The Aristotelian Society

The Aristotelian Society

est. 1880

Symposium III

Wakeful Consciousness

Chaired by Henry Taylor (Birmingham)

Matthew Soteriou | 2019 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association | Durham University

Waking Up and Being Conscious

Matthew Soteriou (KCL)

Abstract

This paper addresses the following questions: what account should be given of the state of wakeful consciousness, and what explanatory roles should be assigned to that state? Those questions are taken up after some discussion of the related but distinct question of what it is to be awake. On the view proposed here, in seeking to provide an account of the state of wakeful consciousness one should be aiming to provide an account of a point of view that is associated with the distinctive the form of awareness to which one surfaces when one wakes up. Our specification of that point of view should appeal to the awake subject’s temporal point of view, and the epistemic orientation and agential perspective it embodies. The explanatory roles that can be assigned to the state of wakeful consciousness are the explanatory roles that can be assigned to that point of view.

Biography

Matthew Soteriou is a Professor in Philosophy, and Chair in Philosophy of Mind, at King’s College London. He is the author of Disjunctivism (Routledge 2016), The Mind’s Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action (Oxford University Press, 2013), and co-editor (with Lucy O’Brien) of Mental Actions (Oxford University Press, 2009).

James Stazicker| 2019 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association | Durham University

Waking Up and Being Conscious

James Stazicker (Reading)

Abstract

Being conscious, in the sense in which this state is associated with being awake as opposed to dreaming or sleepwalking, has a distinctive experiential character and epistemic role. The former is reflected in the experience of waking up, the latter in traditional problems about perceptual knowledge. I outline a conception of being wakefully conscious which identifies this state in terms of its role in explaining knowledge about one’s environment and oneself. I suggest that this dual epistemic role may be grounded, in part, in the control of attention. I argue that this conception has some advantages over Matthew Soteriou’s (2019) account of the state in question in terms of a temporal point of view. These advantages are brought out by examining the experience of waking up, a traditional problem about perceptual knowledge, and folk attitudes to sleepwalking and infant consciousness.

Biography

James Stazicker is a Lecturer in Philosophy of Mind and Psychology at King’s College London. He was previously a Bersoff Faculty Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at New York University, and a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He studied Classics at New College, Oxford, before doing an MPhil in Philosophy at University College London, then a PhD in Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. His research focusses on the nature and epistemic roles of consciousness, attention and perception. He has published papers in the philosophy of perception and in interdisciplinary work about the scientific study of consciousness and attention. He also edited The Structure of Perceptual Experience (Wiley 2015). He has run interdisciplinary projects funded by the AHRC, the British Academy, the University of Reading and the University of California, Berkeley. At King’s College London he teaches courses for the Psychology BSc as well as courses for Philosophy degrees.


further info

future joint sessions

XCIV
2020 joint session:
Kent

july 2020

XCV
2021 joint session:
Hertfordshire

july 2021

XCVI
2022 joint session:
TBC

july 2022





supplementary volume




The inaugural address and symposia for the Joint Session are published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, which is published digitally and in hardcover every June. The Supplementary Volume is sent to subscribing members of the Society in categories 4 and 5.

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The 2018 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association | Cardiff University

past conferences

XCII
2018 joint session:
Oxford

6 - 8 july 2018

XCI
2017 joint session:
Edinburgh

14 - 16 july 2017

XC
2016 joint session:
cardiff

8 - 10 july 2016





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