The local organiser from Birmingham is are Professor Nikk Effingham and Dr Jussi Suikkanen.
For full details and to participate in the conference, and for updates on the format and program, please see the official conference website.
Christabel is a PhD student in the philosophy department at UCL, specialising in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Her main projects are situated within the philosophy of time, with special reference to the problem of change, exploring the implications of perdurance-style solutions to this problem and their impact other metaphysical questions, such as material constitution, temporary intrinsics, and modal predication. Her current research focuses on how objects differ from themselves: across space, over time, and according to different counterfactual scenarios. She posits spatiotemporal and modal parts, offering an analogy between extension in space-time and across possible worlds. Christabel is currently a graduate TA at UCL and LSE, and is also teaching philosophy classes atHMP Lewes as part of MM McCabe’s TeachingPhilosophy In Prisons initiative. In the course of teaching, she has become passionately interested in critical pedagogies, and has given talks and led discussion groups for the UCL MAP chapter and departmental staff about how the critical theory that surrounds our current pedagogical practices might be implemented in philosophy classrooms.
Frederik J. Andersen is a PhD student in the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews, where he is supervised by Greg Restall, Francesco Berto, and Jessica Brown. His main research interests are in epistemology and logic. In June 2024 he will officially graduate with his doctoral project on Logical Disagreement. Later in 2024 he is expected to publish a co-authored entry on the same topic with Professor Anandi Hattiangadi for the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Oxford University Press. Before coming to St Andrews, he obtained degrees in logic and philosophy at MA-level in Amsterdam and Copenhagen, respectively. Since January 2024 Frederik has also been working as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Copenhagen.
Jacopo is a Doctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Oslo. He holds a BA and an MA in Philosophy from the University of Padua, Italy. He is currently working on generative approaches to intensional entities, such as properties and propositions, under the supervision of Øystein Linnebo. His research primarily focuses on the application of these theories to formal semantics, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics, with a special interest in the philosophical foundations of the generation process, by means of the notions of grounding and metaphysical dependence.
Wouter Cohen recently finished his PhD at the University of Cambridge and is currentlya postdoctoral researcher at the University of Manchester funded by an AnalysisStudentship. His PhD thesis is about existence concepts and negative existentials in the works of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. His current post-doc project is about a disagreement between Carnap and Popper on the demarcation between science and metaphysics. Besides history of analytic philosophy, he is also interested in(meta)metaphysics, philosophy of music and logic. Before starting the PhD atCambridge, Wouter was at the University of Amsterdam for the Logic Year, completed an MPhil in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and received a BA in Philosophy and a BA in Musicology from Utrecht University.
Lauren is a PhD student at Princeton University in the Classical Philosophy Program. Before starting at Princeton, she completed an MSt in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Oxford and an MA in Philosophy at Tufts University. Lauren is primarily interested in ancient Greek ethics and moral psychology, especially in Plato and Aristotle. She also has interests in contemporary moral philosophy and philosophy of religion
Joe is currently finishing his MPhil in Philosophy at UCL as a Keeling Scholar in AncientPhilosophy. Prior to this he studied for the MStin Ancient Philosophy and BA in PPE, both at theUniversity of Oxford. He has broad interests in ancient ethical thought, particularly moral psychology, the place of the emotions in ethical theory, and moral development, as well as in philosophy as a written form. Joe also has interests in contemporary philosophy in similar areas
Intuitively, it would be wrong to create a person whose life would be worth living, when the alternative is to create a numerically different person whose life would be better. “The Non-Identity Problem” is, roughly, the problem of explaining why this would be wrong, given that it would be worse for no one. Many believe that Scanlonian contractualism solves the Non-Identity Problem since, according to that theory, whether a choice is wrong is insensitive to the numerical identities of the individuals it stands to affect. I show this is a mistake. In the relevant respect, numerical non-identity is beside the point of the Non-Identity Problem. What generates the problem is instead the apparent absence of a different type of non-identity, which I call “standpoint non-identity”: whatever we choose, whoever comes into existence will instantiate one and the same standpoint, namely that of someone for whom our choice has not made things worse. I argue contractualism cannot solve the Non-Identity Problem, properly understood.
Despite the apparent difference between aversion and desire as two separate ways in which we can be motivated, a notorious passage in De AnimaIII.7 seems to identify their respective faculties, claiming that they are ‘the same but different in being.’ In this paper I defend a new way to understand the identity of the faculty of aversion and the faculty of desire that takes inspiration from the two-way rational capacities, such as medicine, that enable two contrary activities. I suggest that aversion and desire are analogously two aspects of a single two-way conative capacity that can be active as either pursuit or avoidance. This interpretation clarifies the sense in which aversion and desire are ‘the same but different in being’ while also making sense of Aristotle’s tendency to compare pursuit and avoidance to affirmation and denial.
Owen is a PhD candidate, Global Priorities Fellow and Canada Graduate Scholar in theDepartment of Philosophy at Queen’s University in Canada. In 2022, he was a visiting doctoral researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, and an early-career fellow at the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Institute. By invitation of the Global Priorities Institute, he returned to Oxford in 2023 as a visiting scholar. Owen’s research lies at the intersections of ethics and political philosophy. At present, his two main research projects concern the ethics of, respectively, far-future-affecting policy and social and political membership.
Zack Brants is a PhD candidate at the University of California, San Diego. His work focuses on Ancient Greek Philosophy, with an emphasis on the role of pleasure and pain in Plato and Aristotle’s moral psychology. He is currently writing a dissertation that articulates the essential roles that pleasant and painful anticipation play in Plato and Aristotle’s theories of embodied action, motivation, and emotion. Both philosophers, he claims, take a large part of moral education and the cultivation of virtue to consist in the proper development of such future-oriented affective states. Zack is also interested in the importance of affective anticipation in Epicurean and Stoic thought, for instance in underlying the alleged ability of philosophy to modify our emotions.
The Aristotelian Society, founded in 1880, is a charity registered in the United Kingdom (no. 254021).
© The Aristotelian Society 2021. All rights reserved.
