Value monists and pluralists disagree how many dimensions of value there fundamentally are. A semantics for evaluative language should be able to explain our use of words like ‘good’ to state and debate monist and pluralist positions. It’s unclear just what kind of semantics may best achieve this. For example, how can ‘good’ be used to state monist positions about value if it’s semantically associated with a multidimensional scale or pluralist positions if it’s semantically associated with a unidimensional scale? This paper articulates the problem of dimensional variability, describes two solutions, and offers a partial defence of one of them.
My topic here is semantic neutrality. In what interesting ways can language – or the meanings of particular expressions – be, or fail to be, neutral? Talk of neutrality might be developed in different directions. I critically discuss some different conceptions. Some of the discussion will concern the idea that it is an important desideratum on a semantic theory that it respect a particular kind of neutrality constraint.
Pekka Väyrynen is Professor of Moral Philosophy at University of Leeds. His work is in metanormative theory, primarily on issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language as applied to reasons, oughts, and values of various kinds. He is currently writing a book about normative explanation
Matti Eklund is Chair Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University. He works mainly on topics in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and metaethics. He is the author of two monographs, Choosing Normative Concepts and Alien Structure: Language and Reality, both published by Oxford University Press.
