The Aristotelian Society

Normative theory aims to understand the commonalities between ethics, prudence, epistemology, aesthetics, and political philosophy (among others). One central question in normative theory is what is fundamental to the normative. The Reasons First approach holds that normative reasons are fundamental to the normative domain. This view has been challenged by proponents of alternative X-first views such as value, fittingness, and ought. This paper examines the debate about the analysis of normative reasons and argues for a new form of reductive naturalism that analyzes normative reasons in terms of fittingness, ought, and value. I argue that this view is compatible with Reasons First because fittingness and the type of ought and value appealed to are not robustly normative notions. It is also extensionally and explanatorily plausible and thus has much to recommend it on both first-order and second-order grounds.