Kant’s political philosophy might seem an unlikely resource for theorizing our rights and obligations in relation to climate injustice. A political philosophy based on defending individual freedom rather than promoting welfare or some other conception of the good, that opens with private property and private contract, and that seems to treat the world and its resources as fundamentally available to be made into private parcels, subject to private control in the pursuit of private purposes, might be thought to be the source of the problem. Angela Breitenbach argues that Kant’s practical philosophy is less individualist than it is often taken to be, and includes resources for thinking about our individual obligations with respect to the climate emergency. My response takes up Breitenbach’s idea that Kant takes our ethical obligations to be indeterminate without the right political institutions. I take this to get at something crucial for understanding Kant’s complete position as well as important for thinking about the climate emergency. I argue that on Kant’s systemic approach to individual freedom, it is confused to view private property, markets and market actors such as business corporations, as providing starting limits, ‘interference’ in which is in tension with individual freedom. On the contrary, the structure of his position makes climate justice a necessary background condition of individual freedom.