Abstract

I argue that a pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain. I then illustrate the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for defeating such scepticism. These strategies appeal to associations between metaphysical modality and the following: objective probability, counterfactuals and distinctive explanatory value.

Biography

John Divers is a first-generation University entrant who studied, and subsequently taught, Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and currently holds that position at the University of Leeds. The dominant theme in his published work is modality, including the 2002 book Possible Worlds and (in progress) Necessity After Quine. John is also an Editor of Thought and Director of the Leverhulme Trust Research Project, Thinking Counterfactually - How "Would have been” reveals what is and what must be.

subscribing memberships

Subscribing members receive online access to the Proceedings from 2000 to the most current issue.

Subscribing members also receive the bound, hardcover volume of the latest Proceedings through the post.

Learn more about subscribing memberships with the Aristotelian Society