality If a structural normative theory entails the falsity of a plausible first-order theory, we have reason to reject it. Neutrality implies that structural theories should not invalidate plausible first-order theories. However, I argue that this principle is problematic. Neutrality assumes a clear distinction between normative explanation (why something has a property) and metaphysical analysis (what that property is). This distinction is challenging to maintain because normative ethical claims (e.g., "Necessarily: X is wrong if, and only if, Y") often resemble necessary truths in other domains (e.g., "Necessarily: gold is the element with atomic number 79") for which the distinction breaks down. If this observation is correct, it is hard to see what difference there could be between an explanation of what an ethical property is, and what explains why something has that property. I consider a reply to this argument, that the analogy between these necessary truths is inapt because it assumes a particular view about metaphysical analysis, namely constitutive explanation. The chief alternatives to this sort of explanation are (i) identity, (ii) multiple realisability, and (iii) plural grounding. I argue that the only reasonable alternative candidate to constitutive explanation is plural grounding, but that adopting this stance faces serious challenges.

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Dynamic Desire: Explaining Our Privileged Access to Dispositional States

This paper proposes a novel defence of the view that we have privileged access to some of our desires. This argument is made in light of a puzzle consisting of three inconsistent propositions:

(1) All desires are dispositional states

(2) We have privileged access to at least some of our desires

(3) We do not have privileged access to any dispositional state (Peterson 2019, p.3655)

(3) must be rejected. The motivation for **(3)** comes from the intuitive view that the only things that are within the scope of privileged access are occurrent states (Gertler, 2011). But this is odd, given that we seem to be in an epistemically privileged position in regards to our own desires in much the same way we are with our own sensations like pain.

The argument goes, although we can have privileged access to the *internal manifestations* of our desires, this isn't the same as having privileged access to the dispositional desires *themselves*. There is assumed to be a metaphysical and, by extension, an epistemological gap between the manifestations and dispositions. I show that this assumption is misguided.

Dispositions do not merely *cause* their manifestations but are themselves *instantiated* in the manifestation process. Given this, having privileged access to the manifestation of a desire amounts to having privileged access to the desire itself. In this sense, desires are dynamic—desires aren't just things we have, desiring is something that we do and something we feel. This lack of a metaphysical gap explains why there isn't an epistemological gap.

If successful this account can also be applied to other dispositional mental states like beliefs and emotions.

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The Citizenry as a Responsible Agent: Collective Blame and Forward-Looking Duties

Should the citizenry be blamed for its state's actions? This question has generally been set aside in recent discussions of citizen responsibility, which focus instead on citizens' obligations to address the wrongs resulting from the state actions (exceptions include Zakaras, 2014, and Stilz, 2023). I believe, though, that it is crucial not to neglect these responsibilities, as they play a key role in fostering a sense of accountability in the citizenry for its role in its state's wrongdoings rather than allowing it to see itself as a passive entity with no influence on the state's decisions. Some philosophers, however, question this very point, arguing that citizens' contributions are too minuscule to hold them morally responsible (see, for example, Lawford-Smith 2019 and Pasternak 2021). My approach, which focuses on the citizenry as a collective agent rather than individual citizens, helps to overcome this concern. In this framework, the citizenry's responsibilities are tied to its collective capacity to authorise and influence the state's decisions. Furthermore, the citizenry's blame responsibility, on my account, is non-distributively collective, meaning it does not necessarily extend to individual members. I see this as an asset: it is often complex and context-dependent which citizens deserve blame, and even when it can be determined, attributing it may be counterproductive. Nonetheless, the citizenry's blameworthiness could give rise to emotional duties, such as a duty to be ashamed of the election of a particular administration, which are duties that individual members must acknowledge and encourage others to recognise as well. It could also generate forward-looking duties, such as the responsibility to engage in corrective action, or to support measures that prevent future wrongdoings. Fulfilling these duties would similarly require the active contributions of individual citizens.

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The New Age of Enumerative Induction

Enumerative induction in mathematics—the idea that sampling evidence can yield high credence or even knowledge of mathematical statements—was long dismissed (Frege 1884, section 10). However, it has recently regained prominence (Waxman 2017; Paseau 2021; Paseau 2023; Franklin 2021; Walsh 2014). The central thesis of my paper is that, in some cases, enumerative induction can indeed yield strong justification for believing mathematical conjectures.

I first clarify which epistemic good is at stake. To motivate my proposal, I then critically discuss three recent arguments defending the viability of enumerative induction. First, I consider Echeverría's (1996) appeal to mathematical practice. I argue that it is question-begging to use naturalism to justify enumerative induction.

Instead, both Paseau (1996) and Baker (2024) argue for enumerative induction by appealing to an analogy with the natural sciences: enumerative induction in the empirical sciences yields epistemic goods, and the setup in mathematics is no worse. However, I call this weak enumerative induction due to its susceptibility to Humean scepticism.

To move beyond this limitation, I propose four factors that, if they are all in place, allow for enumerative induction not to rely on an analogy to the empirical sciences:

(i) we have confirmed that the conjecture holds for $1, \ldots, n$,

(ii) we have a model of P(N) that predicts that $\prod_1^{\wedge}\infty$ P(n+1) $\in$ P(N) ≈ 1,

(iii) we have the strong justification to believe the predictions of the model and

(iv) crucially, this strong justification is not essentially reliant on an appeal to weak induction.

A detailed case study of Goldbach's Conjecture illustrates how two models (Cramér's and Hardy–Littlewood's) can satisfy conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv).

Thus, enumerative induction offers a robust epistemic tool that, if the right conditions are met, can surmount inductive scepticism when enhanced by these hybrid methods.

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Intuitive Contradictions: Hume on the Possibility of Thought with Negative Contents

In Hume's philosophy, the notion of intuition carries a heavy load of argumentative weight but has been largely underdiscussed. According to Hume: a) Non-intuitive propositions open up space to discuss how 'matters of fact' should look (T 1.3.3.1-4,8; T 1.3.6.7; L 7). b) They motivate investigations into the nature of liberty and moral sentiments (T 2.3.2.2). c) Intuitive relations, in general, should bring about certainty and absolute necessity (T 1.3.7.3; E 4.1). d) Intuition can serve, arguably, as a medium for demonstrations (T 1.3.7.3). They are, as Hume suggests, exemplified by: e) comparative relations of resemblance (T 1.3.1.2), f) varying degrees in qualities (ibid), and finally, g) what he terms as relations of contrariety (T 1.3.3.1).

The last assumption motivates an intuition-based account of contradiction, which pushes Hume's readers into challenging territory: If contradictions require a negative content for thought, how can an intuitive account of contradiction square with Hume's conceivability principle (T 1.2.2.8)? Or, how can it align with his copy principle (T 1.3.1.7; E 7.4), let alone his refutation of abstract thought (T 1.1.7)?

This paper aims to flesh out a Humean account of contradiction, especially based on the last assumption above (g), where intuitions and contradictions become deeply intertwined. Addressing such difficulties within a Humean framework, the paper proposes a twofold reading of intuition in Hume's texts, according to which Hume's thought and talk of intuition cannot have a univocal meaning. Hume's own text suggests that we can distinguish a sense-based intuition as well as a rational kind of intuition. The latter, at first glance, strikes one as anti-Humean. Nevertheless, as the paper argues, it not only can consistently bring together Hume's possible account of contradiction, negative thoughts construed abstractly, the missing shade of blue, and arithmetic, but also addresses those challenging questions regarding Hume's overall empiricist orientation.

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On the Metaphysical Status of Minimum Principles

This paper investigates the metaphysical status of the Principle of Least Action (PLA), which states that a dynamical system extremises a quantity called action when moving between two points. Historical discussions of minimum principles trace back to Aristotle's De Caelo, where the spherical shape of the heavens is explained by its representing the shortest path. This intuition evolved through Hero of Alexandria's principle of least distance and Fermat's refinements, culminating in Maupertuis' formulation of the PLA. Today, the PLA is a cornerstone of theoretical physics, underpinning theories from classical mechanics to quantum field theory and string theory. Modern debates have focused on the metaphysical status of the PLA, with most approaches roughly ascribing to it an elevated status (Ellis (2005), Katzav (2004), Thebault and Smart (2015), Glick (2023), and Terekhovich (2017). In this paper, I focus primarily on Glick (2023), who argues that the PLA's wide applicability renders it a constraint in Lange's (2016) sense—implying that all physical laws must necessarily adhere to it. In contrast, I argue that the PLA's universality stems from the fact that our fundamental equations are second order—a necessity imposed by avoiding the Ostrogradski instability (a problem in non-degenerate higher-order Lagrangian theories) (Swanson 2022). I argue that the Lagrangian character of our theories is a deep structural feature that guarantees stability, with the action formulation (and hence the PLA) emerging naturally as a consequence. Consequently, while the PLA is indispensable for deriving equations of motion, it should be regarded as a methodological byproduct rather than as a fundamental constraint. This analysis suggests that attributing elevated metaphysical significance to the PLA is unwarranted; its pervasiveness is better understood in terms of the mathematical structure of our physical laws.

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Feminist Witches? Beauvoir on Women, Magic, and Otherness

In recent years, the figure of the witch has become a mainstream symbol of feminist liberation. The historical, early modern 'witch' has been reclaimed as a role model of independence and power. At the same time spells, tarot cards, and astrology have become popular forms of personal and political empowerment. But there are several reasons to be sceptical of this feminist embrace of witches and witchcraft. According to historians, the European witch-hunts actually targeted ordinary and unremarkable people, not rebellious or unconventional proto-feminists. Practices like astrology also set aside questions about effectiveness and reality. At the end of the day, 'feminist witchcraft' seems relatively free-floating from facts and fundamentally animated by what we might call the myth of the magic, powerful woman. Drawing on Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, I argue that this myth is a dangerous one for feminists to embrace.

For Beauvoir, "an action is magic when it emanates from a passivity instead of being produced by an agent." Considering women as naturally magical means associating them with the passivity of an "object charged with fluids." Woman is magic because she is the "Other", a projection of men's fears and desires, rather than another human agent. Beauvoir also explains women's interest in magical practices as a symptom of the atrophied subjectivity they develop under male domination.

But if magical thinking is so oppressive, why do feminist women today cling to witchcraft so strongly? Beauvoir suggests that thinking of ourselves as having magical powers gives us a sense of being secretly special, of being justified in our existence by a hidden character. Thinking of themselves as 'natural witches' allows women to adopt an attitude of "bad faith." Therefore, more than a rhetorical mistake, feminist witchcraft may be a symptom of this understandable but criticizable inauthentic attitude.

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Epistemic Reparations and Disability

Lackey argues for epistemic reparations deserved by those harmed by injustices and violations, due to the ways in which injustice and violation include epistemic harm. Here, I apply Lackey's (2022) concept of epistemic reparations to the case of disability injustice. I do not just identify a gap wherein epistemic reparations can be applied to a new context; additionally, through considering the prospects for this application, I argue that its success requires a re-assessment of assumptions underlying some existing social epistemological theorising, via increased attention to disability in this sub-field.

This novel exploration makes three contributions. First, that given widespread historical and contemporary injustice and violations incurred by disabled people—material and epistemic—theoretical resources such as Lackey's, which aim to account for and ameliorate injustice, should have significant value for the pursuit of disability justice. I outline three examples of conceptual and inferential mishandling of disability which harmfully distort the identities of disabled people, functioning epistemically to uphold oppression. I argue that these are epistemic harms of the type that Lackey's concept serves to ameliorate.

Second, as disability intersects with other populations, taking disability into consideration herein serves the wider context of epistemic reparations.

Third, despite the potential value of epistemic reparations for disability justice, I submit that this application will be forestalled without acknowledging and moving to address the neglect of disability—particularly intellectual disability—in social epistemological theorising. This neglect incurs the cost of some existing justice-aimed accounts in the domain being unable to account for the ways in which some disabled people—those with intellectual disability or incorrectly identified as such—can be epistemically harmed.

Through applying Lackey's own epistemological framework for epistemic reparations, I demonstrate that ameliorating this neglect is epistemically reparative work in itself, as well as being required to realise the value of Lackey's epistemic reparations for disability injustice.

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Addressing the Replication Crisis in Psychology: On the Importance of Base Rates

Experiments in psychology fail to replicate too often. In various branches of psychology published experimental results are overturned by later studies trying to replicate them. This paper discusses two prominent accounts explaining and responding to the replication crisis in psychological science: An objectivist frequentist account and a subjectivist Bayesian account. Common to these accounts is their emphasis on the importance of base rates in understanding and remedying the crisis. Our aim is to charge a middle way between an objectivist frequentist conception and a subjectivist Bayesian conception of the base rate problem of true hypotheses. On the one hand, the frequentist conception ends up with requirements that current experimental psychology will be unable to satisfy. On the other hand, the subjectivist Bayesian conception ends up providing estimates of the base rate that no longer track the real base rate of true hypotheses in the fields of experimental psychology. In this paper, we provide a road map of the frequentist and Bayesian proposals and argue that both of them lead to an apparent impasse. We then propose a way out of this dilemma. The basic idea is that both strong formal theorizing (in the form of mathematizable computational theories) and rigorous experimental practice matter.

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Inquiry and the Coordination Problem

According to an increasing number of philosophers, we can morally wrong others through our beliefs about them. This is called "doxastic wronging" (Basu & Schroeder 2019; Marušić & White 2018; Quanbeck 2023). At the same time, these beliefs sometimes seem evidentially well supported, and thus epistemically justified. This gives rise to the so-called "coordination problem", which arises from conflicts between moral and epistemic norms governing our doxastic attitudes (Basu & Schroeder 2019; Hirvelä 2023; Traldi 2023).

In this paper, I take the coordination problem seriously and assess extant approaches to (dis)solving it. As I argue, the most promising way to do so is to locate the relevant moral wrongings not at the level of the doxastic but at the level of the zetetic.

A common route to dissolve the coordination problem is by adopting the view called "Moral Encroachment". According to Moral Encroachers, moral considerations can bear on epistemic justification, so there is no coordination problem since most morally objectionable beliefs turn out to be epistemically unjustified, too. An important objection against this view is that we cannot form or refrain from forming beliefs in light of moral considerations, given the largely involuntary nature of belief formation.

A more promising way, as I argue, is locating the relevant moral wrongings not at the level of the doxastic but at the level of the zetetic, that is, at the level of acts of inquiry. "Zetetic wronging" occurs when moral wrongs are committed through acts of inquiry, such as asking questions or gathering certain evidence (Atkins fc; Friedman fc; Saint-Croix 2022). Unlike belief, acts of inquiry are under our voluntary control, allowing moral considerations to guide these acts. This opens a path for Moral Encroachment in the zetetic domain, and thereby dissolving the coordination problem.

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Heidegger's realism and his appropriation of Kant

Heidegger's early phenomenology centres on an idea which can be summarised as follows: intending entities presupposes an understanding of the being of the respective entities. Accordingly, entities are only accessible within an understanding of their ontological features, which differ across different kinds of entities. Heidegger thereby commits to a version of Kant's transcendental turn, since he replaces a first-order ontological investigation with an inquiry into the subjective conditions that make entities accessible. In my paper, I argue that – contrary to a widely held claim – this does not make Heidegger an idealist, insofar as idealism is understood as the claim that we are closed off from 'reality' in a proper sense, or from entities as they are 'in themselves'. This is because Heidegger's version of transcendental philosophy also assigns a central normative role to entities, advancing the additional claim that our understanding of being must be apt to the entities it enables us to encounter. I proceed in three steps. In the first part, I introduce key terms and ideas. In the second part, I discuss and criticise the popular 'transcendental idealist' interpretation of Heidegger, which entails that the ontological features of entities derive from the human standpoint. I argue that – due to Heidegger's commitment to both an ontological pluralism and what I call 'ontological freedom' – this reading makes his position collapse into a relativism about entities. This calls for a more favourable interpretation. In the third part, I focus on a central idea this account neglects: the ontological normativity of entities. Centrally, for Heidegger, our understanding of being is no mere imposition on entities but reciprocally constrained by the entities it enables us to intend. Since Heidegger thereby transforms the Kantian transcendental by tying it back to what it conditions – suggesting a co-dependency between the transcendental and the empirical – I cash this out as a realism.

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Playing Politics: On the Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy in Virtual Game Worlds

We tend to assume that the virtual worlds of the games we play generally reflect certain understandings of contemporary or real-world political structures, and it is plausible to assume that certain games can teach their players something about democracy or foster democratic behaviour. The broader idea behind such claims is that we can learn from fiction, whether in books, films, or interactive games. The representation of democracy in games, understood this way, would have a pedagogical and therefore instrumental value.

Does democracy in virtual game worlds have value beyond this instrumental role? Particularly in complex multiplayer online games (e.g., EVE Online or World of Warcraft), we can find instances of democratic coordination of in-game activities by groups of players. These are not part of the game mechanics by

design; players could organise themselves in alternative ways. Thus, their value appears not to be purely instrumental in the way assumed for other types of fiction.

It might be tempting to claim that such instances of in-game democracy are intrinsically valuable. Yet discussions of intrinsic value often serve as convenient escape hatches for philosophers seeking to avoid further debates about value. In many cases, it remains unclear what exactly is meant by 'intrinsic' and whether an equally convincing account of the value of some phenomenon could be provided in instrumental terms. The same is likely true for democracy.

Rather than relying on the notion of 'intrinsic' value, I propose using a distinction of value types developed by Christine Korsgaard and Rae Langton, and recently refined by Elena Ziliotti. My suggestion is that democracy in multiplayer virtual game worlds is not intrinsically but nonetheless non-instrumentally valuable. In-game instantiations of democratic structures can be understood as having symbolic value as well as contributory value, enriching democratic political culture in ways other forms of fiction and media cannot.

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LLMs vs HLF

Much recent work has argued that there may be good reason to believe that Large Language Models have acquired linguistic capacities akin to those of humans. Milliere (forthcoming) discusses the claim that LLMs have identified and internalized the syntactic rules of human language, and Grindrod (2024) and Pepp (2025) discuss the case for LLMs having acquired the semantic capacity to use words to refer to extra-linguistic entities. I argue that such claims rely on an implausible picture of human linguistic capacities. As is widely accepted in linguistic theory, human languages are tightly integrated systems. The coarse division between syntax, semantics, morphology, and phonology obscures significant degrees of inter-relation, interaction, and inter-definition. This integration suggests that exemplifying one component/module of human language requires exemplifying them all. As it is known that LLMs differ in some of these systems (most obviously, they lack phonology entirely), this should make us skeptical that they will display the same capacities in areas like syntax and semantics. I will discuss a couple of indicative case studies. One will turn on the deep differences between the basic units of LLM linguistic processing, tokens, and those of human language, morphemes. Tokens are individuated by their superficial properties: they are strings drawn from an alphabet. Morphemes, on the other hand, can "surface" with a wide range of superficial properties. These different individuation criteria lead to cross-cutting classificatory schemes, undermining our ability to map the operations of one system onto another. The other will look at work on the syntax-semantics interface, suggesting that characteristic semantic capacities are, in human language, characterized by specific syntactic structures. If this claim is plausible, this makes the claim that LLMS can refer to things in the way we can highly implausible, as there is no evidence of these structures in LLMs.

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Mitigated Standing to Blame

Peter hypocritically blames Lisa, his wife, for having an affair; he himself has had an affair and is unapologetic about it. Intuitively, Peter lacks the right–i.e. standing–to blame Lisa.

Recently various accounts have been offered that explain why agents like Peter lack standing; e.g., he implicitly rejects the moral equality of persons, or is insufficiently committed to the relevant norm. We develop a framework for understanding how standing can be *mitigated* without being lost altogether, and which can be adopted by these different accounts.

Consider Steff, who blames herself for having an affair, but blames her wife Donna more harshly for having an affair. Steff's blaming Donna is also somewhat hypocritical. Yet, though Steff lacks standing to

blame Donna *as harshly as she does*, she plausibly retains the standing to blame Donna to some degree– perhaps as much as she blames herself.

Not only can our framework help to distinguish between hypocritical blamers like Peter and Steff, it also helps resolve some persistent puzzles in the literature. Consider, for example, *hyper*critical blamers, who blame themselves more than others for similar violations. Intuitively, hypercritical blamers retain standing to blame others, yet standard accounts suggest otherwise. On our framework, the hypercrite retains standing to blame others as he does; at most, he loses standing to blame *himself* as severely as he does.

Finally, our framework eases some skeptical worries. Some argue that standardly proposed conditions on standing are rarely met; we all blame inconsistently to some degree, which suggests insufficient commitment to some norm or failure to respect moral equality. If so, virtually no one has standing to blame for various norms. Yet once one takes degrees of standing into account, the force of this argument is considerably blunted. Standing may often be mitigated without being eliminated.

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Anscombe on Causality

My paper explores the importance of the category of 'process' for an understanding of causality in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe. In particular, I want to draw out the deep connections between the causal pluralism she defends in 'Causality and Determination' (1971) and her claims about the structure of intentional action in her monograph 'Intention' (1958). There are large bodies of scholarship on both of these pieces separately, but very little which focuses on the connections between the two. I will argue that tracing the connections illuminates both her work on causality and her work on action. My starting point will be Anscombe's discussion of what she calls 'special causal concepts', such as those expressed by the verbs 'scrape', 'push', 'wet', 'carry', 'eat', 'burn'. I will argue that when used in reports of observations of causality, they are most basically used in predications where the verbs have a progressive aspect (which reveals their processual nature). Here I build on work by Dorothy Emmet and more recent work by Jennifer Hornsby, Helen Steward, Michael Thompson and Amanda White, all of whom have emphasized the importance of the category of 'process' for an understanding of agency. I will argue that this category is necessary for an understanding of Anscombe on causality much more generally, well beyond 'philosophy of action'. If this is right, I will argue, we should see Anscombe's work on causality as embodying a theoretical perspective from which the concept 'cause' belongs essentially to, and has meaning only in the context of, beings who experience things in time. Her theorizing about causality is, as such, radically different from mainstream views, which begin from an alienated, timeless, quasi-scientific perspective.

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Sexual Prejudice

Do we have a right to sex? Is X wronging Y by declining to have sex with Y? Most of us accept some version of what I call the *Standard View*, on which there can be no claim right to sex. Since claim rights generate corresponding duties, and since no one is under a duty to have sex with anyone else, it follows that no one has a claim right to sex. X lacks a duty to have sex with Y, and thus Y lacks any right to sex.

We could simply leave it there. But increasingly many philosophers think there is a problem. This is due to the likelihood that the construction of our sexual preferences involves various types of prejudice. These attitudes also seem morally evaluable: we can be morally criticized for attitudes to others embodying racism, misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, fat-phobia, etc. Call this the *Appraisal View*. If the explanation of why X refuses to entertain Y as a sexual partner consists in X's prejudiced attitude to Y, then the Appraisal View suggests that X is open to criticism for refusing to have sex with Y.

The Standard View appears to protect X against moral criticism, while the Appraisal View appears to expose X to moral criticism. So is there a tension between the Standard View and the Appraisal View? It seems so!

I will review a number of strategies for reconciling these two views – the 'Shortlisting Strategy', the 'Grounds of Exclusion Strategy', and the 'Right To Do Wrong Strategy' – and argue that they are unconvincing. I will argue that, in the sexual domain, attitudes which would normally be condemnable as prejudicial can be cleansed of this status. When it comes to sex, (what would seem to be) *prejudices* are (to be treated as) *mere preferences*.

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The Pragmatics and the Normativity of Ignorance Attributions

The way we attribute ignorance to each other is often connected to normative considerations. Intuitively, assertions such as 'S is ignorant that p' sound odd when S is under no zetetic obligation to know that p. According to the increasingly popular Normative Account of ignorance (Pritchard 2021 a, b; Meylan 2020, 2024) these linguistic intuitions pick up on an essential property of ignorance: ignorance is lack of knowledge or true belief which manifests a failure of inquiry. Here, I will offer a different, less committal explanation, which is compatible with the non-normative views of the nature of ignorance. Drawing on the communicative functions of attributions of ignorance, I will argue that 'S should know that p' is just a regularized implicature of ascriptions of ignorance which are used to assess the agent's epistemic performance.

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What's Nonideal About Nonideal Social Ontology?

Nonideal theorising is distinguished from ideal theorising in social ontology primarily by its attention to real-world injustices: to the existence of oppression, domination, and illegitimate relations of power. Nonideal social ontology rejects the move to idealise away such phenomena, treating them, on the contrary, as both central and primary objects of analysis. Methodologically, nonideal social ontologists are further committed to theorising with the normative goal of transforming these illegitimate power relations in view. The nonideal social ontologist, however, does not get this latter thing for free with the former. This paper challenges the extent to which nonideal social ontology makes good on the latter commitment. Taking Åsa Burman's "power view" as exemplary, I argue that nonideal social ontology has thus far failed to transform the operative picture of power at the heart of ideal social ontology. A satisfactory picture of how power works to maintain illegitimate power relations should emphasise the existence of a sinister loop between people's use of their powers and the power that returns to dominate them. Paradigmatically, this is the situation of the worker under capitalism: the waged worker uses their labour-power to produce products and services appropriated for profit by the capitalist class that dominates them. I argue that nonideal social ontology, as it stands, not only fails to express this key feature of social reality, but also speaks about power in ways that make it more difficult to express perspicuously. To remedy this, I recommend turning to a tradition of thought that is related to, but distinct from, that of nonideal theory: namely, 'radical realism'. Radical realism's central commitment is to the use of the method of ideology-critique to analyse power. I suggest that this commitment would serve to better orient theorising in social ontology towards the normative goal of transforming illegitimate power relations.

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On the distinctiveness of listening to music

In philosophy of auditory perception works such as O'Callaghan (2021) and O'Callaghan & Nudds (2009), consider the perception of music as a distinctive case. Yet, the current literature on the matter does not provide a generally accepted reason for which this should be the case. In this talk, I consider two possible ways to go to reply to the question regarding the distinctiveness of perceiving music. On one side, I consider the idea that there is nothing too special about music, and that psychological and naturalistic explanations can provide a good picture of the case. On the other, I consider the idea that there is something special in perceiving music.

I start presenting what I call here "the Naturalistic View", based on the works of Budd (2008) and DiBona (2022), which holds that perceiving music is explainable through the study of psychological mechanisms that are also common to the ordinary auditory case. I then show how this view provides insight on necessary, yet not sufficient, mechanisms at play in the experience of perceiving music. In particular, this way to proceed seems unable to account for the experience of music as presenting dynamic elements.

I proceed considering Scruton's (1997) account of the experience of music, to which I refer here as "the Metaphorical View". In this account, what allows perceivers to perceive music as including dynamic elements within the sounds, are their rational and imaginative capacities. In other words, what makes a difference is the personal contribution of a perceiver listening to music.

After presenting some widespread criticisms to Scruton's view and abandoning it for those reasons, I discuss the case of inculturated and uninculturated listeners, to defend an interesting core element present in Scruton's proposal, which takes that listeners shape this experience.

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On Why Vagueness is not Ambiguity under any Scale

Among many other predicates, 'being a child' is particularly intriguing. It bears the mark of vagueness, e.g., by lacking precise boundaries, but it is also ambiguous by virtue of its multiple meanings (e.g., age and behaviour). Philosophers such as Fine (1975) claim that supervaluationism effectively treats vagueness by subsuming it under ambiguity—an approach that has gained considerable traction.

In this paper, I contend that this thesis is untenable under a strong as well as weak reading. On the former, vagueness is model-theoretically equivalent to ambiguity; on the latter, vagueness and ambiguity are recognised as requiring different formal treatments, but the analogy between disambiguations and precisifications is considered theoretically instructive and thus retained. I argue that (i) although supervaluationism is a tenable strategy to deal with vagueness, it is inadequate for ambiguity; (ii) more generally, because of the denotational differences between the two phenomena, they will inevitably require different semantic treatment on any proposed theory.

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The Epistemic Importance of Narratives

Narratives have been explored by epistemologists from numerous vantage points, for example by exploring the question if and how narratives are important in creating self-identity. Nevertheless, a 'broadscale' view of the epistemic importance of narratives has received scant attention in the literature. This paper aims to explore the notion that narratives play an outsized but underexplored role in our everyday epistemic routines. Most importantly, narratives guide inquiry: Narratives can serve as a motivating factor to inquire while also being the desired outcome of inquiry, especially in the case of inquiries into topics rather than just isolated questions.

To defend this view, I will offer a definition for the kind of (non-fictional) narratives which play an outsized role in our everyday epistemic behaviour, including inquiry. I call this type of narrative a 'zetetic narrative'. A crucial role zetetic narratives play is that they can make information about the world salient to us and place it in a relevant context. Importantly, I will distinguish zetetic narratives from explanations. Next, I will explain how zetetic narratives can be both a motivating force for inquiring as well as a desired outcome of inquiry.

Finally, I want to distinguish between a descriptive and a normative argument for the epistemic importance of narratives. The descriptive argument merely states that narratives play a large role in how we perceive the world and that they heavily influence our everyday epistemic routines, including inquiry. The normative argument is that if the descriptive argument holds true, we need to establish norms which govern zetetic narratives and the way in which we use them. I will advocate for norms on which legitimate zetetic narratives should lead to epistemic improvement.

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Knowledge and Inquiry

Inquiry and its relation to knowledge have gained significant philosophical attention in the last years. Some theorists argue for a close connection between knowledge and inquiry, while others think that they are more distinct. The existing discussions, however, ignore the question of whether knowledge and inquiry are co-extensive, that is whether everything that we can know we can also successfully inquire into and vice versa.

In this paper, I will argue that they are not co-extensive, discussing several kinds of propositions that, even though they can be known, we cannot properly inquire into whether they are true. I will introduce rationality requirements for suspension of judgment that limit the possibilities of rational inquiry but not of other potential procedures of knowledge acquisition. As I will show, we cannot rationally inquire in cases where new and independent information is required that is not available.

This limitations concern inquiry via bootstrapping and inquiry into the truth of indications that can only be delivered by a single source at a single occasion. However, we can clearly know in this latter case and, arguably, we can also know via bootstrapping. Hence, there are propositions that we can know but into which we cannot rationally inquire.

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Suspending for practical reasons

In the debate about the existence of normative practical reasons for belief, there is often the implicit assumption that what goes for belief goes for all categorical doxastic attitudes (belief, disbelief and suspension of judgement). In this paper, I aim to challenge this assumption and examine whether we can have practical reasons to suspend judgement, even if there are no practical reasons for belief or disbelief. First, I outline prominent objections to non-epistemic reasons for belief (from possibility, from the nature of the attitude and from the balancing of reasons) and argue that they are less compelling when directed at suspension. Second, I argue that if we accept non-evidential reasons to suspend judgement (like future-comparative reasons or cost-of-error reasons), the existence of practical motivating reasons to suspend becomes hard to resist. It would be a significant result, since much of the opposition to putative practical reasons for belief lies in showing that these are instead motivating reasons for action. This supports a moderate form of reason pragmatism. Third, I explore an agential conception of suspension on which it is not an attitude but a mental action (like waiting to deliberate). On this picture, there are no practical reasons for any doxastic attitudes. Nonetheless, assuming certain connections between agential suspension and doxastic attitudes (e.g., that waiting to deliberate disposes against believing), this brings to light interesting normative tensions between practical reasons to suspend judgement and epistemic reasons to believe. In many respects, suspension differs from belief: it might not be surprising after all that practical normativity affects one and not the other.

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The Lessons of Accountability Understanding Individual Responsibility, Shared Responsibility, and Complicity

When an agent is (negatively) accountable for a freely chosen action and its foreseeable consequences, the objects of accountability are the agent's fault. But paradigmatic accountability reactions—moral indignation and guilt—also seem fitting in three other types of cases: (i) Cases of shared rather than individual responsibility for harmful outcomes. (ii) Cases of "fungible switches," where an agent assisted a harmful process but someone else would otherwise have done the same. (iii) Cases of complicitous contributions to unjustifiable harmful endeavors that do not in any way causally contribute to the harms. In such cases, indignation or guilt over the harms seems fittingly directed at the agent even though the agent can plausibly deny that the outcome is their fault.

In this talk, I propose a unifying theory of accountability, covering all these cases. The proposal is guided by two ideas.

The first is an understanding of what distinguishes specific accountability reactions from the related but distinct reactions of criticism, requests for explanations, or mere frustration with someone's failures to live up to expectations. Accountability reactions, I suggest, crucially involve a call for correcting imbalances in the agent's distribution of their agency in the service of persons, or their interests and points of view.

The second is an understanding of when some action or outcome is connected to the accountable person's agency in ways that bear on degrees of balance in this distribution. Elsewhere, I have argued that objects of moral accountability are those that provide the agent with moral lessons, or opportunities for moral feedback learning. Here, I argue that in cases of complicity and shared responsibility, much as in cases of individual responsibility, the object of accountability provides a relevant lesson.

Finally, I discuss the connection between degrees of accountability and the strength of the lessons provided.

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Learning with AI

Education's goals are to improve our onboard cognitive abilities, help us acquire new skills, and cultivate an intellectually virtuous character by instilling intellectual virtues. Some have raised concerns that over-reliance on generative AI systems makes students lose their innate abilities and fail to develop important skills. It also discourages critical thinking, dilutes creativity, and erodes intellectual character (Cassinadri 2024).

In this paper, I consider how these technologies might be reimagined to support education's goals. Realising this potential requires us to redesign these AIs differently to target specific skill-building.

Specifically, I argue that we ought to design generative AI (for primary education) to help students learn how to ask better questions. Following Watson (2018), I understand questioning well as the ability to ask good questions, to the right people and at the right time, to elicit relevant information. The paper presents what such a design can look like and how part of the design can be achieved by carefully prompting Large Language Models.

Questioning well can pave the way to additional intellectual skills such as deepening personalised understanding, learning to lead a virtuous inquiry, and promoting intellectual emotions such as curiosity, fascination, and wonder.

Building on these skills and intellectual emotions, we can train students to develop intellectual virtues. Some argue that these virtues are the primary goal of education (Pritchard 2015; Baehr 2016). To foster an intellectually virtuous character, we should help students cultivate virtues such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, attentiveness, epistemic courage, and creativity. I illustrate how generative AI, designed to teach students how to question effectively, can help them develop these intellectual virtues.

Thus, generative AI need not be a complete devastation for education and its goals.

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Challenging the 'Debate' Framing of the Trans Panic: On Cissexist Ideology and Epistemic Injustice

The UK is currently in the midst of what has been referred to as a 'trans debate' but is more accurately understood as a 'trans panic': a moral panic about transgender people. I explain what is happening in the trans panic and why it is so harmful to transgender people by describing how the 'debate' framing of the trans panic results in epistemic injustice towards trans people, and the ways that epistemic injustice is intertwined with a type of ideology I term 'cissexist ideology' – a network of social meanings about sex and gender that function to uphold the oppression of transgender people.

Using a Haslanger-inspired conception of ideology, I detail how cissexist ideology and epistemic injustice form a feedback loop which can explain why the trans panic has such a broad scope, and why it is so persistent and resistant to efforts to tackle it. Ideology shapes hermeneutical resources and stereotypes which lead to epistemic injustice, ideology prevents the recognition of injustice, and epistemic injustice inhibits the sharing and uptake of ideology critique. In the case of the trans panic, the ideological stereotype of transgender women as predatory shapes prejudices which means that transgender women's testimony that they are not a danger to cisgender women in female-only spaces is likely to be dismissed.

I focus on the UK trans panic as a case study, but the feedback loop can help to make sense of the interplay of ideology and epistemic injustice in other protracted and ongoing moral panics. The cissexist ideology-epistemic injustice feedback loop can also make sense of some otherwise puzzling features of the trans panic, such as frequent appeals to 'common sense' and 'free speech' made by anti-trans campaigners, and the fact that much of the trans panic 'debate' has centred around misinformation.

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Explaining increased rates of synaesthesia in autism populations: the monotropic-compensatory account

Synaesthesia is a condition in which a sensory experience (the inducer) evokes an additional internally generated 'illusory' sensory experience (the concurrent). Synaesthesia is a broad condition which can present itself through a wide variety of sensory combinations. For example, sounds evoking tastes, tastes evoking tactile sensations, or visual experiences of movement evoking sounds.

It has been suggested that synaesthesia affects around 4% of the general population (Simner et al., 2006). In contrast, the observed rate of synaesthesia in autism populations is around 18% (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013) which shows a significant co-occurrence between the two conditions. This co-occurrence suggests a possible link between synaesthesia and autism. Even though several similarities in perceptual processing have been found in people with these conditions, largely relating to increased attention to detail, it remains unclear why there is an increased prevalence of synaesthesia in autism populations.

In this paper, I will develop a novel account, the monotropic-compensatory account, which provides an explanation for this co-occurrence. According to this account, synaesthesia arises more frequently in autism populations as the result of a compensatory process. The synaesthesia compensates for a deficit in global processing which is caused by a tendency in autistic individuals to utilise a monotropic processing style.

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Ways of Being: The Metaphysics of Emotions

Emotion theorists are typically concerned with two issues: (1) what emotions involve and (2) what emotions are fundamentally. The first question is rather straightforward to answer. The phenomenon of emotion involves both various psychological entities such as experience, evaluation, motivation, etc. and various behavioral/physiological responses and actions (e.g., fleeing a situation). The second question, by contrast, is more difficult to answer confidently.

Commonly, theorists have debated on whether one of the aspects – evaluation, motivation, perception, etc. – involved in emotions should be given priority and be declared emotions proper. At first sight, this is a curious methodology. A car involves many different things – wheels, windows, a trunk, seats, etc. But we are not tempted to ask if any of these particular things is the car, and how it relates to the other things from the list. We take the car to be some kind of unity that relates to the items of the list in some way (presumably composition) without being any of these items.

The problem with emotion, however, is that we do not seem to have a vantage point from which emotions appear whole alongside any item we might put on a list of what the phenomenon involves. All we have, it seems, is a sense that in having an emotion, one is evaluating an object, one has certain experiences, one is motivated a certain way, and so on. What would support positing an emotion on top of these things?

In this paper, I argue that considerations of this kind are not far to seek. It turns out that we do have a vantage point from which emotions appear as unified wholes. If I am right, we need a different account of emotions than the common reductive and component accounts.

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On Baptisms

Suppose a causal theory of the reference of utterances of proper names is true. Then the reference mechanism has two parts: baptisms, where a name is bestowed on an object, and inheritance where later utterances of the same name refer to an object because of their relation to the baptism. Inheritance has been the subject of significant research, but there is surprisingly little on what baptisms are supposed to be. Most work assumes either that baptisms are always explicit ceremonies of dubbing ('I hereby name you ...') or that they are uses of a name with certain relational properties. I have two goals. First, I show that neither simple picture is adequate: cases of unintended baptism or reference 'switching' (as in Evans' 'Madagascar' case) cannot be explained as explicit ceremonies, but conversely explicit ceremonies cannot be explained as uses of names with certain relational properties (because they generally involved mentioning the name, not using it). Second, I offer my own account of baptisms. On my account, a baptism is either an act which is intended to produce a series of later uses of the relevant name, each referring to the relevant object, or is an (extended) act which includes a series of uses, each of which is intended to refer to the relevant object. Explicit dubbings are paradigms of the first kind of baptism, 'Madagascar'-type cases of the second.

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How To Persevere

Perseverance in the face of discouraging developments is crucial to the successful pursuit of long-term projects. This talk will compare and evaluate two forms of perseverance. One is the "epistemic resilience" advocated by Morton and Paul (2019), on which an agent is kept on track by an optimistic outlook about her chances of success. The other is a practical resilience, on which the agent is disposed to quit less readily given her outlook.

My aim is to sketch a general argument for practical resilience over epistemic resilience. Optimistic attitudes, I argue, are likely to have adverse side-effects on an agent's wider decision-making. However, the non-epistemic alternatives currently on the table are unpromising. Philosophical discussion of commitment has focused mostly on more straightforward short-term commitments rather than perseverance in complex long-term projects. The latter, however, require a distinctive kind of sensitivity to new reasons to quit—specifically, a distinctively holistic sensitivity to new reasons—which eludes existing approaches to commitment. This makes practical resilience seem unappealing in comparison to epistemic resilience.

This talk defends a more sophisticated approach to practical resilience in long-term projects which restores its appeal. Rather than being directly committed to her project, the agent is committed to a "reasoning policy" which specifies how to conduct practical deliberation about whether to quit. This approach gets the best of both worlds. Such a policy keeps the agent on track without the side-effects of optimism, while maintaining her sensitivity to new reasons to quit.

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Organizational Functions as a Source of Ethical Normativity

The goal of this paper is to articulate a neo-Aristotelian theory of ethics which applies the organizational theory of functions to human norms. The organizational theory of functions is typically offered as an account of biological and scientific explanation. But recently, Peter Graham has applied the theory to epistemology to formulate a theory of functionalism for epistemic normativity. I argue that the organizational theory of functions can be applied to ethical normativity in a similar way. The result of

such an application is a plausible theory of neo-Aristotleian naturalism which can be used to evaluate norms as ethical or unethical.

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Attention and its limits: perceptual boundaries and the co-perceiver in joint attention

This paper explores joint attention as a perceptual phenomenon wherein two subjects share awareness on a particular object with each subject conscious of the involvement of the other agent. The paper centers on how the presence of another subject becomes an integral constituent of one's perceptual experience. How is another subject involved in one's experience? Here is John Campbell's answer: "Just as the object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the object." (Campbell 2005: 285). But how is it that "the other person" can be a constituent in my experience? In this paper I present and defend the idea that we can be perceptually conscious of subjects as limits in our experience. We do not see that eye that sees; a subject is never to be found directly in our perceptions as another object. In this line, the author of the Tractatus similarly holds that one cannot perceive oneself, for the subject does not belong to the world. There is no subject as subject that can be observed, he holds. However, he adds: "(the subject) is a limit of the world" (TLP 5.632). I want to present a way of understanding how another subject is consciously given as part of what structures attention. The co-perceiver in episodes of joint attention appears partly limiting the possible field in which joint attention can occur and, in that sense, is given in conscious perception. The paper thus provides a novel perspective on joint attention, proposing that our awareness of another subject in joint attention is fundamentally tied to the way attention is bounded and structured.

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On the Division of Well-Being Across Time

We regularly appeal to different temporal perspectives when we think and talk about welfare or well-being. I might ask about how things are going for you right now, this afternoon, this week, this year, and so on. This has led many philosophers to posit distinct kinds of well-being corresponding to different temporal periods. Most commonly, philosophers distinguish between momentary well-being, corresponding to the minimal unit in which well-being can be realised, and lifetime well-being, corresponding to one's life considered as a whole. Questions are then asked about the relation between these notions. For example, is a good life just a succession of good moments? Or are global and holistic features of extended periods also relevant to determining well-being?

This paper argues against the division of well-being into distinct temporal kinds. After outlining the view, it offers two arguments against it. The first argument offers a comparison with moral and aesthetic value, where the presence of temporalized moral or aesthetic judgments does not plausibly result in a postulation of distinct temporal kinds of moral or aesthetic value. The second argument draws out some of the implications of accepting the divided picture of well-being, showing how it leads to implausible consequences about the value of extended and non-extended prudential goods.

The paper then offers an alternative interpretation of temporalized well-being judgments according to which such judgments are about the temporal location and distribution of particular prudential goods, understood as those things that contribute to a temporally unqualified notion of well-being. It then explores some of the implications of this alternative approach to debates about wellbeing across time, such as debates about the significance of a life's shape, the significance of a life's end, and whether to accept the thesis of 'momentary wellbeing internalism'.

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On Being Left Cold: Emotional Blanks & Ethical Knowledge

According to Moral Empiricism, we can obtain ethical knowledge through emotional experience. Moral Empiricism looks attractive, because it promises a psychologically plausible, nonsceptical account of how

ethical knowledge is possible. However, humans' emotional dispositions clearly have various epistemic limitations—Moral Empiricism will only be plausible if we can show how emotion-based ethical beliefs amount to knowledge despite the specific shortcomings humans' emotional dispositions exhibit.

Here, I highlight one shortcoming (which hasn't been dealt with sufficiently), namely the problem of emotional blanks. Emotional blanks are situations in which an agent is confronted by something ethically significant, but is left cold, failing to have the emotional response that would be fitting. For instance, slowly accumulating risks (e.g. smoking-induced cancer, climate change) often fail to evoke fitting fear. Similarly, humans often fail to feel compassion for disaster-victims in distant countries when they are anonymous and belong to out-groups. Intuitively, if an agent's emotional dispositions produce many blanks, this means her emotions are too unreliable to provide a basis for ethical knowledge.

I show how Moral Empiricists can meet this challenge. I argue that, on careful analysis, emotional blanks do not pose a threat to the core Moral Empiricist claim that ethical beliefs based on emotions amount to knowledge. In a blank case, the agent fails to form an ethical belief that would have been true. But she does not form a false ethical belief based on an emotion. Thus, blanks threaten the "breadth" of the habit of forming emotion-based ethical beliefs, but not its "reliability" (in the sense pertinent to knowledge-attributions).

Nevertheless, the phenomenon of emotional blanks reveals that emotion-based ethical beliefs form a problematically incomplete body of ethical knowledge. I thus argue that Moral Empiricists need to supplement their account of emotion-based belief-formation with substantive recommendations regarding ethical reasoning, communication, and self-cultivation.

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Belonging

Human beings are social animals that seek to live in communities in which they feel like they belong. But what is it we want in wanting to belong? In this talk, I distinguish two, distinct, forms of belonging—belonging in a place and belonging to a group—and offer an account of their relationship.

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Higher-Order Counterpart Theory

First-order counterpart theory is the view that de re modal and temporal attributions to individuals should be analysed in terms of the properties had by our counterparts across possible worlds. For example, 'Kim could have been the next US president' is true at a world just in case there exists some possible world at which a counterpart of Kim is the US president.

Higher-order counterpart theory is the generalisation of first-order counterpart theory to de re modal and temporal attributions to properties, relations, and propositions. Higher-order de re modal attributions are no less intelligible than their first-order counterparts (e.g., 'to be a vixen is necessarily equivalent to being a female fox' is perfectly intelligible). Furthermore, the project of given a counterpart-theoretic alternative to quantified modal logic naturally extends to giving an alternative to higher-order quantified modal logic. But despite the vast literature on first-order counterpart theory, higher-order counterpart theory has been relatively neglected.

In this paper, I explore the foundations of higher-order counterpart theory in the metaphysical framework of David Lewis. Focusing specifically on first-order properties and modal attributions, I argue that Lewis's views on modality and properties lead to serious issues in formulating a suitable higher-order counterpart theory. More specifically, Lewis's concrete modal realism, his view that possible individuals are world-bound, and his view that properties are sets of individuals, make de re modal attributions of first-order properties either contentless or trivial.

After ruling out several alternative solutions, I provide my own solution: rather than building the counterpart relation into the semantics of modal and temporal operators, the counterpart relation should be encoded into the semantics of predicates.

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The Aristotelian Unity of Causation

In this paper I subject Alastair Wilson's theory of causation to scrutiny. According to Wilson, grounding and causation are both types of causation: grounding is metaphysical causation; causation *simpliciter* is nomological causation. Grounding and causation, so the story goes, are species of the same causal genus. Their laws differentiate them. However, Wilson underdetermines the nature of the genus-species relation. Should we understand 'genus', 'species', and 'differentia' in their original or strongest senses (as per Aristotle)? Or are they merely classificatory concepts? Notably, Wilson is silent on the role of essence.

But all is not lost, for Wilson's view can be read in one of two ways. According to what I call the 'Weak' interpretation, grounding and causation are species of the same genus, to which they're *not* essentially connected. Here it remains unclear what, if anything, unifies them. According to what I call the 'Strong' interpretation, grounding and causation are species of the same genus, to which they *are* essentially connected. While they differ according to their differentiae, a single genus is part of their essences and explains the important features they have in common.

I conclude, *pace* Wilson, that we reach a stumbling block either way. The Weak interpretation fails to be metaphysically illuminating. The Strong interpretation handles differences between the two species poorly. On both counts I suggest we turn our attention to other relations to explain the connection between grounding and causation.

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Understanding for Believers: A Belief-First Account of Understanding Why

This essay intervenes on the question of what it takes to understand why P. I offer a development on the understanding why account of (Hills, 2016). Specifically, I argue that the abilities which feature in the account are all ultimately grounded in some set of true beliefs held by the agent. For any P, and for any agent A who understands why P, there will be some set of true beliefs that A has that grounds A's understanding why P. I will endeavour to show that such grounding is sufficient for understanding why, leaving an argument that it is necessary to a later date.

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Inquiry Aims at Usable Knowledge

Carter and Hawthorne (2024) note that the view that inquiry aims at knowledge creates a zetetic, 'ex ante' dogmatism puzzle: once we know the answer to a question, we should decline to gather additional evidence, no matter how easily accessible. Carter and Hawthorne's solution appeals to the idea that norms governing activities give rise to derivative norms to know that the norm is satisfied (and to know that one knows it and so on). Thus, a norm not to cease inquiring until knowing the answer to the question investigated generates a derivative norm not to cease inquiring until knowing that one knows the answer (and knows that one knows etc).

I argue that Carter and Hawthorne's proposal is insufficient. It can be rational to keep gathering evidence about a question despite knowing that one knows its answer (and that one knows one knows it and so on). Consider, for instance, cases of non-occurrent knowledge, where the agent knows that they know the answer, but cannot currently recall it (Falbo 2023). Other examples are cases of knowledge known to be unreasonable (in Lasonen-Aarnio 2010's sense): agents can know that one and only one of their beliefs about a question constitutes knowledge of its answer, without knowing which one. Gathering additional evidence seems rational in all these cases.

I take these examples to show that inquiry does not generally aim simply at knowledge, but at usable knowledge. This is knowledge that can be used competently for the purposes of the inquirer (e.g. in

reasoning or decision-making), by manifesting a good enough disposition to treat something as knowledge just in case it is.

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Mutual Recognition: Bipolar or One-on-all?

Contractualism purportedly provides us with an answer to the question 'Why be moral?'. But while Scanlon makes clear that contractualism's answer has something to do with 'mutual recognition', it is very far from clear what this answer is supposed to be. This paper sheds light on this puzzle.

On one popular interpretation -the bipolar view-, mutual recognition is (1) a value that is (2) realized between (3) two individuals. When an individual acts morally towards another individual (i.e. based on contractualist principles/principles no one can reasonably reject), they therefore come to stand in a relation of mutual recognition with the other individual, and this relation has value. Thus, individuals have reason to act morally because this brings about the value of mutual recognition. There are problems with the bipolar view, some of which are well-known: It is suspiciously consequentialist, ignores that the reason-giving force of morality seemingly pre-dates any relationships, places concern for relationships above concern for persons, and conflicts with the fact that contractualism's justification is explicitly hypothetical.

This piece offers an alternative interpretation of how mutual recognition provides contractualism's answer to the question 'Why be moral?'. It proposes that mutual recognition is a value response that is constituted by directing oneself to act morally and that, therefore, holds between the agent and all other individuals. On the one-on-all view of mutual recognition, mutual recognition is a value response to the special value of individuals. The value response which is rendered appropriate by the reason-having, reason-assessing nature of individuals, is acting based on principles no one can reasonably reject. Mutual recognition is constitutive of amending one's actions accordingly, and is a relation which one takes up towards all individuals at the same time. Ultimately, the reason-giving force of morality is found in the nature of individuals.

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Lie as a Prototype Concept

In recent years we've witnessed a surge in attempts to demonstrate that the traditional definition of lying (according to which you lie iff you say something you believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience) is inadequate. People invent more and more complex scenarios supposedly showing e.g., that you don't need to say something you believe false: it is enough if you imply or presuppose it; or that you don't have to intend to deceive your audience: you may lie even if they know that what you're saying is false. The main problem with these scenarios is that they are all inconclusive. Each one of them has been criticized as unsuccessful.

In my talk I'm going to argue that instead of trying to invent further scenarios or quarreling over the existing ones, we should go back to the idea put forward by linguists Coleman & Kay (1981). They argue that 'lie' is a prototype concept and suggest three prototypical properties of lies. Their idea so far has been ignored by philosophers of language, but I'm going to suggest that it is well worth revisiting.

I do not agree with Coleman & Kay's choice of prototypical properties and I oppose their claim that 'lie' is gradable. Nevertheless, I'm going to argue that 'lie' is best seen as a prototype concept, by which I mean that there is a paradigm of a lie (having certain prototypical properties) and utterances may resemble it in various respects. The notion doesn't have clear boundaries and there is no determinate answer whether having particular properties is necessary and sufficient for being a lie. I conclude that constructing further convoluted scenarios is a pointless enterprise.

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What's Wrong with "Ugging-Up"?

There exists a broad consensus that there is a moral prohibition against actors participating in blackface. Similar attitudes are held for a variety of other cases where actors, who are not members of a particular marginalised group, take on roles playing characters who do have those marginalised identities. For example, it is regarded as similarly offensive for actors to put on "yellowface" (using makeup to play an East Asian character) or "cripface" (where non-disabled actors play a character with a disability).

Various explanations have been given for justifying this moral prohibition. We might point to historical examples of these practices, and suggest that the sociohistorical context can imbue these acts with a pernicious meaning, which makes blackface oppressive, regardless of an agent's intentions (Zheng and Steer 2023). Or we might suggest that the wrong consists in reinforcing damaging stereotypes against the marginalised group.

Alternatively we might point to more indirect explanations, such as the complaint that this may in effect take jobs away from marginalised people (who may struggle to be cast in other roles), the suggestion that they will be less able to capture the lived experience of someone from that group (which may be seen as an aesthetic failing, because it worsens the artwork, or a moral failing, because of how it represents members of the marginalised group).

In this talk, I note that that there is a striking similarity between these kind of portrayals and attractive actors who use makeup/prosthetics to play ugly actors (e.g., Colin Farrell in *The Penguin*). I consider each of the candidate explanations for the prohibition, and argue that we should be similarly uncomfortable with "ugging up".

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Does the causal exclusion problem require a theory of causation?

Some hold that any proper account of the causal exclusion problem (CEP) should build in a (presumed correct) substantive theory of causation (e.g. Baker 1993: 78-79; Loewer 2007: 251; Kim 2007: 234-239; Hitchcock 2012: 54-55); others deny this (e.g. Bennett 2008: 293; Won 2014: 208n3; Donaldson 2019: 1381-1382; Vaassen 2021: 10348-10349). I argue that the latter are correct because the former approach violates three desiderata that any account of the CEP should meet: Generality: apply to a wide range of relevant theories. Utility: be useful for choosing between relevant theories. Scrupulosity: not be gerrymandered. I consider an episode from the annals of the CEP debates in which Kim responded to objections by endorsing the conserved quantity view of causation (2007: 236). I show how this move violates the three desiderata and identify it as part of a general pattern in exclusion debates where other causal theories are similarly built-in to accounts of the CEP. This, I argue, results in complex wrangling about the nature of causation that usually amounts to little better than sophisticated gerrymandering (examples include LePore and Loewer 1987: 637-642; Baker 1993: 90-95; Horgan 1989: 61-64; 1997: 178-181; Block 1990: 162-166; Kim 1998: 57-76; 2007: 236-239; Loewer 2007: 251-259; Gertler 2007: 311-312; Zhong 2011: 138-146; Weslake 2017: 221-229). I close by sketching an alternative "problem-first" approach whereby the CEP is articulated without relying so heavily on a particular casual theory. A key move in that regard involves demonstrating that the notion of causal completeness can be articulated in a manner which is inclusive of a relatively wide range of causal theory.

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Large Language Models and the Question of Rule-Following

The recent success of large language models (LLMs) raises far-reaching philosophical questions: Can LLMs understand human language? Can they meaningfully be said to speak? Can they act? Among philosophers and AI researchers, there is a strong tendency to answer these questions in the negative (Bender and Koller 2020; Shanahan 2022). My presentation aims to open up a conceptual space for a more nuanced analysis of LLMs' capacities. To that end, I frame questions about the ability to understand, speak, and act as subsets of a broader question, the question of rule-following, as initiated by Wittgenstein (1986) and Kripke (1982).

My paper examines the extent to which LLMs can be said to follow rules. I show that the predominant attempts to deny LLMs the ability to understand, speak, and act are rooted in misguided conceptions of rule-following, which I call "mentalism" and "neurophysiologicalism". In opposition to these misconceptions, I develop a new non-reductionist and deflationary approach to rule-following that builds on but goes beyond existing non-reductionist accounts, such as those presented by McDowell (1984), Stroud (2012), and Child (2020), by overcoming their implicit anthropocentric tendencies. On this basis, I argue that today's LLMs are in interesting, but substantive respects capable of rule-following. I also demonstrate how my deflationary account of rule-following provides a useful framework for assessing the capacities of LLMs.

The final section of my presentation defends my approach against three objections. According to these criticisms, we should neither claim that LLMs can understand, speak, or act nor that they can follow rules, since (a) such claims encourage anthropomorphism (Shanahan 2022), (b) current LLMs lack intent (Mitchell and Krakauer 2023), (c) machines are not alive (Hacker 2019). I show that these objections do not undermine LLMs' capacity to follow rules.

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What's Wrong With Victim-Blaming?

Victims of wrongdoing are sometimes held partly or fully responsible (by others, themselves, or both) for the wrongs they've suffered. This is typically the case when there's a perception that they reasonably could've acted differently to avoid the wrongdoing. This kind of blaming—that is, victim-blaming—often takes the shape of directing anger, disappointment, or frustration at the victim and/or reduced feelings of sympathy towards them. Although victim-blaming is routinely criticized in the media and online, it's unclear exactly when and why it's wrong.

This paper discusses a few possible reasons and develops its own answer. According to the account presented, victim-blaming should be understood as a kind of blame and, as such, is only justified if it's true that the victim should've acted differently. So we, first of all, need to interrogate the possible normative reasons a victim may have to avoid being wronged. Two potential sources of such reasons are discussed. First, victims can have self-directed reasons to avoid being wronged. Second, victims can have other-directed reasons to avoid being wronged because wrongdoing typically creates reasons for third parties to respond in specific ways (attending to the wrongdoing, punishing the wrongdoer, helping the victim, and so on).

Victim-blaming is wrong, it's argued, when these reasons are outweighed or cancelled by competing ones. First, avoiding others' wrongdoing is often costly, especially when one considers the cost of repeatedly taking precautions. Second, and more importantly, it's argued that avoiding others' wrongdoing can also constitute "moral harm" insofar as it involves accommodating oneself to injustice. Both provide plausible explanations for when it's false that a victim should've acted differently and, so, for when and why victim-blaming is wrong.

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Are Moorean Arguments any Good?

G.E. Moore's notorious "proof of an external world" by means of gesturing with his hands has inspired arguments against all kinds of revisionary philosophical theories. A philosophical theory R is revisionary if it implies that a pretheoretically exceedingly plausible ('Moorean') proposition MR is false. The Moorean argument schema is:

MOORE (P1) MR (e.g. 'It is sometimes wrong to kill for fun') (P2) MR, then R (e.g. moral error theory) is false (C) R is false

I will argue that 1) while MOORE fails to affect R, 2) an alternative version of the argument schema successfully undermines revisionary theories.

MOORE is a very good argument in a conventional sense: 1) It is valid and 2) its premises are extremely plausible. However, the argument turns out to be dialectically ineffective: The revisionist is aware that non-MR follows from R, so denying MR does not go beyond the philosophical commitments that they have already entered into and that they take to be well justified.

The alternative reconstruction of the Moorean argument schema swaps (C) for the conclusion (C*) It is irrational to believe R and mainly rests on (P*) If the premises in the revisionist's arguments turn out to be logically inconsistent with MR, it is irrational to believe these premises.

Unlike MR, (P*) is compatible with R. Furthermore, given (P*)'s own enormous plausibility, rejecting (P*) amounts to subscribing to a further revisionary theory R' on what is rational to believe.

Assuming the methodological rule "For any revisionary theory R, it is only permitted to reject non-R if good arguments can be provided in R's favour," the revisionist is forced to provide further arguments to the effect that it is more rational to believe their premises than to believe MR to escape (C*).

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Attending to things past as reliving the past

The phenomenal character of one's experience is shaped by what one is attending to, and the way in which one is attending; distribution and character of attention shape and affect our conscious experiences (see Wu 2001; Jennings 2012; Watlz 2017). Consider the following case: say that one is episodically remembering having listened to the opening of the Adagietto in Mahler's 5th symphony. What is one attending to when one remembers in this way? One natural answer is that one is attending something in the past. However, is one attending to something <the Adagietto in Mahler's 5th symphony> as a past event not currently given in auditory perception, or is one attending to one's past auditory experience of <the Adagietto in Mahler's 5th symphony>. If there is pressure to answer in the second way, then attention to things past has the intentional structure of attention to our experience of things in the past (see Peacocke 1985; Martin 2001). As such, we don't, at least in 'imagistically driven' episodic memory, directly remember the past, but rather in attending to things past we have to relive the past by attending to our experience of things past. In this paper I argue that that any plausible account of first-personal autobiographical memory needs to respect this condition, which I call the reliving condition. However, there are a number of challenges that are faced in accepting it. First it seems to make the intentionality of attentive-memory fundamentally experience-directed rather than world-directed, such that our past experiences serve as mediators for our contact with past events. The condition also gives rise to puzzles concerning the way attention in deployed in memory: can I fail to pay attention to details of my experience of some past event in the same way as I can fail to pay attention to details of the past event itself? I argue that a properly fleshed-out account of attentive-memory can address these worries while respecting the reliving condition.

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Rethinking Compatibilist Agent-Causation: Motivations and Misgivings

This talk will begin by briefly outlining the motivation for a compatibilist agent-causal theory, suggesting that compatibilism's success could depend on it. Having done so, its main focus will be to argue that current versions of compatibilist agent-causation fall short and require further work. It will finish by providing the groundwork for a more persuasive formulation of the view.

In providing this motivation, I will build on the work of Markosian (2012), arguing that:

i. Agent-causationists would do well to show that their view holds even if determinism is true. ii. For compatibilists, agent-causal theories are best positioned to overcome their most common challenges (including that presented in Van Inwagen, 1983), along with several novel problems presented in this talk.

I will then examine three current compatibilist agent-causal theories, from Markosian (1999); Nelkin (2011); and Franklin (2016), providing reasons to reject them. I shall argue that they:

(a) fail to account for the intuitive attributes of genuine free will and moral responsibility; (b) beg the question against the libertarian on definitions of 'determinism'; and (c) implausibly treat free actions as 'events' (which results in issues similar to those in event-causal libertarian views).

This talk will build on these motivations and shortcomings to lay the foundation for an alternative view. In doing so, it will discuss how agents play a meaningful role in their actions when determinism is true; justify a particular definition of 'determinism' (to avoid or minimise begging the question); and argue that free actions, from an agent-causal perspective, may best be understood as ongoing processes rather than isolated events.

Given its length, this talk is not as ambitious as to persuade listeners of one form of compatibilist agent-causation. Instead, it will highlight why such theories warrant further exploration, offering some promising thoughts on rethinking current versions.

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Fiction and I

A metaphysical theory shared with Buddhists (anatta) and some analytic philosophers (the problem of personal identity) is that there may be no entity that corresponds to the subject of experience or the agent of action (Monima Chadha 2025). On the other hand, the subject of experience, or the enduring agent of action is a concept that we cannot easily do without. In understanding action over time or good and bad outcomes, we need to assign subjects and agents. One way of resolving this issue is to propose that we construct ourselves (Korsgaard 1996). If this is right, then it might seem that what we understand as being referred to as "I", is fictional.

In using first and second person pronouns we can create descriptions of the world in which we self-locate using "I". How do we know who we are in this sense? I propose that we know who we are being through "creative intuition"; a separate category from empirical verification or deduction. There are situations where people choose to be an agent or subject. In play a child can "be" a train driver; in acting, especially method acting, actors can "be" the characters that they are playing; in psychology adults can fulfill different roles during the course of a day, being a parent, a spouse, a teacher, a friend, an audience member.

A central question is whether all these agents are fictions created by a single authentic self? Or whether it is fiction all the way down? I argue that the distinctions between truth and falsehood, and authenticity and pretense, can be maintained even if there is no self which is not fictional.

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Giving Caring Gratuitousness Its Due

We treat people differently from objects: we recognize one another as subjects aware of thinking and acting for ourselves. Though the mutual recognition of caring for one another is nominally distinguished from that of respecting one another's rights, it is comparatively neglected and poorly understood. One hindrance to understanding this caring recognition is a poverty of paradigms. Though rights-based relationships, increasingly presumed to model nearly any human relationship, illuminate aspects of disinterested and codifiable moral phenomena, they cannot explain caring recognition. In this talk, I use the personal gift as a model to uncover this recognition's distinctive moral gratuitousness. I begin by using Joel Feinberg's characterization of all gratuitousness as the waiving of rights to show how approaching caring recognition through rights makes it disappear. Then I make it visible, first with contrasts: I show in the second section how the mutual recognition in commercial transaction and impersonal charity lacks what is intuitively fundamental to caring recognition because these practices are arranged to avoid human bonds. But human bonds are the point of what I call the personal gift, and in the talk's final section, I argue that this kind of gift instantiates and thus illuminates genuine caring recognition. Caring gratuitousness comes to light when seen not as an isolated person's doing more than can be demanded of her but rather as partly constitutive of caring relationships, in which personal demands' role is at most secondary. What is distinctively valuable in personal gifts is not the indeterminate freedom of being

unbound by directed duties but rather the positive sharing of care or love. To give from care is to give of oneself in recognition of another, to share oneself without loss in supporting the pursuits of the other, who receives the giver as a partner in spirit.

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Fair allocation to rare disease research

Over 300 million people worldwide are estimated to have a rare disease. However, the small number of patients with each rare disease means that research into such diseases attracts little private-sector investment. Left to its own devices, the market would not generate better treatments for them. To many, this appears unfair. Consequently, many countries have enacted legislation to incentivize rare disease research, as well as directly supporting it through government funding.

In this paper, I analyse whether and when it is unfair to give lower priority to research on more rare conditions. I begin with the question of whether treating diseases differently on the basis of prevalence is discriminatory. I argue that it is not: prevalence is not in-itself a relevant dimension of equity with which we should be concerned.

I then consider outcome fairness and argue that, all else equal, directing resources to more common diseases is better in terms of outcome inequality. Contrary to what some have argued, then, rare disease research is not a case in which utilitarian and egalitarian principles necessarily conflict. It remains possible that there is an argument in favour of supporting rare disease research on the basis of equality of opportunity. I explain some of the challenges with making this argument.

Finally, I identify some ways in which all else is, in fact, not equal between rare and non-rare diseases. These include the historical underfunding of rare diseases and their comparative neglect by for-profit research funders. I briefly assess the conditions under which these differences can ground claims of unfairness.

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The Special Questions Dispute: A Simple Case of Metalinguistic Negotiation in Mereology

There are two special questions in mereology: "When is it that some things compose an F?" and "When is it that some things are arranged F-wise?" These questions have given rise to a dispute in mereology that I call the Special Questions Dispute (SQD): "Do some things compose an F or are they arranged F-wise?" I argue that this dispute is a straightforward case of metalinguistic negotiation. The disputants turn out to agree on all the underlying facts, they use key terms differently, and their term use reflects different underlying philosophical norms.

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Reliability and Truth Ratio Drops

We show that a highly natural principle proves incompatible with standard accounts of reliability. This has repercussions for process reliabilism but also for other theories of epistemic competence. The Weakening Principle says, roughly, that replacing a given method's propositional outputs with logically weaker ones cannot lower the reliability of that method. This principle is closely related to the principle of single-premise closure for reliabilist justification, but is even more plausible.

Standard accounts of reliability are all based on the idea that a method's reliability corresponds to the ratio of truths among its outputs. We explore several ways of rendering this idea precise. In doing so, we highlight certain choice points that the literature on reliability has so far missed, such as the difference between absolute and expected truth ratios. We proceed to argue that all of the resulting accounts invalidate the Weakening Principle. We suggest that, rather than rejecting the latter, epistemologists should work out suitable alternatives to the truth ratio idea.

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On the Duality of the Schemata

Recent literature on Kant's theory of perception has focused on the role of imagination in perception (e.g., Stephenson, 2017 and Rosefeldt 2019, 2022). Samantha Matherne (2015) has argued we should pay attention to the role of the products of imaginative synthesis, namely, images. Though not without considerable merit, her account relies centrally on a conception of the schemata, which, I argue, is wrong.

Matherne understands schemata as 'monograms' that guide the imaginative synthesis and thus guide the formation of images (767). Her conception of schemata is well-suited for empirical concepts and a priori mathematical concepts, but, I argue, fails to meet the requirements for schemata of *the categories*. My argument turns on Kant's claim that empirical concepts are homogeneous, whereas the categories are heterogeneous, with sensible representations (A137-8/B176-7). I argue that Kant thinks this because empirical concepts include 'shape-concepts' within them, which allows for the subsumption of intuitive representations under them. Empirical schemata, as per Matherne, can be construed as rules for image-construction. Yet, for the categories, this imagistic model fails. The reason for this is that the categories are fundamentally *modal concepts*, which cannot be represented by means of images. As Kant puts it: "how is the [...] application of the category to appearances possible, since [categories, e.g., causality cannot] be intuited through the senses [?]" (A138/B177)

The curious nature of the categories means that their schemata cannot be mere rules for construction of images, but instead have to construed as rules for "the transcendental time-determination" (A139/B178). As Kant identifies this transcendental time-determination as a product of imaginative synthesis (A146/B185), my argument entails that Kant thinks the imagination has two radically distinct roles in enabling us to apply concepts to sensible representations. It both produces images for perception, and structures the time-sequence in which these images are consciously perceived.

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The Problem of Passive Self-Movement

Desires have a puzzling dual character. Considered under one light, desires are a paradigm of passivity while, considered under another light, desires are a paradigm of activity. Suppose I am woken up by an alarm and feel a desire to hit the snooze button and return to sleep. In this case, I am passive in relation to my desire – it simply happens to me – while my desire involves pursuing the object of desire – I move myself to acquire what I desire. My desire for x is the beginning of self-movement in pursuit of x but also something that simply happens to me. How could it be possible for my own pursuit of a goal to simply happen to me?

This is a problem any theory of desire must address, but it poses an especially urgent challenge to perceptualist views of desire. On such a view, desires involve quasi-perceptual appearances of value. However, perception is a paradigm of passivity. There is seemingly no room for the idea that desires involve self-movement, or active motivation. I answer this challenge on behalf of perceptualism by developing an account of the dual-aspect intentionality of desire.

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Just Say It! Harmful Thoughts and Vague Behaviour

For George Sher (2021), our mind is like the Wild West: everything's allowed; there are no moral laws regarding what we ought and ought not to think. One aspect of his view is that thoughts cannot be harmful. Sher partially argues for this idea by stating that expressive behaviour often intimately linked to thoughts—rolling our eyes, crossing our arms, speaking in a high pitch—cannot harm because such behaviour is too imprecise to discern.

I argue that's wrong: thoughts can be harmful even when we cannot discern their harming content. Behaviour deemed to convey insufficient information ('vague behaviour') can be harmful, and expressive behaviour can be a form of such harmful, vague behaviour. Against possible objections, I argue that thoughts can become public even when we cannot discern their content, that my view does not entail an implausibly broad scope of harmful thoughts, and that in the cases I present, it's not just the expressive behaviour that's harmful but also the thought.

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When not to pick casually?

This paper explains why it is unfitting to pick an option casually in some hard choices but not in others. I reject four explanations: the first appeals to the importance of the choice (Reuter & Messerli 2017), the second appeals to "resolutional remainder" (Chang 2022), the third appeals to moral dilemma, and the fourth appeals to "the right reason" (Tenenbaum 2024).

I then provide my explanation appealing to the Williamsian idea of integrity and the concept of deep-self. I argue that by picking an option casually in a hard choice involving attitudes constituting the agent's deep-self, the agent disowns what happens following this casual pick as their deeply-taken attitudes are not reflected in this pick and thus make their integrity attacked. I finally address three potential concerns regarding the moral implications of my proposal, the "egocentricity" of it, and a confusing regression problem.

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Some 'objects of thought' are not objects

Modern Meinongeans and noneists assume that objects of thought are objects and so, when we think or speak about what does not exist, we are speaking and thinking about non-existent objects. Yet the existence of non-existent objects appears paradoxical and was rejected by Russell. Perhaps surprisingly, Russell suggested that Frege, as well as Meinong, proposed that some objects of thought, even when they don't exist, have kind of a Being, which is in no way dependent on their being objects of thought. Russell had in mind the fact that, according to Frege, what enables us to think and speak about what does not exist is that we can think about empty concepts and unasserted thoughts. These have a kind of being different from objects, which are identified by their location in space time. Properties, processes, similarities, functions, thoughts, and concepts, as well as objects, can be objects of thought.

Frege's semantics makes them objects of thought, without assimilating them to objects. This it is argued is an advantage of his semantics over that of noneists. Arguably, however, Frege did recognise one non-existent object, the False, so a tweak to his semantics is proposed to eliminate reference to this non-existent object. Finally, it is argued that not only does Frege's introduction of functions allow him to avoid Meinong's distinction between bestehen and existieren, what Meinong intended, when he spoke of sosein and sein, is better captured using Frege's distinction between the instantiation of a concept by an object and the subordination of one concept to another. Ultimately, it is claimed that anything Meinong does, Frege does better. Fregeans can do everything better than noneists.

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Authorial play as a form of gameplay

In this paper I consider forms of gameplay, a key issue within the philosophy of games, and argue that what I call authorial play should be understood as a form of gameplay for three related reasons: to make sense of player actions in games, to better understand what it means for gameplay to be engaging, and to understand more of the aesthetics of gameplay. My starting point is Nguyen's (2020) distinction between achievement play (roughly, play for the sake of victory) and striving play (roughly, play for the sake of the struggle) as forms of gameplay that help to explain players' behaviour – this distinction, I argue, is only partially correct because there are behaviours which can be expected in gameplay but are

inexplicable to a theorist with access only to achievement play and striving play. Here, I focus on those behaviours that require us to acknowledge the existence of authorial play – roughly, play for the sake of making things happen – such as 'kamikaze' gameplay which leads inevitably to defeat or 'game-breaking' gameplay which tests the tolerance of the game's parameters. In section 1, I introduce the context for examining forms of play – doing so helps make sense of player behaviour, shows how games engage their players, and sheds light on why gameplay can merit aesthetic appreciation. In section 2, I recapitulate Nguyen's distinction between achievement play and striving play, briefly indicating through examples how this contributes to the above three goals. In section 3, I introduce some examples of gameplay and argue that they cannot be accounted for by the existing forms of play, before providing an account of what I take to unite the examples. In section 4, I first consider possible objections to the distinction before closing by drawing some preliminary boundaries of this form of play.

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The Nonworseness Claim and Oppressive Double Binds

The *nonworseness claim* has been a longstanding topic of discussion among business ethicists. It posits that it cannot be worse, morally speaking, to engage in a voluntary and mutually beneficial transaction, than to refrain from transacting altogether. I introduce oppressive double binds as a significant moral concern for these debates and argue that they constitute a challenge for defenders of the nonworseness claim.

I argue for three main claims. First, I argue that the choice situation facing potential sweatshop employees constitute a form of oppressive double bind. Second, I argue that choice situations structured as oppressive double binds are morally problematic as they perniciously constrain the agency of those subjected to them as well as reproduce and maintain structural injustice and oppression. Lastly, I argue for a negative duty held by the beneficiaries of structural injustice to not subject the victims of structural injustice to oppressive double binds.

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The Intuition of Dualism and an Epistemic Gap

There is no consensus on how to explain our persistent intuition that consciousness is not a physical property. While physicalists argue that the intuition of dualism results from a cognitive error of some sort (e.g., Papineau 2020), others argue that it reflects a genuine epistemic problem (Levine 2020). I propose a new argument for the second view.

Levine assumes that we do not understand how conscious states could be physical states. But this does not seem to be the sense of the epistemic problem at issue. Typically, we do not understand how *a* can be *b* when we have reasons to think that *a* is not *b*. But the intuition of dualism is independent of any reasons for thinking that consciousness is not physical.

In my view, the intuition of dualism is related to the fact that phenomenal truths are not deducible from physical truths. A consequence of this epistemic gap is that psychophysical identities are not deducible from the complete physical description of the world.

One can therefore assume, consistently with our complete physical knowledge, that conscious states are not identical with physical states but only correlated with them. For this reason, it intuitively seems arbitrary to suppose that the relation between conscious states and physical states is identity rather than mere correlation.

By contrast, theoretical identities are deducible from the complete physical truth. If I possess the concept *water*, then sufficient information about the distribution, behavior, and appearance of clusters of H_2O molecules enables me to infer that water is H_2O (Chalmers and Jackson 2001).

My information about H_2O molecules is therefore inconsistent with assuming that water is XYZ, which explains why there is nothing arbitrary about the claim that water is H_2O rather than XYZ.

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Feminist Pornography as Slur-Appropriation

Feminist philosophers of language have typically used speech act theory to analyze the harms of pornography. But this linguistic treatment of pornography is often restricted to anti-pornography sentiments, and feminists have rarely used speech-act theory to analyze potentially positive aspects of pornography. Here, I attempt to account for some non-subordinating and possibly empowering dimensions of pornography by analyzing it in terms of speech-acts of slurring. I argue that just as targeted groups often appropriate slurs through discourse role reversal (Popa-Wyatt 2020), feminist pornographers appropriate seemingly misogynistic pornographic narratives and otherwise subordinating illocutionary acts through appropriative uses of signs (images, videos, words etc.) that function like appropriative uses of epithets or slurs. Crucially, this approach reveals important philosophical limitations of treating pornography as speech in the first place.

My argument comprises three steps. First, I present Rae Langton's speech-act view of pornography and develop on a familiar objection to it: the authority problem. I argue that she demands too much of pornography for it have a subordinating illocutionary force — Langton is mistaken to claim that pornography can only subordinate when it has an authority derived from some formal or sanctioned authority, and I call this the problem of special authority.

Second, I argue that if we want to analyze pornography using tools from the philosophy of language, then pornography is best understood in terms of speech acts of slurring. This analysis has two important theoretical advantages over previous speech-act views: it side-steps the special authority problem, and it avoids over-generalizations about pornography's misogyny.

Third, I argue that feminist pornography is best understood as an instance of slur appropriation: because feminist pornographers often undermine subordinating illocutionary forces of mainstream pornography (either via discourse role reversal, or by intentionally violating misogynistic industry norms), feminist pornography does not constitute subordination.

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Giving Uptake to the Metaphorical Meaning of Delusions

Sometimes, people report beliefs to us which are extremely implausible or straightforwardly false, such as delusional beliefs. In these cases, listeners can feel that they face an anxiety-inducing trade-off between giving generous uptake, or being stricter with the testimony they accept but at the risk of perpetrating epistemic injustice.

I argue that in these cases, we can separate giving uptake to the propositional content of that testimony, and giving uptake to the perspective conveyed in that testimony. This way, we avoid facing any such trade-off. But what is the 'perspective' of that testimony and how do we give uptake to it?

Here, I draw on recent work on the meaningfulness of delusions (Ritunnano and Bortolotti 2022) and specifically metaphorical meanings of delusions (Bongiorno 2020; Bradley and Gibson 2023; Ritunnano & Littlemore 2024). Moving away from deficit-based accounts of delusions, these accounts consider that delusional beliefs are attempts to capture and convey the emotional experiences of that speaker. Given the strength and complexity of those feelings, what is usually recognised as metaphorical is taken as literally true by those with delusions (Bradley and Gibson 2023). This mistake may be central to delusions, but isn't exclusive to them; in non-clinical populations experiencing profound grief, individuals move back and forth between literal and metaphorical meanings (Littlemore & Turner 2019).

I argue that to take the false propositional content of testimony as a sign that there is no other possible meaning available is unjustified and rooted in pathophobia. Despite falsehoods, those with delusions still have capacity to make their best attempts at sense-making of their emotions and predicaments, which can be grasped via metaphorical meanings. I bring together work on the nature of uptake (Bianchi 2021), and

agential accounts of self-knowledge (Moran 2012; McGeer 2008) to flesh out what exactly is involved in giving uptake here.

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On Species Revival and the Badness of Extinction

Extinction is commonplace and is, for the most part, a natural part of the existence of life on Earth. Nevertheless, to varying degrees, and in various cases, we bemoan the extinction of species. This can be explained by the loss of the species itself, or the loss of the instrumental value of the species, or the loss of the intrinsic value of the species.

Recent developments in synthetic biology mean that scientists could soon create organisms of an extinct species. In a sense, then, it is possible to have members of an extinct species in existence again. This is what I call "species revival," also commonly known as "de-extinction."

The proponent of species revival argues that, where species go extinct, reviving the species can serve as an alternative to conservation. The opponent of species revival denies this claim, arguing that reviving a species is not as good as conserving the species and preventing the extinction.

In this paper, I consider one way to make sense of the opponent's position. Namely, I consider whether there is something bad about extinction over and above the aforementioned losses. I argue that, in the case of anthropogenic extinctions, this may be explained by some moral reason not to cause species to go extinct. If this is correct, then the opponent of species revival seems to be right, for even if we can mitigate the losses of extinction by later reviving species, some morally bad state of affairs occurs when a species goes extinct.

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A reading of Rousseau's theory of property rights

Rousseau's understanding of property rights is paradoxical and difficult to decipher. For a long time, scholars argue that Rousseau fails to offer a consistent account of property rights (Vaughan, 1917; Bertram, 2004; Garnsey, 2008; James, 2015), as he both supports and criticism the private property in his writings.

This paper aims to offer a reading of Rousseau's property theory which reconciles his different remarks on property rights. This paper argues that Rousseau's views on property is consistent but dual-sided as property rights involve both one's connection with oneself and with others. Following from that, Rousseau allows the right to hold property but limits the right to benefit from property.

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Restricted Hearer Attitudes: An Uptake-Based Approach to Illocutionary Force

On intentionalist views of speech acts, what fixes the illocutionary force of an utterance is the communicative intention of the speaker producing it. Although intentionalists seem to provide a plausible account of the mechanisms behind speech acts, there remain some types of illocutionary acts they seem unable to account for. After outlining the central components of intentionalism (Section 2), I show that intentionalist views lack the resources to explain some common cases of delayed illocutionary acts, speech acts with multiple illocutionary forces and unintentional dogwhistles (Section 3). Hearer uptake plays a significantly larger role in determining illocutionary force in these cases than assigned to them by intentionalists.

Emphasising hearer interpretation, however, invites what I term the *no-restriction objection* (levelled against existing uptake-centred theories in various forms): speakers now seem to be unintentionally performing unrestricted types of illocutionary acts with a single utterance. In response, I propose that only certain hearer attitudes can fix illocutionary forces of utterances (Section 4). By drawing on the theory of

code words given by Khoo 2017 (Khoo, Justin. 2017. "Code Words in Political Discourse." *Philosophical Topics* 45 (2): 33-64), I develop my proposal into an account where hearers infer the illocutionary forces of utterances based on pre-existing generalised beliefs they have or generics they believe.

After articulating further conditions on the use of such attitudes and the speaker's role in constraining the range and types of attitudes hearers can employ (Section 5), I show how this theory deals with the *no-restriction objection* (Section 6). I conclude that this new account, by incorporating the role of hearer uptake while preserving the intuition that speakers have at least some control over their illocutionary acts, offers a favourable alternative to intentionalist views (Section 7).

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Rethinking the Sex/Gender Distinction

In this paper, I argue that the sex/gender distinction puts feminist philosophers in two related binds. Some have worried that the separation of sex and gender re-introduces a pernicious conceptual split between body and mind.[1] Yet, such criticisms have seen little uptake, given the worry that rejecting the sex/gender distinction is a regression into pernicious forms of biological determinism that harms and delegitimizes the existence of trans people.

The *conceptual* bind then could be thought of thus: Either we accept the sex/gender distinction and embrace such a split, or we fall back into a picture where sex *is* gender, and therefore, that it follows from being a specific sex (e.g. female) that one is a particular gender (e.g. a woman). For those who critique the mind-body dualism that the sex/gender distinction implicitly assumes, a second *practical* bind arises, for such projects face skepticism and criticism given the distinction's usefulness for explaining and legitimizing the existence of trans people to themselves, as well as to the broader public. Given that the access to fundamental rights and material goods for trans people is still not afforded in many contemporary contexts, maintaining a robust conceptual and ontological distinction seems *practically* more important than ever.

I argue that the conceptual and practical binds point towards serious shortcomings in *a)* the ways we theorize sex and gender and *b)* how we justify and legitimate trans people's existence. To begin remedying these shortcomings, I outline different questions pertinent to rethinking the implicit mind/body dualism in the ontology of sex and gender and argue that we should move away from according too much weight to the sex/gender distinction when justifying and legitimizing trans peoples' existence.

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Why Professors Should Not Sleep With Their Students

Is it possible to explain the wrong involved in professors (or other teaching staff) sleeping with their students within a consent framework? I argue that it is. My proposed account of the wrong is distinct from what I consider the two most common accounts of sexual consent in the context of those relationships. The first group of accounts holds that (valid) consent to sleeping with one's professor is impossible (e.g. Coleman 1988, Archard 1994). The second group claims that consent is possible in those relationships and holds that we ought to move away from a consent-based evaluation of the wrong involved, instead proposing alternative accounts (e.g. Srinivasan 2020, 2021).

My account presents a distinct third option. I argue that genuine or valid consent is indeed possible even in this context, but that in order for one to permissibly act on the basis of someone else's consent, one needs to be justified in believing that they are consenting (see also Guerrero 2021, Lackey 2021). Thus, I hold that the wrong involved is consent-based.

Specifically, I argue that apparently consensual professor-student relationships are either (1) actually non-consensual or (2) minimally involve unacceptable moral risk due to the lack of necessary justification even when consent is present. To establish this, I consider relevant sociological and psychological research regarding those relationships (Bull and Page 2020, Bellas and Gossett 2001, Glaser and Thorpe

1986 i.a.) , including student self-reports, and studies of the phenomenon of delayed disclosure (and recognition) of sexual violence (Wilson and Miller 2016).

Drawing from this data, I find that students rarely genuinely consent to those encounters and that the professors involved are unlikely to have a justified belief (or knowledge) that the student consents, which renders sleeping with them at best unacceptably morally risky and at worst non-consensual.

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Higher-Order Evidence in Philosophical and Biomedical Ethics

Appeals to higher-order evidence, like peer disagreement or expert opinion, seem prohibited in scholarly philosophical argumentation: arguments for the truth of p should only appeal to first-order evidence. In ethics, for example, it would not be particularly interesting or fruitful to appeal to the controversial status among epistemic peers of a view like deontology to argue against it.

Insulating our philosophical reasoning from such kinds of higher-order evidence allows us to focus our epistemic pursuits on first-order evidence, fosters epistemic diversity, allows sincerity in our positions (Barnett 2019), avoids inconclusive conclusions based on higher-order evidence (Königs forthcoming), without becoming irrational in holding on to our positions, despite granting conciliationism, because our all-things-considered judgments differ from our insulated positions.

But if we are not just interested in epistemic pursuit, but have to act on the basis of our judgments, we should take into account all of our evidence and act on the basis of our all-things-considered judgments. This is suggested by cases such as a medical doctor deciding on treatment for a patient (Barnett 2017).

This sheds light on some perceived differences between ethics in scholarly philosophy and biomedical ethics. There does not seem to be a norm against appeals to higher-order evidence such as peer disagreement in medical ethics; this may be accounted for, and justified by, its action-guiding character. I reconstruct elements of Beauchamp and Childress' common-morality based principlism, appeals to professional medical ethos, and various methodological aspects in clinical ethics research as appeals to higher-order evidence.

While the action-guiding character of medical ethics may justify some appeals to higher-order evidence, caution is necessary: there are scenarios in which higher-order evidence should be bracketed in practical, action-guiding issues, as well. In general, an explicit account of the proper role of higher-order evidence in medical ethics is needed.

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Role Ethics and Action Guidance

Role ethics asserts that the duties, responsibilities, and virtues which constitute moral life are sourced from and shaped by the social roles that individuals occupy. Despite its prevalence in non-Western philosophical traditions and its apparent intuitive appeal, role ethics has been largely overlooked in contemporary analytic moral discourse. One worry that has stunted its growth is its perceived inadequacy in delivering action-guidance. Social roles are complex, multifaceted, and often ambiguous, making it difficult to specify the content of role-differentiated duties and the actions which would best fulfil them. Furthermore, even if there were some procedure from which we were able to specify role-related duties, it may still be unclear how to act rightly because individuals will confront several distinct role duties simultaneously, many of which will conflict.

In this paper, I seek to motivate the viability of role ethics as a normative ethical theory by responding to criticisms regarding its capacity to provide action-guidance. I suggest we need a more detailed understanding of the composition of roles and the kinds of demands they produce. Drawing on Stephanie Collins (2023) framework, I suggest that roles produce two sets of demands: a set which is derived from the role's function, and a set which is imposed on the role-bearer by others. With a sufficiently detailed understanding of these two different demands and their origins, a strategy to determine role-differentiated duties and settle conflicts between them soon emerges. Overall, the strategy I propose aims to reconcile

the inherent dynamism and interpretability of social roles with consistent, clear role ethical action-guidance.

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Options as known abilities

In deciding what to do, agents deliberate over options, one of which will maximise some value and be recommended by the subjective ought. On one view of options, they are those actions the agent knows they are able to perform. Options as known abilities has intuitive appeal: it captures that an agent's options are both determined by how the world actually is and by how the agent believes the world to be. The extant literature on options, however, has been quick to dismiss it, arguing, for example, that the view allows for the following problematic distribution of subjective oughts:

Agent A, who knows she is able to Φ, ought to Φ Agent B, who has the justified but false beliefs that she is able to Φ, ought not to Φ

This would be problematic for two reasons. First, if two agents ought to do different things, then we should evaluate them differently if they do the same thing. Intuitively, however, it is rational to Φ for both. Second, agent B is not in a position to know what they ought to do and so the subjective ought fails to be action-guiding for them. I argue that this dismissal is based on a misunderstanding concerning which kinds of abilities options as known abilities ascribes, and, in particular, whether such ascriptions entail that attempts are successful. Opponents of options as known abilities seem to assume that the facts about the world on which an agent's options depend – the facts in view of which an ability is ascribed to them – include whether or not their attempt will be successful. Using an existing distinction between specific ability and particular ability, I suggest that the most plausible version of options as known abilities, on which options require specific abilities, evades counterexamples.

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Should We Compensate Economic Disadvantage Through Education?

Several influential philosophers argue that the economically disadvantaged should be compensated for differences in educational achievement. I argue that they rely on a contentious distinction between the naturally and the socially disadvantaged. I propose a prioritarian alternative according to which more should be spent on the educationally worst-off, regardless of why they are worse off. This principle can alleviate harmful amounts of inequality in society, when necessary, without having to make questionable assumptions about natural and social causes for differences in people's educational achievement.

Equality of Opportunity advocates hold that education is valuable because it grants access to rewarding careers and powerful positions in society. The more educated you are the better your chances of success in competition for such positions. But because wealthy parents can invest more in their child's education a just society must ensure that people are compensated for the effect their economic background would have on their educational attainment and, thus, their chances of success in competition for jobs. A fair competition requires that those with the same amount of natural talent and ambition have the same chances of success in competition for jobs.

However, these Equality of Opportunity principles distinguish between resource entitlements to the socially and the naturally disadvantaged. While social disadvantage should be fully compensated, natural disadvantage may be partially alleviated. I will first take their distinction as a given and show what problems we run into; then, I will draw on the social model of disability to question the distinction between natural and social disadvantage altogether. I then propose an alternative priority principle, according to which more should be spent on the worst-off. This principle is preferable to alternatives because it can alleviate harmful amounts of inequality in society without drawing an arbitrary distinction between natural and social disadvantage.

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Why Fun Aunties Matter: A Modest Account

Ethical and political discussions of children have tended to focus on relationships between parents and children, the value of institutional daycare and education, and the value of widening systems of childcare to include more parental adults. There is a form of adult-child relationship that has largely fallen by the wayside: fun auntie relationships. Despite the name, one need not be a child's relative by blood, adoption, or marriage to be a fun auntie. One might, for example, be a family friend or neighbour who occasionally spends time with or takes care of the child. In this paper, I offer a sketch of how, at their best, fun aunties relate to children and a modest account of why these relationships matter. It is modest in that I deny that non-parents of this sort figure in what children are owed as a matter of justice or have rights of the sort that parents enjoy. Nevertheless, what distinguishes fun aunties from formally responsible caregivers like parents and teachers explains the unique value that they can bring to children's lives. Drawing on recent work by Monique Wonderly on attachment security and Sarah Ruddick's "Maternal Thinking," I explore some challenges of parenting, including: overcoming separation anxiety and fostering "acceptability" without reproducing dubious social values. With these challenges in view, we can appreciate that fun aunties have an enhanced capacity to affirm children in their growing independence and individuality (even when this deviates from parents' hopes and preferences).

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Difficulty, Achievement, and Perfectionist Value

Climbing Mount Everest and writing a convincing philosophy paper seem like activities that constitute achievements. It is commonly thought that for such activities to qualify as achievements they must be difficult. On Gwen Bradford's influential account of the nature of achievement, an activity qualifies as difficult only when it involves the exertion of a sufficient quantity of what she calls intense effort. It is also commonly thought that achievements are themselves non-instrumentally valuable. On Bradford's perfectionist account of the value of achievement, the exertion of intense effort also explains an activity's achievement value. An achievement is valuable in part because it involves the development or exercise of the will, which is, according to this version of perfectionism, a valuable capacity.

In this paper, we take issue with both Bradford's view about difficulty and her perfectionist account of the value of achievements. First, we raise doubts about the intuitive plausibility of her view that only intensely effortful activities qualify as difficult. We contend that there are cases in which an activity counts as difficult simply when and because it involves a sufficient quantity of effort, even when none of that effort possesses the degree of intensity required by Bradford's view.

Second, we argue that on Bradford's account of difficulty it may turn out that living a life high in perfectionist value is not difficult in her sense and that therefore a life high in perfectionist value need not include many achievements in her sense. Pace Bradford, we argue that this may make perfectionism more, not less, attractive.

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Why ignorance is not lack of true beliefs

I argue against the mainstream views of ignorance and the lack of true beliefs as a necessary condition for an x to qualify as ignorance. I argue that the lack of true belief condition is not compatible with ignorance instances developed by critical theorists, for example white ignorance. I then conclude that we should seek a perspective that does not use the lack of true belief as a condition for an x to be an instance of ignorance.

I propose instead the Potentia view of ignorance, focusing on the lack of epistemic agency in the ignorant subject, which can be formulated as: S is ignorant of p i! S has the potentia to know that p. I defend that the Potentia view has many advantages, one of them being to be compatible with critical theories such as white ignorance.

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Russell's Meta-philosophy: Moorean Relics and Unfounded Expectations

It has become commonplace to observe that Russell's philosophical views have undergone frequent, as much as radical, changes. Amidst these numerous changes, however, two influential meta-philosophical commitments would appear to remain constant in Russell's thought: the first is the idea that the ultimate goal of philosophical enquiry is to tell us something about the make-up of reality, not just the make-up of our representations thereof; the second, that the appropriate method for pursuing the goal of philosophy is that of analysis.

In this talk, I will argue that there is a fundamental tension between these two meta-philosophical commitments – a disconnect, so to speak, between what the method of analysis aims to achieve, and what the philosophical framework in which it is embedded legitimises it to achieve. This tension, I will further maintain, is more than a mere historical curiosity. For, far from being isolated aspects of Russell's philosophy, the two meta-philosophical commitments that give rise to the tension still inform and shape the way Analytic Philosophy is understood and practised.

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On Cake, Death, and Restricted Transitivity

Cake is better than death. Can something be better than cake, yet worse than death? Some theories deny the transitivity of "better than," according to which for any A, B, and C, if A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A is better than C. This paper introduces Restricted Transitivity, asserting that for some options B and C, and any option A, if A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A is better than C. This creates a new constraint for intransitive theories: Restricted Transitivity must hold at least for some specific combinations of B and C, such as the combination where B is cake and C is death. This constraint is violated by a paradigmatically well-developed, well-understood family of intransitive theories, namely Narrow Person Affecting theories, according to which an outcome is worse only if it is worse for someone. I conclude that intransitive theories face a novel, important constraint: they need to ensure Restricted Transitivity is respected in a plausible range of cases, including the case of Cake or Death.

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The argument of Dion and Theon: the Stoic refutation of the Academic argument against growth and diminution

My objective is to show how the Stoic argument of Dion and Theon refutes the conclusion of the "Growing Argument" (GA), an Academic argument that aims to show that the processes commonly considered as of growth and diminution of an identical subject are in fact cases of destruction of a subject and of generation of another subject.

After expressing objections against Sedley's influential interpretation of the argument of Dion and Theon, I offer a new reconstruction of the argument of Dion and Theon and a new interpretation of its relationship with GA. I maintain that the argument of Dion and Theon is a refutation of GA in a dilemmatic form. The dilemma obliges to reject the premise that Theon is a whole man besides being a part of Dion – call this premise "P". P is an instance of a principle which I call "PW", saying that for any F having parts there is a whole F within a whole F. PW is entailed by the conclusion of GA. So by rejecting P the Stoics show that PW is false and therefore that the conclusion of GA is false, too.

Once GA is refuted, the Stoics can put forward their own solution to account for processes of growth and diminution: the peculiar quality.

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Conventions without Meanings, Assertions without Forces: An Austinian Perspective on Metasemantics

In this paper, I present an Austin-inspired position in metasemantics that combines two ideas: Meaning Eliminativism and Dynamic Conventionalism. I argue that linguistic units do not have meanings or forces as stable abstract objects. Instead, they have past uses (Recanati 2004: 148-152; Jaszczolt 2016: 50) that impose constraints on their new applications. The meaning or force potential of a linguistic unit — a word or sentence — can be represented as a collection of its past uses deemed standard. However, these past uses do not determine the exact properties of the unit's new applications, inviting what Sbisà (2013) calls 'interactional negotiation'. In short, each linguistic convention is a dynamically developing family or lineage (Millikan 2005) of linguistic precedents. Importantly, this family is conventional because it exists and perpetuates through a mechanism that involves negotiating an agreement between language users (Sbisà 2009).

In Section 1, I elaborate on Austin's doctrine of senses as standard item-types (Austin 1953/1979), part of his model of four assertion types — calling, describing, exemplifying, and classing — performed in uttering sentences like 'This G is an F'. I argue that the conventional meaning of the predicate 'an F' is best understood as a family of its situated senses.

In Section 2, I apply the Question Under Discussion (QUD) framework (Roberts 1996; Beaver et al. 2017) to further elaborate on the distinction between calling, describing, exemplifying, and classing. I contend that each of these assertion types is a situated speech act addressing a different QUD.

In Section 3, I examine the roles these acts play in the mechanisms that perpetuate linguistic conventions, introducing the category of counter-calling, which, together with Austin's doctrine of adjuster-words (1950, 1962), helps describe situations in which existing vocabulary must be used to report unexpected phenomena.

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Linguistic "Holding": Speaking Each Other Into Linguistic Futures

The affirmation and expression of linguistic identity is a salient cultural and political project for many minoritized language communities. Because of their dynamic linguistic environments, minoritized language communities often develop regionalisms, sociolects, and localized linguistic practices. But many of them also face widespread linguistic insecurity, sharp generational language losses, and the threat of disappearance—often due to hostile and assimilationist policies and attitudes. Consequently, many minoritized communities attempt to engage in future-oriented identity-affirming projects that might chart a course for linguistic and cultural continuance. Unfortunately, standard models of linguistic proficiency—which rely on centre-periphery models of language variance and prioritize formal registers—are ill-suited to many minoritized language communities' needs. They cast minoritized variations as dilutions of some (presumed) antecedent linguistic identity. And, rather than valuing minoritized communities' fruitful, generative, and emerging linguistic practices, such models interpret their parlance as proof of their ongoing and inevitable assimilation. This paper offers a critique of, and alternative to, standard models of linguistic proficiency. I argue that they obstruct minoritized communities' continuance by presenting them with a false dilemma where the only paths to linguistic legitimacy are the adoption of standardized dialects or assimilation into the majority language. Neither horn of the dilemma makes minoritized linguistic futures possible. And both regard the central point of language as reaching proficiency rather than forging identity through shared ways of life. I articulate a better model for understanding minoritized linguistic identities, practices, and communities. I do so by applying Hilde Lindemann's (2009) work on identity "holding" to the experiences of minoritized francophones in Atlantic Canada. I suggest that this reframing can help us understand how minoritized speakers might hold each other into their linguistic identities. Such acts of holding, I will argue, can empower minoritized communities to take up cultural inheritances and contribute to forward-looking narratives—even in the face of immense external pressures and existential risks.

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Wilfrid Sellars' Inverted Antinomy: How His Kantianism Overcomes the Clash of the Images

Wilfrid Sellars confronts the challenge of reconciling two seemingly antagonistic conceptions of the world: The 'manifest image', populated by observable entities such as trees and tables, and the 'scientific image', composed of unobservable theoretical entities such as subatomic particles. Contemporary scholarship often claims that it is impossible to fully reconcile these perspectives, leading to the assumption that one image must either be subsumed under or eliminated in favor of the other. This has led either to a rejection of Sellars' commitment to scientific realism or to a denial of the reality of the observable objects in the manifest image.

This paper shows that Sellars' adaptation of Kantian transcendental idealism provides a unique solution. By framing the conflict as a Kantian 'antinomy', in which two opposing positions present equally compelling but mutually exclusive arguments, Sellars mirrors Kant's strategy for resolving such contradictions. He assigns the scientific image to the noumenal realm (things in themselves) and the manifest image to the phenomenal realm (appearances). However, Sellars reverses Kant's solution: Whereas Kant places freedom in the noumenal realm and determinism in the phenomenal realm, Sellars places causal determinism in the noumenal (scientific) realm and freedom in the phenomenal (manifest) realm.

This approach preserves the integrity of both images while addressing some enduring challenges to Kantian transcendental idealism, particularly regarding the nature of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. However, this introduces a new challenge, which I call 'Sellars' view from nowhere'. Since the manifest and scientific images exhaust the logical possibilities, there is no third standpoint from which to evaluate both images and determine the reality of one over the other. This poses a serious problem for Sellars' transcendental idealism, as it lacks a framework for resolving the status of these two perspectives.

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Understanding Counterfactuals in Historical Narratives

A long-standing methodological debate concerns whether (good) history needs to involve counterfactuals. Two programmatic recent statements are Evans' (2008, p. 77), for whom use of counterfactuals in history boils down to "telling it like it wasn't", and Lebow's (2008, p. 92), for whom "counterfactuals are critical to good history". My contribution to this debate is twofold. First, I survey some of the reasons given in favor of thinking that counterfactuals are necessary for (good) historical understanding, and find that such reasons are not compelling. Second, I offer a diagnosis of what the debate is: each side of the debate relies on a plausible intuition, but the two sides construe counterfactuals differently, so the debate might, in all plausibility, be seen as based on an equivocation. What are the respective intuitions? For friends of counterfactuals, these are devices without which our everyday speaking and thinking would be severely impoverished. Those who think historical discourse can (in principle) be purged of counterfactuals must be construing them differently, as an appeal to circumstances that never actually occurred; and it is sensible to think that appeal to what didn't happen can't clarify what did happen. Once these intuitions are spelled out, we see that they construe counterfactuals in a linguistic and cognitive, and in an ontological way, respectively. This helps clarify the debate because it raises the question of which construal, if any, is more in line with how counterfactuals are actually used in historical discourse. The answer, however, will likely differ between different historical narratives. If properly spelled out, the debate about the role of counterfactuals in historical understanding seems to trade on a mix of conflicting intuitions – each of which is plausible in its own right – and an equivocation concerning the central notion of the debate: counterfactuals.

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The Division of Perception

According to major internalist views, one is in a position to make informed judgments about one's surroundings simply by having perceptual experiences because (1) these are partly composed of seemings

(experiences with representational content in virtue of which things seem a certain way) and (2) it is a necessary truth that, if one has a seeming that p, then one has prima facie justification for p.

The view expressed by (2) is the doctrine of dogmatism, a principle of epistemic justification held primarily within contemporary internalist epistemology of perception. Dogmatist views like these endorse or imply two theses about perceptual experience. I call the first 'the metaphysical division of perception': a perceptual experience is a composite of two metaphysically distinct states: a seeming, in virtue of which things seem a certain way whenever one enjoys a perceptual experience; and a purely sensorial state, a sensation. I call the second thesis 'the epistemic division of perception': the justification one acquires from a perceptual experience derives only from one of its components (namely, the seeming), not both.

The thesis of this paper is that if the metaphysical division of perception is true, then the epistemic division is false. I will argue for this on the basis of what I call an "incongruent experience", namely, an experience composed of a seeming and a sensation with incompatible contents. I argue that the possibility of such an experience is entailed by the metaphysical division of perception. However, intuitively, it would be irrational to believe anything on the basis of such an experience.

I argue that this intuition is explained by the thought that such incongruent experience would represent conflicting evidence for the subject. This implies that not only seemings but sensations as well are evidence. Thus, the epistemic division is false.

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The Dilemma of Demandingness

There is an overlooked dilemma for the overdemandingness objection. The overdemandingness objection is levelled against ethical theories that are considered unreasonably demanding. The intuition behind this objection is that morality must allow an agent to live a good life. Yet, the two most obvious ways to spell out this intuition are both unsatisfactory. (1) Morality must leave room for a person to live their good life, taking into account existing commitments, projects, and preferences (CPPs) that are central to who they are. The resulting picture of morality would be too permissive: Morality could not ask agents to sacrifice the pursuit of any of the specific CCPs that happen to be central to their lives. (2) Morality must leave room for a person to live a good life, irrespective of how this life relates to who they are right now. This presents an overly restrictive view of morality: Agents could be required to sacrifice the pursuit of any and all CCPs that are central to the specific persons they currently are - as long as it would be possible for them to change into a different person who would live a good life by pursuing different CPPs that align with the demands of morality. To overcome this dilemma, we need to find a middle ground: Morality must respect some aspects of a person's specific life, but agents can also be expected to change central aspects of who they are, in order to align living a good life with the demands of morality. To do this, the demandingness debate must shift its focus. Instead of asking how much agents can be asked to sacrifice of the pursuit of their actual CPPs, we must ask under what conditions and in what way agents can be expected to change the content of these CCPs.

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Authenticity: A Dilemma for Moralism

Various critical figures in modern ethics (e.g. Murdoch 1956, 1970; Williams 1985; Taylor 1989, among others) have expressed a dissatisfaction with the dominant role that contemporary philosophy assigns to a narrow conception of morality, and the impoverished picture of human life that emerges as a result. I will call this mainstream view 'moralism'. In this paper I discuss an ideal with which some of the critical thinkers I've mentioned were deeply concerned, but which receives surprisingly little focus in contemporary ethics: authenticity. Taking authenticity seriously gives rise to a dilemma for moralism. Neither horn of the dilemma, I argue, is good news for the moralist.

The problem is this. Moralism is the view that moral considerations have overriding importance in comparison to non-moral ones. And this has familiar implications: for how we should think of our relationship to what we think and do; how we might justify the commitments that structure our lives; and how we should think of our relationships to others. But these implications seem to stray into the territory of another ideal which proliferates modern life: authenticity. In fact, many patterns of behaviour seem driven by a pursuit of authenticity but clash with moralism. I draw this out by revisiting Williams' discussion of Anna Karenina in the context of moral luck (Williams 2002), and trying to cast it in a different light.

So, moralism faces a dilemma. It insists that authenticity can only be achieved under the auspices of moralism, in which case it seems to warp authenticity – this is the explanatory challenge. Or, it admits authenticity as a self-standing ideal, in which case authenticity emerges as a genuine rival to morality – this is the normative challenge. After setting out the dilemma, I consider some implications of the normative challenge.

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AI Testimony, Responsibility Gaps, and Epistemic Blame

What should we think about the status of AI speech? In particular, what should we think about the apparent ability of AI systems to make assertions? One emerging view holds that since AI cannot bear responsibility and responsibility is necessary for making assertions, AI cannot assert (Van Woudenberg et al, 2023; Fricker, 2024). According to this view, which we might label semantic nihilism, LLMs are incapable of producing output with semantically meaningful content, and our treatment of them as sources of information should be viewed as engaging in a kind of pretence. One consequence of this is that we are faced with the problem of an epistemic responsibility gap, similar to the more familiar notion of ethical responsibility gaps. In response, I show that the argument for nihilism equivocates between moral and epistemic conceptions of responsibility. The argument in favour of the absence of responsibility for AI appeals to moral notions of responsibility and blame, having to do with the inappropriateness of reactive attitudes such as resentment, indignation, guilt, and shame, whereas the notion of responsibility relevant to the question of whether an agent is capable of assertoric speech acts is epistemic. I then consider what options are available to us for making sense of epistemic responsibility for AI assertion, appealing to a distinction between responsibility as attributability, accountability, and answerability. I argue that while it perhaps makes little sense to hold AI responsible in the attributability sense, it is prima facie plausible that AI can be answerable for its assertions. Finally, I argue against the prevailing wisdom that it is "absurd" to hold AI accountable, appealing once again to the distinction between moral and epistemic accountability and blame.

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Vagueness and Responsibility

The philosophy of responsibility often assumes—or at least implies—that responsibility is a precise concept. That is, it makes the metaphysical or ontological claim that, despite our limited epistemic capacities, there is always a clear matter of fact as to whether someone is responsible or not, with no room for genuine indeterminacy. In this talk, I challenge this assumption by exploring the idea that responsibility is, instead, a vague concept. This alternative suggests the existence of a grey area where no metaphysical or ontological fact definitively determines whether someone is responsible.

I first support the vagueness of responsibility by highlighting key features such as imprecise gradability, lack of clear boundaries, and tolerance. I then introduce an unconventional approach to addressing this vagueness: the normative power of taking responsibility after the fact. I propose that this normative power enables individuals to navigate moral vagueness by transitioning their status from indeterminate to determinate responsibility by mere declaration. This power is not about creating responsibility ex nihilo, but only about resolving vagueness where responsibility is indeterminate.

Drawing on contractualist frameworks, I argue that no one could reasonably reject a principle granting this power, given its potential to address significant values in three domains: morality, by fostering moral

reasoning and action; relationships, by reinforcing trust and accountability; and identity, by affirming one's agential self-conception. To ensure this power is not misapplied, I propose two conditions: failure of a quality of will test (to preclude cases of already established responsibility) and the absence of a denial, i.e. a specific type of defence (to preclude cases without any link to the agent taking responsibility).

I conclude that responsibility can be altered retrospectively in cases of vagueness, while remaining unchangeable in clear, 'sharp' cases.

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The Black-White Binary as an Epistemology of Ignorance

In her canonical 1999 paper "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," Claire Jean Kim called for the end of the Black-white binary and the inclusion of Asian (and Hispanic) Americans in American race discourse. In her 2003 article "Latino/As, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary" and her 2006 book Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Linda Alcoff does the same. Why, then, despite prominent academic criticism and proven empirical inadequacy, has the Black-white binary persisted in both American popular race discourse and in the analytic philosophy of race? This paper reconceives of this rhetorical persistence as an epistemology of ignorance, or, a structural inattention toward evidence and theories that are disruptive to dominant material and ideological structures. I will argue that Black-white binary language upholds oppressive structures in at least the following ways: 1. It dehistoricizes and decontextualizes race into abstract analytic poles, which makes binary race appear inevitable and fixed while simultaneously erasing varied and contingent modes of racialization. 2. It obfuscates and upholds specific racist American legal and political constructs, such as the One Drop Rule and linear racial hierarchy. 3. It produces theories of race that are inattentive to the existence and experience of most racialized people, rendering them at best inaccurate and at worst pernicious. By considering the Black-white binary to be a species of epistemology of ignorance, two features of this discourse come to the fore. First, we see that it is functional in maintaining oppressive structures, rather than being merely incidental to these structures or being a byproduct of those structures. And, secondly, we see that it is defined not by the absence of knowledge but by substantive epistemic practices that produce ignorance. In other words, the Black-white binary actively produces ignorance in the discursive contexts in which it occurs, including the academic study of race.

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Reconsidering the Grounds for Public Trust in Science

In recent years, philosophers of science have proposed various grounds for public trust in science. A popular view of this kind grounds trust in the alignment of values, which is conceived as alignment of inductive risk assessments. In this paper, I argue that thinking these two are the same is a mistake.

After showing how alignment of values and alignment of risk assessments are distinct, I discuss the implications of this conceptual distinction for the value alignment view. When considered apart from risk assessment, its distinct challenges become apparent.

Subsequently, I examine how other views proposing grounds for trust in science compare in light of this distinction. These views are the high epistemic standards view and the democratic values view. While the former fails to provide additional reasons for trust that other views provide, the latter prescribes a more attainable situation but lacks some benefits of value alignment, which is harder to achieve. My aim in this discussion is to offer a clear view of the conceptual landscape and reveal the particular strengths and weaknesses of different views in justifying public trust in science.

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On Lexical Priority

Appeals to forms of lexical priority whereby moral phenomena are placed in serial ordering appear in numerous debates in political philosophy, axiology, and decision theory. 'Lexical priority' is thought to have a common meaning across these fields, belying the need for further conceptual analysis. Yet distinct definitions across debates build in diverse commitments at the expense of conceptual clarity and continuity. This work accordingly identifies the components of different definitions, explains why they do not refer to a single concept, and defends a minimalist, Rawlsian conception of lexical priority. It thereby demonstrates that participants in distinct debates risk talking past one another and that the idea of lexical priority can be plausibly understood without strong axiological commitments about 'absolute' values.

Definitions of lexical priority variously suggest that a lexical prior principle/imperative/value (a) must be fulfilled to a sufficient degree before attending to inferior ones, (b) cannot be sacrificed or traded off for gains in an inferior one, (c) has absolute or infinite weight with respect to inferior ones, and (d) should always be pursued even at the expense of inferior ones. It is also said that (e) any violation of a lexically prior principle is worse than any violation of an inferior one. These claims are non-equivalent – and may not even be consistent.

I argue that (a) provides the basis for a concept that is able to serve lexical priority's intended roles in moral and political thought. Lexical priority demands that one ensure A is fulfilled to a sufficient degree prior to attending to B. This demand can be justified without strong axiological commitments about the value of A and B, though plausible axiological commitments explain why lexical priority appears plausible in some cases. This account can accordingly also explain appeals to lexical priority in axiology.

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Freedom and Ideological Oppression

What is it to be rendered politically unfree by one's own beliefs? Recent work on ideology and epistemic oppression has yielded insightful analyses of the ways in which belief can be shaped and distorted by forms of social power. However, while it's often presumed in this literature that ideological belief is capable of rendering its victims unfree in a politically relevant sense, this isn't a claim that's received much explicit discussion or defence. Moreover, it isn't entirely clear what modern account of political freedom could be brought to its defence—especially since, as I argue here, neither relational theories of personal autonomy, nor neo-republican theories of freedom, turn out to be up to the task.

In this talk, I propose and defend a theory of interpersonal subjection designed, in part, to help us to make sense of the claim that ideological belief constitutes a form of unfreedom. Crucially, this is a theory on which interpersonal subjection, though requiring that there obtain a certain kind of structural relation between wills, does not require that this relation obtain as a result of anyone's intentional actions. I argue that this enables us to make sense of cases of structural ideological oppression, in which the prevalence of certain ideas amongst a social group is explained, in part, by the fact that this prevalence covertly helps to advance the interests of another social group.

Thus I claim that to be rendered politically unfree by one's own beliefs is for those beliefs to help, in this way, to constitute one's subjection to foreign wills. Though broadly republican in flavour, this account departs from contemporary republicanism in a number of important respects, which I detail. I also draw out some potentially productive implications of the account for our understanding of the relationship between freedom and knowledge.

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Philosophy and Literature: Companions in Guilt
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the position that one can do philosophy through literature. I address central challenges to this position, arising from the sceptical view that interacting with literature by itself either does not constitute philosophical activity or involves only limited and superficial philosophical activity unless accompanied with a non-literary supplement such as a commentary.

To do so, I present a companions-in-guilt argument. Sceptics claim that there is only limited philosophical content in literature, and therefore engaging with this type of writing does not constitute self-sufficient philosophical activity. However, the reasons they give for this claim commit them to a further, implausible implication, which is that – on their own reasoning – engaging with traditional academic philosophical writing (e.g. articles, monographs) likewise cannot constitute self-sufficient philosophical activity.

Since I assume this implication is unacceptable - it certainly looks absurd to even suggest that the reading of philosophical writing does not constitute in philosophical activity - we can conclude that there's something wrong with the reasons given for rejecting philosophical content in literature too. As a result of this conclusion, the sceptic is left with the option of accepting that literature is not less philosophical than traditional academic philosophical writing or conceding that neither are philosophical, resulting in undesirable nihilism for both disciplines.

I conclude that, given the companions in guilt argument, there is no reason to suggest that literature cannot have philosophical content, or result in philosophical activity, for the reasons given by the sceptics.

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A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model

Evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) models of morality have been the target of several powerful criticisms. The project of using EGT for the vindication of this hypothesis has largely stalled in the last decade, giving the impression that the criticisms conclusively showed that EGT simulations are bound to remain toy models with little connection to reality.

The pessimistic impression is premature. I defend the thesis that the criticisms ultimately show only that the most naive models in the EGT tradition are what philosophers of models call epistemically opaque how-possibly models. They can be modified to reach the status of causal how-possibly models, thus supplying real resources for philosophical arguments about moral emergence rather than empirically irrelevant formal exploration.

Guided by philosophy of simulations literature, I make concrete steps towards achieving the transition. The first step is concerned with fostering closer collaboration between palaeoanthropology and EGT and drawing on evidence from the former to improve the models. Concrete parameter ranges and empirically adequate idealisations for model design are provided, and empirical justification for these is given. The second contribution consists in defining the set of metaethical theories on which the models show the evolution of morality proper rather than some other, purely behavioural phenomenon. This solves the most pressing objection: that no degree of sophistication of EGT models can make them relevant in explaining moral emergence due to the thick nature of morality as an explanandum.

The work contributes two general arguments. One: that most naive EGT models of moral evolution are proven inadequate by criticisms does not showcase the general futility of using EGT in all philosophical work concerning moral evolution. Two: there are concrete, implementable ways to make these models more valuable explanatory tools, which the project details and begins implementing.

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Externalism Does Have an Access Problem

Externalism about the mind is widely popular, and the worry that externalism poses a threat to a sort of immediate knowledge of one's mind seems outdated for a number of reasons. First, given the prevalence of empirically-minded views of the mind (see Byrne 2022), according to which any special status of self-knowledge is questionable, it's not an issue specific to externalism if people struggle to know their minds. Second, compatibilist theories of self-knowledge according to which self-knowledge is special only insofar as it is trivial are thriving and being extended from thought contents to attitudes (see Das & Salow 2016). Third, even those externalists who have never thought it compelling that self-knowledge is any more trivial than any other sort of knowledge, don't think that externalism generates an access problem for us: the cases discussed in the debate are too outlandish to be relevant to us (see Brown 2004). So,

there is a general sense that compatibilism won the debate. This status quo I hope to change. I will argue against each of the compatibilist central claims. First, I show that externalism generates an access problem however deflationary one's views about self-knowledge are. Second, I show that compatibilists theories of self-knowledge according to which self-knowledge is trivial are plausible only to the extent that they are uninteresting. Finally, I argue that the access problem isn't harmless: externalism leads to an access problem in normal situations. If externalism is correct, people sometimes don't know their minds. True anti-Cartesians aren't surprised. But true anti-Cartesians aren't compatibilists - you can't have it all.

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Dissolving 'Henrich's Challenge': On the Proof-Structure of Kant's B-Deduction

In a seminal paper, Dieter Henrich posed a puzzle concerning the interpretation of the B-deduction: In §21, Kant seems to claim that the B-Deduction is one proof given in two distinct steps. Yet, the conclusion that Kant arrives at in the second step would seem to be the very same conclusion he had already drawn in the first. What, then, is the second step good for?

Some commentators (among others Gomes 2010, Shaddock 2015, Williams 2018, Laywine 2020) have offered an answer to this question by proposing reconstructions of the 'B-Deduction' that assign distinct argumentative aspects to the two steps (two-sided readings). Other commentators (restriction readings) see the proof of the objective validity of the categories as fundamentally given by the first step, but merely under some restriction or indeterminacy that is only removed by the second step (among others Henrich 1973, Pippin, 1982, Guyer 1987/2010, Carl 1998, Pollok 2008, Rauscher 2014). While according to bifurcation readings, the separation into two distinct proof steps is explained by some conceptual ambiguity (Allison 1987/2004, Evans 1990, Onof/Schulting 2015, Allais 2017). The extant literature, that is, has for the most part accepted Henrich's reading of §21, consequently attempting to solve the purported puzzle.

In this paper, I propose to dissolve the puzzle instead—by rejecting Henrich's interpretation of §21. The crucial juxtaposition of §21 does not, as Henrich assumed, concern 'Anfang der transzendentalen Deduktion' and 'Absicht der transzendentalen Deduktion'. Instead, as I will show, the text of §21 unequivocally suggests a juxtaposition concerning 'Transzendentale Deduktion' and 'Absicht der transzendentalen Deduktion'. According to my alternative proposal, Kant points to a secondary aim of the deduction in §21. The paragraph therefore does not demand the proof-structure suggested by Henrich's interpretation.

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Gender Orientalism and Cultural Harms

The multiculturalism-feminism debate has recently been gathering more attention given Western states' growing emphasis on "rescuing" minority women from allegedly oppressive cultural practices (Abu-Lughod 2013, Khader 2019). These efforts have taken various forms, from military interventions, to legal bans on religious traditions, to immigration restrictions targeting certain cultural/religious groups (Spohn 2013, Farris 2017). As political polarisation intensifies and backlash against perceived "outsiders" escalates, it is apparent we ought to revisit the intersections of gender, culture, and religion.

This talk aims to do so through an exploration of how Gender Orientalism (GO) shapes Western views of minority women. Drawing from Said's (1973) Orientalism, GO is a style of thought based upon a distorted ontological and epistemological distinction between 'Oriental' and 'Western' women. 'The former are defined as exotic, submissive victims, while the latter are defined as civilised and free (Fernandes 2017, Belli & Loretoni 2019).

I look into how the GO's distorted ontology shapes the Western understanding of 'gendered cultural harms.' By comparing parallel cultural practices in the West and 'Orient,' I will argue that through the manufactured binary between autonomous Western and victimised 'Oriental' women, cultural harms are thus defined as an exclusively non-Western issue. This distortion has twofold consequences: First, it perpetuates colonial narratives of racial and cultural superiority (Ahmad 2009, Nader 2013). Second, it

creates significant epistemic barriers for Westerners in recognising the shared, transnational nature of gendered oppression, allowing some patriarchal practices in the West that similarly encroach on women's bodies to remain largely unchallenged (e.g., cosmetic surgery).

Ultimately, I argue that recognising commonalities in how women's bodies are controlled across cultures could not only challenge certain Orientalist notions of Western superiority, but also provide alternative avenues to address gendered harms without falling into common "missionary feminist" errors of resorting to paternalism and imperialism (Khader 2019).

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Norms of inquiry for bounded epistemic agents

In recent years, epistemology has taken a zetetic turn: the focus has shifted from investigating epistemic norms towards exploring the norms of inquiry. In contrast to epistemic norms, which regulate the properties of belief and other doxastic states, zetetic norms refer to the entire process of inquiry from initial curiosity to active investigation and settling the question. Inquiry epistemology studies how to conduct rational and responsible inquiry and what norms should govern it.

Norms of inquiry can be investigated in an idealized or non-idealized way. Non-ideal epistemology, as defined by Robin McKenna, is an approach to addressing first-order epistemological questions that aims to avoid various types of idealizations that traditional analytic epistemology often relies on. Although it is widely acknowledged that we are bounded agents, constrained by the limitations of our cognitive system, such as working memory, attention span and processing power, this is not necessarily reflected in the norms of inquiry. Norms often rely on idealized models of epistemic agents, scraping away their cognitive and practical limitations, and assume that they operate in an epistemically hospitable environment. The issue of these norms is not only that they are often unattainable for real inquirers, but also that they do not help us achieve our epistemic goals and cannot serve as good epistemic advice.

The aim of this paper is to propose norms of rational inquiry for bounded agents embedded in a non-ideal epistemic environment. These norms consider empirical data about the scope and limitations of human cognition, practical constraints on inquiry in our daily lives, and the nature of epistemic environment in which we conduct our inquiries, such as the prevalence of misinformation and access to trustworthy sources of information. Such norms could serve as epistemic guidance for non-ideal agents at various stages of inquiry.

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Feelings Touched: On Tactually Perceiving the Emotions of Others

It has recently been argued that the emotions of others can be directly perceived. On such a view, when we see, e.g. an angry face—the teeth exposed, the brow furrowed, the jaw clenched—we do not merely see its low-level visual features, such as its shape, color, or spatial orientation. We also directly see its anger. Until now, the debate on direct emotion perception has remained largely confined to a visuocentric framework, with all sensory modalities beyond the visual receiving little to no attention.

The aim of my presentation is to advance further our understanding of how we perceive the emotions of others by focusing on the overlooked role of touch. The presentation will be divided into three parts.

In the first part of the presentation, I will discuss some evidence that human beings can accurately assess the emotions of others based solely on tactile stimulation. As in the visual domain, however, recognizing the emotions of others based on touch does not necessarily entail that said emotions are tactually perceived; it might instead involve inferring emotions from tactile cues.

Thus, in the second part of the presentation, I will challenge the latter view via an argument that draws from the recent empirical literature on the relationship between purely tactile cues and our ability to recognize emotions from those cues.

Lastly, in the third part of the presentation, I will explore some key differences between visual and tactile emotion perception, highlighting the unique role of touch in the perception of prosocial emotions like love, gratitude, and sympathy.

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Carroll's Tortoise Against Meta-Decision Theory

Decision theories tell us which combinations of belief, preference, and choice are instrumentally rational in conditions of uncertainty. Given the range of alternative theories, and the wealth of arguments for and against each, it is reasonable to remain uncertain about which is the correct account. How, then, should we make choices under uncertainty about decision theory itself? In this paper, I draw a distinction between two approaches to this question, and show that one is untenable. "Proliferators" think of decision theories as options between which agents can choose. Because different decision theories present different strategies for making first-order choices, decision-theoretic uncertainty generates an additional, higher-order choice about which theory to follow. "Reframers" stick with a single, first-order decision, but change its framing to incorporate one's decision-theoretic uncertainty. This involves treating decision theories like states of the world and assigning them probabilistic credences. This paper presents a two-step argument against the reframers' strategy. The first step shows that this strategy involves adopting instrumental rationality as an end in itself. This is established by demonstrating that reframers must model agents as assigning different values to propositions that differ only with respect to the nature of instrumental rationality. The second step is to show that holding instrumental rationality as an end is necessarily self-defeating. The argument for this claim builds on an analogue of Lewis Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. Numerous philosophers have presented modified versions of this story to demonstrate that taking instrumental rationality as an end leads to an infinite regress. Here, I show that, once an agent adopts instrumental rationality as an end, they cannot arrive at a stable evaluation of the possible outcomes of their choice. Therefore, the reframers' strategy is unable to answer the question of which option is instrumentally rational in choices under decision-theoretic uncertainty.

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On Love and Categorisation

As a rule, we tend to be invested in categorising the people we encounter in various ways. For instance, we might be invested in categorising them according to their gender, race, and/or class; according to whether they are a political theorist or a philosopher, and if the latter then whether they are an analytic or a continental philosopher; and so on. There are obviously a number of good reasons for this investment: categorising people provides us with explanations for their behaviour, scripts to follow in our interactions with them, information relevant to an assessment of their credibility, and so on. At the same time, there are downsides to being the object of this investment: it can exhaust us by forcing us to consistently take up an alienated, outside perspective on ourselves; and it can constrict us by making it consistently difficult to act genuinely spontaneously.

I propose that each of us has both a need for opportunities to rest from viewing ourselves from this alienated, outside perspective, and a need for opportunities to act genuinely spontaneously; and moreover that loving someone is at least in part a matter of being responsive to their needs. It follows that disinvesting from categorising someone in various ways can be a way of loving them. What emerges is a picture on which the intimate sphere has the capacity to function as a kind of refuge from our everyday practices of making sense of one another.

In developing and justifying this picture, I draw extensively on the late and posthumously published work of Roland Barthes – particularly passages in *Camera Lucida*, *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, *The Neutral*, and *Mourning Diary* where Barthes describes how his mother loved him. I further illustrate this picture using Maggie Nelson's acclaimed memoir *The Argonauts*.

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Thompson's non-empirical conception of life

In 'The Representation of Life' (1995), Michael Thompson articulated a description of living beings under the 'life form' they bear. Consider the statement 'Wolves hunt in packs.' Its subject, 'wolves' denotes the life form, and the predicate 'hunt in packs' describes a characteristic part of *that* particular life form. A totality of such sentences constitutes knowledge about the life form 'wolf', and provides a background - the standard, or norm - against which we can judge *particular* members of that life form. Were we to encounter a free-riding wolf we could claim: *this* wolf is defective, with respect to being a wolf, in that it does not hunt in packs. Thus, we can formulate normative judgements about individuals from the knowledge of their life form.

Thompson proposed such a metaphysical account of life with an ethical purpose of conceptualising human beings as such, to conceivably be used at the centre of ethical thinking - as it has been in neo-Aristotelian theories of natural normativity. Notably, in Philippa Foot's 'Natural Goodness' (2001). These theories hold a neo-Aristotelian, *teleological* conception of nature, instead of an empirical, scientific one. As such, the salient feature of Thompson's account for them is that it is conceivably a *non-empirical* conception.

A defence of this particular feature is relevant because, if it was *empirical*, then those theories which appeal to it would be deriving their ethics out of biology. I note the importance of this non-empirical feature of Thompson's account, propose the consequences of it being incorrect, and defend it by firstly invoking Thompson's articulation of his account as a logical system, and his two supporting arguments for it being non-empirical, and secondly, by supporting it with my own argument of considering the referent of a life form in statements such as 'Wolves hunt in packs.'

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Extracting McDowell's Insight on Colour from his Dispositionalism

In this paper, I argue that what I consider as McDowell's key insight on the nature of colour and colour experience – that human subjectivity is inevitably involved – can be detached from his stronger claim that colours are dispositions constituted by human subjectivity, and whose essential nature is exhausted by their distinctive looks.

I first explicate McDowell's key motivation for his dispositionalism, before presenting an independent reason against conceiving of colours as dispositions. I will then show how a form of selectionism about colour perception that emphasises on the partiality of our "colour perspective" – and our broader perceptual perspective – on the world can preserve McDowell's key insight without his dispositionalism.

In doing so, I highlight how even if this form of selectionism is true, the phenomenology of our colour experience might nevertheless motivate a contrary intuition about the nature of colours. I also show why this form of selectionism need not compel us to think of the essential nature of colours as exhausted by their distinctive looks.

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Pluralism about scientific progress in a social framework

Discussions of the nature of scientific progress have ballooned. In this paper, I make two complaints about the state of this debate, both pointing to a common solution: (i) all accounts proposed in these discussions are *monistic* — focusing on a single cognitive good as the measure of progress, like verisimilitude, usefulness, justification, knowledge, or understanding — and (ii) most accounts rely on troubling assumptions about *who* progress is for, implausibly attributing progress to the *institution* of science or *individuals*. Both complaints encourage us to take seriously the social nature of scientific inquiry.

Scientific practices are varied, often aiming at multiple seemingly conflicting ends, even within a single discipline, making it implausible that one monist account can cover all forms of scientific progress. In one case, progress is made by improving the reliability of methods for measuring physical quantities,

increasing precision and justification, in another case progress is made by developing an accurate and comprehensive model of a phenomenon, increasing understanding. Individuals collaborate to form groups, whose actions as collective agents are structured towards particular aims that regulate individuals' actions. Progress is neither at the individual level nor at the institutional level, but at the level of coherent groups working towards particular aims; that is, progress should be identified at neither the micro nor the macro level, but at the meso level.

Progress is multiply goal-oriented, and as a social phenomenon it is dependent on the development, integration, and absorption of different types of results from a variety of sources. By recognising the social dimension of science, we finally open up space for a properly pluralist account of progress, which has been missing from the contemporary debate. Scientific progress occurs along multiple dimensions precisely because scientists work together in groups with multiple aims. Progress is *plural* because science is *social*.

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Innocent Incompatibilism

I argue that there is a broadly contractualist justification for a principle allowing blame, even if, due to our lack of free will, no one is blameworthy—and I situate this argument in the context of the longstanding debate concerning whether moral responsibility is consistent with determinism. I call the resulting view "Innocent Incompatibilism". The ultimate idea is that what we owe to one another, if no one deserves the reactive attitudes, is not to abandon these reactive attitudes; what we owe to one another is to agree that this fact can be properly ignored.

Given our human natures, I claim, the burden of suppressing the reactive attitudes is smaller than the burden of being subject to those very attitudes. Thus, we do not owe it to one another to abandon the reactive attitudes—even if no one deserves them.

The key point to be made concerns what we might call the differential harm. Consider the harm involved in being subject to the reactions of the idealized ordinary believer in moral responsibility. Now compare those harms to those involved in being subject to the reactions of the idealized "responsibility skeptic". My claim is that the differential harm is relatively small: the believer in responsibility may exhibit some reactions that "sting" that the skeptic will not, but the difference here, on reflection, is relatively mild.

On the other hand, for most of us, the harms of suppressing our dispositions to the reactive attitudes will be considerable, even if we are convinced that those attitudes are unfitting. Plausibly, then, the burden of suppressing the differential harm is more serious than being subject to the differential harm itself. It is thus hard to see why we owe to one another to suppress that differential harm—even if that harm is "undeserved" or "unfitting".

As I hope to show, these facts do not call into question the truth of incompatibilism/skepticism. Happily, however, they do call into question its practical moral significance in our interpersonal relationships.

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Collective Incoherence

In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon I dub "collectively incoherent" and identify problems that arise when our ends instantiate this phenomenon. A set of ends is incoherent when they cannot all be satisfied. It is well known that when an individual's ends are incoherent, they are subject to a Dutch book.

But incoherent ends are also problematic when they are possessed by different individuals. In such cases, groups of people are subject to an inter-personal Dutch book.

Consider Jeff and Bill, who both want to have the biggest yacht. Their ends are collectively incoherent, and as such, they are subject to a Dutch book. Jeff spends to get a bigger yacht than Bill, then Bill spends to get a bigger yacht than Jeff. But after the upgrades, neither derives more welfare from his yacht, but

both are millions poorer. The shipyard has used them as a money pump. Incoherent ends lead to a Dutch book and generate waste, regardless of whether the ends are instantiated intra- or inter-personally.

I show that to the extent that our ends are collectively incoherent, economic growth does not benefit us. I do this by examining the thought of the two leading American social critics of the Gilded Age: Thorstein Veblen and Henry George. Though their critiques of affluent society are superficially dissimilar, the concept of collective incoherence reveals that they both grasped aspects of the same fundamental problem.

There are two possible solutions to the problem of collective incoherence. First, we can design institutions that prevent us from accepting an inter-personal Dutch book, like taxes on positional consumption and land value. Second, we can try to reduce the degree of incoherence that obtains among our ends. The first kind of solution is much more feasible.

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Non-Human Animals and the Goal of Population Axiology

Axiology theorises the nature of the good. An axiologist theorises the good because they expect it to play some ultimate role in the right – most obviously, because they expect the promotion of good consequences to play some role in right action. Population axiology theorises the goodness of populations, with a particular focus on those which vary in size and membership.

I argue that the field of population axiology has lost sight of its theories' role in the right. The field's almost exclusive focus on persons has neglected those beings that we most frequently create, modify the populations of, and change the identity of: non-human animals.

In support of this claim, I propose two criteria for measuring the relevance of a theory of the good to a domain of action: (1) *extent* which measures the frequency and magnitude with which human action affects the relevant good, and (2) *significance* which measures the degree to which the relevant good determines right action in the domain. Treating the raising of domestic animals and interactions with wild animals as distinct domains of action, I argue that both of these domains score significantly higher for extent and significance than comparable domains involving humans.

I argue that the close connection between non-human domains of action and population axiology can also be seen in the readiness with which the former provides practical examples of the hard cases theorised in the latter. Focusing on domestic farming, I argue this domain of action raises questions of trade-offs between quantity versus quality of well-being, the value of creating new beings and the non-identity problem far more readily than equivalent human domains.

I close by noting how a shift in focus to non-human animals may problematise the literature's assumptions about the nature and comparison of well-being.

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Evaluating the Unexperienced

Transformative experiences are experiences that are both epistemically and personally transformative. That is, they teach you something that you cannot know without having the experience and change who you are at your core. Paul (2014) argues that they pose a problem for rational decision-making. This problem primarily stems from the fact that one cannot know what such experiences are like without undergoing them: one cannot know what a transformative experience is like, and so one cannot assign a utility to such an experience.

This claim has received significant pushback, with many philosophers arguing that not knowing what an experience is like does not prevent you from knowing whether the experience is valuable (Dougherty, Horowitz and Sliwa, 2015; Sharadin, 2015; Bykvist and Stefansson, 2017: 128). For example, because we have a wealth of information to draw on about most standard transformative experiences (e.g. parenthood, career choice). Hence, rational transformative decision-making is possible.

However, even if we accept that transformative experiences are evaluable, there remains an intuitive pull to the idea that not knowing what such experiences are like prevents us from knowing whether we want to have them. I will argue that transformative experiences are strikingly similar to aesthetic experiences, in the respect that they are, in an important sense, unevaluable without experiencing them first-hand. In aesthetics, this idea is encapsulated by the Acquaintance Principle (Budd, 2003). The principle says that an agent can only appreciate an object's aesthetic properties if that agent is first-personally acquainted with the object.

I explore the similarities between transformative and aesthetic experience and whether transformative experiences (or, a restricted class of them) share sufficient relevant features with aesthetic experiences to motivate an amended form of the Acquaintance Principle, providing a new argument for the problem of transformative experience.

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What Price Fiber Bundle Substantivalism? On How to Avoid Holes in Fibers

A fundamental objective of philosophy of science is to determine how scientific theories relate to reality. While much attention has been given to the ontological status of concepts like the wave function in quantum mechanics, the status of fiber bundles has received comparatively little discussion. This is unfortunate, given that our most fundamental physical theories can be written in the geometrical language of fiber bundles. More precisely, our currently most successful and fundamental physical theories—namely, the Standard Model of particle physics and general relativity—are gauge theories, and their most general mathematical framework is expressed in terms of fiber bundles.

This naturally raises the question of whether fiber bundles are physically real. Although this question is not often explicitly addressed, it has been argued that similarly to how Einstein's notorious hole argument rules out spacetime substantivalism (Earman & Norton 1987), a generalized version of the argument rules out fiber bundle substantivalism (Lyre 2004 and Healey 2001; for an opposing view, see Arntzenius 2012).

My talk will be based on the widely accepted but crucial insight that only gauge-invariant quantities can be physically real. Importantly, there are well-known methods to reduce gauge symmetries and to transform gauge-variant "elementary" fields into gauge-invariant quantities. In my talk, I will focus on the recently developed dressing field method (Attard et al. 2018; Berghofer & François 2024). I will show that when we transform the non-gauge-invariant "elementary" fields into gauge-invariant dressed fields and move from the "bare" principal bundle to the dressed principal bundle, no hole argument (at least under certain conditions) can be raised against the dressed principal bundle. (The principal bundle is the type of fiber bundle that plays the most fundamental role in gauge theories.)

This result sheds new light on fiber bundle substantivalism and deepens our understanding of gauge theories.

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Obligations, omissions, and logical consequence

Attempts to adequately articulate the normativity of logic for reasoning often focus on the sentential operators we should assign to the normative claims that correspond to facts about logical consequence. There is widespread agreement with respect to the kind of norm for reasoning put forward by validity facts, in that it is prescriptive in character. The claim, for example, 'one ought to conform to a valid argument', expresses an obligation and therefore puts forward a prescription on how one ought to reason in the presence of validity claims. But, in arguing for another way in which logic might be normative, some (e.g., Evershed 2021) have defended a position that takes invalidity facts to put forward negative obligations for reasoners. In this sense, the norms associated with both validity and invalidity facts are viewed as prescriptions. An implication of this view however, is that it allows for conflicting obligations in the presence of logical disagreement in cases, for example, where one is a pluralist about logic. In this paper, I articulate a distinction between the deontic modals that correspond to validity and invalidity facts.

My hope is that such a distinction will help disentangle the normative aspects of logic. Specifically, I argue that distinguishing between the prescriptive norm of obligation and the non-prescriptive norm of omission by drawing on alethic modal analogues of necessity and non-necessity associated with validity and invalidity respectively, helps clarify two distinct senses in which logic is normative. I conclude that validity facts trump invalidity facts and therefore logic isn't doubly normative for reasoning in the strict sense.

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Berkeley, Virtue Ethics, and Expressivism

There is a long-standing dispute among scholars about an alleged Berkeley's commitment to an emotivist theory of meaning as the very first and early modern instantiation of non-cognitivism. According to this interpretation, the religious domain of language does not refer to facts about the world but expresses the emotional attitudes of religious language users. Some scholars in the dispute suggest the claim that he is emotivist (non-cognitivist), and some disagree, arguing that he is not emotivist (non-cognitivist). The paper seeks to offer an interpretation, which supports the non-cognitivist reading of Berkeley, although not in emotivist terms, but rather in instrumentalist or pragmatist terms. It argues that the label instrumentalism or pragmatism covers better the textual evidence of the Berkeleian understanding of religious language, as what is characteristic of Berkeley is his interest in explaining the nature of religious language practice (how we formulate moral statements – metalevel considerations about morality) than understanding whether morality is the only expression of our emotions (if moral rightness and wrongness are merely our emotional states – first order considerations about morality). The papers emphasize two elements as crucial for such an interpretation: (i) a historical context of Irish Enlightenment (esp. of John Tolland's works on religious language and the so-called free-thinkers), and (ii) a religious language description elaborated by Berkeley by analogy to an instrumental role played at least by some parts of scientific linguistic practice. The crucial element of my interpretation is Berkeley's virtue ethics reading of expressivism.

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Normativity in Substantive Metaphysics

Contemporary metaphysics has grown apart from only focusing on fundamental categories and it's more and more common to explore the metaphysical status of social categories. How to understand the substantivity of some of these metaphysical questions has generated a discussion that has gained much attention. In general, when facing substantive questions or disputes we seem to presuppose that something is at stake, and we are inclined to abandon debates after diagnosing them as non-substantive. Such a role makes of paramount importance the criteria we build for diagnosing substantivity in our metaphysical questions—especially for social metaphysicians.

The discussion has had tremendous progress and we seem to be having a better understanding of the substantivity of questions around our social reality. In this paper, I evaluate in depth two of the main criteria for substantivity in metaphysical questions and argue that they fail to account for relevant desiderata. In particular, I argue that these criteria fail to account for the normative dimension of diagnoses of substantivity. Appealing to the structural rationality disputants aim to have, I propose a necessary condition for substantivity that is in a position to shed some light on the conditions under which questions and disputes turn substantive within metaphysics.

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The Threat of Over-Conceptualization

In this paper, I will argue that the tendency to over-conceptualize subjective experiences can influence people's process of information and formation of beliefs, leading to epistemic problems at both individual and social levels, such as belief-polarization and the formation of echo chambers.

The first section will identify and explain three notions: preconceptual content, conceptual content, and non-conceptual content. I adopt the distinction by Wu (2024) based on an enactivist interpretation of mental states. The second section adopts the concept of predictive processing (Clark, 2016) to analyze how body-environment interaction facilitates the conceptualization of subjective experiences. In particular, the influence of nonconceptual content functions mainly in top-down processing; the preconceptual content functions to facilitate bottom-up processing.

The third section analyzes the over-conceptualization of subjective experiences as a disrupted balance between top-down and bottom-up processing, in which the former overwhelms the latter. This disrupted balance is commonly seen in today's online information sharing and discussion. In particular, the over-reliance on indirect description (conceptual content-based) as the main type of incoming information will largely reduce the amount of relevant preconceptual content in bottom-up processing. The conceptualization based on this oversimplified incoming information (i.e., lack of ambiguities and uncertainties as pre-conceptual content) will lead to an unproportionate emphasis on top-down processing facilitated by non-conceptual content (i.e., the implicit predictions based on past body-environment interactions).

Phenomenally speaking, the subject will build up an epistemic feeling of "I know it all along," blurring the boundary between her knowledge and the information available online. Epistemically speaking, if the disrupted balance continues, at the individual level, the subject can be trapped in an echo chamber whose authoritative voice comes from herself, and at the group level, groups holding different opinions can be further divided (i.e., polarization of beliefs).

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Must False Memories be Malfunctions?

Episodic memory can be erroneous to various degrees. Some argue that memory errors make it unlikely that episodic memory has a mnemonic function (De Brigard 2014), that is, aims at accurate recall (Boyle 2019, 2022; Brown 2024; Schwartz 2020). In this paper, I defend the mnemonic function from this criticism by looking at one of the most extreme cases of memory errors: false memories. In these memories the subject reports that they episodically remember an event which never happened to them (Loftus 1997, 2003; Loftus and Pickrell 1995).

I evaluate different alternatives to question whether failures to achieve the goal of the function necessarily mean that the system is malfunctioning. The basic idea is that we must disentangle the outcomes from the processes producing them: various things might hinder the achievement of an outcome (like accurate recall) without the underlying process malfunctioning. In the case of false memories, I argue that the underlying process is functioning correctly, but the produced episodic memory is inaccurate because it was produced in an unsupportive environment.

When facing an unsupportive environment, the options are between a "misfunction" and a "by-product". A "misfunction" suggest that the environment changed from episodic memory's selective environment to an unsupportive environment (Sullivan-Bissett 2024), whereas we speak of a "by-product" when the environment was already unsupportive during episodic memory's selection. I argue that false memories are due to an unsupportive, selective environment. Thus, false memories are by-products of a proper mnemonic function, rather than malfunctions.

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The Moral Status of Personites

The Personite Problem (Johnston 2016) purports to show that perdurantism contrasts with our premetaphysical moral and prudential practices. Johnston takes this result as an objection to perdurantism. I contend that endurantism is also beset by this problem. The key claim is that personites have the same moral status of persons, where a personite is a proper part of a person that shares her mind and some relevant part of her body.

Johnston's Master Argument (2016, pp.203-204) for the claim that personites have the same moral status of persons is based on three premises. Importantly, for Johnston, the property of having a moral profile for persons is determined by a basis of intrinsic properties. I argue that the basis of properties for a personite is different, and this makes Johnston's premise (3) is false, and premise (2) trivially true.

A personite and its person share the same mind. However, this is the mind primarily of the person, not of the personite. Systematically, many beliefs, hopes, fears, are false if the bearer is the personite; but they are true if the bearer is the person. What makes these attitudes systematically wrong when possessed by the personite is that they are true when possessed by the person and that the personite is a proper part of the person. So, the "I" primarily stands for the person. So, the fundamental center of rationality is the person, not the personite.

Further, without the person, we wouldn't have the mind of the personite either. Thus, the mind of the personite is extrinsic and dependent on the person. Then, the basis of properties for the purportedly moral status of the personite is extrinsic and dependent, and so different from the basis for persons. So, (3) is false, and (2) trivially true.

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Ontic injustice and psychiatric diagnosis: the example of schizophrenia

The assignment of a psychiatric diagnosis to someone often has the effect of labelling that person. This can lead to the individual experiencing stigma, including internalised stigma. I argue that such labels can lead to them becoming victim to ontic injustice, as described by Katharine Jenkins (2023). Such a label can constitute a social category which the person has to live with subsequently. This can be understood within the conferralist framework described by Ásta (2018). The label carries with it a set of constraints and enablements, which may differ depending on the diagnosis. It is conferred on the individual, first by a formal diagnosis from a psychiatric professional, and then takes on a corresponding social significance within the wider community. It is understood to track an undefined base property of some form of mental disorder which is taken to represent some property of the person concerned.

Most psychiatric diagnostic labels are not explanatory and do not describe any known biomedical abnormality. Rather, they can have the effect of assigning a label to the individual which places that person in a corresponding social category that becomes part of their identity. The individual is therefore exposed to the constraints accompanying the category, including stigmatising effects on their self-esteem. This can be particularly harmful when the individual is led to believe their condition is a life-long one.

I illustrate this with personal reports by people who have received the diagnosis of schizophrenia showing the stigmatising effect which the diagnosis had. It is seen as a negative social identity that has been given to them and does not represent any identifiable biomedical disease. Consequently, I claim that they can become victims of ontic injustice, due to being placed in an unwanted and stigmatising social category.

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Reflective Equilibrium 2.0: AI's Role in Balancing Healthcare Ethic.

In *Justice as Fairness*, one of the most important works of contemporary moral theory, John Rawls introduces the concept of reflective equilibrium in order defend his principles of justice. Reflective equilibrium is an interative, iterative process in which moral intuitions are justified by testing them against moral theory and all relevant philosophical argument for them. In short, reflective equilibrium is reached when judgments and intutions, and principles and theories have been revised such that they agree with each other. This forms a justification for a moral judgment.

This paper explores the application of reflective equilibrium in the ethical decision-making processes of hospital transplant and ethics committees, where balancing ethical principles like fairness, patient autonomy, and medical urgency is critical. Reflective equilibrium, which seeks coherence between specific intuitions and broader ethical principles, is examined as a framework that enables transplant committees to navigate complex and often conflicting bioethical considerations. I assess ways that

artificial intelligence (AI) could support this process by analyzing patient data, detecting potential biases, and modeling outcomes to improve decision accuracy and transparency. However, the inclusion of AI introduces concerns, such as the potential for over-reliance on technology, risk of perpetuating biases, and challenges in accountability, given the high-stakes and urgent nature of transplant decisions. Through an evaluation of both benefits and critiques, I argue that while AI enhances reflective equilibrium by offering transplant and ethics committees a more systematic and adaptable approach. Simultaneously, human oversight is essential to ensure that fairness, compassion, and intellectual and facutal rigor remain at the forefront of transplant decision-making.

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Context-Relative Belief, by Analogy

The aim of this paper is to clarify a certain kind of context-relativity, which has figured in several recent accounts of belief, but which differs from more familiar sorts of context-relativity. For instance, epistemic contextualism posits sensitivity to context in the semantics of knowledge-attributing sentences. Pragmatic encroachment involves another, non-semantic, sort of context sensitivity: whether a given true belief amounts to knowledge depends in part on contextual (pragmatic) facts.

It might be less clear how a non-normative phenomenon like belief could be context-sensitive. Pragmatic encroachers can say that the epistemic norms require a stronger epistemic position in some contexts than in others; encroachment might be easily portable from knowledge to other normative items like justification or evidence, but it's less obvious how to transfer this sort of non-semantic context-sensitivity to belief.

I'll outline, by surveying several examples, a conception of non-semantic context-relativity that can apply to belief. I'll claim that we already think of these phenomena (mostly taken from high school science) as context-relative. This is not to say that we commonly describe these things as "context-relative" in those terms. Rather, I mean that the philosophers alluded to above treat belief as context-relative in the same sense in which familiar thinking about weight, phase state, etc. already treats those phenomena as context-relative.

I draw two main conclusions from this discussion: first, that the examples have enough in common to show that context-relativity is not a bizarre or unusual feature for a theory of as ordinary a phenomenon as belief; and, second, that the examples differ in some specific ways that serve as a counterexample to certain sorts of objection.

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Lines of Contradiction: The Müller-Lyer Illusion's Challenge to Representational Theories

The Müller-Lyer illusion poses a novel problem for at least two representational theories of perception, for it forces them to accept either a contradiction or an infinite regress. In more detail, most representational theories maintain that perceptual experiences are infallible, and that I discern between the good and bad cases of perception if a representational content or belief is true or false; I am not wrong about my perceptual experience – I experience what I experience – yet I can be wrong whether my experience is a perception.

The Müller-Lyer illusion shows that the combination of assuming the infallibility of perceptual experiences, coupled with the claim that what is responsible for the experience is some sort of representation, forces representational theorists to recognise that positing representations could lead to contradictions.

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Epistemic Perspectivism about Ought, Fit, and Value

Epistemic perspectivism about ought is the view that what an agent ought to do in a particular situation is in part determined by her epistemic position, including her beliefs, evidence and/or knowledge. Objectivism is the rejection of this view. I argue that epistemic perspectivism about fittingness, a view largely rejected in the literature, is supported by the same considerations that support epistemic perspectivism about ought, while the same is not true for epistemic perspectivism about value simpliciter. The upshot is a significant problem for value-first theories of normativity: the fact that both 'ought' and 'fit' are plausibly constrained by the agent's epistemic position, while 'good' is not, will need to be accounted for by theorists who seek to explain all normative categories in terms of value.

This conclusion is reached in four steps. First, I motivate the debate about ought and show how analogous factors motivate a parallel debate about fittingness. I then provide one argument against objectivism, and one in favour of epistemic perspectivism about ought and fit. The first appeals to the claim that the action one ought to do, and the attitude it is fitting to have, are always rational responses. I argue that objectivism is incompatible with this thesis. The second involves the necessary availability to the agent of the features of her situation which make certain responses obligatory or fitting. Availability, I argue, entails an epistemic constraint.

Finally, I show how each of these considerations does not transfer straightforwardly to the evaluative categories: drawing a distinction between epistemic perspectivism and objectivism about value is unmotivated, the rationality of an agent's responses to an object is irrelevant to the value of that object, and the availability to the agent of an object's good-making features is likewise irrelevant to its value.

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Hedging, bullshitting, and hedged bullshitting

A bullshit assertion is classically characterised as being uncoupled from truth or falsity. A hedged assertion, on the other hand, is explicitly connected to the alethic. Prima facie, then, bullshitting and hedging are mutually exclusive. And yet, bullshitters seem to hedge their bullshit all the time. I explore this puzzle and argue that the existence of hedged bullshitting constitutes a potent counterexample to the majority of extant bullshitting accounts. I then show that, despite the apparent incompatibility, hedging can uniquely assuage key vulnerabilities associated with consummate bullshitting, thus making hedged bullshitting a phenomenon of crucial import—it is the superlative form of bullshit.

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Gricean Maxims as Epistemic Norms

Gricean maxims, aside from *Quality*, are standardly understood not as epistemic but rather as social, or conversational, imperatives. In this article I argue that this is a mistake; there are genuine epistemic norms corresponding to all Gricean maxims, not just one. I consider and dismiss a range of arguments for the contrary view, which I dub *Quality-exceptionalism*, showing that the rationale for countenancing an epistemic norm on *Quality* applies equally to *Quantity, Relation*, and *Manner*. I then offer a positive proposal, which build on recent work in zetetic, or inquiry-based epistemology to account for the full range of Gricean-epistemic maxims. The upshot, I argue, is a richer picture of the epistemic normativity of testimony, one that can account for the multiple dimensions along which it can go well or badly *qua* social, communicative practice.

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Doing What Another Would Want

It is often valuable to do what another would want you to do. We often relate in this way to the dead, as when we continue their traditions or memorialize their accomplishments. But it resists understanding, for three reasons.

First, to understand doing what another would want, we must identify the relevant counterfactual. Second, doing what another would want is distinct from the more thoroughly explored phenomena of doing what is good for another, respecting another's preferences, and acting for another. Third, the reasons to do what another would want are opaque, especially if it is distinct from these phenomena.

I defend a conception of doing what others would want as acting from empathetic concern. Acting from empathetic concern requires two separate decisions, that correspond to two sets of reasons: first, reasons to adopt an empathetic stance and, second, reasons that appear from within the empathetic stance.

From within the empathetic stance, we can appreciate the agent-neutral reasons that already applied to us and, if we have a close relationship with our target, we can inherit and appreciate their agent-relative reasons. One reason to take the empathetic stance is that doing so can help us see these reasons that we otherwise would be blind to.

But the less obvious reason to take the empathetic stance is that doing so affirms the value of one's relationship with one's target. This is especially clear in friendship. Friends want each other to appreciate their point of view, to see where they are coming from. Empathizing with a friend is a way of affirming the value of one's friendship. Affirming the value of a relationship is in part a response to existing value and in part a decision to confer value on the relationship. Doing what another would want thus exhibits distinctively relational value.

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Social Encroachment

Cooperation and division of labor are fundamental to our knowledge-seeking. In our everyday reliance on others' testimony, we not only depend on the words of those around us but on the wider cooperative scheme that enables a systematic generation, maintenance, and transmission of knowledge within society. In this paper, I argue that implications of this social character of our epistemic reliance have not yet been thoroughly appreciated in epistemology despite their importance.

Specifically, I show how a pair of widely accepted and seemingly uncontroversial principles about knowledge and epistemic roles can lead to a surprising thesis about the relevance of social facts to the epistemic status of our beliefs—a kind of social encroachment on knowledge.

The structure of my argument is as follows: I first lay out and defend a widely assumed thesis about epistemic criticizability – roughly put, that an epistemic agent's being epistemically criticizable for believing some proposition p implies that they do not know that p. I then argue that agents occupying different epistemic roles are subject to different criteria for epistemic criticizability, using cases of a journalist and a scientist to illustrate my point. From these two principles, I then show how we arrive at the conclusion that a difference in one's epistemic roles can constitute a difference in knowledge, regardless of their awareness of the roles or norms that bind them.

Despite its seemingly counterintuitive implications, I explain how this conclusion naturally aligns with plausible normative theories of epistemic reliance, including our understanding of how allocation of epistemic trust and responsibility importantly vary along the epistemic roles that individuals occupy.

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Empathy in Virtual Reality and Large Language Models

Recent debates have emerged in relation to empathy in the context of Virtual Reality and Large Language Models. In the case of VR, some argue that empathy is an ability that can be enhanced via specific VR apps (Ahn et al. 2016; Zahiu et al. 2023), while others criticize this view or argue that only some aspects of empathy can be enhanced (Ramirez et al. 2021). In the case of Large Language Models, some argue that LLMs might even be deemed more empathetic than humans (Welivita and Pu 2024), while others say they lack empathy (Ilicki 2023; Barash et al. 2024).

I begin with a survey of the reasons given in favour and against both claims, that LLMs have empathy and that empathy can be enhanced via VR, and the analysis reveals that both sides construe empathy differently—which calls for a conceptual analysis of the concept of empathy.

In the case of LLMs, some may target linguistic markers for empathy, others might target emotion recognition—I argue that the linguistic dimension of empathy is not the same as the psychological concept of empathy. In the case of VR, some refer to emotional contagion, others refer to KWIL knowledge, knowing what it is like to Φ. VR empathy simulations are often considered to enhance the user's empathy (ability) and/or induce prosocial behaviour, leading, to some degree, to a transformative experience. I find these uncompelling; some might have transformative experiences in VR, some may not. I also argue against the idea that a person gets to know what it is like to (non-VR) Φ in VR.

Once the differences in how empathy is construed are emphasised, the most important question that arises is which approach comes closer to how we intuitively understand empathy and how this bears on the LLMs and VR empathy trend.

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Perceptual versus Empathic Knowledge of Others' Emotions: re-reading Edith Stein's empathy (Einfühlung)

Just how is it that I grasp Others' emotional lives? Edith Stein in her 1917 On the Problem of Empathy offered an original answer: we know Others' emotions directly and non-perceptually through empathy (Einfühlung), (Stein 1989, 11). This original answer has been overlooked.

Advocates of Direct Perception Theory (DPT) unanimously assert that Stein would support their programme and that Stein's empathy is a form of DPT. But this is an incomplete picture. While Stein thinks that we can know Others' emotions perceptually, she thought that empathy was a sui generis intentional state through which we could directly and non-perceptually know Others' emotions. The distinction is significant because it grounds Stein's further argument that the empathic grasp of an Other's emotion could yield epistemically better results than the perceptual grasp.

This paper demonstrates DPT's mischaracterisation of Stein, offers this new reading of Stein's work, and identifies two assumptions that explain how a group of inventive and impressive thinkers overlooked such an original offering.

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The Property-Inheritance Problem

Suppose that a sculptor molds a statue out of a lump of clay. Under the supposition that the statue and the lump are two distinct objects standing in the constitution relation, the following puzzle arises. Suppose the lump weighs 10 kg; then, the statue also weighs 10 kg. However, when considered together, they do not weigh 20 kg, but just 10 kg. Furthermore, it seems evident that the statue weighs 10 kg because the lump of clay weighs 10 kg, and not the other way around. We will refer to this problem as the Property-Inheritance Problem.

In this paper, after presenting and discussing the most relevant proposals offered to solve this problem, we will propose our own attempt to solve it. In doing so, we will address three different questions: (i) What properties can be shared by objects in the constitution relation, whether in virtue of being in this relation or not? (ii) which of these properties can be inherited by one object from another?; and (iii) given two objects in the constitution relation and an inheritable property, when is it the case that one of them inherits the property from the other?

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Kripke's Dogmatism Paradox

Kripke's (2011) dogmatism paradox seems to show that if you know a proposition, p, then you can disregard any evidence against p. But that conclusion looks unacceptably dogmatic! The challenge, then, is to show how the argument goes wrong. Harman (1973) offers a widely accepted solution appealing to the defeasibility of knowledge. But other versions of the paradox have since emerged which are untouched by Harman's solution. This presentation begins by taking another look at Harman's solution and arguing that, in fact, it isn't successful. It merely raises a puzzle about how evidence which you know in advance is misleading with respect to p can nonetheless defeat your knowledge that p. This is arguably no less puzzling than the original puzzle about why knowing that any evidence against p is misleading doesn't entitle you to disregard such evidence. Next Carter and Hawthorne's (2024) solution to their "Ex Ante" version of the dogmatism puzzle is considered. This time, the question is why, when you know that p, you aren't rationally obliged to stop gathering evidence concerning p lest the new evidence defeat your knowledge. In response, they appeal to the failure of the KK principle and to knowledge norms of belief. But this strategy will be shown to have limited success. It provides a rationale to continue gathering evidence in support of p, but it provides no rationale to consider evidence against p. Still, the strategy of appealing to a weakness in your epistemic position with respect to p even when you know that p points us in a promising direction. I conclude by offering a novel response to Kripke's original paradox which appeals to epistemic modals and the idea that even when you know that p, if that knowledge is fallible, then it might be that case that not p.

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Fully Excused but Responsible

Several philosophers maintain that excuses are "all partial". By this, some (Wallace 1994; Rivera-López 2006; Bruno 2023) mean that excuses can at best *reduce* blameworthiness—they never fully exculpate. Others (Sliwa 2019; van Loon 2023) mean that excuses leave moral and emotional residues: the excused must always discharge special obligations or feel extra negative emotions. I reject the first claim, but accept the second. What's more, I reject the first *because I accept the second*. Excuses always leave a residue, and this partly explains why they sometimes fully exculpate.

Philosophers who deny that excuses can fully exculpate worry that this view could cheapen obligations. If I can be fully excused for infringing my obligation, was I really obliged? Suppose I committed perjury blamelessly because I was coerced. If I'm truly blameless, it's because it would have been unreasonable to expect me to sacrifice my interests. But then, if morality is fair, why would I have an obligation in the first place?

The answer comes from accepting the second claim, namely that excuses always leave a residue. It makes sense for morality to set very high expectations. It makes sense because, though the agent might be blameless for failing to meet her obligation, she remains liable to answer for this failure. The perjurer must at least admit that she committed perjury, explain why she did it, apologise and feel regret for the act. This burden is justified by the fact that the perjurer infringed an obligation, though blamelessly.

Differently put, we can make sense of the view that some wrongdoing can be fully excused by insisting on the fact that all wrongdoing is responsible, and add that responsibility is not blameworthiness but a liability to answer (Kiener 2024), corresponding to the aforementioned residue.

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Effective Physics and Effective Metaphysics: A Perfect Match?

Recently, a discussion has emerged around the viability of an effective metaphysics (McKenzie 2024). This term denotes the idea that metaphysics can provide an accurate and coherent description of a nonfundamental ontology, either independently of the fundamental ontology or while remaining neutral with respect to it. This issue intersects (partly) with contemporary discussions on the metaphysics of scale in physics. In this regard, Fraser (2024) proposes a useful distinction between two primary approaches. The first (Batterman 2021), which we might call the metaphysical approach, holds that there are different scales with de facto distinct nomic structures. This metaphysical perspective seems to imply that, within

its domain of application, an effective physical theory "carves nature at its joints" better than the alleged underlying fundamental theory. The second (Woodward 2016), an instrumentalist or pragmatist approach, views the use of different scales as a purely technical maneuver. Accordingly, the nonfundamental theory simply provides us with the ability to make more accurate predictions than the underlying fundamental theory. The question of whether a project like effective metaphysics holds promise appears crucial for naturalistic metaphysicians. If it does not, then engaging in metaphysical inquiry without a fundamental theory becomes hopeless. Additionally, the relationship between so-called armchair metaphysicians and metaphysicians of science would need to be reformulated, as many of the criticisms made by the latter against the former would no longer hold. In this contribution, I will argue that effective metaphysics is not only possible but, most likely, the only viable path to a genuinely naturalized metaphysics. To support my argument, I will explore the Effective Field Theory (EFT) approach and its implications for the metaphysics of science, showing how, even while remaining agnostic about the existence of a fundamental physical theory, effective theories provide a special perspective on scale-relative properties.

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Against Divine Moral Perfection

Perfect being theists typically assume that God, as a perfect being, is morally perfect. In this paper, I will argue this assumption is either mistaken or unmotivated. If God were morally perfect, God's moral perfection would either be necessary or contingent. Suppose God's moral perfection were necessary. A necessary condition for God's being necessarily morally perfect is God's necessarily fulfilling God's moral obligations. But God can only necessarily fulfill God's moral obligations if, necessarily, God has moral obligations. The problem is that necessarily, God has moral obligations iff necessarily, God creates beings unto whom God is morally obligated. For given the standard theistic assumption that God is the only uncreated being, any being unto whom God has moral obligations is created by God. The problem with the conclusion that necessarily, God creates beings unto whom God is morally obligated is that it contradicts the traditional theistic assumption that creation is contingent, dependent upon the libertarian free choice of God and, moreover, is prima facie in tension with the assumption that God, as a perfect being, is perfectly free. Suppose instead, however, that God's moral perfection were contingent. If God were contingently morally perfect, contingent moral perfection would not be a great-making property for God to possess. For given the standard understanding of great-making properties as properties which are better to have than not, if contingent moral perfection were a great-making property, God's greatness would increase upon God's becoming contingently morally perfect – by God's perfectly fulfilling God's moral obligations to those contingent beings whom God creates – a conclusion which would be anathema to perfect being theism. Accordingly, perfect being theism does not provide reason for thinking that God, as a perfect being, is morally perfect.

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Mind Your Probability Language

The notion of probability has multiple interpretations, and one of these interpretations is the propensity interpretation. Given this possible interpretation and the opaque causal structure of the social world, it can be argued that when probabilistic statements are used about social groups, they can conventionally implicate essentialist claims about those social groups.

Moreover, in decision-making conversational contexts, the propensity interpretation about social groups can conversationally suggest interventions that are aligned with oppressive social practices. These implicatures render statistical generalizations about social groups vulnerable to exploitation and misinterpretation, potentially perpetuating social injustice.

This paper scrutinizes the pragmatics of probabilistic statements in relation to oppressive social practices. It also outlines some strategies to minimize the chance of exploitation and misunderstanding.

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Reasons Deliberation

We don't just deliberate about what to do or believe. We can also deliberate about why we are performing these actions and holding these beliefs. Much attention has been paid to the fact that we can assess our reasons in the course of deliberating to a belief or action, that is, epistemic and practical deliberation. In this paper I argue that we also engage in a distinctive form of deliberation directed at our reasons themselves – reasons deliberation.

§1 introduces the phenomenon. This is clearest when the subject doesn't doubt the belief or course of action itself, only her reasons for them, e.g., when we consider new arguments for positions we already endorse.

§2 argues that reasons deliberation is a distinctive subspecies of deliberation. The main alternative is to say that in these cases we only deliberate to a belief, namely the belief that the consideration in question is a good reason, and that this is just a subspecies of doxastic deliberation. But the subjects in these cases are not just trying to determine what is a good reason out of idle curiosity. Presumably they would expect this deliberation to make some further immediate difference.

§3 argues that when we deliberate about our reasons, we are deliberating about what to base our belief or action on, where this in turn is 'transparent' to a further question. First-order reasoning about our reasons is transparent to the question of what are the weightiest reasons for this belief or action? And in the case of second-order reasons, it is transparent to the question of what is the most appropriate kind of reason?

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Reasons and the Logic of Obligation

According to the balancing view of obligation, one ought to do something iff doing so is favoured by the balance of reasons, i.e., iff one's reasons for doing it outweigh one's reason for not doing it. According to standard views in deontic logic, what one ought to do is governed by substantive logical rules. Combining these views allows us to derive broadly logical principles governing the *balance of reasons* for logically related actions. Such principles, however, cry out for explanation in terms of corresponding principles governing *individual reasons*, their weights, and the ways they combine. A pressing question therefore emerges for proponents of the balancing view: Is there a plausible set of such principles which generates a plausible logic of obligation?

My talk addresses the special case of that question which targets so-called standard deontic logic and argues for an optimistic conclusion: I identify a set of natural principles governing reasons that generates, via the balancing view, an essentially standard deontic logic. The central upshot may be stated as follows: a reason supports doing φ-or-ψ exactly as strongly as it supports whichever of φ and ψ it supports most strongly. An important corollary of the investigation is that the question of reason aggregation should be conducted exclusively at the level of definite, non-disjunctive actions.

Finally, I relate my results to comparable views that have been proposed in the literature, such as several versions of the idea that reasons for actions transmit, at least in some cases, to necessary means for the action, and in some cases, to consequences of the action. I show that some of these, while similar, are incompatible with the view proposed here, and incompatible, under the balancing view, with core components of standard deontic logic.

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Freedom, Resentment, and Structural Injustice

Structural injustices are difficult to pin on agents (Young 2011; McKeown 2024). Given the shortage of culprits, questions arise concerning reactive attitudes: are indignation and resentment apt regarding structural injustice, given that no agent culpably caused the holistically-described harm? If so, towards whom can that indignation and resentment aptly be targeted?

This paper argues that reactive attitudes can aptly target social structures themselves. This conclusion will be controversial. Building on P.F. Strawson's seminal "Freedom and Resentment" (1962), most philosophers take reactive attitudes to be apt only when they target human beings—or, more generally, agents. The paper develops a variant of Strawson's theory that vindicates structure-targeting reactive attitudes, building on Pamela Hieronymi's (2020) interpretation of Strawson.

Section 1 begins by characterising social structures and structural injustice. This clarifies what it is we are resenting, when we resent social structures: social structures are materially constituted by humans, without being reducible to them.

Section 2 outlines four unsatisfying ways of using Strawson to vindicate structure-targeting reactive attitudes.

Section 3 lays the ground for my proposal: following Hieronymi, I explain how Strawson's argument produces a troubling relativism, since he calibrates reactive attitudes to people's statistically-normal socially-formed capacities. Hieronymi has provided a solution to this problem, but I raise problems for her solution: it licenses the resentment of all against all, which is anathema to Strawson's system.

Section 4 introduces my preferred solution: an intermediary 'structural' stance, which sits between Strawson's famous 'participant' and 'objective' stances. From within this stance, we have reactive attitudes towards structures while targeting the correlative demands at the structure's agent-constituents. The reactive attitudes of the structural stance solve the problems with Strawson's and Hieronymi's views, while retaining their virtues and spirit.

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The 'Settled Mind' and Breakdowns of Habitus

Lisa Guenther (2017) has pointed out with several philosophers such as Miranda Fricker and Bernard Williams that "trustful conversation with others" (Williams) leads to a 'settled mind', that is a relatively peaceful and stable orientation within one's lifeworld, in which a sense of objectivity and knowledge is learned and maintained. Inasmuch as other bodies, their reactions and interactions are always already objects of this world as navigated by a subject (Merleau-Ponty), how those bodies react in gesture and word to one's own body will affect the settling or unsettling of the mind.

The usual navigation of the lifeworld occurs at the level of habitus, the taken-for-granted negotiation of social meanings in daily behaviours and interactions within a given social setting (Haslanger 2019). Bourdieu claims that reflection often begins wherever habitus breaks down. It is often the lack of 'seamless' reaction and interaction with others which causes the break-down and leads to a kind of estrangement, resulting in reflection and questioning.

However, there are various ways estrangement can develop. One reaction to the breakdown of habitus within a lifeworld is, I contend, "wayward" thinking. This is the discursive and sequential linking together of concepts, ideas or images according to some inferential or associational mechanism, driven by a concomitant emotion or mood of not fully belonging. Examples might be 'second-guessing' one's own actions or speculative 'internal' diatribes about people's purportedly nefarious motives.

I argue that there are various healthy ways of regaining habitus. However, regaining habitus can also occur by adopting the social meanings and practices of a community where one feels 'at home,' and this can include adopting their false ideologies and conspiracy theories.

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Deflationism: Feminist Epistemology and Theory of Truth

In this talk, I am going to argue for two points: the first is that deflationism about truth is a source of feminist epistemology. The second is that it is apt as a feminist theory of truth. As for the first point, many feminists have pointed out that scientific results are often presented as reflecting so-called facts in an objective manner, but they are often the result of a dominant patriarchal perspective on the world (e.g.,

Bordo 1987, Code 1991, Harding 1986, 1991, 1993). I argue that this bias is, in part, due to a faulty notion of truth, e.g., truth as correspondence to facts (e.g., Moore 1910, Russell 1912). My claim is that if science aims at truth, and truth is understood via a faulty notion of 'fact', in claims such as 'truth is the correspondence of sentence to fact', then we get an inaccurate methodology that doesn't only leave out female perspectives on science, but also facilitates weak objectivity as opposed to strong objectivity. However, deflationism about truth (e.g., Horwich 1998) does not denigrate 'feminine' cognitive styles. As it is not after a faulty notion of fact and objectivity, it allows variations in attitudes, background beliefs of inquirers, and so on, to function as epistemic resources. As for the second point, as deflationism only advocates for the truth-schema "'p' is true iff p", where 'p' can be replaced by a sentence such as 'lying is wrong' or '2+2=4', we're not committed to a faulty notion of fact and objectivity. 'Lying is wrong' can be construed as reflecting attitudes (see subjectivism about morality), and '2+2=4' as reflecting intuitions (see intuitionism about mathematics). In this way, deflationism is less oppressive, less gendered and more multi-faceted than the correspondence theory. This makes it more apt as a feminist theory of truth.

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Against Optimization

Value is complex and hard to measure. So we often measure and optimize a simplified proxy metric. For example, we care about getting healthy but measure steps, we care about educating students but measure standardized test scores and so on. It's easy to feel uneasy about this. For example, Nguyen (2024) describes this phenomenon as "value capture" and thinks it is bad. Similar phenomena are discussed as "Goodhart's law" and "reward hacking" in economics and machine learning. But it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what is going wrong here. Nguyen thinks that value capture is bad because the proxy metric distorts our values. While this is true, there are also advantages to using proxy metrics. For example, we can actually use them to guide our decision-making. So it's not clear whether value capture is, all things considered, a bad thing. My goal is to make progress on this question by investigating a simple decision-theoretic model of value capture. Assume you have a true utility function which is sensitive to many features of the world and a proxy utility function which is sensitive to fewer features of the world. Zhuang and Hadfield-Menell (2020) prove a theorem which shows that, given relatively mild assumptions, optimizing the proxy utility function eventually leads to a decrease in true utility. This means that we can give a decision-theoretic explanation of why value capture is bad: If you use the proxy utility function for making decisions, you will eventually make bad decisions by your own lights. In the rest of the paper, I discuss whether the assumptions of the theorem are plausible and think through some consequences for debates around consequentialism, capitalism and various other topics.

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State Entrapment, Private Entrapment, and their Implications

Criminal entrapment occurs whenever one party, the "Agent", intentionally brings it about that another, the "Target", commits a *criminal offence*, intending to have the Target *prosecuted* and *punished* for committing the offence.

The Agent could either be a state official ("*state entrapment*") or a private party ("*private entrapment*"). According to several jurisdictions and parts of the literature, only *state* entrapment may warrant a stay of proceedings or a complete defence, thereby blocking the prosecution or conviction of the Target.

The article examines whether the identity of the Agent should matter for whether, and if so, by whom, the Target ought to be held accountable for the criminal offence into which they were entrapped. The article has three parts.

The first part undertakes some conceptual groundwork. The second rejects two justifications for the difference of implications between state and private entrapment mentioned above. They both appeal, in different ways, to the suggestion that only state entrapment can undermine the state's standing to prosecute the Target.

In its third part, the article defends the position that we need to discern the *distinctive* wrongfulness of entrapment to ascertain what its implications should be, and the significance—if any—of the entrapping agent's identity. It argues that entrapment amounts to an objectionable *subversion of practices of accountability*. Still, there are conditions under which entrapment is permissible and, all else being equal, Targets should be prosecuted for the entrapped offence. Absent these conditions, there is reason to block the prosecution to prevent the Agent's scheme from coming to fruition, *regardless of the (state or private) identity of the Agent.* The reason, however, is typically weak and therefore often defeated. Contrary to current legal practice, *Agents* involved in impermissible instances of entrapment ought to be prosecuted if their behaviour amounts, in itself, to a criminal offence.

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The Normativity of Vice

According to a popular view, knowledge is a cognitive achievement attributable to an agent's epistemic virtue or competence (Greco, 2010, 2020; Sosa, 2015, 2021). This view of epistemic normativity underpins *reliabilist virtue epistemology*. Whilst there are differences between their views, all virtue reliabilists tend to understand the central notion of an epistemic virtue (competence) in skill-theoretic terms.

Given that virtue reliabilists employ the concept of virtue to make sense of good beliefs, we should expect them to appeal to the corresponding concept of vice to make sense of bad beliefs. Since they model epistemic virtue (competence) on skill, moreover, we should expect them to equally understand epistemic vice in skill-theoretic terms. In this paper, I consider whether skill-theoretic language can be extended to understand the normativity of epistemic vice.

I start by motivating two ways of theorising epistemic vice in skill-theoretic terms. According to the *Incompetence conception*, epistemic vices are failings in virtue of being epistemic incompetences – i.e., error-conducive. According to the *Deficiency conception*, epistemic vices are failings because they involve a deficit of epistemic skill (competence) – i.e., truth-inhibiting. Ultimately, I argue that neither conception adequately captures the way in which epistemic vices are normative failings.

The main problem with the Incompetence conception is that it fails to attribute epistemic vice to cases of bad belief that are the product of epistemic negligence, laziness, and servility – qualities that virtue reliabilists would want to recognise as epistemically bad. Whereas the Incompetence conception fails to attribute epistemic vice to cases of bad belief, I argue that the Deficiency conception's main problem is that it wrongly attributes epistemic vice to cases of otherwise good belief. Specifically, it attributes vices to agents in Gettier cases. I conclude by reflecting on the prospects of a virtue-reliabilist account of epistemic normativity.

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Groups and Group Agents

Arguably, groups can be agents: the general conditions for agency, whatever precisely those are, can be met by groups of agents acting together in a suitably organised way. I will consider a neglected metaphysical issue raised by the possibility of group agents. Groups are, by their very nature, entities that have members, and the metaphysical character of the membership relationship has been much discussed in recent literature. In this talk, I won't take a stand on that issue, but rather consider how the group membership relationship relates to another important relationship that can obtain between groups and individuals.

From a broadly functionalist perspective, agents are causal systems whose behaviour meets certain conditions; they must—roughly—process and respond to information from their environment in such a way as to reliably steer towards certain states of affairs, and thus be usefully characterisable as pursuing ends in the light of beliefs they hold. Agency can be variously realised, and in the case of group agency, the causal system in question has as its functional parts individual agents and/or subordinate group agents.

What is the relationship, in the case of groups that are agents, between the group's members and the agent's functional parts? A natural answer is that since the group *is* the agent, the members and functional parts will simply coincide. However, it is not hard to describe scenarios in which some of a group's members are not functional parts of the group agent, and scenarios in which some of the group agent's functional parts are not members of the agent. This renders the metaphysical relationship between the membership and functional parthood relationships, and consequently that between groups and group agents, unobvious. In this talk I articulate the issue and consider some constructive responses.

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What do thick concepts refer to?

There is a view that the appropriateness of ethical concepts corresponds to how well they accommodate certain needs that societies face. While this approach seems fruitful, the way in which this is to be understood is not self-explanatory. Not only ethical concepts in the strictest sense are action-guiding and the way in which a set of concepts or a certain way of thinking might be justified can not work just like the justification of actions. Recent publications like e.g. Queloz (2025) provide helpful resources for this. What the current discourse about conceptualization seems less focused on is the dimension of the meaning of ethical concepts and how our supposed mastery of them is to be understood. For some concepts which we reject we may accept that they refer to something but have action-guiding aspects we would like to avoid (cf. the concepts expressed in some slurs). In the case of scientific concepts we reject it is often said that they simply don't refer. As Wilson (2006) has pointed out, the way in which theoretical concepts connect to reality is more complex than we assume and there are often e.g. complex systems of properties we want to point out which are caught by multiple concepts partly. What I want to discuss is how difficult it can be in concrete cases to understand whether we share the same action-guiding concepts and whether we can suppose our concept mastery to go as far as to confidently classify instances of even relatively artificial concepts. Finding out which action-guiding concepts serve our needs and what they even refer to is not always clear. This is more difficult to see in the case of social and ethical than in the case of scientific concepts, but, I argue, faces similar complications.

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Aristotelian ideas in modern education: Empirical insights into virtue cultivation

Aristotelian virtue ethics, emphasizing moral character and the cultivation of virtues, provides a compelling framework for character education and moral development. This paper synthesizes Aristotelian virtue ethics with contemporary research in psychology, arguing that integrating virtue-based education inspired by the Aristotelian framework into modern curricula can reliably cultivate morally responsible and flourishing individuals and communities. Aristotelian virtue ethics offer a strong theoretical foundation for moral character education, particularly in virtue cultivation. Within this framework, moral development is inextricably linked to the formation of virtuous dispositions through habituation, the cultivation of practical wisdom (phronesis), and the influence of moral exemplars, such as teachers and educators. Kristján Kristjánsson (2015) argues that education should incorporate Aristotelian principles, moving beyond instrumental reasoning to primarily focus on fostering moral virtues and character development. In the same vein, David Wright (2014) supports a return to Aristotelian principles, emphasizing their structured and reliable approach to emotional and moral character formation. Empirical research in psychology aligns with this (neo)Aristotelian perspective. Studies in moral psychology suggest that individuals with a strong moral identity are more likely to engage in prosocial behavior (Miller, 2023). Additionally, Christine Tappolet's work (2016) on emotions as evaluative perceptions supports Aristotle's view that emotions play a crucial role in moral reasoning and ethical behavior. Recent studies in moral education (2016) further highlight the benefits of Aristotelian educational approaches, demonstrating that they foster deeper and more holistic moral development compared to alternative models. Therefore, the application of Aristotelian virtue ethics to character building and education finds substantial and increasing support in contemporary empirical research. This growing body of evidence underscores the need for a renewed emphasis on Aristotelian educational models that prioritize emotional

development and moral character formation, ultimately fostering ethical individuals and stronger communities.

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A Challenge for Self-Aware Perceptual Knowledge from Gaṅgeśa

An appealing claim about the nature of perceptual knowledge is that when we know that p, we know that we know that p. Whilst this seems at first like a plausible claim, it leads to a vicious regress. One promising way of resolving this issue is by adopting a view under which our perceptual knowledge is self-aware – when I know that p by seeing that p, as part of knowing that p, I have knowledge of my knowledge that p.

Whilst this addresses the issues associated with the regress problem, it faces a major problem of its own – how is it that knowledge can be self-aware. Drawing an argument from the works of the 14th century Indian philosopher Gaṅgeśa shows that this solution faces a major hurdle.

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Constitutivism and the Goodness-fixing Kind Objection

Constitutivism is the view that an account of what a thing is yields those normative standards to which that thing is by nature subject. Constitutivists about ethics often proceed by attempting to apply this idea to the notion of action (or agency), arguing that an account of action (or agency) can itself yield normative standards by which we may determine whether some action (or exercise of agency) is good. One might object to this by arguing that action (or agency) itself is not susceptible to an account of its nature such that this account yields normative standards. On this objection, some event either is or is not an action (an exercise of agency); there is no sense in saying that one action is, or is not, better, qua action, than another. In other words, action is not what Judith Jarvis Thompson calls a goodness-fixing kind. In this paper, we explore the merits of this Thomsonian-style objection and consider two responses: one on behalf of Kantian constitutivism (as typified by the work of Christine Korsgaard) and the other on behalf of Neo-Aristotelian constitutivism (as typified by the work of Philippa Foot). We argue for the superiority of the Neo-Aristotelian response. Essentially, we agree that action is not a goodness-fixing kind, but, we argue, following the Neo-Aristotelian, human action is. We conclude by considering the possibility that whereas action must be indexed to the life form of human beings in order to be a goodness-fixing kind, thought, more generally, can be a goodness-fixing kind without reference to the life form of human beings.

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Reasons First, Deontic Logic Second

1. I suggest a novel and explanatorily powerful version of the view that one ought to do what one has most reason to do. The account returns correct results across a wide range of cases, and it entails important deontic principles, including ones that axiomatise Standard Deontic Logic.

2. The core of the account is the widely accepted Balancing View of ought:

(BV) One ought to x if, and only if, for each incompatible alternative, the reasons for x-ing outweigh those for the alternative.

Following Schmidt (2024), I argue that (BV) should be complemented by principles that specify how reasons for and reasons against actions are related, such as:

(R) A reason for x-ing provides equally weighty reasons against each incompatible alternative.

These principles bridge the logical gap between (BV) and the correct verdicts in paradigm cases, fulfilling a role otherwise assumed by deontic principles like:

(O-R) If one ought to x, and y-ing is an incompatible alternative, then one ought to refrain from y-ing.

Thus, one may expect the account to entail deontic principles. And, indeed, showing that (BV) and (R) entail (O-R) is straightforward.

When a second, equally plausible principle of reasons transmission is added, the resulting account further entails a set of deontic principles that axiomatise Standard Deontic Logic.

3.   These results are noteworthy even if you disagree with (some of) the principles the account involves. I show how to structurally work out an account of how reasons determine deontic status, such that it entails deontic principles. No matter the details, the results can be turned into the core of an explanation of deontic principles in terms of facts about how reasons interact in determining oughts.

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Perfect Being Theology and the Triviality Objection

Perfect being theology holds that God is the greatest possible being. Based on this metaphysical claim, perfect being theologians argue that we can acquire knowledge about divine attributes through some sort of counterfactual reasoning. For example, in order to know whether God is F, one may ask whether God would be better were he to be F than were he to be non-F. If the answer is yes, then we can conclude that God is F. For if God were not F, then God, by being F, could have been better than he actually was. But as God is the greatest possible being, he must be in the better state, i.e. being F, instead of the worse one, i.e. being non-F.

In The Greatest Possible Being (2018), Jeff Speaks raises an objection, what he calls 'the problem of triviality' (2018: 32), to the foregoing strategy of exploring divine attributes. The objection draws on the metaphysical claim mentioned above: Speaks notes that perfect being theology motivates not only this claim but also its necessitation, i.e. that necessarily, God is the greatest possible being. Speaks then argues that this necessitated claim also entails a further consequence, i.e. that God is either necessarily F or necessarily not F, which is in conflict with how perfect being theologians investigate whether God is F or not.

In this talk, we will argue that Speaks's objection, as it stands, fails to refute perfect being theology by showing that the necessitated claim does not entail the putative dichotomy. Instead, we will argue that the necessitated claim itself has already posed a fatal problem to the practice of perfect being theology. We will also indicate how this modified objection undermines some variants of perfect being theology that Speaker's original objection does not apply to.

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Philosophical progress and inductive reasoning

What reasons, if any, do we have for supposing that the time and effort invested by today's philosophers will result in disciplinary-wide philosophical progress? And how much progress, if any, should we expect philosophy to make over the next 500 years? When thinking about these questions, it may seem reasonable to suppose that whatever is true of philosophy's past will also be true of philosophy's future. Stoljar (2017), for instance, argues that philosophy has made a reasonable amount of progress in the past, and that we therefore should expect philosophy to make a reasonable amount of progress in the future.

In this paper, I argue that things are not so straightforward. In order for the induction to hold, making progress in the future cannot be significantly easier or significantly harder than it has been up till now. It is not clear, however, why we should assume that to be the case. Focusing primarily on optimism about philosophical progress, this paper explores ways in which one might challenge or defend the induction from past to future progress.

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How to evaluate decisions in hindsight

Evaluating whether a decision was right or wrong in hindsight often provokes controversy. Some believe that we should try and fully inhabit the perspective of the past when assessing whether an act was right or wrong; others believe we should judge past actions from our present perspective. I argue that we can avoid unnecessary contention by understanding the pragmatics and semantics of the normative language. I argue that the meaning of "should" is sensitive to a contextually given body of information and show how this body of information is supplied by a context. This account predicts that there are certain cases where we should let present concerns colour our retrospective judgements of past actions and cases where we shouldn't. I draw some lessons on how to avoid conceptual and moral mistakes when evaluating actions in hindsight. I show that my account of "should" provides ample room for substantive moral disagreement and moral progress.

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Agnosticism About Artificial Consciousness

Could a future AI have conscious experiences? The recent literature maintains that this question can – and must – be answered scientifically. According to their Evidentialist ideal, claims about artificial consciousness ought to be based not on intuition, dogma, or speculation but on solid scientific evidence. Moreover, government policy and industry standards must be guided by whatever the science tells us about the prospects of artificial consciousness.

I argue that such evidence is hard to come by and that the only justifiable stance on the prospects of artificial consciousness is agnosticism. In the current debate, the main division is between biological views that are sceptical of artificial consciousness and functional views that are sympathetic to it. I argue that both camps make the same mistake of overestimating what the evidence tells us.

Scientific insights into consciousness have been achieved through the study of conscious organisms. Although this has enabled cautious assessments of consciousness in various creatures, extending this to AI faces serious obstacles. 'Theory heavy' approaches make unwarranted claims about the scope of their preferred theory. And 'theory light' approaches make unwarranted claims about the validity of their preferred markers of consciousness.

AI thus presents consciousness researchers with a dilemma: either reach a verdict on artificial consciousness but violate Evidentialism; or respect Evidentialism but offer no verdict on the prospects of artificial consciousness. The dominant trend in the literature has been to take the first option while purporting to follow the scientific evidence. I argue that if we truly follow the evidence, we must take the second option and adopt agnosticism. I reflect on what this means for 'science-based policy' and argue that consciousness science can still play a legitimate role in guiding government and industry.

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Why does Russell hold his Principle of Acquaintance?

My aim in this paper is to explore Russell's reasons for holding his Principle of Acquaintance: his claim that acquaintance with an object is required in order for that object to be a constituent of judgement. Does Russell have an argument for this Principle? What is this argument? I will spend most of my time arguing against a fairly popular reading of Russell: that he holds his Principle of Acquaintance because he thinks that there is some substantive epistemic constraint on thought, one that only acquaintance can allow us to meet.

I discuss three such possible epistemic constraints here: that thought about an object requires either (i) knowledge of what an object is; (ii) knowledge of the identity of an object; or (iii) knowledge of the existence of an object. I argue that it is a mistake to think that Russell holds his Principle of Acquaintance because he thinks that acquaintance gives us the above sorts of knowledge of objects. Instead, I will argue that Russell has a simple regress argument in favour of the Principle. I also argue that the special

epistemic position we enjoy, with respect to the typical objects of acquaintance, has much more to do with the nature of these objects themselves, than it has to do with the acquaintance relation. As part of this argument, I recommend a functionalist understanding of Russell's notion of sense data.

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Higher-Order Evidence Against (Many) Conspiracy Theories

Philosophers and academics disagree about whether conspiracy theories are always irrational to believe in or not. Generalists say that they are, but particularists say they are not. Particularists often use the example of Watergate or the Gunpowder Plot as conspiracy theories that are rational to believe in. As a consequence, they argue, we should evaluate each conspiracy theory on a case-by-case basis to determine which are rationally permissible theories and which are not.

In this paper, I argue that we can be particularists while denying that we should evaluate each conspiracy theory on a case-by-case basis. To do this, I suggest that many conspiracy theories share two features that, when possessed, give us higher-order evidence about our first-order evidence related to the theory. These are highly powerful and intelligent conspirators trying to act in secret. I argue that these two features make it likely that the epistemic environment surrounding the conspiracy is bad. Therefore, we should not rely on any evidence gathered from those environments. Instead, we should stick with our antecedent beliefs and wait for expert or insider testimony to be verified through trusted sources.

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Imagination and Two Contents of Desire

Nanay (2023) has argued that mental imagery is constitutive of desire, claiming that to desire something is to mentally represent its fulfillment through imagery, which plays a crucial role in sustaining the desire. In my paper, I challenge Nanay's argument and propose a more nuanced view which maintains that there is relevant connection between desire and imaginings but that such imaginings are not confined to mental imagery. I also argue that the content of such imaginings is not always constitutive of desire. Instead, they typically emerge as a response to desire and, over time, form its secondary content.

The primary content of desire is given by its satisfaction condition: the agent wants a specific state of affairs, P, to be realized. However, as the agent begins to imagine the fulfillment of P, a second layer of desire emerges. When the agent vividly imagines the realization of P, the content of that imagination, Q, is something the agent also desires, thereby becoming the secondary content of desire. Secondary content may often dominate the primary content. For instance, if the agent comes to feel more strongly about Q than about P, it is plausible that they desire Q more intensely than P. The agent's dispositions to act may still be oriented primarily towards P, their original goal, but the strength of desire may be determined primarily by the representation of Q.

This conceptualization of desire highlights a dynamic relationship between initial goals and subsequent imaginative elaborations, providing a flexible framework to account for how desires evolve over time. It also allows us to analyse what the strength of desire amounts to in a novel way, giving a crucial role to desire's imaginative elaborations.

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Which epistemological evidence for the idea of universal grammar?

The idea of universal grammar as it has been developed in the framework of generative linguistics is commonly understood as an innate type of knowledge of the universal principles which structure sentences of each human language. This idea has been largely criticized in linguistics, cognitive sciences, and philosophy. Nevertheless, I argue that two major epistemological issues need still to be addressed: the epistemological status of the idea of universal grammar, particularly whether it is a hypothesis of heuristic

paragigm; its epistemological soundness (conceptual clarity and coherence) and evidence (by contrast with concurring theoretical models).

First, I show that the idea of universal grammar is often characterized as a hypothesis which aims at explaining a series of facts related to language acquisition and structure (Dąbrowska 2015). Nevertheless, I argue that this type of argument rests on supposed facts that are established as such in a particular heuristic paradigm, that of universal grammar, characterized by two assumptions, namely modular nativism and universalism. The idea that universal grammar is a heuristic paradigm allows to explain the existence of concurring theoretical models, particularly from cognitive linguistics (Tomasello 1995) and linguistic typology (Evans & Levinson 2009), which deny the facts themselves on which the idea of universal grammar rests.

Second, I argue that the above-mentioned assumptions presuppose a form of linguistic universality. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether this form of universality must be understood as an *a priori* form of knowledge of universal syntactic structures or as a general innate linguistic capacity. I argue that this ambiguity rests on two different possible models for understanding universal grammar, a representational model (Goodman 1969; Cowie 1999; Laurence & Margolis 2001) and a neurobiological model (Chomsky 1968; 2002). Their epistemological mutual relations and compatibility must still be investigated.

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Calling Imagination to Arms: how a decision-maker imagines

Rational agents employ imagination to attain their practical ends. The corresponding normative question is how a rational agent ought to imagine. In this talk, I address the preliminary question of this inquiry - What do we mean when we say a decision-maker 'imagines'? I present the special case of high-stakes decision-making under uncertainty - the use of a 'mental map' by a military commander in Clausewitz's (2018/1832) account of Ortssinn. I put forth that to say that the commander imagines is to mean that she constructs a mental representation of the field, the part of the world that she believes she can affect through her agency. I further show how domain-specific normative requirements give rise to the imagistic character of a commander's imagining. To generalise, I make a case that this mental representation is an instance of epistemic representation. Employing Salis and Frigg's (2020) account of scientific imagination, I argue that mental imagery is not necessary for instrumental imagining and the same sense of 'imagine' applies in the decision-making contexts involving factors without sensory correlates.

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A Kantian Approach to Scientific Understanding

Scientific understanding is a central issue of contemporary philosophy of science. There are three main accounts of scientific understanding, namely "explanationism," "manipulationism," and "knowledgism." First, advocates for 'explanationism' argue that scientific understanding is, in essence, the correct scientific explanation (Hempel, 1965; Khalifa, 2013; Strevens, 2013). Second, defenders of "manipulationism" assert that scientific understanding involves a specific ability of a cognitive agent to implement manipulation of certain mental representations of phenomena (de Regt & Dieks, 2005; Wilkenfeld, 2013); Third, adherents for 'knowledgism' contend that understanding refers to someone who has well-connected knowledge of certain phenomenon (Kelp, 2015; Bird 2020). However, each of the three arguments remains unsatisfactory. As for the "explanationism," on the one hand, it relies heavily on scientific theories and is so overintellectualized that normal people can hardly ever achieve scientific understanding; on the other hand, protesters like Peter Lipton propose four types of understanding without explanation, including the understanding of tacit causes, of necessity, of possibility, and of unification (Lipton, 2009, p.43), explanationists have no satisfactory answer to it; Then, for the "manipulationism," the reference of manipulation is too inclusive which results in obscurity (Kelp, 2015). Lastly, the "knowledgism" traps in the definition of knowledge and still has no effective solution to the argument of understanding without explanation. I contend a Kantian account of understanding will shed light on the recent discussion of scientific understanding. In the context of Kant's work, understanding is the spontaneity of cognition through concepts and, in general, is the faculty of rules. The power of judgment

is the faculty of subsuming under rules with twelve categories (Kant, 1998, A131). Since Kant emphasizes the pure interaction between representations and cognition, concepts are spontaneous, so with the Kantian approach, it seems very promising to overcome the difficulties confronted by the three camps, such as theory-based problems, solutions for understanding without explanation, and so on.

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The Form of Agency

Philosophers often think agency is essentially connected with rationality, intention, or control (Davidson, 2001; Velleman, 1992). However, Minimalists argue that agency is just the power to cause a change; acids and boulders are agents too (Alvarez & Hyman, 1998). Many philosophers treat Minimalism as a wild outlier, assuming its falsity without argument. My paper has two main aims: to show that Minimalism is actually the theory to beat, and then to try to beat it. Firstly, I provide a new argument for Minimalism's attractiveness as the default view of agency for anyone engaged in the popular and plausible Creature Construction approach to agency (Bratman, 2001; Shepherd, 2021). If agency were just the power of causality, we could then see different forms of agency – biological, intentional, and rational – as causal and psychological complexifications of a basic power of causality. This promises a naturalistic and unifying picture of agency's place in nature. The challenge to Minimalism's opponents is to give a principled reason for thinking we must accept that agency begins somewhere 'in the middle' of the scale of possible options. Despite this, I argue that Minimalism fails because agency can be manifested in more ways than the power of causality can: they have different shapes. This is because agency can be manifested in refraining, but when one refrains from f-ing, one causes no change. Rather, one intentionally does not cause a change. Since agency can be manifested by both causing changes and refraining from causing them, and the power of causality can only be manifested in causing changes, agency is not the power of causality: Minimalism is false. I end by suggesting that since it is probably only animals which can refrain, agency is likely a distinctively animal phenomenon.

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Block's new argument for the nonconceptuality of perception

In his recent *The Border Between Seeing and Thinking* (2024), Ned Block argues on novel empirical grounds that conscious color perception is nonpropositional. Because, Block argues, conscious color perception in 6-11-month-olds is demonstrably not constitutively conceptual, neither is color perception in general constitutively conceptual. This in turn entails color perception is in general also not propositional (given Block's preferred usage, on which a representational state is propositional just in case it is a syntactic-like structure with conceptual states as elements). In this paper, I examine the first step of Block's argument.

Not only, I argue, are mechanisms (cone-opponency) thought not to underpin color consciousness thought (even by Block) to explain relevant data, but there is better evidence that subjects with cerebral achromatopsia (sc. black-and-white color-blindness), who also have, and skilfully exploit, cone-opponency mechanisms, exhibit color constancy than there is that infants do.

This warrants thinking infants are not aware of color until they acquire color concepts. Which, paired with independent argumentation for conceptualism (Connolly, 2011; Mandik, 2012; Mandelbaum, 2017) encourages we retain commitment to the constitutive conceptuality of perception.

I conclude with comments on the upshot of the above for the format of color-perception. The evidence does not support color perceptions are not (sometimes) iconic representations. Neither, though, does it support color perceptions are propositional. Instead, it is left open that color-perception may sometimes be iconic, and sometimes propositional. If, though, it is (at a time) propositional, then it is not (at that time) iconic. I close by sketching how, by thinking of the relevant vehicles as vectors in color-postreceptoral activation space, this can be understood to work.

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Large Language Models and Testimonial Injustice

Recently, testimonial injustice (TI) has been applied to AI systems, such as decision-making-support systems and large-language-models (LLMs) within healthcare, the COMPAS recidivism algorithm, and generative AI models. Extant accounts of algorithmic TI identify the morally problematic epistemic issue as being when the user of an AI system mistakenly assumes the processes underlying an AI system to be superior to the capacities of another human, and in doing so, the user assigns a credibility excess to an AI system and deflates the credibility of a human such that they're assigned a credibility deficit – call these Mistaken Assumption Accounts (e.g., Walmsley, 2023; Symons & Alvarado, 2022). This paper focuses on how algorithmic TI might emerge in quotidian uses of LLMs.

In the pars destruens, I argue that Mistaken Assumption Accounts operate on an unsatisfactorily broad construal of identity prejudice (viz. "being a computer" vs "being a human"), leading to an inability to account for the intersectional nature of identity-based oppression and extensional inadequacy.

In the pars construens, I provide an alternative which fares better: Undue Acknowledgement as Testifier. I argue that (i) when an LLM is taken to be a genuine knower of minimally equal standing to humans in an epistemic community, an LLM is assigned a credibility excess such that a human suffers a credibility deficit, (ii) these credibility assessments are driven by implicit comparative credibility assessments based on the anthropomorphised "identity" of an LLM, and (iii) identity prejudice influences these credibility assessments. To achieve this, I draw upon work in human-computer-interaction and feminist science and technology studies to show how user-experience design and the current social imaginary of AI contributes to algorithmic TI. Consequently, this paper shifts the current focus in the literature from a discussion of how the proposed conditions for TI obtain emerge from issues of bias within training data or the opacity of AI systems, to how the interactive relationships between humans and LLMs enable TI.

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James Baldwin's Critique of Redirectional Forgiveness

The work of African-American author, essayist and activist James Baldwin contains philosophically rich conceptions of such notions as forgiveness, guilt and atonement. In this paper, I discuss Baldwin's powerful critique (1985b) of what I will call *redirectional forgiveness*. I introduce this new notion mainly through Richard Wright's novel *Native Son*. Wright was one of Baldwin's early idols and *Native Son* a novel which Baldwin thought important enough to write several critical essays about.

In *Native Son*, Bigger, a poor and black teen, commits a crime but is forgiven because his actions are believed to be a consequence of the racism he suffers under. The person who forgives directs his moral upset at systemic racism of his society, choosing to blame those who perpetuate this racism instead of Bigger. I also mention two simpler examples before setting out a provisional definition of redirectional forgiveness.

Baldwin wrote a powerful critique of the forgiveness in *Native Son*, and thereby highlighted a problem with redirectional forgiveness generally. I suggest we can make sense of Baldwin's critique by framing it in terms of Strawson's famous 'objective attitude'. What Baldwin objected to, is that Bigger is treated objectively (in Strawson's sense), namely as someone who is so warped by their environment that they become barely human. In Baldwin's words (1985b):

[Bigger] is the monster created by the American republic, the present awful sum of generations of oppression; but to say that he is a monster is to fall into the trap of making him subhuman.

I close by suggesting that Baldwin wouldn't have opposed redirectional forgiveness completely, but that we must be careful not to let our critical lenses—those through which we see people's choices and choice spaces shaped by their material conditions and oppressive ideologies—dehumanise those affected.

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From Endoxa to Systematization: The Role of Nutritive Soul

In the first book of De Anima (DA I), Aristotle announces that he plans to investigate the definition of the soul under the scope of the study of Nature (phusis), with the expectation and pre-assumption that the concept of "soul" (Psukhe) could undertake the role of being the principle (arkhe) of living being. As obscure and puzzling as this task is, Aristotle starts this investigation by first examining the predecessors' theory of soul, which is known nowadays as "Endoxa," and then, starting from the book 2 of De Anima (DA II), the systematization of the soul is exemplified, with the well-known division of three different parts of the soul, namely the nutritive, perceptive, and intellectual.

Whether Aristotle is loyal and neutral historically is controversial and debatable. His own systematized theory of the soul has also been a challenging yet appealing task. However, what would be more intriguing is, how the endoxa and the systematic part are inherently connected? What problem was at hand, and how did Aristotle philosophize?

In this paper, I present a perspective of understanding the connection between Endoxa and systematization, within the scope between DA I and DA II.1-4. By reconstructing the problem of inseparability between soul and body, I argue that the notion of the "Nutritive Soul" is an Aristotelian invention, and that this invention is a vital conceptual tool that enables Aristotle to move from historical reports to a systematic construction of a soul theory.

Also, by tackling both theory and experience in the dialectic with predecessors, plants, which were not mentioned from the beginning of DA I, are included in the whole picture of living beings.

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The Challenges to "the Banality of Evil" and Kant's Religion

In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt presents Adolf Eichmann as a symbol of the banality of evil. The fact that the specific issue he is involved with – the Holocaust – is appalling does not mean that he aims at anything with depth. This paper examines Arendt's theory of the banality of evil in the light of two objections and Kant's theory of radical evil.

Section 1 explains Hannah Arendt's account of the banality of evil. The banality arises from the role that contingency plays in evil: the contingency of social environment and individual constitution. Although Arendt makes it clear that the banality of evil is only a lesson she draws from a specific event - the trial of Adolf Eichmann - I will suggest that this should be a general explanation of evil, because Arendt's arguments leave no conceptual room for an alternative. In her interpretation, the intimate relationship between thinking and the good gives the good a depth that evil, qua non-good, cannot reach.

Two objections will be articulated in section 2. One objection is based on the facticity of radical evil: evil can derive its depth from origins other than thinking, and it is the good, qua non-evil, that does not have access to these origins. The other objection challenges the exclusively intimate relationship between thinking and the good: thinking can invest in evil in a similar or parallel way to how it invests in the good.

In section 3, I will argue that, in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant's theory of radical evil not only accommodates the facticity of radical evil and the contribution of thinking to evil, but also builds upon it. Therefore, if the two objections to the banality of evil are valid, this leads us to Kant's position in Religion.

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Survivors' Testimony and Epistemic Agency Revisited

Existing research on epistemic injustice in rape cases focuses on how distorted social understandings of rape systematically undermine victims' credibility and prevent them from applying the concept of rape to their experiences. In this paper, I explore a different possibility: a victim could be wronged not by having her testimony disbelieved but by having her perspective on her experience ignored.

My central case is Susan Brison's account of her experience of sexual assault. Brison writes that during the testimony collection process, her testimony about the physical facts of what happened during the assault was believed, and she was considered to be a reliable witness to the incident. However, she was not considered to be a reliable witness of a gender-based crime that was deeply rooted in power imbalances. The criminal system did not offer her the chance to provide her testimony in the latter sense.

To analyse the epistemic obstacles encountered by Brison, I draw on Elisabeth Camp's notion of "perspective," understood as a certain way of seeing the world, a cluster of open-ended dispositions to interpret, evaluate, and inquire. In Brison's case, the information she provided was accepted, but not the way she interpreted and weighed it. The inferences she disposed to draw and the further inquiry she inclined to take were never solicited: her perspective on her experience was unjustly pre-empted from the discourse.

By highlighting Brison's case, I aim to demonstrate that when survivors speak out about their experience, they often intend more than to provide a bundle of information; they try to offer a perspective, a certain way of looking at their experience. Respecting their epistemic agency, therefore, requires more than treating them as reliable informants. It demands engaging with their perspectives and seeing the world through their eyes. This shift could be useful for deepening the understanding of epistemic agency and the virtuous listening of survivor's testimony.

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Rethinking the Perception-Cognition Border: Olfaction as a Challenge to Format-Based Approaches

In this paper, I challenge the format approach of drawing the perception-cognition border by arguing that it fails to accommodate to sensory modalities other than vision, particularly olfaction. To distinguish between cognition and perception, one major kind of approach is the format-based approach. According to the format-based approach, the key differences between perception and cognition lies in the format of their representations: perceptual states are iconic, while cognitive states are discursive or symbolic. One notable version of format-based approach is recently proposed by Ned Block. Block argues that perception is fully iconic, nonconceptual and non-propositional, but cognition does not require these features.

I argue against the format-based approaches by questioning the role of iconicity as a defining character of perception. Specifically, I focus on Block's version of iconicity: Analog Tracking and Mirroring (ATM). ATM holds that differences in representations will track and mirror environmental differences in a degree-sensitive way. I argue that this criterion fails to capture the border of cognition and perception when applied to olfaction.

To support this claim, I present three key challenges: 1) the irregular and non-linear mapping of odors onto molecular structures, 2) the tight connection between cognition and olfactory perception, and 3) the multisensory nature of olfaction. Based on these challenges, I further argue that olfactory perception is fundamentally non-analogue and non-iconic due to a) its distinct temporal structure of olfaction and b) the inability to describe odors using simple variables, which poses problems for broader accounts of iconicity. Finally, I examine why olfactory and visual perception are radically different in format and why it is dangerous to treat visual perception as a paradigm case for perception.

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A non-consequentialist thought on collective impact cases

In collective impact cases, a sufficient number of people acting collectively leads to a significant impact, but no individual action seems to make a difference to a morally relevant outcome caused by people's collective action. Given the apparent causal inefficacy of individual action, it is unclear what kind of moral considerations count in favor of a relevant moral requirement.

In this paper, I offer a proposal based on a neglected type of consideration. I draw on the non-consequentialist idea that the fact that a certain type of action is required has significance for us. Relying on this idea, I argue that the fact that a relevant type of action is required in collective impact cases confers on individuals a valuable status of a pursuer of a good life with a higher degree. This higher status can be a morally relevant consideration for a relevant requirement in collective action cases.

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Debugging the Turing test: Towards a Resource-Relative Conception of Intelligence

The "Turing test conception of intelligence" (Turing 1950, Block 1981) suggests understanding intelligence as an ability to produce certain types of behavior. Block (1981) famously argues that such an ability can never be sufficient for intelligence because sufficiently strong, but intuitively unintelligent computers may be able to produce any finite pattern of behavior by brute-force computation. In this paper, I propose a revised version of the Turing test that evades Block's objection. I suggest that we understand intelligence as an ability to produce a certain type of behavior given a certain amount of computational resources. Relativizing intelligence to computational resources in this way excludes Block's brute-force systems from qualifying as intelligent as they are inherently immensely resource-intensive. Beyond blocking Block's objection, I offer two additional arguments to independently motivate the relativization of intelligence to computational resources. First, I argue that the computational efficiency required by the revised Turing test tracks a certain type of sophistication that we intuitively associate with intelligence. Indeed, it is the lack of precisely this type of sophistication that grounds the intuitive unintelligence of Block's brute-force computer. Second, I argue that abilities in general are resource-relative – whether an agent is able to do something always depends on the amount of resources they would require to do it. Therefore, if intelligence is understood as an ability, then we should expect it to be resource-relative. One important upshot of the proposed conception is its application to modern systems of Artificial Intelligence such as Large Language Models. The intelligence of such systems on the proposed conception will depend not merely on the nature of their outputs, but also on the computational resources they require to produce them. This would affect the way we compare such systems to one another, and to humans with respect to intelligence.

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Higher-Order Evidence as Unspecific Evidence

It is a popular view among formal epistemologists that unspecific evidence requires imprecise credence. Henderson (2022) has recently proposed that imprecise credence is also required by higher-order evidence. I think Henderson is on the right track. Unfortunately, she says little about why the two kinds of evidence happen to require the same treatment. Is it a coincidence?

I believe the answer is no. Higher-order evidence, as it is typically presented, requires the same treatment as unspecific evidence does because the former is just a special case of the latter. With the reducibility of higher-order evidence to unspecific evidence in mind, I show that the intuition that lopsided higher-order evidence requires the simple increasing or decreasing of credence is mistaken. What lopsided higher-order evidence requires is to make one's credence imprecise in a particular direction.