

"The recognition of the existence of another mental life could be expressed by the judgment, "This is a living being"... We immediately perceive the presence of a mind, but we often fail to discern anything further with regard to it; we are directly aware that the fellow creatures we meet in the street are human beings and not walking mannekins, but we hardly see more than this.'(Duddington p.176)

"My object...is to maintain that our knowledge of other minds is as direct and immediate as our knowledge of physical things." (Duddington p.147)

"Perceiving a mind certainly does not lay bare before us all its thoughts, feelings, wishes, and so on, but neither does perceiving a table reveal to us the atoms and molecules that compose it."(Duddington p.170)

"We do not first know bodies and then infer that they are animated bodies; the presence of mental life is revealed to us along with the qualities of shape, colour, movement, and so on that characterise the body. This does not imply anything so absurd as the assertion that a six-months-old baby knows its mother's mind as distinct from her body; but it does imply that in so far as it is aware of its mother at all, it is aware of her as qualitatively different from the perambulator she is pushing." ((Duddington p.164)

*Mill's question:* "By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe... that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds?"

*Mill's answer:* "they have bodies like mine, that exhibit 'acts, and outwards signs' that 'in my own case I know to be caused by feelings'". (1865 [1872: 243])

"A child of two attaches intelligible meaning to the phrases, "mother is angry" or "mother is pleased," and correctly interprets her expressive behaviour. Are we to assume, then, that at that tender age the child has already observed its own feelings of anger and pleasure, its own expression of these feelings, and has compared the angry tone of its mother's voice, or her smile, with the sound of its own little voice when angry, and the look in its own face when pleased? This is such a ridiculous supposition, that no wonder psychologists do not like being questioned too closely as to the age at which we are supposed to make the momentous inference that saves us from being solipsists." (Duddington p.160)

"[H]uman affections would not be there to frustrate the demands of if it were true that other minds were for us merely inferred entities. How could one love or hate "in uncertain supposition of we know not what"? (Duddington p.162)

"When we are confronted with the complex reality that we call a human being, we may be as directly and immediately aware of the mental as of the physical aspect of it." (Duddington p.165)

"The look of misery in a fellow-creature's face wrings my heart with pity just because it is his suffering that is revealed to me, and no amount of sophistication will hide it from me. The pain of someone you love seems to blot out the rest of the world from your view; it will not allow you to forget its existence for a moment, and your cognitive attitude to it is exactly the same as to an obtrusive object of sense perception." (Duddington p.171)

"the differentia of responsive or animate objects as compared with inanimate is just the presence of psychical life." (Duddington p.163-4)

"no amount of perception, on its own, implicates awareness of another first-person perspective, another 'I'" (Eilan 2025, p.299)

"A solution to the problem of other minds that tells me that, contrary to first appearances, the behavioral evidence I encounter in the outside world really is sufficient for an extremely probable inference to the sentience of others, could still seem unsatisfying for at least two reasons. It seems a distortion of my

actual relations to other people to characterize them as based on a very probable inference to their sentience. Rather, I experience my relations to other people as somehow more ‘immediate’ or more ‘engaged’ than that, and I normally hope that their own relations to me are similarly ‘immediate’ or ‘engaged’. Secondly, the idea that a form of inference to the best explanation could be a satisfying response to solipsism loses touch with the Cartesian starting point that set the terms of the problem. We began with a sense of disparity between the indubitability that I am presented with in the cogito and what I can be presented with in the experience of other creatures around me.” (Moran p.3?)

“It would seem then that we have a stronger belief in the existence of other minds than in the existence of material things. No one in his senses doubts either proposition in practice; but the philosopher can and does doubt the latter in his study, whilst, even in that chaste seclusion, he seems to be unable or unwilling to doubt the former. I do not think that this difference can be ascribed either to the fact that the evidence for the existence of other minds is more cogent than the evidence for the existence of matter, or to the fact that we have a stronger instinctive belief in the former than in the latter. I think that the real explanation is that certain strong emotions are bound up with the belief in other minds, and that no very strong emotions are bound up with the belief in matter. The position of a philosopher with no-one but himself to lecture to, and no hope of an audience, would be so tragic that the human mind naturally shrinks from contemplating such a possibility. It is our business, however, to stifle our emotions for the present, and to follow the argument whithersoever it may lead.” (Broad 1925, 317– 18, Quoted by Eilan)

“If the Other’s existence is not a vain conjecture, or pure fiction, it is because there is something like a cogito that applies to it.” (Sartre, 2018 p.345)

“Descartes did not prove his existence. Because in fact I have always known that I existed, I have never ceased to practice the cogito. Similarly, my resistance to solipsism – a resistance that is as lively as that which an attempt to doubt the cogito would arouse – proves that I have always known that the Other existed” (Sartre, 2018, p.345)

“[T]he ‘problem of solipsism’ cannot be understood by the philosopher himself either as a debate with an ordinary philosophical opponent or as an encounter with a madman, but rather as some kind of trouble with himself. The philosopher has to take himself to understand the path to solipsism well enough to get the problem started, and he has to have the ‘reef’ in view well enough to make sure to avoid it, but at the same time he will not be satisfied simply to avoid it. Rather his disquiet will not be relieved unless he can also say and show that the reef was never there to begin with, because after all he was never really tempted by madness.” (Moran, p.2?)

“Why doesn’t the experience of the Look depend on a logically prior grasp of the Other, rather than providing it without presuppositions?” (Nagel, p.167).

### *Cogito*

Engagement in: (1) A particular act of conscious thinking;

Judgment: (2) I am thinking

Judgment: (3) I exist

### *Social Cogito*

Engagement in: (1) Seeing human eyes extendedly directed at me.

Engagement in: (2) A feeling of self-consciousness (or shame, pride, embarrassment...)

Judgment: (3) The other is looking at me and has made me feel self-conscious.

Judgment: (4) Other minds exist.

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